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POLYBIUS

IV

POLYBIUS

THE HISTORIES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

W. R. PATON

IN SIX VOLUMES

IV

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THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

FRAGMENTA LIBRI IX

I. Ex Prooemio

1 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπιφανέσταται πράξεις τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς προειρημένης ὀλυμπιάδος περιληφθεισῶν καὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς διαστήματος, ὅ φαμεν δεῖν ὀλυμπιάδα νομίζειν, εἰσὶν αὗται· περὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐν δυσὶ βυβλίοις πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν.
2 οὐκ ἀγνοῶ δὲ διότι συμβαίνει τὴν πραγματείαν ἡμῶν ἔχειν αὐστηρόν τι καὶ πρὸς ἓν γένος ἀκροατῶν οἰκειοῦσθαι καὶ κρίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μονοειδὲς
3 τῆς συντάξεως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι συγγραφεῖς σχεδὸν ἅπαντες, εἰ δὲ μή γ', οἱ πλείους, πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς ἱστορίας μέρεσι χρώμενοι πολλοὺς ἐφέλκονται
4 πρὸς ἔντευξιν τῶν ὑπομνημάτων. τὸν μὲν γὰρ φιλήκοον ὁ γενεαλογικὸς τρόπος ἐπισπᾶται, τὸν δὲ πολυπράγμονα καὶ περιττὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ κτίσεις καὶ συγγενείας, καθά που καὶ παρ' Ἐφόρῳ λέγεται, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ περὶ τὰς
5 πράξεις τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων καὶ δυναστῶν. ἐφ' ὃν ἡμεῖς ψιλῶς κατηντηκότες καὶ περὶ τοῦτον πεποιημένοι τὴν ὅλην τάξιν, πρὸς ἓν μέν τι γένος, ὡς προεῖπον, οἰκείως ἡρμόσμεθα, τῷ δὲ πλείονι

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK IX

I. From the Preface

1. These are the principal events included in the above-mentioned Olympiad, that is in the space of four years which we term an Olympiad, and I shall attempt to narrate them in two Books. I am not unaware that my work owing to the uniformity of its composition has a certain severity, and will suit the taste and gain the approval of only one class of reader. For nearly all other writers, or at least most of them, by dealing with every branch of history, attract many kinds of people to the perusal of their works. The genealogical side appeals to those who are fond of a story, and the account of colonies, the foundation of cities, and their ties of kindred, such as we find, for instance, in Ephorus, attracts the curious and lovers of recondite lore, while the student of politics is interested in the doings of nations, cities, and monarchs. As I have confined my attention strictly to these last matters and as my whole work treats of nothing else, it is, as I say, adapted only to one sort of reader, and its

μέρει τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἀψυχαγώγητον παρεσκευά-
6 καμεν τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν. τίνος δὲ χάριν τἄλλα
μέρη τῆς ἱστορίας ἀποδοκιμάσαντες αὐτὰ τὰ
κατὰ τὰς πράξεις προειλάμεθα γράφειν, ἐν ἑτέροις
ἡμῖν εἴρηται διὰ πλειόνων, κεφαλαιωδῶς γε μὴν
οὐδὲν ἐπέχει καὶ νῦν ἐμφάσεως χάριν ὑπομνῆσαι
τοὺς ἀκούοντας.

2 Πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἐξηριθμημένων τά
τε περὶ τὰς γενεαλογίας καὶ μύθους καὶ περὶ τὰς
2 ἀποικίας, ἔτι δὲ συγγενείας καὶ κτίσεις, λοιπὸν
ἢ τὰ ἀλλότρια δεῖ λέγειν ὡς ἴδια τὸν νῦν περὶ
τούτων πραγματευόμενον, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶν αἴ-
σχιστον, ἢ τοῦτο μὴ βουλόμενον προδήλως ματαιο-
πονεῖν, ὑπὲρ τοιούτων ὁμολογοῦντα συντάττεσθαι
καὶ φροντίζειν, ἃ διὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων ἱκανῶς
δεδήλωται καὶ παραδέδοται τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις.
3 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν παρελείφθη τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ
4 πλειόνων ἑτέρων· ὁ δὲ πραγματικὸς τρόπος ἐν-
εκρίθη πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ καινοποιεῖσθαι συν-
εχῶς καὶ καινῆς ἐξηγήσεως δεῖσθαι τῷ μὴ
συμβατὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τὸ τὰς ἐπιγινομένας
5 πράξεις ἡμῖν ἐξαγγεῖλαι, δεύτερον δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ
πάντων ὠφελιμώτατον αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μέν,
μάλιστα δὲ νῦν ὑπάρχειν, τῷ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ
τέχνας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προκοπὴν εἰληφέναι καθ'
ἡμᾶς ὥστε πᾶν τὸ παραπῖπτον ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν
ὡς ἂν εἰ μεθοδικῶς δύνασθαι χειρίζειν τοὺς
6 φιλομαθοῦντας. διόπερ ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως τῆς
τέρψεως στοχαζόμενοι τῶν ἀναγνωσομένων ὡς
τῆς ὠφελείας τῶν προσεχόντων, τἄλλα παρέντες
7 ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κατηνέχθημεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν
τούτων οἱ συνεφιστάνοντες ἐπιμελῶς ἡμῶν τοῖς

perusal will have no attractions for the larger number. I have stated elsewhere at some length my reason for choosing to exclude other branches of history and chronicle actions alone, but there is no harm in briefly reminding my readers of it here in order to impress it on them.

2. Since genealogies, myths, the planting of colonies, the foundations of cities and their ties of kinship have been recounted by many writers and in many different styles, an author who undertakes at the present day to deal with these matters must either represent the work of others as being his own, a most disgraceful proceeding, or if he refuses to do this, must manifestly toil to no purpose, being constrained to avow that the matters on which he writes and to which he devotes his attention have been adequately narrated and handed down to posterity by previous authors. So omitting these things for the above and various other reasons, I decided on writing a history of actual events; firstly, because there is always some novelty in them which demands novel treatment—since it was not in the power of the ancients to narrate events subsequent to their own time—and secondly, owing to the great practical utility of such a history, both formerly and especially at the present day, when the progress of the arts and sciences has been so rapid, that those who study history are, we may almost say, provided with a method for dealing with any contingency that may arise. My aim, therefore, being not so much to entertain readers as to benefit those who pay careful attention, I disregarded other matters and was led to write this kind of history. The best testimony to the

ὑπομνήμασι βεβαιότατα μαρτυρήσουσι τοῖς νῦν λεγομένοις.

II. Res Italiae

3 Ἀννίβας δὲ κύκλῳ περιλαμβάνων τὸν χάρακα τοῦ Ἀππίου τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠκροβολίζετο καὶ κατεπείραζε, βουλόμενος ἐκκαλεῖσθαι πρὸς μάχην· 2 οὐδενὸς δὲ συνυπακούοντος τέλος ἐγίνετο πολιορκίᾳ παραπλήσιον τὸ συμβαῖνον, τῶν μὲν ἱππέων ἐπιφερομένων ταῖς ἴλαις καὶ μετὰ κραυγῆς εἰσακοντιζόντων εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, τῶν δὲ πεζῶν κατὰ σπείρας προσπιπτόντων καὶ διασπᾶν τὸ 3 χαράκωμα πειρωμένων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ἐδύνατο κινῆσαι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐκ τῆς ὑποκειμένης προθέσεως, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν εὐζώνοις ἀπετρίβοντο τοὺς προσπίπτοντας πρὸς τὸν χάρακα, τοῖς δὲ βαρέσι τῶν ὅπλων ἀσφαλιζόμενοι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τῶν βελῶν ἔμενον ἐν τάξει κατὰ τὰς σημαίας. 4 Ἀννίβας δὲ δυσαρεστούμενος τοῖς ὅλοις διὰ τὸ μήτε παραπεσεῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν δύνασθαι ‹μήτ' ἐκκαλεῖσθαι› τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐβουλεύετο περὶ 5 τῶν ἐνεστώτων τί χρὴ ποιεῖν. ἐμοὶ δ' οὐ μόνοις ἂν δοκεῖ Καρχηδονίοις τὰ τότε συμβαίνοντα παρέχειν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων 6 τοῖς πυθομένοις. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀπιστήσαι πῶς Ῥωμαῖοι, πολλαῖς μὲν ἡττημένοι μάχαις ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων, οὐ τολμῶντες δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἔτι συγκαθίστασθαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ὅμως οὔτ' εἴκειν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν οὔτ' ἐκχωρεῖν τῶν ὑπαίθρων; 7 καὶ τὸν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀντιπαρῆγον μόνον

truth of what I say will be that of those who study this work with due application.

II. Affairs of Italy

Siege of Capua

3. Hannibal surrounding the camp of Appius Claudius at first harassed him by skirmishing with the object of provoking him to come out and give battle. But as none paid any attention, his attack finally became very much like an attempt to storm the camp, the cavalry advancing in squadrons, and with loud cries hurling their javelins into the camp, while the infantry attacked in maniples and attempted to tear down the palisade. But even thus he was unable to move the Romans from their purpose ; they used their light-armed forces to repel the assault on the palisade, and kept their heavy-armed troops in their ranks under their standards protecting themselves from the shower of missiles. Hannibal was dissatisfied in general at being unable either to penetrate into the town or to provoke the Romans to battle, and began to consider what it was best to do under the circumstances. It seems to me indeed that the state of matters was such as might puzzle not only the Carthaginians, but anyone who heard of it. For who could believe that the Romans, who had been beaten in so many battles by the Carthaginians, and did not yet even dare to face the enemy in the field, nevertheless refused to retire or to abandon the open country ? While up to now they had contented themselves with follow- 211 B.C.

ἀεὶ ταῖς ὑπωρείαις, τότε δὲ καθίσαντες εἰς τὰ πεδία καὶ τὸν ἐπιφανέστατον τόπον τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπολιόρκουν τὴν ἰσχυροτάτην πόλιν, κύκλῳ προσμαχομένων αὐτοῖς τῶν πολεμίων, πρὸς οὓς οὐδ' 8 ἐπινοήσαντες οἱοί τ' ἦσαν ἀντοφθαλμεῖν· Καρχηδόνιοί τ', ἀδιαλείπτως νικῶντες ταῖς μάχαις, οὐχ ἧττον ἐνίοις καιροῖς ἐδυσχρηστοῦντο τῶν 9 ἡττωμένων. δοκεῖ δέ μοι ‹παρ›αίτιον τοῦτο γεγονέναι τῆς ἑκατέρων προαιρέσεως, τὸ παρ' ἀμφοῖν συντεθεωρῆσθαι διότι τὸ παρ' Ἀννίβου σύνταγμα τῶν ἱππέων αἴτιον ἦν καὶ τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ τοῦ λείπεσθαι τοὺς Ῥω-10 μαίους. διόπερ αἵ τε τῶν ἡττωμένων στρατοπέδων ἀντιπαραγωγαὶ μετὰ τὰς μάχας εὐθέως κατὰ λόγον ἐγίνοντο· διὰ γὰρ τόπων τοιούτων ἀντιπαρῆγον ἐν οἷς οὐδὲν ἔμελλε βλάψειν αὐτοὺς 11 τὸ τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἱππικόν. τά τε περὶ τὴν Καπύην τότε συμβαίνοντ' εἰκότως ἑκατέροις ἀπήντα.

4 Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον ἐξιέναι μὲν πρὸς μάχην οὐκ ἐθάρρει τῷ δεδιέναι τοὺς 2 τῶν πολεμίων ἱππεῖς, ἔμενε δ' ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ τετολμηκότως, σαφῶς εἰδὸς ἀβλαβῆ τὴν ἵππον αὐτοῖς ἐσομένην, ὑφ' ἧς ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ἡττᾶτο. 3 οἵ τε Καρχηδόνιοι πάλιν εὐλόγως οὔτε στρατοπεδεύσαντες μετὰ τῆς ἵππου μένειν ἐδύναντο πλείω χρόνον διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ παρακειμένῃ χώρᾳ χορτάσματα πάντα κατεφθαρκέναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους αὐτοῦ τούτου χάριν, τοῖς δὲ νώτοις οὐκ ἐφικτὸν εἶναι τοσαύτῃ μὲν ἵππῳ, τοσούτοις δ' ὑποζυγίοις κατανύσαι χόρτον ἢ κριθὰς κομίζοντας 4 ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος· οὔτε μὴν ἄνευ τῶν

ing the enemy's movements upon the hills, they had now established themselves in the plain in the finest district of Italy, and were besieging the strongest city of all, with that very enemy surrounding and attacking them whom they could not even bear the thought of confronting; while the Carthaginians who had won an unbroken series of victories were at times in equal difficulties with the losers. In my opinion the reason of this conduct on the part of both, was that both had perceived that it was to Hannibal's force of cavalry that the Carthaginians owed their victories and the Romans their defeats. Consequently both the former tactics of the beaten armies after the battles in moving along parallel to their adversaries were justified, since they were marching through country where the enemy's cavalry could not hurt them, and the present conduct of both before Capua was only what was to be expected.

4. As a fact the Roman army had not the courage to go out and give battle since they were afraid of the enemy's cavalry, but they remained in their camp with complete confidence since they well knew that the cavalry to which they had owed their defeat in the battles could do them no harm there. The Carthaginians again obviously could not remain there longer encamped together with their cavalry, since the Romans had with this very object destroyed all the forage in the neighbourhood, and it was impossible to get carried up from such a long distance enough hay and barley for so many horses and mules; nor again if they remained in their position

ἱππέων παραστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐθάρρουν πολιορκεῖν χάρακα καὶ τάφρον προβεβλημένους τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πρὸς οὓς καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἴσου κίνδυνον αὐτοῖς ἀμφίδοξον εἶναι συνέβαινε χωρὶς τῶν
5 ἱππέων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἡγωνίων καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαθισταμένους ὑπάτους μὴ παραγενηθέντες ἐπιστρατοπεδεύσαιεν καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν σφίσι παραστήσαιεν, ἀφελόμενοι τὴν τῶν χορηγιῶν ἐπάρ-
6 κειαν. ἐξ ὧν συλλογιζόμενος Ἀννίβας ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχον τὸ διὰ τῆς ἐκ χειρὸς βίας λῦσαι τὴν
7 πολιορκίαν, ἐπ᾽ ἄλλης ἐγένετο γνώμης. ὑπέλαβε γάρ, εἰ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν αἰφνιδίως ἐπιφανείη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην τόποις, ἴσως μὲν ἂν καὶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνύσασθαί τι τῶν χρησίμων, ἐκπλήξας τῷ παραδόξῳ τοὺς ἐνοικοῦν-
8 τας· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, τούς γε περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον ἀναγκάσειν ἢ λύειν τὴν πολιορκίαν, σπεύδοντας τῇ πατρίδι βοηθεῖν, ἢ διαιροῦντας τὴν δύναμιν εὐκαταγωνίστους ὑπάρξειν καὶ τοὺς βοηθοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους αὐτῶν.

5 Ἃ διανοηθεὶς ἐξέπεμψε γραμματοφόρον εἰς τὴν Καπύην, πείσας τινὰ τῶν Λιβύων αὐτομολῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, κἀκεῖθεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν,
2 προνοηθεὶς τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων ἀσφαλείας· πάνυ γὰρ ἡγωνία μὴ θεωρήσαντες αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαττόμενον οἱ Καπυανοί, κἄπειτα διατραπέντες ὡς ἀπηλπισμένοι, παραδῶσι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἑαυτούς.
3 διὸ γράψας ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀναζυγὴν ἀπέστειλε τὸν Λίβυν, ἵνα συνέντες τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν χωρισμὸν εὐθαρσῶς
4 ὑπομένοιεν τὴν πολιορκίαν. τοῖς δ᾽ ἐν Ῥώμῃ προσπεπτωκότων τῶν περὶ τὴν Καπύην, διότι

without their cavalry were they bold enough to assault an enemy having the advantage of protection by a trench and palisade, an engagement with whom on equal terms would be attended with doubtful success now they were deprived of their cavalry. Besides this they were in dread of the consuls designate appearing and establishing themselves in their rear, and thus placing them in great difficulties by cutting off their supplies. For these reasons Hannibal thought it would be impossible to raise the siege by force of arms and changed his plan. For he thought that if by a secret march he could appear suddenly before Rome, he might possibly by the surprise and dismay he would cause among the inhabitants manage to gain some advantage against that city itself; or if not would at least compel Appius either to raise the siege and hasten to the help of his native town, or to break up his army, so that both the force that went to relieve Rome and that which was left behind would be easy to overcome.

5. With this project in his mind he sent a letter-bearer to Capua, inducing one of the Libyans to desert to the Roman camp and thence to the city, taking every precaution for the security of the letter. For he was in great dread lest the Capuans on witnessing his departure should think he despaired of saving them and in their consternation surrender to the Romans. He therefore wrote explaining his purpose in leaving, and sent off the Libyan, so that when they heard of his purpose and learnt why he had left they might continue to sustain the siege courageously. Now when the news from Capua first reached Rome that Hannibal had encamped

παρεστρατοπεδευκὼς Ἀννίβας πολιορκεῖ τὰς δυ-
νάμεις αὐτῶν, ὀρθοὶ ταῖς διανοίαις καὶ περίφοβοι
πάντες ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα διατεινούσης
5 τῆς ἐνεστηκυίας κρίσεως· διὸ καὶ ταῖς ἐξαπο-
στολαῖς καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ
6 μέρος ὅλοι καὶ πάντες ἐνενεύκεισαν. οἱ δὲ Καπυα-
νοὶ κομισάμενοι τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Λίβυος γράμματα
καὶ γνόντες τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων,
ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, κρίνοντες ἔτι ταύτην
7 ἐξελέγξαι τὴν ἐλπίδα. Ἀννίβας δὲ μετὰ πέμπτην
ἡμέραν τῆς παρουσίας, δειπνοποιησάμενος καὶ
καταλιπὼν τὰ πυρὰ καιόμενα, τοιαύτην ἐποίησε
τὴν ἀναζυγὴν ὥστε μηδένα συνεῖναι τῶν πολεμίων
8 τὸ συμβαῖνον. χρησάμενος δὲ ταῖς πορείαις διὰ
τῆς Σαννίτιδος ἐνεργοῖς καὶ συνεχέσι καὶ τοὺς
περὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τόπους αἰεὶ ταῖς προπορείαις ἐξ-
9 ερευνώμενος καὶ προκαταλαμβάνων, ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῇ
Ῥώμῃ ταῖς διανοίαις περὶ τὴν Καπύην καὶ τὰς
ἐκεῖ πράξεις ὄντων ἔλαθε διαβὰς τὸν Ἀνίωνα
ποταμὸν καὶ συνεγγίσας, ὥστε μὴ πλεῖον τετταρά-
κοντα σταδίων ἀποσχὼν τῆς Ῥώμης ποιήσασθαι
τὴν παρεμβολήν.

6 Οὗ γενομένου καὶ προσπεσόντος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην,
εἰς ὁλοσχερῆ συνέβη ταραχὴν καὶ φόβον ἐμπεσεῖν
2 τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἅτε τοῦ πράγματος αἰφνιδίου
μὲν ὄντος καὶ τελέως ἀνελπίστου διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε
τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπηρκέναι τῆς πόλεως,
ὑποτρεχούσης δέ τινος ἅμα καὶ τοιαύτης ἐννοίας
ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐγγί-
σαι καὶ καταθαρρῆσαι μὴ οὐ τῶν περὶ Καπύην
3 στρατοπέδων ἀπολωλότων. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες
τὰ τείχη προκατελάμβανον καὶ τοὺς πρὸ τῆς πόλεως

parallel to their lines and was besieging them, it caused universal excitement and dismay, as they felt that the impending decision would influence the whole war. Consequently the whole attention of everyone was at present directed to the preparation and dispatch of succour to that quarter. The Capuans on receiving the letter from the Libyan, and on understanding the Carthaginian plan, continued to maintain their resistance, being resolved to try the chance of this expedient. Hannibal on the fifth day from his arrival, after giving his men their supper, left his fires burning and retreated in such a manner that none of the enemy had any notion of what was happening. By a series of rapid marches through Samnium, and by sending his outposts on each day to reconnoitre and occupy the district near the road, he succeeded, while the minds of the Romans were still occupied with Capua and what was happening there, in crossing the Anio unperceived and getting so near to Rome that he established his camp at a distance of not more than forty stades from the walls.

6. When the news reached Rome it caused universal panic and consternation among the inhabitants, the thing being so sudden and so entirely unexpected, as Hannibal had never before been so close to the city. Besides this, a suspicion prevailed that the enemy would never have approached so near and displayed such audacity if the legions before Capua had not been destroyed. The men, therefore, occupied the walls and the most advantageous positions outside the town, while the

εὐκαίρους τόπους, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες περιπορευόμεναι τοὺς ναοὺς ἱκέτευον τοὺς θεούς, πλύνουσαι ταῖς
4 κόμαις τὰ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐδάφη· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐταῖς ἔθος ἐστὶ ποιεῖν, ὅταν τις ὁλοσχερὴς τὴν πατρίδα
5 καταλαμβάνῃ κίνδυνος. ἄρτι δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν κατεστρατοπεδευκότων καὶ διανοουμένων τῇ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμέρᾳ καταπειράζειν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, γίνεται παράδοξόν τι καὶ τυχικὸν σύμπτωμα
6 πρὸς σωτηρίαν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον καὶ Πόπλιον τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς στρατοπέδου πρότερον πεποιημένοι τὴν καταγραφὴν ἐνόρκους εἶχον τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἥξειν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, τοῦ δ' ἑτέρου τότε τὰς καταγραφὰς ἐποιοῦντο καὶ δοκιμασίας.
7 ἐξ οὗ συνέβη πλῆθος ἀνδρῶν αὐτομάτως ἀθροισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην. οὓς ἐξαγαγόντες εὐθαρσῶς οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ παρεμβαλόντες πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπέσχον τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν
8 περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. οἱ γὰρ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥρμησαν, οὐχ ὅλως ἀπελπίζοντες αἱρήσειν κατὰ κράτος αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην· συνθεασάμενοι δὲ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους παρατεταγμένους καὶ ταχέως διά τινος αἰχμαλώτου πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπιβολῆς ἀπέστησαν, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἐδῄουν ἐπιπορευόμενοι καὶ τὰς οἰκίας
9 ἐνεπίμπρασαν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς ἀναρίθμητον περιελασάμενοι λείας πλῆθος ἤθροισαν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, ὡς ἂν εἰς ἄγραν ἥκοντες τοιαύτην
7 εἰς ἣν οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε πολέμιον ἤξειν ἤλπιζε· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ὑπάτων τολμησάντων ἐν δέκα σταδίοις ἀντιστρατοπεδεῦσαι σφίσι παραβόλως, Ἀννίβας ἅμα μὲν λείας πλῆθος ἠθροικώς, ἅμα

women made the round of the temples and implored the help of the gods, sweeping the pavements of the holy places with their hair—for such is their custom when their country is in extreme peril. But just after Hannibal had established his camp, and while he was contemplating an attempt on the city itself for the following day, an unexpected stroke of luck intervened to save Rome. Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius had completed the enrolment of one legion, and had engaged the soldiers on their oath to present themselves in arms at Rome exactly on this day, and they were now engaged in enrolling and testing the men for a second legion; and the consequence was that a large number of men were spontaneously collected in Rome just when they were required. The consuls led them out confidently, and drawing them up in front of the city put a check on Hannibal's ardour. For the Carthaginians had at first eagerly advanced not without hope of taking Rome itself by assault, but when they saw the enemy drawn up in battle order, and when very soon afterwards they learnt the truth from a prisoner, they abandoned the project of attacking the city and took to overrunning and plundering the country and burning the houses. At first they drove into their camp a vast collection of captured animals, as they were in a country which no one ever expected would be entered by an enemy; (7) but afterwards, when the consuls had the extreme boldness to encamp opposite them at a distance of ten stades, Hannibal retired. He had now collected a large quantity of

2 δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐλπίδος ἀποπεπτωκώς, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, συλλογιζόμενος τὰς ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς ἤλπιζε κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπίνοιαν πυθομένους τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον τὸν περὶ τὴν πόλιν κίνδυνον ἤτοι λύσαντας τὴν πολιορκίαν ὁλοσχερῶς παραβοηθήσειν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ Ῥώμῃ πράγμασιν ἢ μέρος τι καταλιπόντας τῷ πλείονι βοηθήσειν κατὰ σπουδήν·
3 ὧν ὁπότερον ἂν συμβῇ, δεόντως ἕξειν ὑπειληφὼς ἐκίνει τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ὑπὸ τὴν
4 ἑωθινήν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον διασπάσαντες τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ προειρημένου ποταμοῦ γεφύρας καὶ συναναγκάσαντες αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦ ῥεύματος περαιοῦν τὴν δύναμιν, προσέκειντο τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις περὶ τὴν διάβασιν καὶ πολλὴν παρεῖχον δυσχρηστίαν.
5 ὁλοσχερὲς μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἐδύναντο πρᾶξαι διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τὴν πρὸς πάντα τόπον εὐχρηστίαν τῶν Νομάδων· τῆς δὲ λείας ἱκανόν τι μέρος ἀφελόμενοι καὶ περὶ τριακοσίους καταβαλόντες τῶν πολεμίων τότε μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν
6 παρεμβολήν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσαντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διὰ φόβον σπουδῇ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὑποχώρησιν, εἵποντο κατόπιν ταῖς παρωρείαις.
7 Ἀννίβας δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠπείγετο, σπεύδων ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον· μετὰ δὲ πέμπτην ἡμέραν προσαγγελθέντος αὐτῷ μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον, οὕτως ὑποστὰς καὶ προσδεξάμενος τοὺς ἑπομένους ἐπιτίθεται νυκτὸς ἔτι τῇ
8 στρατοπεδείᾳ, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε,
9 τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐξέβαλε. τῆς δ' ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης συνθεωρήσας τοὺς Ῥω-
10 μαίους πρός τινα λόφον ἐρυμνὸν ἀποκεχωρηκότας, τοῦ μὲν ἔτι προσκαρτερεῖν τούτοις ἀπέγνω, ποιησά-

booty, but he had given up his hope of taking Rome, and most important of all he reckoned that the time now had elapsed in which he expected, according to his original calculation, that Appius on learning of the danger that threatened Rome would either raise the siege and come with his whole force to save the city, or, leaving a part of it behind, would hasten to the rescue with the greater portion. In either event he considered that his purpose would have been attained, and he therefore moved his army out of the camp at daybreak. Publius, who had destroyed the bridges on the Anio and compelled Hannibal to take his army across by fording the stream, attacked the Carthaginians as they were crossing and caused them no little distress. He could strike no decisive blow owing to the numbers of the enemy's cavalry and the ease with which the Numidians rode over any kind of ground; but after recovering a considerable part of the booty and killing about three hundred of the enemy he retired to his camp, and afterwards thinking that it was out of fear that the Carthaginians were retreating so precipitately, he followed them, keeping to the hills Hannibal at first marched with great speed, being anxious to attain his object, but when in five days he received the news that Appius was continuing the siege he halted until the part of his army which was following him came up and then attacked the enemy's army by night, killing a considerable number and driving the rest out of their camp. When, however, day dawned and he saw that the Romans had retired to a strong position on a hill, he gave up any thought of further molesting them,

μενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῆς Δαυνίας καὶ τῆς Βρεττίας ἐπέστη τοῖς κατὰ τὸ Ῥήγιον τόποις ἀνυπόπτως, ὥστε παρ' ὀλίγον μὲν καὶ τῆς πόλεως κυριεῦσαι, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκπεπορευμένους ἀποτεμέσθαι καὶ πλείστων γενέσθαι Ῥηγίνων κύριος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ παρουσίᾳ.

8 Δοκεῖ δέ μοι δικαίως ἄν τις ἐπισημήνασθαι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν τάς τε Καρχηδονίων καὶ Ῥωμαίων ἀρετὰς καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν. 2 καθάπερ γὰρ Ἐπαμινώνδαν τὸν Θηβαῖον θαυμάζουσι πάντες, διότι παραγενόμενος εἰς Τεγέαν μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων καὶ θεωρήσας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὐτούς τε πανδημεὶ παραγεγονότας εἰς Μαντίνειαν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους εἰς ταύτην ἡθροικότας τὴν 3 πόλιν, ὡς παραταξομένους τοῖς Θηβαίοις, δειπνοποιήσασθαι τοῖς αὑτοῦ καθ' ὥραν παραγγείλας ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν ἄρτι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιγινομένης, ὡς τῆς παρατάξεως χάριν σπεύδων εὐκαίρους 4 τινὰς προκαταλαβέσθαι τόπους, τοιαύτην δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξαν ἐνεργασάμενος προῆγε, ποιούμενος 5 τὴν πορείαν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, προσμίξας δὲ περὶ τρίτην ὥραν τῇ πόλει παραδόξως καὶ καταλαβὼν τὴν Σπάρτην ἔρημον τῶν βοηθησόντων, μέχρι μὲν ἀγορᾶς ἐβιάσατο καὶ κατέσχε τῆς πόλεως τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐστραμμένους τόπους. 6 γενομένης δὲ περιπετείας, καί τινος αὐτομόλου τὴν νύκτα διαπεσόντος εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν καὶ διασαφήσαντος Ἀγησιλάῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ συμβαῖνον, καὶ τῶν βοηθούντων παραγενομένων εἰς τὸν 7 τῆς καταλήψεως καιρόν, ταύτης μὲν τῆς ἐλπίδος ἀπεσφάλη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τὸν Εὐρώταν ἀριστοποιησάμενος καὶ προσαναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ

and marching through Daunia and Bruttium descended on Rhegium so suddenly that he came very near taking the town itself, and did cut off from it all the inhabitants who had gone out to the country, making a number of Rhegians prisoners by this sudden appearance.

8. We are fully justified, I think, on this occasion in noting with admiration the high courage and determined spirit which both Romans and Carthaginians displayed in the war. To take a somewhat similar instance, Epameinondas of Thebes is universally admired for his conduct in the following circumstances. On reaching Tegea with the allies, and discovering that the Lacedaemonians had arrived 362 B.C. at Mantinea in full strength and had collected their allies there with the object of giving battle to the Thebans, he ordered his troops to take their supper at an early hour, and a little after nightfall led them out as if he was anxious to occupy in time some favourable ground for the battle. Having conveyed this impression to people in general he advanced and marched straight on Sparta, and reaching that city at about the third hour of the day took it by surprise, and finding no one there to defend it forced his way as far as the market-place, occupying all that part of the town which faces the river. A mischance however occurred, a deserter having escaped in the night to Mantinea and informed King Agesilaus of the facts, so that upon the Spartans coming up to help just as the city was being occupied, Epameinondas was disappointed of his hope, but after breakfasting on the banks of the Eurotas, and refreshing his troops after their hard

τῆς κακοπαθείας, ὥρμα πάλιν ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς τὴν
8 αὐτὴν ὁδόν, συλλογιζόμενος ὅτι συμβήσεται τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων παραβεβοη-
θηκότων εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην ἔρημον πάλιν καταλεί-
9 πεσθαι τὴν Μαντίνειαν· ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι.
διὸ παρακαλέσας τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ χρησάμενος
ἐνεργῷ τῇ νυκτοπορείᾳ παρῆν καὶ προσέμισγε τῇ
Μαντινείᾳ περὶ μέσον ἡμέρας, ἐρήμῳ τελέως
10 ὑπαρχούσῃ τῶν βοηθησόντων. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι
κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον σπουδάζοντες μετασχεῖν
τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους ἀγῶνος τοῖς Λακεδαιμο-
11 νίοις κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν παρῆσαν. ἤδη δὲ τῆς
Θηβαίων πρωτοπορείας συναπτούσης πρὸς τὸ
τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερόν, ὃ κεῖται πρὸ τῆς πόλεως
ἐν ἑπτὰ σταδίοις, ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες συνεκύρησεν
ἅμα καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπιφαίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν
12 τῆς Μαντινείας ὑπερκείμενον λόφον· εἰς οὓς ἐμ-
βλέψαντες οἱ καταλελειμμένοι τῶν Μαντινέων
μόλις ἐθάρρησαν ἐπιβῆναι τοῦ τείχους καὶ κωλῦ-
13 σαι τὴν τῶν Θηβαίων ἔφοδον. διόπερ εἰκότως οἱ
συγγραφεῖς ἐπιμέμφονται τοῖς προειρημένοις ἔργοις,
φάσκοντες τῷ μὲν ἡγεμόνι πεπρᾶχθαι πᾶν ὅσον
ἀγαθῷ στρατηγῷ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπεναντίων κρείττω,
τῆς δὲ τύχης ἧττω γεγονέναι τὸν Ἐπαμινώνδαν.

9 Τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ περὶ τῶν
2 κατ' Ἀννίβαν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ προσβαλόντα τοῖς
πολεμίοις πειραθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐκ μέρους ἀγώνων
3 λύειν τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ τὸ ταύτης ἀποπεσόντα
τῆς προσβολῆς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὁρμῆσαι τὴν Ῥώμην,
κἄπειτα μὴ καθικόμενον τῆς προθέσεως διὰ τὰς
ἐκ ταὐτομάτου περιπετείας αὖθις ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς
συντρῖψαι μὲν τοὺς ἑπομένους, ἐφεδρεῦσαι δὲ τῷ
20

march, he marched back again by the same road, reckoning that since the Lacedaemonians and their allies had come to the help of Sparta, Mantinea would now be left without defenders, as indeed was the case. Exhorting the Thebans, therefore, to exert themselves, and marching rapidly all night, he reached Mantinea about midday, finding it with scarcely a soul to defend it. But just at this time the Athenians, who were anxious to take part in the battle against the Thebans, arrived to help the Lacedaemonians, as stipulated in their treaty of alliance. So at the very time that the leading column of the Thebans had reached the temple of Poseidon, which is at seven stades distance from the town, the Athenians happened as if by design to appear on the hill above Mantinea. When the few Mantineans who were left in the town saw the Athenians, they just managed to pluck up enough courage to man the wall and keep off the assault of the Thebans. Writers, therefore, very properly apportion the blame for the ill-success of these operations, when they tell us that the commander did all that behoved a good general, and that Epameinondas here overcame his enemies but was worsted by Fortune.

9. Very much the same may be said of Hannibal. Who can refuse admiration to this general, who considers how he first fell on the enemy and attempted to raise the siege by a series of combats, how failing in his attack he marched on Rome itself, and then when his design on the city was frustrated by the merest accident, how he turned round and not only broke up the enemy, but waited a

κατὰ λόγον, εἰ συνέβη γενέσθαι κίνημα περὶ τοὺς
4 τὴν Καπύην πολιορκοῦντας, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον μὴ
λήξαντα τῆς προθέσεως εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐχθρῶν βλάβην
ἀποσκῆψαι, μόνον οὐ δ' ἀναστάτους ποιῆσαι
5 Ῥηγίνους, τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο καὶ θαυμάσαι
6 τὸν προειρημένον ἐπὶ τούτοις ἡγεμόνα; καὶ μὴν
Ῥωμαίους Λακεδαιμονίων ἀμείνους ἄν τις ἐν
7 τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ κρίνειεν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν
γὰρ τῇ πρώτῃ προσαγγελίᾳ συνεκχυθέντες τὴν
μὲν Σπάρτην ἔσωσαν, τὴν δὲ Μαντίνειαν τὸ καθ'
8 αὑτοὺς μέρος ἀπέβαλον· Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τὴν
πατρίδα διεφύλαξαν καὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν οὐκ ἔλυσαν,
ἀλλ' ἔμειναν ἀσαλεύτως καὶ βεβαίως ἐπὶ τῶν
ὑποκειμένων καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη τεθαρρηκότως
9 προσέκειντο τοῖς Καπυανοῖς. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐχ
οὕτως τοῦ Ῥωμαίων ἢ Καρχηδονίων ἐγκωμίου
χάριν εἴρηταί μοι—τούτους μὲν γὰρ ἤδη πολλάκις
ἐπεσημηνάμην—τὸ δὲ πλεῖον τῶν ἡγουμένων παρ'
ἀμφοτέροις καὶ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα μελλόντων χειρίζειν
10 παρ' ἑκάστοις τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἵνα τῶν μὲν ἀνα-
μιμνησκόμενοι, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνοντες
ζηλωταὶ γίνωνται παράβολον ἔχειν τι καὶ κινδυ-
νώδες, τοὐναντίον ἀσφαλῆ μὲν τὴν τόλμαν, θαυμα-
σίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ἀείμνηστον δὲ καὶ καλὴν ἔχει
τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ κατορθωθέντα καὶ διαψευσθέντα
παραπλησίως, ἐὰν μόνον σὺν νῷ γένηται τὰ πρατ-
τόμενα. . . .

11 Τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων πολιορκούντων Τάραντα
Βομίλκας ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος εἰς τὸ
συμμαχήσειν μετὰ δυνάμεως πλείστης καὶ μηδὲν

reasonable time to see if the force besieging Capua had made any movement, and how finally, still holding to his purpose, he swept down to damage his enemies, and all but destroyed Rhegium? As for the Romans, we must pronounce that they behaved better on this occasion than the Lacedaemonians. For the latter, flocking off to the rescue when the news first reached them, saved Sparta indeed, but as far as it depended on them lost Mantinea, while the Romans not only preserved their native town, but far from raising the siege remained firm and unshaken in their purpose, and henceforth pressed the Capuans with greater confidence. It is not for the purpose of extolling the Romans or the Carthaginians that I have offered these remarks—I have often had occasion to bestow praise on both peoples —but rather for the sake of the leaders of both these states, and of all, no matter where, who shall be charged with the conduct of public affairs, so that by memory or actual sight of such actions as these, they be moved to emulation, and not shrink from undertaking designs, which may seem indeed to be fraught with risk and peril, but on the contrary are courageous without being hazardous, are admirable in their conception, and their excellence, whether the result be success or failure alike, will deserve to live in men's memories for ever, always provided that all that is done is the result of sound reasoning. . . .

Tarentum

When the Romans were besieging Tarentum Bomilcar, the Carthaginian admiral, came with a very large force to its help, and finding himself

δυνηθεὶς ἐπικουρῆσαι τοῖς ἔνδον διὰ τὸ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀσφαλῶς θέσθαι τὰ περὶ τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ἔλαθεν ἀναλώσας τὴν χορηγίαν. καὶ μετὰ παρακλήσεως πρότερον ἀφικέσθαι ἐκβιασθεὶς καὶ ὑποσχέσεων μεγάλων, ὕστερον μεθ' ἱκετηρίας τῶν ἔνδον ἀποπλεῦσαι ἀπηναγκάσθη.

III. Res Siciliae

10 Οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἔξω κοσμεῖται πόλις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν οἰκούντων ἀρετῆς. . . .

2 Ἐκρίθη μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰ προειρημένα μετακομίζειν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα καὶ
3 μηδὲν ἀπολιπεῖν· πότερα δ' ὀρθῶς τοῦτο καὶ συμφερόντως αὐτοῖς ἔπραξαν ἢ τἀναντία, πολὺς ἂν εἴη λόγος, πλείων γε μὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ δεόντως σφίσι πεπρᾶχθαι μηδ' ἀκμὴν νῦν πράττεσθαι τοῦτο τοὔργον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοιούτων ὁρμηθέντες προεβίβασαν τὴν πατρίδα, δῆλον ὡς εἰκότως ταῦτα μετ-
5 έφερον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, δι' ὧν ηὐξήθησαν. εἰ δ' ἁπλουστάτοις χρώμενοι βίοις καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς ἐν τούτοις περιττότητος καὶ πολυτελείας ἀφεστῶτες ὅμως ἐπεκράτουν τούτων αἰεὶ παρ' οἷς ὑπῆρχε πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα, πῶς οὐ νομιστέον εἶναι τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἁμάρτημα; τὸ
6 γὰρ ἀπολιπόντας τὰ τῶν νικώντων ἔθη τὸν τῶν ἡττωμένων ζῆλον ἀναλαμβάνειν, προσεπιδραττομένους ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἐξακολουθοῦντα τοῖς τοιούτοις φθόνον, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ φοβερώτατον ταῖς ὑπερ-

unable to render any assistance to those in the town, as the Roman camp was so securely defended, he used up his supplies before he was well aware of it. He had been forced to come by urgent entreaties and large promises, and he was now compelled to sail off at the earnest request of the inhabitants.

III. Affairs of Sicily

The Spoils of Syracuse

10. A city is not adorned by external splendours, 211 B.C. but by the virtue of its inhabitants. . . .

The Romans, then, decided for this reason to transfer all these objects to their own city and leave nothing behind. As to whether in doing so they acted rightly and in their own interest or the reverse, there is much to be said on both sides, but the more weighty arguments are in favour of their conduct having been wrong then and still being wrong. For if they had originally relied on such things for the advancement of their country, they would evidently have been right in bringing to their home the kind of things which had contributed to their aggrandizement. But if, on the contrary, while leading the simplest of lives, very far removed from all such superfluous magnificence, they were constantly victorious over those who possessed the greatest number and finest examples of such works, must we not consider that they committed a mistake? To abandon the habits of the victors and to imitate those of the conquered, not only appropriating the objects, but at the same time attracting that envy which is inseparable from their possession, which is the one thing most to be

οχαῖς, ὁμολογούμενον ἂν εἴποι τις εἶναι τῶν πραττόντων παράπτωμα. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεώμενος 7 οὐδέποτε μακαρίζει τοὺς τἀλλότρια κεκτημένους, ὡς ⟨ἐν τῷ⟩ φθονεῖν ἅμα καί τις ἔλεος αὐτὸν ὑποτρέχει τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀποβαλόντων. ἐπὰν δὲ καὶ 8 προβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς εὐκαιρίας καὶ πάντα συνάγῃ πρὸς αὑτὸν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα συγκαλῇ τρόπον τινὰ τοὺς ἐστερημένους ἐπὶ θέαν, 9 διπλάσιον γίνεται τὸ κακόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοὺς πέλας ἐλεεῖν συμβαίνει τοὺς θεωμένους, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἀναμιμνησκομένους τῶν οἰκείων συμπτω- 10 μάτων. ἐξ ὧν οὐ μόνον φθόνος, ἀλλ' οἷον ὀργή τις ἐκκαίεται πρὸς τοὺς εὐτυχοῦντας· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων περιπετειῶν ἀνάμνησις ὡς ἂν εἰ προτροπή 11 τις ἐστι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τῶν πραξάντων μῖσος. τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ τὸν ἄργυρον ἀθροίζειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἴσως ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων ἀντιποιήσασθαι μὴ οὐ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀδυναμίαν ἐνεργασαμένους, σφίσι δὲ 12 τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἑτοιμάσαντας. τὰ δ' ἐκτὸς ὑπάρχοντα τῆς προειρημένης δυνάμεως ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τόποις ἅμα τῷ φθόνῳ καταλιπόντας ἐνδοξοτέραν ποιεῖν τὴν σφετέραν πατρίδα, μὴ γραφαῖς καὶ τύποις, ἀλλὰ σεμνότητι καὶ μεγαλο- 13 ψυχίᾳ κοσμοῦντας αὐτήν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τῶν μεταλαμβανόντων ἀεὶ τὰς δυναστείας, ἵνα μὴ σκυλεύοντες τὰς πόλεις κόσμον ὑπολαμβάνωσιν εἶναι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν πατρίσι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας συμφοράς· Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ μετακομίσαντες τὰ προειρημένα ταῖς μὲν ἰδιωτικαῖς

dreaded by superiors in power, is surely an incontestable error. For in no case is one who contemplates such works of art moved so much by admiration of the good fortune of those who have possessed themselves of the property of others, as by pity as well as envy for the original owners. And when opportunities become ever more frequent, and the victor collects around him all the treasures of other peoples, and these treasures may be almost said to invite those who were robbed of them to come and inspect them, things are twice as bad. For now spectators no longer pity their neighbours, but themselves, as they recall to mind their own calamities. And hence not only envy, but a sort of passionate hatred for the favourites of fortune flares up, for the memories awakened of their own disaster move them to abhor the authors of it. There were indeed perhaps good reasons for appropriating all the gold and silver: for it was impossible for them to aim at a world empire without weakening the resources of other peoples and strengthening their own. But it was possible for them to leave everything which did not contribute to such strength, together with the envy attached to its possession, in its original place, and to add to the glory of their native city by adorning it not with paintings and reliefs but with dignity and magnanimity. At any rate these remarks will serve to teach all those who succeed to empire, that they should not strip cities under the idea that the misfortunes of others are an ornament to their own country. The Romans on the present occasion, after transferring all these objects to Rome, used such as came from private houses to embellish their

κατασκευαῖς τοὺς αὑτῶν ἐκόσμησαν βίους, ταῖς δὲ δημοσίαις τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως.

IV. Res Hispaniae

11 Ὅτι οἱ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνες, κρατήσαντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων, σφῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἠδύναντο κρα-
2 τεῖν, καὶ δόξαντες τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον ἀνηρηκέναι πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἐστασίαζον, ἀεὶ παρατρι-βόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον Φοίνιξι πλεονεξίαν καὶ
3 φιλαρχίαν. ὧν ὑπάρχων Ἀσδρούβας ὁ Γέσκωνος εἰς τοῦτο κακοπραγμοσύνης προήχθη διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ὡς τὸν πιστότατον τῶν κατ' Ἰβηρίαν φίλων Ἀνδοβάλην, πάλαι μὲν ἀποβαλόντα τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ Καρχηδονίους, ἄρτι δὲ πάλιν ἀπειλη-φότα διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους εὔνοιαν, ἐπεβάλετο
4 χρημάτων πλῆθος αἰτεῖν. τοῦ δὲ παρακούσαντος διὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ προγεγενημένῃ πίστει πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ψευδῆ διαβολὴν ἐπενέγκας ἠνάγκασε τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην δοῦναι τὰς ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρας εἰς ὁμηρείαν.

V. Res Italiae

11[a] Ὅτι οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον, βουλόμενοι σίτῳ χορηγηθῆναι
2 διὰ τὸ μεγάλην εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς σπάνιν, ὡς ἂν τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὑπὸ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἅπαντος ἐφθαρμένου μέχρι τῶν τῆς Ῥώμης πυλῶν, ἔξωθεν δὲ μὴ γενομένης ἐπικουρίας, ἅτε κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης πολέμων ἐνεστώτων καὶ στρατοπέδων παρακαθημένων, πλὴν τῶν κατ'

own homes, and those that were state property for their public buildings.

IV. Affairs of Spain

11. The Carthaginian commanders had mastered the enemy, but were unable to master themselves, and while thinking they had put an end to the war against the Romans began quarrelling with each other, constant friction being caused by that covetousness and love of domination which is innate in Phoenicians. Hasdrubal, son of Gescon, was one of them, and his abuse of the authority he wielded went so far that he attempted to extract a large sum of money from Andobales, the most faithful friend the Carthaginians had in Spain, who had formerly been deprived of his principality owing to his attachment to them and had recently been restored to it for the same reason. When he now refused to pay, relying on his loyalty in the past to Carthage, Hasdrubal brought a false accusation against him and compelled him to give his daughters as hostages. 211 B.C.

V. Affairs of Italy

Roman Embassy to Ptolemy

11*a*. The Romans sent envoys to Ptolemy wishing to procure a supply of corn, as they were suffering from a great scarcity of it, all the crops in Italy up to the gates of Rome having been destroyed by the armies, and no help from abroad having been forthcoming, since all over the world except in Egypt there were wars in progress and hostile forces in the 210 B.C.

3 Αἴγυπτον τόπων. εἰς γὰρ τοσοῦτον κατὰ τὴν
'Ρώμην προεβεβήκει τὰ τῆς ἐνδείας ὥστε τὸν
Σικελικὸν μέδιμνον πεντεκαίδεκα δραχμῶν ὑπάρ-
4 χειν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τοιαύτης οὔσης τῆς περιστάσεως
οὐκ ἠμέλουν τῶν πολεμικῶν. . . .

12 Πολλὴν μὲν ἐπισκέψεως χρείαν ἔχει τὰ συμβαί-
νοντα περὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἐπιβολάς· ἔστι δὲ δυνατὸν
ἐν ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν εὐστοχεῖν, ἐὰν σὺν νῷ τις πράττῃ
2 τὸ προτεθέν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον
ἔργων ἐλάττω τὰ προδήλως καὶ μετὰ βίας ἐπιτε-
λούμενα τῶν μετὰ δόλου καὶ σὺν καιρῷ πραττομέ-
νων, εὐχερὲς τῷ βουλομένῳ καταμαθεῖν ἐκ τῶν
3 ἤδη γεγονότων· ὅτι γε μὴν αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν καιρῷ
πάλιν ἐνεργουμένων πλείω γίνεται τὰ διαμαρ-
τανόμενα τῶν κατορθουμένων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο γνῶναι
4 χαλεπὸν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων. καὶ μὴν διότι
παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων ἀγνοίας ἢ ῥᾳθυμίας
ἐπιτελεῖται τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, οὐδεὶς
5 ‹ἂν› τοῦτ' ἀπορήσειε. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοιαύ-
της διαθέσεως σκοπεῖν ἤδη πάρεστι.

6 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπροθέτως ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς συμ-
βαίνοντα πράξεις μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἁρμόζει λέγειν,
7 περιπετείας δὲ καὶ συγκυρήσεις μᾶλλον· διὸ καὶ
λόγον οὐκ ἔχοντα μεθοδικὸν οὐδ' ἑστῶτα παραλει-
πέσθω· τὰ δὲ κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἐνεργούμενα, ταῦτα
8 δηλούσθω· περὶ ὧν ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος. πάσης δὴ
πράξεως ἐχούσης καιρὸν ὡρισμένον καὶ διάστημα
καὶ τόπον, καὶ προσδεομένης τοῦ λαθεῖν καὶ
συνθημάτων ὡρισμένων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δι' ὧν καὶ μεθ'
9 ὧν καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ πραχθήσεται, φανερὸν ὡς ὁ μὲν

field. The scarcity at Rome had reached such a pitch that the Sicilian medimnus [a] cost fifteen drachmae. But in spite of this distress the Romans did not neglect their military preparations. . . .

On the Art of a Commander

12. The accidents attendant on military projects require much circumspection, but success is in every case possible if the steps we take to carry out our plan are soundly reasoned out. That in military operations what is achieved openly and by force is much less than what is done by stratagem and the use of opportunity, can easily be learnt from the history of former wars. And it is no less easy to be convinced by facts that in those actions depending on the choice of opportunity failure is far more frequent than success. Nor can anyone doubt that most of the failures are due either to error or to negligence on the part of the commander. We must therefore inquire in what such faults consist.

It is by no means proper to describe as actions, things in war which occur undesignedly, but such events should be rather styled accidents or coincidences. As therefore they fall under no systematic or fixed rules, I may neglect them, and deal only, as I will now proceed to do, with such things as are accomplished by design. Since every such action requires a fixed time for its commencement, and a fixed period, and an appointed place, and also requires secrecy, definite signals, proper persons through whom and with whom to act and the proper means, it is evident that the commander who is happy in

[a] About ten gallons.

ἑκάστου τούτων εὐστοχήσας οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ὁ δ' ἑνὸς ὀλιγωρήσας σφαλήσεται τῆς
10 ὅλης προθέσεως. οὕτως ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὰς ἀποτυχίας τῶν ἐπινοηθέντων ἱκανὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ τυχὸν
ἐποίησε τῶν κατὰ μέρος· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατορθοῦν
13 μόλις ἱκανὰ πάντα. διὸ χρὴ μηδενὸς ἀφροντιστεῖν
ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐπιβολαῖς τοὺς ἡγουμένους.
2 ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ μὲν τῶν προειρημένων τὸ σιγᾶν,
καὶ μήτε διὰ χαρὰν παραδόξου προφαινομένης
ἐλπίδος μήτε διὰ φόβον μήτε διὰ συνήθειαν μήτε
διὰ φιλοστοργίαν μεταδιδόναι μηδενὶ τῶν ἐκτός,
3 αὐτοῖς δὲ κοινοῦσθαι τούτοις, ὧν χωρὶς οὐχ οἷόν τε
τὸ προτεθὲν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν, καὶ τούτοις μὴ
πρότερον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου χρείας καιρὸς
4 ἐπαναγκάζῃ. χρὴ δὲ σιγᾶν μὴ μόνον τῇ γλώττῃ,
5 πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ ψυχῇ· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κρύψαντες
τοὺς λόγους ποτὲ μὲν δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιφάσεως,
ποτὲ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν πραττομένων φανερὰς ἐποίησαν
6 τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἐπινοίας. δεύτερον δ' ἐπεγνωκέναι
τὰς ἡμερησίους καὶ νυκτερινὰς πορείας καὶ τὰ
διανύσματα τούτων, μὴ μόνον κατὰ γῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
7 κατὰ θάλατταν. τρίτον καὶ μέγιστον, τῶν ἐκ τοῦ
περιέχοντος καιρῶν ἔχειν ἔννοιαν καὶ δύνασθαι
8 τούτων κατὰ τὸ κριθὲν εὐστοχεῖν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
τὸν τόπον τῆς πράξεως ἐν μικρῷ θετέον, ἐπειδὴ
πολλάκις παρὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατα δοκοῦντ' εἶναι
9 δυνατά, τὰ δὲ δυνατὰ πέφηνεν ἀδύνατα. τὸ δὲ
τελευταῖον συνθημάτων καὶ παρασυνθημάτων, ἔτι
δὲ τῆς ἐκλογῆς, δι' ὧν καὶ μεθ' ὧν ἐνεργηθήσεται
τὸ κριθέν, οὐκ ὀλιγωρητέον.

his choice of each and all of these will not meet with failure, but the neglect of anyone of them will ruin the whole design; so true is it that nature makes a single trivial error sufficient to cause failure in a design, but correctness in every detail barely enough for success. 13. Therefore in such enterprises commanders must be careful about every detail. The first and foremost requisite is to keep silence, and never either from joy if some unexpected hope shall present itself, or from fear, or from familiarity with or affection for certain persons, to reveal one's design to anyone unconcerned in it, but to communicate it only to those without whom it cannot be put in execution, and even to these not earlier than when the need of their services renders it imperative. And we must keep not only our tongues tied but even more so our minds. For many who have kept their own counsel have revealed their projects either by the expression of their faces or by their actions. The second requisite is to be well versed in the question of night and day movements and voyages, knowing exactly how far they will bring us, not only by land but also by sea. The third and most important is to have a notion of time and season and to be able to hit on the right ones for our design. Nor is the place fixed for the intended *coup de main* a matter of small importance; for often this shows seemingly impossible things to be possible and seemingly possible ones to be impossible. Finally, we must pay due attention to signals and counter signals, and to the choice of those by whose agency and in whose company our project is to be executed.

14 Τῶν δὲ προειρημένων τὰ μὲν ἐκ τριβῆς, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἱστορίας, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν μεθοδικὴν θεω-
2 ρεῖται. κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς καὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐφ' ὃν δεῖ παραγενέσθαι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τόπου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, δι' ὧν
3 μέλλει καὶ μεθ' ὧν πράττειν. δεύτερον δ' ἱστορεῖν ἐπιμελῶς καὶ ‹μὴ› πιστεύειν τοῖς τυχοῦσι· τὴν δὲ τῶν καθηγουμένων πίστιν ἐπί τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐν
4 τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἀεὶ δεῖ κεῖσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια δυνατὸν ἴσως καὶ δι' αὐτῆς τῆς στρατιωτικῆς τριβῆς περιγίνεσθαι τοῖς ἡγουμέ-
5 νοις, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὐτουργίας, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἱστορίας· τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας προσδεῖται μαθήσεως καὶ θεωρημάτων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξ ἀστρολογίας καὶ γεωμετρίας, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔργον οὐ μέγα πρός γε ταύτην τὴν χρείαν, τὸ δὲ χρῆμα μέγα καὶ μεγάλα συνερ-
6 γεῖν δυνάμενον πρὸς τὰς προειρημένας ἐπιβολάς. ἀναγκαιότατον δ' αὐτοῦ τὸ περὶ τὰς νυκτερινὰς θεωρίας καὶ τὰς ἡμερινάς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσας εἶναι συνέβαινεν ἀεὶ ταύτας, οὐδ' ἥστινος ἂν ἀσχολίας τὸ πρᾶγμα προσεδεῖτο, κοινὴ δ' ἂν ἦν ἁπάντων ἡ γνώ-
7 σις· ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἔχει τὰ προειρημένα πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὑτά, δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη γινώσκειν τὰς αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις ἑκατέ-
8 ρων. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις εὐστοχήσειε πορείας καὶ διανύσματος ἡμερησίου, πῶς δὲ νυκτερινοῦ, μὴ κατα-
9 νοήσας τὰς τῶν προειρημένων διαφοράς; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν ἐξικέσθαι δυνατὸν ἄνευ τῆς τούτων ἐμπειρίας, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ὑστερεῖν,
10 ποτὲ δὲ προτερεῖν ἀνάγκη. μεῖζον δὲ τὸ προτερεῖν

14. These things are learnt either by experience or by inquiry or by scientific investigation. It is of course far best for a general to be himself acquainted with the roads, the spot he is bound for and the nature of the ground, as well as with the people by whose agency and in concert with whom he is going to act. But the next best thing is to make careful inquiries and not to rely on chance informants. The pledges of good faith given by those who act as guides in such a case must be in the hands of those who follow their guidance. Skill, therefore, in these and similar matters can perhaps be acquired by a general just through military experience, partly by practice, and partly by inquiry; but what depends on scientific principles requires a theoretical knowledge more especially of astronomy and geometry, which, while no very deep study of them is required for this purpose at least, are exceedingly important and capable of rendering the greatest services in projects such as we are speaking of. The most necessary part of astronomy is that dealing with the variations of day and night. If day and night were always of equal length, the matter would give us no trouble and the knowledge of it would be common property; since, however, days and nights differ not only from each other, but also from themselves it is evidently necessary to be acquainted with the increase and decrease of both. For how can one rightly calculate the distance traversed in a day's march or in a night's march without knowing the different lengths of day and night? Indeed it is impossible for anything to come off at the proper time without such knowledge; it is sure to be either too late or too soon. And in such matters

11 ἐν μόνοις τούτοις ἁμάρτημα τοῦ καθυστερεῖν· ὁ
μὲν γὰρ ὑπεράρας τὸν ὡρισμένον καιρὸν αὐτῆς
ἀποτυγχάνει τῆς ἐλπίδος—τὸ γὰρ γεγονὸς ἐξ
ἀποστήματος ἐπιγνοὺς αὖθις ἀπολύεται μετ' ἀσφα-
12 λείας—ὁ δὲ προλαβὼν τὸν καιρόν, ἐγγίσας καὶ
γνωρισθεὶς οὐ μόνον ἀποτυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιβολῆς,
15 ἀλλὰ καὶ κινδυνεύει τοῖς ὅλοις. κρατεῖ δ' ἐπὶ
πάντων μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἔργων ὁ καιρός,
2 μάλιστα δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν. διὸ προχείρως ἰστέον
τῷ στρατηγῷ τροπὰς ἡλίου θερινὰς <καὶ χειμε-
ρινάς>, ἔτι δ' ἰσημερίας καὶ τὰς μεταξὺ τούτων
3 αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν· οὕτως
γὰρ ἂν μόνως δύναιτο συμμετρεῖσθαι πρὸς λόγον
τὰ διανύσματα καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.
4 καὶ μὴν τοὺς κατὰ μέρος καιροὺς ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι,
καὶ τοὺς τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τοὺς τῆς νυκτός, πρὸς τὸ
γινώσκειν πηνίκα ποιητέον καὶ τὰς ἐξεγέρσεις καὶ
5 τὰς ἀναζυγάς· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνειν
6 μὴ οὐ τῆς ἀρχῆς εὐστοχήσαντα. τοὺς μὲν οὖν τῆς
ἡμέρας καιροὺς τῇ σκιᾷ θεωρεῖν οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἔτι
δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον πορείᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ κόσμου
7 γινομένοις αὐτοῦ τούτου διαστήμασι· τοὺς δὲ τῆς
νυκτὸς δυσχερές, ἐὰν μή τις ἐπὶ τοῦ φαινομένου
τῇ τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ τάξει συμ-
περιφέρηται· πάνυ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον τοῖς τὰ
8 φαινόμενα πεπολυπραγμονηκόσιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀν-
ίσων οὐσῶν τῶν νυκτῶν ὅμως ἐν πάσῃ τῇ νυκτὶ
τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων ἓξ ἀναφέρεσθαι συμβαίνει,
φανερὸν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μέρεσι πάσης
νυκτὸς ἴσα μέρη τῶν δώδεκα ζῳδίων ἀναφέρεσθαι.
9 τοῦ δ' ἡλίου γνωριζομένου καθ' ἡμέραν, ποίαν
μοῖραν ἐπέχει, δῆλον ὡς δύναντος τούτου τὴν κατὰ

alone it is a worse fault to be in advance than behind hand. For he who arrives later than the hour decided upon is disappointed merely in his hope—since he becomes aware of the fact while still at a distance and can get away in security—but he who arrives too soon, approaching the enemy and being discovered by him, not only fails in his attempt, but runs the risk of total destruction. 15. It is time, indeed, which rules all human action and especially the affairs of war. So that a general must be familiar with the dates of the summer and winter solstices, and the equinoxes, and with the rate of increase and decrease of days and nights between these; for by no other means can he compute correctly the distances he will be able to traverse either by sea or land. He must also be acquainted with the subdivisions of day and night so as to know when to sound the revally and to be on the march; for it is impossible to obtain a happy end unless the beginning is happily timed. Now for the time of day there is nothing to hinder our observing it either by the shadow or by the sun's course or by his position and height in the heavens, but it is difficult to tell the hour of the night, unless one is familiar with the system and order of the twelve signs of the Zodiac in the starry sky, knowledge of which it is quite easy to gain by studying the constellations. For since, though nights are of unequal length, yet during the course of every night six out of the twelve signs of the Zodiac must appear above the horizon, it follows of necessity that equal parts of the twelve signs must appear at the same times of the night. As the position each day of the sun in the Zodiac is known, it is evident that at his setting the part

διάμετρον ἐπιτέλλειν ἀνάγκη. λοιπὸν ὅσον ἂν τὸ μετὰ ταύτην μέρος ἀνατεταλκὸς φαίνηται τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ, τοσοῦτον εἰκὸς ἠνύσθαι τῆς νυκτὸς αἰεί. γνωριζομένων δὲ τῶν ζῳδίων καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τοιούτους γίνεσθαι μετὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος καιροὺς τῆς νυκτός. ἐν δὲ ταῖς συννεφέσι νυξὶ τῇ σελήνῃ προσεκτέον, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος ὡς ἐπίπαν αἰεὶ τὸ ταύτης ἐμφαίνεται φῶς, καθ' ὃν ἂν ᾖ τόπον τοῦ κόσμου. καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς καιρῶν καὶ τόπων στοχαστέον, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς δύσεις, καθυπαρχούσης καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐννοίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε συμπεριφέρεσθαι ταῖς καθ' ἡμέραν διαφοραῖς τῶν ἀνατολῶν. ἔστι δὲ τρόπος εὐθεώρητος καὶ περὶ ταύτην· ὅρος γὰρ εἷς μὴν ὡς τύπῳ, καὶ πρὸς αἴσθησιν τοιοῦτοι πάντες. ἢ καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄν τις ἐπαινέσειε, διότι παρεισάγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, τὸν ἡγεμονικώτατον ἄνδρα, τεκμαιρόμενον ἐκ τῶν ἄστρων οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τοὺς πλοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ γῇ πράξεις. ἱκανὰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρὰ δόξαν γινόμενα <μὴ δυνάμενα> τυγχάνειν προνοίας ἀκριβοῦς εἰς τὸ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρασκευάζειν καὶ πολλάκις, οἷον ὄμβρων καὶ ποταμῶν ἐπιφοραὶ καὶ πάγων ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ χιόνες, ἔτι δ' ὁ καπνώδης καὶ συννεφὴς ἀὴρ καὶ τἄλλα τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις. εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὧν δυνατόν ἐστι προϊδέσθαι, καὶ τούτων ὀλιγωρήσομεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἀποτευξόμεθα δι' αὐτούς; διόπερ οὐκ ἀφροντιστητέον οὐδενὸς τῶν προειρημένων, ἵνα μὴ τοιούτοις ἀλογήμασι περιπίπτωμεν οἷοις φασὶ περιπεσεῖν ἑτέρους τε πλείους καὶ τοὺς

diametrically opposite must rise. So that the portion of the night which is past is to be judged by the portion of the Zodiac which has risen after this; and the number and size of the signs of the Zodiac being known, the subsequent subdivisions of the night correspond to them. On cloudy nights, however, we must observe the moon, because as a rule, owing to her size, her light is visible in whatever part of the heaven she may be situated. We can guess the hour at times from the time and place of her rising and at times again from those of her setting, if here too we have sufficient previous knowledge to be familiar with the daily difference in the hour of her rising. Here also there is an easy method of reckoning, for the period of her revolution is generally speaking one month, and all the months are similar as far as we can perceive. 16. Homer is therefore deserving of praise in representing Odysseus, the most capable of commanders, as observing the stars to direct not only his course at sea, but his operations on land. For those accidents which take us by surprise and cannot be accurately foreseen are quite sufficiently numerous to expose us to great and frequent difficulties, I mean sudden rains and floods, exceeding great frosts and snowfalls, a foggy and clouded state of the atmosphere and the like, and if we pay no attention even to such things as can be foreseen, we are sure to fail in most enterprises by our own fault. So that none of the above-mentioned matters must be neglected, if we are not to commit such blunders as many other generals

νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι μέλλοντας ὑποδείγματος χάριν.

17 Ἄρατος ὁ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἐπιβαλόμενος πραξικοπεῖν τὴν τῶν Κυναιθέων πόλιν, συνετάξατο πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῷ συνεργοῦντας ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ τὸν μὲν Ἄρατον ἔδει νυκτὸς παραγενηθέντα πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Κυναίθης ῥέοντα ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν ἕω[1] μένειν ἐνσχολάσαντα μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, τοὺς δ' ἔνδοθεν περὶ μέσον ἡμέρας, ὅτε λάβοιεν τὸν καιρόν, ἕνα μὲν αὐτῶν μεθ' ἡσυχίας ἐν ἱματίῳ διὰ τῆς πύλης ἐκπέμψαι, καὶ κελεῦσαι προελθόντα στῆναι πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τάφον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς προσενεγκεῖν τὰς χεῖρας τοῖς ἄρχουσι, κοιμωμένοις κατὰ μέσον ἡμέρας, τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τηρεῖν τὴν πύλην. γενομένου δὲ τούτου σπουδῇ καταταχεῖν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας ἔδει πρὸς τὴν πύλην. τούτων δὲ διατεταγμένων καὶ τοῦ καιροῦ συνάψαντος, ὁ μὲν Ἄρατος ἦκε καὶ κρυφθεὶς κατὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἔμενε τηρῶν τὸ σύνθημα· περὶ δὲ πέμπτην ὥραν ἔχων τις πρόβατα μαλακὰ τῶν εἰθισμένων περὶ πόλιν τρέφειν, δεηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ πυθέσθαι τι τοῦ ποιμένος βιωτικόν, ἐξῆλθε διὰ τῆς πύλης ἐν ἱματίῳ καὶ στὰς ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τάφον περιεβλέπετο τὸν ποιμένα. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον ἀποδεδόσθαι σφίσι τὸ σύνθημα νομίσαντες σπουδῇ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐφέροντο πάντες. ταχὺ δὲ τῆς πύλης κλεισθείσης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφεστώτων διὰ τὸ μηδέπω μηδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔνδον ἡτοιμάσθαι, συνέβη μὴ μόνον τῆς πράξεως ἀποτυχεῖν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον,

[1] MSS. ἐπι πρεπιου.

are said to have committed besides those I am about to cite as examples.

17. Aratus, the Achaean strategus, having formed the project of getting Cynaetha betrayed to him, came to an agreement with those in the city who were working for him, fixing a day on which he himself was to march by night to the river that runs down from Cynaetha towards the east and remain there quietly with his forces. Those in the city about midday, whenever they had the opportunity, were to send out quietly through the gate one of their number dressed in a mantle with orders to advance as far as a certain tomb outside the city and take up his post on it. Meanwhile the rest of them were to attack the officers who used to keep the gate, while they were taking their midday sleep. Upon this the Achaeans were to issue from their ambush and make for the gate at full speed. Such being the arrangement, when the day came Aratus arrived and hid in the river-bed waiting for the signal. But at about the fifth hour of the day the owner of some of those delicate sheep which are in the habit of grazing near the town, having some urgent private business with his shepherd, came out of the gate dressed in a mantle and went and stood on the identical tomb looking round for the shepherd. Aratus and his troops, thinking that the signal had been given them, made a rush for the town, but the gate was at once closed in their faces by its keepers, as their friends inside the town had as yet taken no measures, and the consequence was that not only did the coup that Aratus had planned fail, but they brought

ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως συμπράττουσιν αἰτίους γενέσθαι τῶν μεγίστων συμπτωμάτων· καταφανεῖς γὰρ γενόμενοι παραχρῆμα προβλη-
9 θέντες ἀπέθανον. τί οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν τῆς περιπετείας αἴτιον γεγονέναι; τὸ ποιήσασθαι τὸν στρατηγὸν ἁπλοῦν τὸ σύνθημα, νέον ἀκμὴν ὄντα καὶ τῆς τῶν διπλῶν συνθημάτων καὶ παρασυν-
10 θημάτων ἀκριβείας ἄπειρον. οὕτως αἱ πολεμικαὶ πράξεις ἐν μικρῷ τὸ διαφέρον ἔχουσι τῆς ἐφ' ἑκάτερα ῥοπῆς τῶν ἐκβαινόντων.

18 Καὶ μὴν Κλεομένης ὁ Σπαρτιάτης προθέμενος διὰ πράξεως ἑλεῖν τὴν τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν πόλιν, συνετάξατο τοῖς τὸ τεῖχος φυλάττουσι τὸ κατὰ τὸν Φωλοὸν καλούμενον νυκτὸς ἥξειν μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τρίτην φυλακήν· τοῦτον γὰρ ἐφύλαττον τὸν καιρὸν τὸ τεῖχος οἱ συμπράττοντες αὐτῷ.
2 οὐκέτι δὲ προνοηθεὶς ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος ἐπιτολὴν τελέως ἤδη βραχείας εἶναι συμβαίνει τὰς νύκτας, ἐκίνησε τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος
3 περὶ δυσμὰς ἡλίου. λοιπὸν οὐ δυνάμενος καταταχεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμέρας καταλαμβανούσης εἰκῇ καὶ ἀλόγως βιαζόμενος, αἰσχρῶς ἐξέπεσε, πολλοὺς
4 ἀποβαλὼν καὶ κινδυνεύσας τοῖς ὅλοις· ὃς εἰ κατὰ τὸ συνταχθὲν ηὐστόχησε τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ κρατούντων τῆς εἰσόδου τῶν συνεργούντων εἰσήγαγε τὴν δύναμιν, οὐκ ἂν διεψεύσθη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς.

5 Πάλιν ὁμοίως Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεύς, ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, πρᾶξιν ἔχων ἐκ τῆς τῶν Μελιταιῶν πόλεως κατὰ δύο τρόπους ἥμαρτε· καὶ γὰρ τὰς κλίμακας ἐλάττους ἔχων ἦλθε τῆς χρείας καὶ τοῦ και-
6 ροῦ διέπεσε. συνταξάμενος γὰρ ἥξειν περὶ μέσας νύκτας κατακεκοιμημένων ἤδη πάντων, πρὸ τοῦ

destruction on those of the citizens who were acting with him, for they were at once detected, put on their trial, and executed. If we ask what was the cause of the disaster, the answer must be that it was the use of a single signal by the commander, who was still young and ignorant of the accuracy secured by double signals and counter signals. On such small matters does success or failure depend in military operations.

18. Again Cleomenes of Sparta, having formed a plan for taking Megalopolis by treachery, agreed with those of the defenders who guarded the wall near what is called the Den to come there with his army at the third watch of the night, for it was at this hour that his partisans were on guard. But not reflecting that towards the rising of the Pleiads the nights are already quite short, he marched out of Lacedaemon about sunset. So that he was unable to arrive in time, but being overtaken by daylight was rash and imprudent enough to attempt to force his way into the town and was driven out with disgrace and considerable loss, very narrowly escaping complete disaster. Had he succeeded in arriving at the time agreed upon and led his troops in while his partisans were masters of the entrance, he would not have met with failure.

King Philip, to take another instance, having, as I stated above,[a] a proposal from Melitaea to betray the town to him, made two mistakes. Firstly he came there with ladders too short for the purpose, and secondly he did not arrive at the right time. He had arranged to arrive about midnight when everyone was asleep, but he started from Larisa

[a] See Bk. v. 97.

δέοντος καιροῦ κινήσας ἐκ Λαρίσης καὶ προσπεσὼν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Μελιταιῶν χώραν, οὔτ' ἐπιμένειν ἐδύνατο, δεδιὼς μὴ προσαγγελθείη τοῖς ἔνδον, οὔτ'
7 ἀνακάμψας ἔτι λαθεῖν. διόπερ ἀναγκαζόμενος εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν προάγειν, ἦκε πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀκμὴν
8 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγρηγορότων. ὅθεν οὔτε διὰ τῶν κλιμάκων ἠδύνατο βιάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀσυμμετρίαν οὔτε διὰ τῆς πύλης εἰσελθεῖν τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τοὺς
9 ἔνδον αὐτῷ συνεργεῖν διὰ τὸν καιρόν. τέλος διερεθίσας τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν ἰδίων ἀποβαλών, μετ' αἰσχύνης ἄπρακτος ἐπανῆλθε, πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρηγγελκὼς ἀπιστεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ φυλάττεσθαι.

19 Καὶ μὴν Νικίας ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, δυνάμενος σῴζειν τὸ περὶ τὰς Συρακούσας στράτευμα, καὶ λαβὼν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸν ἁρμόζοντα καιρὸν εἰς τὸ λαθεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀποχωρήσας εἰς
2 ἀσφαλές, κἄπειτα τῆς σελήνης ἐκλειπούσης δεισιδαιμονήσας, ὥς τι δεινὸν προσημαινούσης, ἐπέσχε τὴν ἀναζυγήν. καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο συνέβη κατὰ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν αὐτοῦ νύκτα ποιησαμένου τὴν ἀναζυγήν, προαισθομένων τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ὑποχειρίους γενέσθαι τοῖς Συρα-
3 κοσίοις. καίτοι γε παρὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων ἱστορήσας μόνον περῶτούτων δυνατὸς ἦν οὐχ οἷον παραλιπεῖν διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ἰδίους καιρούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεργοῖς χρήσασθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἄγνοιαν·
4 ἡ γὰρ τῶν πέλας ἀπειρία μέγιστον ἐφόδιον γίνεται τοῖς ἐμπείροις πρὸς κατόρθωσιν.

5 Ἐκ μὲν οὖν ἀστρολογίας μέχρι τῶν προειρημέ-

before the proper hour, and on entering the territory of Melitaea, neither could remain there, as he feared that news of his arrival would reach the city, nor could he get back without being noticed. Being compelled, therefore, to advance he reached the city while people were still awake. So that he could neither take the place by escalade, owing to the defective size of his ladders, nor could he get in through the gate, as owing to the earliness of the hour his partisans within could not co-operate with him. Finally, after merely provoking the garrison and losing many of his own men he made a shameful retreat with his purpose unaccomplished, having thus given public notice to everyone else to mistrust him and be on their guard.

19. Nicias, again the Athenian general, could have saved the army before Syracuse, and had fixed on the proper hour of the night to withdraw into a position of safety unobserved by the enemy ; but on an eclipse of the moon taking place he was struck with superstitious terror as if it foreboded some calamity, and deferred his departure. The consequence of this was that when he abandoned his camp on the following night, the enemy had divined his intention, and both the army and the generals were made prisoners by the Syracusans. Yet had he only inquired from men acquainted with astronomy so far from throwing away his opportunity owing to such an occurrence, he could have utilized the ignorance of the enemy. For nothing contributes more to the success of well-informed men than the lack of instruction in their neighbours.

So far as the points I have mentioned are concerned it is to astronomy that we should address our

νων πολυπραγμονητέον. περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν κλιμάκων συμμετρίας τοιοῦτός τίς ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος τῆς θεωρίας. 6 ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ διά τινος τῶν συμπραττόντων δοθῇ τὸ τοῦ τείχους ὕψος, πρόδηλος ἡ τῶν κλιμάκων γίνεται συμμετρία· οἷον γὰρ ἂν δέκα τινῶν εἶναι συμβαίνῃ τὸ τοῦ τείχους ὕψος, τοιούτων δώδεκα 7 δεήσει τὰς κλίμακας δαψιλῶν ὑπάρχειν. τὴν δ' ἀπόβασιν τῆς κλίμακος πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀναβαινόντων συμμετρίαν ἡμίσειαν εἶναι δεήσει τῆς κλίμακος, ἵνα μήτε πλεῖον ἀφιστάμεναι διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπιβαινόντων εὐσύντριπτοι γίνωνται μήτε πάλιν ὀρθότεραι προσερειδόμεναι λίαν ἀκροσφαλεῖς ὦσι 8 τοῖς προσβαίνουσιν. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ μετρῆσαι μηδ' ἐγγίσαι τῷ τείχει, ληπτέον ἐξ ἀποστάσεως παντὸς ὕψους τὸ μέγεθος τῶν πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἐφεστώ- 9 των τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐπιπέδοις. ὅ τε τρόπος τῆς λήψεως καὶ δυνατὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιος τοῖς βουλομένοις πολυπραγμονεῖν ⟨τὰ⟩ παρὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.

20 Διὸ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις φανερὸν ὅτι δεήσει τοὺς βουλομένους εὐστοχεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ πράξεσι γεγεωμετρηκέναι μὴ τελείως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον ἀναλογίας ἔννοιαν ἔχειν καὶ 2 τῆς περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας θεωρίας. οὐ γὰρ περὶ ταῦτα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν σχημάτων μεταλήψεις ἐν ταῖς στρατοπεδείαις ἀναγκαῖός ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος, χάριν τοῦ δύνασθαι ποτὲ μὲν πᾶν σχῆμα μεταλαμβάνοντας τηρεῖν τὴν αὐτὴν συμ- 3 μετρίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς παρεμβολαῖς περιλαμβανομένων, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων μένοντας αὔξειν ἢ μειοῦν τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον τῇ στρατοπεδείᾳ χωρίον, κατὰ λόγον ἀεὶ τῶν προσγινομένων ἢ τῶν χωριζομένων ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς·

inquiries, but the method of discovering the right length for ladders is as follows. If any of our partisans can give us the height of the wall the required length of the ladders is evident. For if the height of the wall be, let us say, ten of a given measure, the length of the ladders must be a good twelve. The distance from the wall at which the ladder is planted must, in order to suit the convenience of those mounting, be half the length of the ladder, for if they are placed farther off they are apt to break when crowded and if set up nearer to the perpendicular are very insecure for the scalers. If however it is impossible to measure the wall or approach it, the height of any object which stands perpendicular on a plane surface can be taken from a distance, the method of determining it being practicable and easy for anyone who chooses to study mathematics.

20. So here again it is evident that those who aim at success in military plans and surprises of towns must have studied geometry, if not thoroughly at least enough to have a notion of proportion and the principles of equations; for this kind of knowledge indeed is necessary not only for the above purpose but for making changes in the plan of camps, so as to enable us either in changing the whole plan of the camp to keep up the same proportion between the different parts enclosed in it, or at other times while adhering to the same plan to increase or diminish the space included in the camp proportionately to the number of fresh arrivals or departures.

4 ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς τάξεις ὑπομνήμασιν
5 ἀκριβέστερον δεδήλωται. οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι τοῦτό γε μετρίως ἡμῖν ἐποίσειν οὐδένα διότι πολλά τινα προσαρτῶμεν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, κελεύοντες ἀστρολογεῖν καὶ γεωμετρεῖν τοὺς ὀρεγομένους αὐτῆς.
6 ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ περιττοῦ παρελκόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι χάριν τῆς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐπιφάσεως καὶ στωμυλίας πολύ τι μᾶλλον ἀποδοκιμάζων, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀνήκοντος ἐπιτάττειν, περὶ τἀναγκαῖα φιλο-
7 τιμότατός εἰμι καὶ σπουδάζων. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τοὺς μὲν ὀρχηστικῆς ἢ τοὺς αὐλητικῆς ἐφιεμένους ἐπιδέχεσθαι τήν τε περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ προκατασκευήν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν παλαίστραν, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν προσδεῖσθαι τὸ τέλος ἑκατέρου τῆς
8 τῶν προειρημένων συνεργίας, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγίας ἀντιποιουμένους ἀσχάλλειν, εἰ δεήσει τῶν ἐκτὸς
9 ἐπιτηδευμάτων μέχρι τινὸς ἀναλαβεῖν. ὥστε τοὺς περὶ τὰς βαναύσους τέχνας ἀσκοῦντας ἐμμελεστέρους εἶναι καὶ φιλοτιμοτέρους τῶν περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ σεμνότατα προαιρουμένων διαφέρειν· ὧν οὐδὲν
10 ἂν ὁμολογήσειε νοῦν ἔχων οὐδείς. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω. . . .

21 Ὅτι τοιαύτης διαθέσεως ὑπαρχούσης περί τε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους καὶ Καρχηδονίους, καὶ παλιντρόπων ἑκατέροις ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἀπαντωμένων ἐναλλὰξ προσπιπτόντων, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ἅμα λύπην καὶ χαρὰν ὑποτρέχειν εἰκὸς ἦν τὰς ἑκάστων ψυχάς. . . .

22 Ὅτι τῶν ἑκατέροις, Ῥωμαίοις φημὶ καὶ Καρχη-

About this matter I have entered into greater detail in my notes on tactics. I do not think anyone can fairly maintain that I attach too many qualifications to the art of generalship, by thus urging those who aim at mastering it to study astronomy and geometry. On the contrary I strongly disapprove of all such superfluous acquirements in a profession as serve but for ostentation and fine talk, but while also disinclined to insist on any studies beyond those that are of actual use, in the case of necessary knowledge I am most exacting and earnest. It is indeed strange that those who wish to learn the arts of dancing and flute-playing should consent to study as a preliminary the theory of rhythm and music and even to acquire some gymnastic training, because it is thought that perfection in either cannot be attained without such aid, while those who aspire to the command of armies regard it as a grievance if we demand of them a certain slight acquaintance with other sciences. This would mean that those who practise illiberal arts show greater diligence and emulation than those whose aim is to excel in the most honourable and serious of all employments—a proposition to which no sensible man would give his assent. But these remarks must suffice on this subject. . . .

21. Such being the respective positions of the Romans and Carthaginians, experiencing in turn the opposite extremes of fortune, it was natural that, as Homer says, pain and joy at once should possess the minds of each. . . .

The Character of Hannibal

22. Of all that befel both nations, Romans and

δονίοις, προσπιπτόντων καὶ συμβαινόντων εἰς ἣν ἀνὴρ αἴτιος καὶ μία ψυχή, λέγω δὲ τὴν Ἀννίβου. 2 τά τε γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὁμολογουμένως οὗτος ἦν ὁ χειρίζων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν διὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τῶν ἀδελφῶν Ἀσδρούβου, μετὰ δὲ 3 ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ [πρεσβύτου] Μάγωνος· οἱ γὰρ τοὺς τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοὺς ἀμφοτέρους ἀποκτείναν- 4 τες [ἅμα] κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἦσαν οὗτοι. καὶ μὴν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἔπραττε τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς διὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἱπποκράτην, ὕστερον δὲ διὰ Μυττό- 5 νου τοῦ Λίβυος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα· καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τόπων φόβον ἀνατεινόμενος ἐξέπληττε καὶ περιέσπα Ῥωμαίους διὰ τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον κοινοπραγίας. 6 οὕτως μέγα τι φύεται χρῆμα καὶ θαυμάσιον ἀνὴρ καὶ ψυχὴ δεόντως ἁρμοσθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σύστασιν πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν ὁρμήσῃ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων.

7 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων διάθεσις εἰς ἐπίστα- σιν ἡμᾶς ἦχε περὶ τῆς Ἀννίβου φύσεως, ἀπαιτεῖν ὁ καιρὸς δοκεῖ μοι τὰς μάλιστα διαπορουμένας 8 ἰδιότητας ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι. τινὲς μὲν γὰρ ὠμὸν αὐτὸν οἴονται γεγονέναι καθ' ὑπερβολήν, τινὲς δὲ φιλάργυρον. τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένων οὐ 9 ῥᾴδιον. ἔνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγχεσθαί φασι τὰς φύσεις ὑπὸ τῶν περιστάσεων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις καταφανεῖς γίνεσθαι, κἂν ὅλως τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀναστέλλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις. 10 ἐμοὶ δ' ἔμπαλιν οὐχ ὑγιὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὀλίγα μοι φαίνονται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν φίλων παραθέσεις, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὰς

Carthaginians, the cause was one man and one mind—Hannibal. It was he indisputably who had the management of the Italian campaign, and he also directed that in Spain through his elder brother Hasdrubal and afterwards through Mago, these being the generals who killed the two Roman commanders in that country. Besides this he managed affairs in Sicily, first of all through Hippocrates and subsequently through Myttonus the African, and he was likewise active in Greece and Illyria, threatening the Romans from these parts and keeping them alarmed and distracted by his understanding with Philip. Such a great and wonderful product of nature is a man with a mind properly fitted by its original constitution to execute any project within human power.

But since the course of affairs has called our attention to the character of Hannibal, I think I am called upon at present to state my opinion regarding those peculiar traits in it which are the subject of most dispute. For some accuse him of excessive cruelty and others of avarice. Now it is no easy thing to state the truth about him or in general about men who are engaged in public affairs. For some say that men's real natures are revealed by circumstances, the truth being in the case of some brought to light by possession of power, even if they have hitherto managed to disguise it entirely, and in that of others by misfortune. But I cannot myself regard this view as sound. For it appears to me that not in a few cases only but in most cases men are compelled to

τῶν πραγμάτων ποικιλίας, ἄνθρωποι παρὰ τὴν
αὐτῶν προαίρεσιν ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν καὶ
23 πράττειν. γνοίη δ' ἄν τις ἐπὶ πολλῶν τῶν ἤδη
2 γεγονότων ἐπιστήσας. τίς γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλέα τὸν
Σικελίας τύραννον οὐχ ἱστόρηκε διότι δόξας ὠμό-
τατος εἶναι κατὰ τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ τὴν
κατασκευὴν τῆς δυναστείας, μετὰ ταῦτα νομίσας
βεβαίως ἐνδεδέσθαι τὴν Σικελιωτῶν ἀρχὴν πάντων
3 ἡμερώτατος δοκεῖ γεγονέναι καὶ πρᾳότατος; ἔτι
δὲ Κλεομένης ὁ Σπαρτιάτης οὐ χρηστότατος μὲν
βασιλεύς, πικρότατος δὲ τύραννος, εὐτραπελώτατος
4 δὲ πάλιν ἰδιώτης καὶ φιλανθρωπότατος; καίτοι
γ' οὐκ εἰκὸς ἦν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς φύσεις τὰς ἐναν-
τιωτάτας διαθέσεις ὑπάρχειν· ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενοι
ταῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς συμμετατίθεσθαι
τὴν ἐναντίαν τῇ φύσει πολλάκις ἐμφαίνουσι διάθεσιν
ἔνιοι τῶν δυναστῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός, ὥστε μὴ
οἷον ἐλέγχεσθαι τὰς φύσεις διὰ τούτων, τὸ δ'
5 ἐναντίον ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ
τὰς τῶν φίλων παραθέσεις εἴωθε συμβαίνειν οὐ
μόνον ἡγεμόσι καὶ δυνάσταις καὶ βασιλεῦσιν,
6 ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεσιν. Ἀθηναίων γοῦν εὔροι τις ἂν
ὀλίγα μὲν τὰ πικρά, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ
σεμνὰ τῆς πολιτείας Ἀριστείδου καὶ Περικλέους
προεστώτων, Κλέωνος δὲ καὶ Χάρητος τἀναντία·
7 Λακεδαιμονίων <δ'> ἡγουμένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅσα
μὲν διὰ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ βασιλέως πράττοιτο,
πάντα συμμαχικὴν εἶχε τὴν αἵρεσιν, ὅσα δὲ
8 δι' Ἀγησιλάου, τοὐναντίον· ὥστε καὶ τὰ τῶν
πόλεων ἔθη ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων διαφοραῖς συμ-
9 μεταπίπτειν. Φίλιππος δ' ὁ βασιλεύς, ὅτε μὲν
Ταυρίων ἢ Δημήτριος αὐτῷ συμπράττοιεν, ἦν

act and speak contrary to their real principles by the complexity of facts and by the suggestions of their friends. 23. There are many previous instances a consideration of which will show that this is so. Take Agathocles the tyrant of Sicily. Do not all historians tell us that after showing himself exceedingly cruel in his first enterprises and in the establishment of his power, afterwards, when once he thought that he had securely attached the Sicilians to his rule, he became to all appearance the gentlest and mildest of men? Again, was not Cleomenes of Sparta at once a most excellent king and a most cruel tyrant, and then again in private intercourse most urbane and courteous? Now we can hardly suppose that dispositions so diametrically opposite existed in the same natures. The fact is rather that some princes are compelled to change with the change of circumstances and often exhibit to others a disposition which is quite the opposite of their real nature, so that so far from men's natures being revealed by such means they are rather obscured. And a like effect is usually produced by the suggestions of friends not only on generals, princes, and kings but on cities. At Athens at least we find that during the government of Aristides and Pericles the state was the author of few cruel actions, but of many kind and praiseworthy ones, while under Cleon and Chares it was quite the reverse; and again when the Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all that King Cleombrotus did was done in the spirit of friendly alliance, but it was the reverse with Agesilaus; so that the character of cities also changes with that of those who govern them. And so with King Philip, when he had Taurion and Demetrius

ἀσεβέστατος, ὅτε δὲ πάλιν Ἄρατος ἢ Χρυσόγονος, ἡμερώτατος.

24 Παραπλήσια δέ μοι δοκεῖ τούτοις καὶ τὰ κατ' 2 Ἀννίβαν γεγονέναι· καὶ γὰρ περιστάσεσι παραδόξοις καὶ ποικίλαις ἐχρήσατο καὶ φίλοις τοῖς ἔγγιστα μεγάλας ἐσχηκόσι διαφοράς, ὥστε καὶ λίαν ἐκ τῶν κατ' Ἰταλίαν πράξεων δυσθεώρητον εἶναι 3 τὴν τοῦ προειρημένου φύσιν. τὰς μὲν οὖν τῶν περιστάσεων ὑποβολὰς εὐχερὲς καὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων καὶ διὰ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένων καταμαθεῖν, τὰς δὲ τῶν φίλων οὐκ ἄξιον παραλιπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ διὰ μιᾶς γνώμης ἱκανὴν τοῦ 4 πράγματος ἔμφασιν ‹ἐξὸν› λαβεῖν. καθ' ὃν γὰρ καιρὸν Ἀννίβας ἐξ Ἰβηρίας τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν ἐπενόει στέλλεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, μεγίστης προφαινομένης δυσχρηστίας περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ τὴν ἑτοιμότητα τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, ἅτε καὶ κατὰ τὸ μῆκος ἀνήνυτον ἔχειν τι δοκούσης τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα 5 τῶν μεταξὺ κατοικούντων βαρβάρων, τότε δοκεῖ καὶ πλεονάκις ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐμπιπτούσης ἀπορίας εἰς τῶν φίλων Ἀννίβας ὁ Μονομάχος ἐπικαλούμενος ἀποφήνασθαι γνώμην διότι μία τις ὁδὸς αὐτῷ προφαίνεται, δι' 6 ἧς ἐστιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐλθεῖν ἐφικτόν. τοῦ δ' Ἀννίβου λέγειν κελεύσαντος, διδάξαι δεῖν ἔφη τὰς δυνάμεις ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν καὶ τούτῳ ποιῆσαι 7 συνήθεις . . . . Ἀννίβας δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τόλμημα καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐδὲν ἀντειπεῖν ἐδυνήθη, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν οὔθ' 8 αὐτὸν οὔτε τοὺς φίλους ἐδύνατο πεῖσαι. τούτου δὲ τἀνδρὸς εἶναί φασιν ἔργα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν

to act with him he was most wicked, but when he had Aratus and Chrysogonus he was most gentle.

24. It was very much the same, I think, with Hannibal. He had to deal with circumstances of such an exceptional and complex nature, and his nearest friends differed so widely in character, that from his actions when in Italy it is very difficult to discover the man's real nature. As for what was due to the promptings of circumstance, that can easily be learnt from my preceding narrative and that which is to follow, but we must not ignore what he owed to the suggestions of his friends, especially as it is possible to get a very adequate notion of their nature from one single piece of advice. At the time when Hannibal contemplated marching on Italy from Spain with his army, it was foreseen that he would be very hard put to it to feed the troops and keep them constantly provided with supplies, the difficulties of the march seeming almost insuperable both owing to the distance and to the numbers and savage character of the barbarous inhabitants of the intervening countries. It seems that the difficulty was more than once discussed in the Council, and that one of Hannibal's friends, Hannibal surnamed Monomachus (*gladiator*), stated that he foresaw only one way by which it would be possible to reach Italy. When Hannibal asked him to explain himself, he said he must teach his troops to eat human flesh and accustom them to this. . . . Hannibal had nothing to say against the boldness and usefulness of this suggestion, but he could persuade neither himself nor his friends actually to entertain it. They say that the acts of cruelty in

Ἰταλίαν εἰς Ἀννίβαν ἀναφερόμενα περὶ τῆς ὠμότητος, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων.

25 Φιλάργυρός γε μὴν δοκεῖ γεγονέναι διαφερόντως καὶ φίλῳ κεχρῆσθαι φιλαργύρῳ Μάγωνι τῷ
2 <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν Βρεττίαν χειρίζοντι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐγὼ παρέλαβον μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν
3 Καρχηδονίων· ἐγχώριοι γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰς τῶν ἀνέμων στάσεις κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων ἀνθρώπων ἤθη κάλλιστα γινώ-
4 σκουσιν· ἔτι δὲ Μασαννάσου . . . ἀκριβέστερον διήκουσα, φέροντος ἀπολογισμοὺς καθόλου μὲν περὶ πάντων Καρχηδονίων, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἀννίβου καὶ Μάγωνος τοῦ Σαυνίτου προσαγορευο-
5 μένου φιλαργυρίας. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔφη γενναιότατα κεκοινωνηκότας ἑαυτοῖς πραγμάτων τοὺς προειρημένους ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας καὶ πολλὰς μὲν πόλεις κατ' Ἰβηρίαν, πολλὰς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν εἰληφότας ἑκατέρους, τὰς μὲν κατὰ
6 κράτος, τὰς δ' ἐκ παραδόσεως, οὐδέποτε μετεσχηκέναι τῆς αὐτῆς πράξεως ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μᾶλλον ἑαυτοὺς ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους στρατηγεῖν χάριν τοῦ μὴ συμπαρεῖναι θάτερον θατέρῳ πόλεως καταλαμβανομένης, ἵνα μήτε διαφέρωνται πρὸς σφᾶς ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μήτε μερίζωνται τὸ λυσιτελές, ἐφαμίλλου τῆς ὑπεροχῆς αὐτῶν ὑπαρχούσης.

26 Πλὴν ὅτι γε καὶ τὴν Ἀννίβου φύσιν οὐ μόνον ἡ τῶν φίλων παράθεσις, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων περίστασις ἐβιάζετο καὶ μετετίθετο πολλάκις, ἔκ τε τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τῶν λέγεσθαι
2 μελλόντων ἐστὶ φανερόν. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ γενέσθαι τὴν Καπύην τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὑποχείριον εὐθέως

Italy of which Hannibal is accused were the work of this man, but in no less degree that of circumstances.

25. He does indeed seem to have been exceedingly fond of money, and so was his friend Mago who commanded in Bruttium. I have been told about this matter both by Carthaginians themselves—for the natives of a place do not only know best, as the saying is, the direction of the wind, but the character of their compatriots—and more in detail by Massanissa, when he discoursed on the love of money displayed by Carthaginians in general and especially by Hannibal and by this Mago who was known as the Samnite. Among other things he told me that while these two men had from their earliest youth most generously shared all kinds of enterprises with each other and had each taken many cities both in Spain and Italy by force or by betrayal, on no single occasion had they both participated in the same enterprise, but had always manœuvred more carefully against each other than against the enemy, so that the one should not be present when the other took a city, to avoid any differences arising between them from such causes and any sharing in the profits as they were of equal rank.

26. But that it was not only the suggestions of friends that changed and did violence to Hannibal's real nature but also the force of circumstances clearly appears from my narrative, both that which precedes and that which is to follow. On Capua falling into the hands of the Romans all the other

ἦσαν, ὅπερ εἰκός, αἱ πόλεις μετέωροι, καὶ περι-
3 έβλεπον ἀφορμὰς καὶ προφάσεις τῆς πρὸς Ῥω-
μαίους μεταβολῆς· ὅτε δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ μάλιστα
δυσχρηστηθεὶς Ἀννίβας εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσεῖν
4 ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. οὔτε γὰρ τηρεῖν τὰς πόλεις
πάσας πολὺ διεστώσας ἀλλήλων δυνατὸς ἦν,
καθίσας εἰς ἕνα τόπον, τῶν πολεμίων καὶ πλείοσι
στρατοπέδοις ἀντιπαραγόντων, οὔτε διαιρεῖν εἰς
5 πολλὰ μέρη τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν οἷός τ' ἦν. εὐ-
χείρωτος γὰρ ἔμελλε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑπάρξειν καὶ
διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι τῷ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
6 πᾶσιν αὐτὸς συμπαρεῖναι. διόπερ ἠναγκάζετο τὰς
μὲν προδήλως ἐγκαταλείπειν τῶν πόλεων, ἐξ ὧν
δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐξάγειν, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ κατὰ τὰς
μεταβολὰς τῶν πραγμάτων συγκαταφθείρῃ τοὺς
7 ἰδίους στρατιώτας. ἐνίας ‹δὲ› καὶ παρασπονδῆσαι'
ὑπέμεινε, μετανιστὰς εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ποιῶν
8 ἀναρπάστους αὐτῶν τοὺς βίους. ἐξ ὧν προσ-
κόπτοντες οἱ μὲν ἀσέβειαν, οἱ δ' ὠμότητα κατ-
9 εγίνωσκον. καὶ γὰρ ἁρπαγαὶ χρημάτων ἅμα τοῖς
προειρημένοις καὶ φόνοι καὶ βίαιοι προφάσεις
ἐγίνοντο διά τε τῶν ἐξιόντων καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰσιόντων
στρατιωτῶν εἰς τὰς πόλεις, ἑκάστων ὑπειληφότων
ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους μεταβαλεῖσθαι
10 πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐξ ὧν καὶ λίαν δυσχερὲς
ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς Ἀννίβου φύσεως, διά τε
τὴν τῶν φίλων παράθεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων
11 περίστασιν. κρατεῖ γε μὴν ἡ φήμη παρὰ μὲν
Καρχηδονίοις ὡς φιλαργύρου, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις
ὡς ὠμοῦ γενομένου [αὐτοῦ].

cities naturally began to waver in their allegiance, and were on the look-out for pretexts and occasions for going over to Rome. Hannibal seems at this crisis to have been in great difficulty and doubt as to how to deal with the situation. For he was neither able to keep watch over all the cities, far distant as they were from each other, if he established himself at one spot, with several hostile armies ready to intercept his movements, nor was he able to subdivide his forces much, as he would then be easily overcome by the enemy owing to numerical inferiority and the impossibility of his being personally present everywhere. He was therefore obliged to abandon openly some of the cities and to withdraw his garrisons from others, from fear lest if they transferred their allegiance he should lose his own soldiers as well. In some cases he even allowed himself to violate the treaties he had made, transferring the inhabitants to other towns and giving up their property to plunder, thereby causing such offence that he was accused both of impiety and cruelty. For as a fact these measures were accompanied by robbery of money, murders, and violence on no matter what pretext at the hands both of the departing and the incoming troops, everybody acting on the supposition that the citizens who were left behind were just on the point of joining the enemy. All this makes it very difficult to pronounce an opinion on the real nature of Hannibal, as we have to allow for the influence of his friends and the force of circumstances. But at any rate among the Carthaginians he was notorious for his love of money and among the Romans for his cruelty.

VI. Res Siciliae

26[a] Οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς περιμέτρου τεκμαίρονται τὰ μεγέθη τῶν προειρη-
2 μένων. λοιπὸν ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὴν μὲν τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν πόλιν πεντήκοντα σταδίων ἔχειν τὸν περίβολον, τὴν δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὀκτὼ καὶ τετταράκοντα, τῷ δὲ μεγέθει διπλῆν εἶναι τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως, ἄπιστον αὐτοῖς
3 εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον. ἂν δὲ καὶ συναυξῆσαί τις βουλόμενος τὴν ἀπορίαν εἴπῃ διότι δυνατόν ἐστι τετταράκοντα σταδίων πόλιν ἢ στρατοπεδείαν ἔχουσαν τὴν περιγραφὴν διπλασίαν γίνεσθαι τῆς ἑκατὸν σταδίων ἐχούσης τὴν περίμετρον, τελέως
4 ἐκπληκτικὸν αὐτοῖς φαίνεται τὸ λεγόμενον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αἴτιον ὅτι τῶν ἐν τοῖς παιδικοῖς μαθήμασι παραδιδομένων ἡμῖν διὰ τῆς γεωμετρίας οὐ
5 μνημονεύομεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων προήχθην εἰπεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πολιτευομένων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡγεμονίαις ἀναστρεφομένων τινὰς ἐκπλήττεσθαι, θαυμάζοντας ποτὲ μὲν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι μείζω τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλιν εἶναι, καὶ πολλῷ μείζω, τῆς τῶν Μεγαλο-
6 πολιτῶν, τὸν περίβολον ἔχουσαν ἐλάττω, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν τεκμαίρεσθαι, στοχαζομένους ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς περιμέτρου τῶν στρατοπεδειῶν.
7 παραπλήσιον δέ τι καὶ ἕτερον ἀδίκημα συμβαίνει περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων ἐπιφάσεις. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰς περικεκλασμένας καὶ βουνώδεις πλείους οἰκίας ὑπολαμβάνουσι κατέχεσθαι τῶν
8 ἐπιπέδων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον διὰ τὸ τὰ τειχία τῶν οἰκοδομιῶν μὴ τοῖς ἐγκλίμασι τῶν

VI. Sicilian Affairs

Computation of the size of Cities

26*a*. Most people judge of the size of cities simply from their circumference. So that when one says that Megalopolis is fifty stades in circumference and Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta is twice as large as Megalopolis, the statement seems incredible to them. And when in order to puzzle them still more, one tells them that a city or camp with a circumference of forty stades may be twice as large as one the circumference of which is one hundred stades, this statement seems to them absolutely astounding. The reason of this is that we have forgotten the lessons in geometry we learnt as children. I was led to make these remarks by the fact that not only ordinary men but even some statesmen and commanders of armies are thus astounded, and wonder how it is possible for Sparta to be larger and even much larger than Megalopolis, although its circumference is smaller; or at other times attempt to estimate the number of men in a camp by taking into consideration its circumference alone. Another very similar error is due to the appearance of cities. Most people suppose that cities set upon broken and hilly ground can contain more houses than those set upon flat ground. This is not so, as the walls of the houses are not built at right angles

ἐδάφων ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐπιπέδοις οἰκοδομεῖσθαι πρὸς ὀρθάς, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ τοὺς λόφους αὐτοὺς
9 βεβηκέναι συμβαίνει. γνοίη δ' ἄν τις ἐκ τοῦ
10 φαινομένου παιδικῶς ὅμως τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ γὰρ νοήσαι τις εἰς ὕψος ἀνατεταμένας τὰς ἐν τοῖς κλίμασιν οἰκίας οὕτως ὥστε πάσας ἰσοϋψεῖς ὑπάρχειν, φανερὸν ὡς ἑνὸς ἐπιπέδου γενομένου τοῦ κατὰ τὰ τέγη τῶν οἰκιῶν, ἴσον καὶ παράλληλον ἔσται τοῦτο τῷ τοῖς λόφοις ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τοῖς
11 τῶν τειχῶν θεμελίοις ἐπιπέδῳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀγνοούντων δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ θαυμαζόντων, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω.

Agrigentum

27 Ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλις οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα διαφέρει τῶν πλείστων πόλεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν κατασκευήν.
2 ἔκτισται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἐν ὀκτωκαίδεκα σταδίοις, ὥστε μηδενὸς ἀμοίρους εἶναι τῶν ἐκ
3 ταύτης χρησίμων· ὁ δὲ περίβολος αὐτῆς καὶ φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ διαφερόντως ἠσφάλισται.
4 κεῖται γὰρ τὸ τεῖχος ἐπὶ πέτρας ἀκροτόμου καὶ περιρρῶγος, ᾗ μὲν αὐτοφυοῦς, ᾗ δὲ χειροποιήτου,
5 περιέχεται δὲ ποταμοῖς· ῥεῖ γὰρ αὐτῆς παρὰ μὲν τὴν νότιον πλευρὰν ὁ συνώνυμος τῇ πόλει, παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς δύσεις καὶ τὸν λίβα τετραμμένην
6 ὁ προσαγορευόμενος Ὕψας. ἡ δ' ἄκρα τῆς πόλεως ὑπέρκειται κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς θερινὰς ἀνατολάς, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἔξωθεν ἐπιφάνειαν ἀπροσίτῳ φάραγγι περιεχομένη, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐντὸς μίαν

to the slope, but to the flat ground at the foot on which the hill itself rests. The truth of this can be made manifest to the intelligence of a child. For if one supposes the houses on a slope to be raised to such a height that their roofs are all level with each other, it is evident that the flat space thus formed by the roofs will be equal in area and parallel to the flat space in which the hill and the foundations of the houses rest. So much for those who aspire to political power and the command of armies but are ignorant of such things and surprised by them.

Agrigentum

27. The city of Agrigentum is superior to most cities not only in the ways I have mentioned but in strength and especially in the beauty of its site and buildings. It stands at a distance of eighteen stades from the sea, so that it enjoys all the advantages of a sea-coast town. It is encircled by natural and artificial defences of unusual strength, the wall being built on a ridge of rock either naturally steep and precipitous or artificially rendered so. It is also surrounded by rivers, that which has the same name as the town running along the southern side and the Hypsas along the west and south-west sides. The citadel overlooking the town is due south-east from it, being surrounded on its outer side by an impassable ravine and having on its inner side but one

7 ἔχουσα πρόσοδον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κορυφῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν ἔκτισται καὶ Διὸς Ἀτα-
8 βυρίου, καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Ῥοδίοις· τοῦ γὰρ Ἀκράγαντος ὑπὸ Ῥοδίων ἀπῳκισμένης, εἰκότως ὁ θεὸς οὗτος τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει προσηγορίαν ἣν καὶ
9 παρὰ τοῖς Ῥοδίοις. κεκόσμηται δὲ καὶ τἄλλα μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἡ πόλις ναοῖς καὶ στοαῖς. καὶ <μὴν> ὁ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου νεὼς παντέλειαν μὲν οὐκ εἴληφε, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδ' ὁποίου τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δοκεῖ λείπεσθαι.

Agathyrna

10 Ἀγάθυρνα, πόλις Σικελίας, ὡς Πολύβιος ἐνάτῃ.
11 Ὁ δὲ Μάρκος δοὺς πίστεις ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας ἔπεισεν ἐκχωρεῖν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, ἐφ' ᾧ λαμβάνοντας μέτρημα παρὰ τῶν Ῥηγίνων πορθεῖν τὴν Βρεττιανήν, κυρίους ὄντας ὧν ἂν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας ὠφεληθῶσι.

VII. Res Graeciae

28 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὴν Μακεδόνων δυναστείαν ἀρχὴν συνέβη γεγονέναι τοῖς Ἕλλησι δουλείας, οὐδ' ἄλλως εἰπεῖν οὐδένα
2 πέπεισμαι τολμῆσαι· σκοπεῖν δ' οὕτως ἔξεστιν. ἦν τι σύστημα τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης Ἑλλήνων, οὓς ἀπῴκισαν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς, ὧν μέγιστον εἶχε πρόσχημα καὶ δύναμιν ἡ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων
3 πόλις. ταύτην ἐξανδραποδισάμενος Φίλιππος καὶ παράδειγμα ποιήσας οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης πόλεων ἐγένετο κύριος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θετταλοὺς
4 ὑφ' αὑτὸν ἐποιήσατο διὰ τὸν φόβον. μετ' οὐ

approach from the town. On its summit stand the temples of Athena and Zeus Atabyrius as in Rhodes ; for since Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians this god naturally bears the same title as in Rhodes. The other temples and porticoes which adorn the city are of great magnificence, the temple of Olympian Zeus being unfinished but second it seems to none in Greece in design and dimensions.

Transfer of the People of Agathyrna

Marcus Valerius persuaded the fugitives to retire to Italy, giving them pledges for the security of their persons, on condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium and plunder Bruttium, retaining whatever booty they carried off from the enemy's country.

VII. Affairs of Greece

Speeches of Chlaeneas the Aetolian and Lyciscus the Acarnanian at Sparta

28. " Men of Lacedaemon, I am convinced indeed 211 B.C.
that no one would venture to deny that the slavery of Greece owes its origin to the kings of Macedon, but the matter may be looked at thus. There was once a group of Greek cities in Thrace founded by the Athenians and Chalcidians, of which Olynthus was the most eminent and powerful. Philip, by selling its inhabitants into slavery and making an example of it, not only obtained possession of the Thracian cities, but intimidated the Thessalians into submission. When, shortly afterwards, he had de-

πολὺ δὲ μάχῃ νικήσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐχρήσατο μεγαλοψύχως τοῖς εὐτυχήμασιν, οὐχ ὅπως Ἀθηναίους εὖ ποιήσῃ, πολλοῦ γε δεῖν, ἀλλ' ἵνα διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἐκείνους εὐεργεσίας προκαλέσηται τοὺς ἄλλους εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐθελοντὴν αὐτῷ τὸ προσταττόμενον. ἦν ἔτι τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως ἀξίωμα, δοκοῦν ἂν σὺν καιρῷ προστήσεσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. τοιγαροῦν πᾶσαν ἱκανὴν ποιησάμενος πρόφασιν ἦκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, καὶ κατέφθειρε μὲν τέμνων τὴν γῆν, κατέφθειρε δ' αἴθων τὰς οἰκίας. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἀποτεμόμενος καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑμῶν προσένειμε τὴν μὲν Ἀργείοις, τὴν δὲ Τεγεάταις καὶ Μεγαλοπολίταις, τὴν δὲ Μεσσηνίοις, ἅπαντας βουλόμενος καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον εὐεργετεῖν, ἐφ' ᾧ μόνον ὑμᾶς κακῶς ποιεῖν. διεδέξατο παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν Ἀλέξανδρος. οὗτος πάλιν ὑπολαβὼν βραχύ τι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔνανσμα καταλείπεσθαι περὶ τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν, τίνα τρόπον αὐτὴν διέφθειρε, πάντας ὑμᾶς οἴομαι καταιδεῖν.

29 Καὶ μὴν περὶ τῶν διαδεξαμένων τούτου τὰ πράγματα πῶς κέχρηνται τοῖς Ἕλλησι, τί με δεῖ κατὰ μέρος λέγειν; οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων ‹οὕτως› ἀπράγμων ὃς οὐχὶ πέπυσται πῶς Ἀντίπατρος μὲν ἐν τῇ περὶ Λαμίαν μάχῃ νικήσας τοὺς Ἕλληνας κάκιστα μὲν ἐχρήσατο τοῖς ταλαιπώροις Ἀθηναίοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, εἰς τοῦτο δ' ὕβρεως ἦλθε καὶ παρανομίας ὡς φυγαδοθήρας καταστήσας ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀντειρηκότας ἢ καθόλου λελυπηκότας τι τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀγόμενοι μετὰ βίας, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν βωμῶν ἀπο-

feated the Athenians in a battle he made a generous use of his success, not with the object of benefiting the Athenians, far from it, but in order that his kindness to them might induce others to obey his orders without resistance. The prestige of your city still survived then and it seemed as if in time you would be the leading power in Greece. Consequently, alleging as sufficient any pretext that offered itself, he came here with his army and inflicted great damage, cutting the crops and trees and burning the homesteads, and finally partitioning your cities and your territory, he assigned part of it to the Argives, part to the Tegeans and Megalopolitans, and part to the Messenians, wishing to confer ill-merited benefits on all of them if by doing so he could only damage you. He was succeeded by Alexander. That king again, because he thought there was left in Thebes a little spark of the Greece that once was, destroyed that city in the manner that you all, I take it, know.

29. "And as for the successors of Alexander, need I tell you in detail how they treated the Greeks? For no one is so indifferent to facts as not to have heard how Antipater after his victory over the Greeks at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians as well as the other Greeks in the harshest manner, going so far in his wanton and lawless violence as to appoint and send round to the different cities exile-hunters to catch those who had opposed or in any way offended the royal house of Macedon. Some forcibly driven out of the temples and others dragged

σπώμενοι, μετὰ τιμωρίας ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες ἐκ πάσης ἐξενηλατοῦντο τῆς Ἑλλάδος· φύξιμον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν πλὴν ἑνὸς αὐτοῖς τοῦ τῶν
5 Αἰτωλῶν ἔθνους. τά γε μὴν Κασσάνδρῳ καὶ Δημητρίῳ πεπραγμένα, σὺν δὲ τούτοις Ἀντιγόνῳ τῷ Γονατᾷ, τίς οὐκ οἶδε; διὰ γὰρ τὸ προσφάτως αὐτὰ γεγονέναι τελέως ἐναργῆ συμβαίνει τὴν
6 γνῶσιν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν. ὧν οἱ μὲν φρουρὰς εἰσάγοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις, οἱ δὲ τυράννους ἐμφυτεύοντες οὐδεμίαν πόλιν ἄμοιρον ἐποίησαν τοῦ
7 τῆς δουλείας ὀνόματος. ἀφέμενος δὲ τούτων ἐπάνειμι νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν τελευταῖον Ἀντίγονον, ἵνα μὴ τὴν ἐκ τούτου πρᾶξιν ἀκάκως τινὲς ὑμῶν θεωροῦντες
8 ὑπόχρεοι χάριτι νομίζωσιν εἶναι Μακεδόσιν. οὔτε γὰρ Ἀχαιοὺς σῴζειν προαιρούμενος Ἀντίγονος ἐπανείλετο τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον οὔτε τῇ Κλεομένους τυραννίδι δυσαρεστούμενος, ἵνα Λακεδαι-
9 μονίους ἐλευθερώσῃ· καὶ λίαν γὰρ ὅ γε τοιοῦτός ἐστι τρόπος εὐήθης, εἴ τις ἄρα ταύτην ὑμῶν ἔχει
10 τὴν διάληψιν· ἀλλ' ὁρῶν οὐκ ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δυναστείαν ἐσομένην, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τὴν Πελοποννησίων ἀρχὴν κατακτήσησθε, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο βλέπων εὖ πεφυχότα τὸν Κλεομένην καὶ τὴν τύχην
11 ὑμῖν λαμπρῶς συνεργοῦσαν, ἅμα φοβηθεὶς καὶ φθονήσας παρῆν, οὐ Πελοποννησίοις βοηθήσων, ἀλλὰ τὰς ὑμετέρας ἐλπίδας ἀφελούμενος καὶ τὴν
12 ὑμετέραν ὑπεροχὴν ταπεινώσων. διόπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγαπᾶν ὀφείλετε Μακεδόνας, ‹ὅτι› κυριεύσαντες τῆς πόλεως οὐ διήρπασαν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐχθροὺς νομίζειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὅτι δυναμένους ὑμᾶς ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλεονάκις ἤδη κεκωλύκασι.

from the altars perished by torture, while those who escaped were expelled from the whole of Greece, having no single place of refuge except the territory of the Aetolian League. And who is ignorant of the actions of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas, all so recent that the memory of them is quite vivid? Some of them by introducing garrisons to cities and others by planting tyrannies left no city with the right to call itself unenslaved. Leaving them aside, I will now pass to the last Antigonus, in case any of you, regarding his action without suspicion, consider themselves under a debt of gratitude to the Macedonians. It was not for the purpose of saving the Achaeans that Antigonus undertook the war against you, nor because he disapproved of the tyranny of Cleomenes and desired to save Sparta. If anyone entertains such a notion he must be very simple-minded. But seeing that his own power would not be safe if you acquired the supremacy in the Peloponnesus, that Cleomenes was just the man to effect this and that Fortune was working for you splendidly, he came here actuated both by fear and envy, not to help the Peloponnesians but to cut short your hopes and humiliate your prestige. So instead of affection for the Macedonians because they did not plunder your city when masters of it, you should consider them your enemies and hate them for preventing you more than once when you had the power of attaining supremacy in Greece.

30 Περί γε μὴν τῆς Φιλίππου παρανομίας τίς
2 χρεία πλείω λέγειν; τῆς μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸ θεῖον
ἀσεβείας ἱκανὸν ὑπόδειγμ' αἱ περὶ τοὺς ἐν Θέρμῳ
ναοὺς ὕβρεις, τῆς δ' εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὠμότητος
ἡ περὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους ἀθεσία καὶ παρασπόνδησις
3 . . . Αἰτωλοὶ γὰρ μόνοι μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
ἀντωφθάλμησαν πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν
ἀδίκως ἀκληρούντων ἀσφαλείας, μόνοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν
Βρέννου καὶ τῶν ἅμα τούτῳ βαρβάρων ἔφοδον
ἀντέστησαν, μόνοι δὲ καλούμενοι συνηγωνίζοντο,
4 βουλόμενοι τὴν πάτριον ἡγεμονίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
ὑμῖν συγκατασκευάζειν.
5 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ νῦν ἐνεστῶτος διαβουλίου γράφειν μὲν
καὶ χειροτονεῖν ἀναγκαῖόν πώς ἐστιν ὡς περὶ
πολέμου βουλευομένοις, τῇ μέντοι γ' ἀληθείᾳ μὴ
6 νομίζειν τοῦτον εἶναι πόλεμον. Ἀχαιοὺς μὲν γὰρ
οὐχ οἷον διανοησομένους βλάπτειν ὑμῶν τὴν
χώραν, μεγάλην δὲ χάριν ἕξειν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνω
τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐὰν δύνωνται τὴν ἰδίαν τηρεῖν, ἐπειδὰν
αὐτοῖς ὁ πόλεμος ὑπ' Ἠλείων καὶ Μεσσηνίων διὰ
τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς συμμαχίαν, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις ὑφ'
7 ἡμῶν περισταθῇ. Φίλιππον δὲ πάντως πέπεισμαι
λήξειν τῆς ὁρμῆς κατὰ μὲν γῆν ὑπ' Αἰτωλῶν
πολεμούμενον, κατὰ δὲ θάλατταν ὑπό τε Ῥωμαίων
8 καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀττάλου. λίαν δ' εὐμαρῶς ἔστι
συλλογίσασθαι τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων.
9 εἰ γὰρ πρὸς μόνους Αἰτωλοὺς πολεμῶν μηδέποτε
δυνατὸς ἦν χειρώσασθαι τούτους, ἥ που συμβεβη-
κότων ἀξιόχρεως ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον;
31 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
πρόθεσιν χάριν τοῦ γνῶναι πάντας ὑμᾶς διότι καὶ

30. "And regarding Philip's offences why need I speak more? As for his impiety to heaven it is sufficient to cite his outrages on the temples at Thermi, and as for his cruelty to men I need but mention his perfidy and treachery to the Messenians. . . . For the Aetolians alone among the Greeks dared to face Antipater and demand security for the unfortunate victims of his injustice, they alone withstood the attack of Brennus and his barbarians, and they alone when called upon came to fight by your side and help you to recover your hereditary position of supremacy.

"I have spoken at sufficient length on this subject, but as regards the present deliberation one may say that while it is necessary to draw up your decree and to vote as if you were deciding on war, as a matter of fact you need not look on this as war. So far from the Achaeans being able to inflict any damage on your territory, I fancy they will be only too grateful to the gods if they can protect their own when encircled by foes, the Eleans and Messenians attacking them on one side owing to their alliance with us, and ourselves on the other. As for Philip, I feel sure that his aggressiveness will soon cease with the Aetolians fighting him on land and the Romans and King Attalus at sea. It is indeed very easy to conjecture what will happen from the past. For if when he was at war with the Aetolians alone he was never able to subdue them, how with this combination against him will he be able to support the present war?

31. "I have spoken so in order that, as was my purpose from the outset, you should all recognize that even if you did not stand in any way committed

μὴ προεισδεδεμένους, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀκεραίου βουλευομένους, μᾶλλον Αἰτωλοῖς ἡμᾶς ἢ Μακεδόσιν ἐχρῆν
2 συμμαχεῖν. εἰ δὲ καὶ προκατέχεσθε καὶ προδιειλήφατε περὶ τούτων, τίς ἔτι καταλείπεται
3 λόγος; εἰ γὰρ συνέθεσθε τὴν νῦν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑμῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς συμμαχίαν πρότερον τῶν ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου γεγονότων εἰς ὑμᾶς εὐεργετημάτων, ἴσως ἦν εἰκὸς διαπορεῖν, εἰ δέον ἐστί, τοῖς ἐπιγεγονόσιν εἴκοντας παριδεῖν τι τῶν πρότερον
4 ὑπαρχόντων. ἐπεὶ δὲ συντετελεσμένης ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου τῆς πολυθρυλήτου ταύτης ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας, ἣν οὗτοι παρ' ἕκαστον ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζουσι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα βουλευόμενοι καὶ πολλάκις ἑαυτοῖς δόντες λόγον, ποτέροις ὑμᾶς δεῖ κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων, Αἰτωλοῖς ἢ Μακεδόσιν, εἵλεσθε μετέχειν Αἰτωλοῖς, οἷς ἐδώκατε περὶ τούτων πίστεις καὶ ‹κατ›ελάβετε παρ' ἡμῶν, καὶ συμπεπολεμήκατε τὸν πρῴην συστάντα πόλεμον ἡμῖν πρὸς Μακεδόνας, τίς ἔτι δύναται περὶ τούτων εἰκότως
5 ἐπαπορεῖν; τὰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς Ἀντίγονον καὶ Φίλιππον ὑμῖν ὑπάρχοντα φιλάνθρωπα παρεγράφη
6 τότε. λοιπὸν ἢ δι' Αἰτωλῶν ἀδίκημά τι δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα γεγονὸς εἰς ὑμᾶς δεικνύειν ἢ διὰ Μακεδόνων εὐεργεσίαν ἢ μηδετέρου τούτων ἐπιγεγονότος, πῶς, οἷς πρότερον ἐξ ἀκεραίου βουλευόμενοι δικαίως οὐ προσέσχετε, τούτων νῦν ἐντραπέντες ἀνασκευάζειν μέλλετε συνθήκας, ὅρκους, τὰς μεγίστας πίστεις παρ' ἀνθρώποις;"

7 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Χλαινέας τοιαῦτα διαλεχθεὶς καὶ δόξας δυσαντιρρήτως εἰρηκέναι κατέπαυσε τὸν
32 λόγον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Λυκίσκος ὁ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων πρεσβευτὴς εἰσελθὼν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπέσχε,

but were considering the question for the first time, you ought rather to ally yourselves with the Aetolians than the Macedonians. But if as is the fact you stand engaged and have made up your minds about the matter, what remains to be said? If indeed you had formed your present alliance with us previous to the favours conferred on you by Antigonus, it might perhaps have been an open question for you whether you should not as a concession to subsequent circumstances neglect earlier obligations. But since it was after the establishment by Antigonus of this much vaunted liberty and security that they are constantly throwing in your teeth, since it was after frequently discussing among yourselves whether you should enter into alliance with the Aetolians or the Macedonians that you decided to join the Aetolians, with whom you have interchanged pledges, side by side also with whom you fought against Macedonia in the late war, what justifiable room for discussion is left? For by your action then your friendly relations with Antigonus and Philip were cancelled. So you must either be able to point to some act of injustice to you committed subsequently by the Aetolians or some benefit conferred on you by Macedonia, or if neither one nor the other exists, how can you, ceding to the instances of the very people whose advances you before rightly decided to reject when your hands were free, contemplate the violation of treaties, oaths, and the most solemn pledges known to men?"

32. Chlaeneas after speaking in these terms which seemed difficult to refute, here ended his harangue. After this Lyciscus, the Acarnanian envoy, coming forward at first refrained from addressing the

θεωρῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν αὑτοῖς διαλαλοῦντας
2 ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων, ἐπεὶ δέ ποτε καθησύ-
3 χασαν, οὕτως πως ἤρξατο τοῦ λέγειν. "Ἡμεῖς, ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παρεγενόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων ἀπεσταλμένοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, μετέχοντες δὲ σχεδὸν ἀεί ποτε Μακεδόσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων καὶ τὴν πρεσβείαν ταύτην κοινὴν ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν καὶ Μακε-
4 δόσιν. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς Μακεδόνων δυνάμεως ἐμπεριέχεσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσφάλειαν ἐν ταῖς ἐκείνων ἀρεταῖς, οὕτως καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβευτικοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐμπεριέχεται τὸ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων συμφέρον ἐν τοῖς Μακεδόνων
5 δικαίοις. διόπερ οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν ὑμᾶς, ἐὰν τὸν πλείω λόγον ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου ποιώμεθα καὶ Μακεδό-
6 νων. Χλαινέας τοιγαροῦν, καταστρέφων τὴν δημηγορίαν, ἀπότομόν τινα συγκεφαλαίωσιν ἐποιήσατο
7 τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πρὸς ὑμᾶς δικαίων. ἔφη γάρ, εἰ μὲν ἐπιγέγονέ τι μετὰ τὸ θέσθαι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὑμᾶς τὴν πρὸς τούτους ἧττοι βλαβερὸν καὶ δυσχερὲς ὑπ' Αἰτωλῶν ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία φιλάνθρωπον ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων, εἰκότως ἂν καὶ τὸ νῦν διαβούλιον
8 ἐξ ἀκεραίου σκέψεως τυγχάνειν· εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς ἐπιγεγονότος τοιούτου τὰ κατ' Ἀντίγονον προφερόμενοι τὰ πρότερον ὑφ' ὑμῶν δεδοκιμασμένα πεπείσμεθα νῦν ἡμεῖς ἀνασκευάσειν ὅρκους καὶ συνθήκας, εὐηθεστάτους πάντων ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχειν.
9 ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν μηδὲν ἐπιγέγονε κατὰ τὸν τούτου λόγον, μένει δὲ τὰ πράγματα τοιαῦτα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν οἷα πρότερον ἦν, ὅτε πρὸς αὐτοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐποιεῖσθε τὴν συμμαχίαν, ὁμολογῶ πάντων εὐηθέ-

assembly, as he saw that they were nearly all engaged in discussing the speech with each other, but when silence was restored he began to speak somewhat as follows: "We, men of Lacedaemon, have been sent to you by the Acarnanian League; and as we have nearly always made common cause with Macedonia we consider that this embassy represents Macedonia as well as our own country. And just as in battles owing to the superiority and strength of the Macedonian force their valour involves our safety, so in diplomatic contests the interests of Acarnania are involved in the rights of Macedonia. You must not therefore be surprised if the greater part of my speech refers to Philip and the Macedonians. Now Chlaeneas at the close of his speech summed up very abruptly the nature of the Aetolian claims on you. He said that if subsequently to your entering into alliance with the Aetolians, you had suffered any injury or offence from them, or had even met with any kindness from the Macedonians, the present meeting would be justified in considering the question afresh, but if nothing of the kind had happened, and if we Acarnanians now believe that by alleging what occurred and met with your approbation in the time of Antigonus we shall succeed in overthrowing oaths and treaties, we are the greatest simpletons in the world. Well, I allow that I am the greatest simpleton in the world and that the words I am about to address to you are idle, if, as he says, nothing has taken place subsequently, but the state of Greece is precisely the

στατος ὑπάρχειν καὶ ματαίους μέλλειν διατίθεσθαι
10 λόγους· εἰ δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔσχηκε διάθεσιν, ὡς
ἐγὼ σαφῶς δείξω προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου, καὶ λίαν
ἐμὲ μὲν οἴομαι φανήσεσθαί τι λέγειν ὑμῖν τῶν
11 συμφερόντων, Χλαινέαν δ' ἀγνοεῖν. παραγινό-
μεθα μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τούτου πεπεισμένοι δεῖν
ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, ὑπὲρ τοῦ δεῖξαι διότι
καὶ πρέπον ὑμῖν ἐστι καὶ συμφέρον, εἰ μὲν δυνατόν,
ἀκούσαντας τῆς ἐπιφερομένης τοῖς Ἕλλησι περι-
στάσεως καλόν τι βουλεύσασθαι καὶ πρέπον
12 ἑαυτοῖς, μετασχόντας ἡμῖν τῶν ἐλπίδων· εἰ δὲ
μή, τούτων τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν κατὰ τὸ παρόν.
33 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνέκαθεν οὗτοι κατηγορεῖν ἐτόλμησαν τῆς
Μακεδόνων οἰκίας, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ
πρότερον ὑπὲρ τούτων βραχέα διαλεχθέντ' ἀφ-
ελέσθαι τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῶν πεπιστευκότων τοῖς
εἰρημένοις.

2 Ἔφη τοιγαροῦν Χλαινέας Φίλιππον τὸν Ἀμύν-
του διὰ τῆς Ὀλυνθίων ἀτυχίας κύριον γενέσθαι
3 Θετταλίας. ἐγὼ δὲ διὰ Φίλιππον οὐ μόνον Θετται-
λούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς Ἕλληνας ὑπολαμβάνω
4 σεσῶσθαι. καθ' οὓς γὰρ καιροὺς Ὀνόμαρχος καὶ
Φιλόμηλος καταλαβόμενοι Δελφοὺς ἀσεβῶς καὶ
παρανόμως ἐγένοντο κύριοι τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ χρη-
μάτων, τότε τίς ὑμῶν οὐκ οἶδε διότι τηλικαύτην
συνεστήσαντο δύναμιν, πρὸς ἣν οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν
5 Ἑλλήνων ἀντοφθαλμεῖν δυνατὸς ἦν; ἀλλ' ἐκιν-
δύνευον ἅμα ταῖς εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβείαις καὶ τῆς
6 Ἑλλάδος γενέσθαι κύριοι πάσης. ἐν οἷς καιροῖς
Φίλιππος ἐθελοντὴν αὐτὸν ἐπιδοὺς ἐπανείλετο
μὲν τοὺς τυράννους, ἠσφαλίσατο δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ
ἱερόν, αἴτιος δ' ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς ἐλευθερίας,

same as it was when you made the alliance with the Aetolians alone. But if the exact reverse is the case, as I shall clearly show in the course of this speech, I think you will be convinced that my advice is highly to your advantage and that Chlaeneas is wrong. We have come here then convinced that we ought to address you on this very matter and demonstrate to you that it will be both to your credit and to your interest to adopt if possible, once you have heard how serious is the danger that threatens Greece, a policy both honourable and worthy of yourselves, by joining our cause ; or if that may not be so, by taking at least no active part in this dispute. 33. But since our opponents have ventured to bring against the house of Macedon accusations dating from early times, I think it incumbent on me to begin by addressing to you a few words on these matters, in order to correct the error of those who put faith in the statements made.

" Chlaeneas, then, said, that it was by means of the calamity of Olynthus that Philip, son of Amyntas, made himself master of Thessaly, whereas what I assert is that not only the Thessalians, but the rest of the Greeks owed their safety to Philip. For at the time when Onomarchus and Philomelus seized on Delphi and impiously and illegally possessed themselves of the god's treasure, who among you is not aware that they established a force of such strength that none of the Greeks dared to face it ; indeed, while acting thus impiously they very nearly made themselves at the same time masters of the whole of Greece. It was then that Philip voluntarily proffered his services, destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple and was the author of liberty in Greece,

ὡς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα μεμαρτύρηκε καὶ τοῖς
7 ἐπιγενομένοις. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἠδικηκότα Φίλιππον
Θετταλούς, καθάπερ οὗτος ἐτόλμα λέγειν, ἀλλ'
ὡς εὐεργέτην ὄντα τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ κατὰ γῆν
αὐτὸν ἡγεμόνα καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν εἵλοντο πάντες·
8 οὗ πρότερον ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἔτυχε. νὴ Δί',
ἀλλὰ παρεγένετο μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν
9 Λακωνικήν· οὐ κατά γε τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν,
ὡς ὑμεῖς ἴστε, καλούμενος δὲ καὶ πολλάκις ὀνο-
μαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ φίλων καὶ
10 συμμάχων μόλις αὐτὸν ἐπέδωκε. καὶ παραγενό-
μενος πῶς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐχρήσατο, ὦ Χλαινέα,
σκόπει. δυνάμενος γὰρ συγχρήσασθαι ταῖς τῶν
ἀστυγειτόνων ὁρμαῖς πρός τε τὴν τῆς χώρας τῆς
τούτων καταφθορὰν καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ταπεί-
νωσιν, καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶξαι μετὰ τῆς μεγίστης
11 χάριτος, ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην αἵρεσιν οὐδαμῶς
αὑτὸν ἐνέδωκε, καταπληξάμενος δὲ κἀκείνους καὶ
τούτους ἐπὶ τῷ κοινῇ συμφέροντι διὰ λόγου τὴν
ἐξαγωγὴν ἀμφοτέρους ἠνάγκασε ποιήσασθαι περὶ
12 τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, οὐχ αὑτὸν ἀποδείξας κριτὴν
ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων, ἀλλὰ κοινὸν ἐκ πάντων
τῶν Ἑλλήνων καθίσας κριτήριον. ἄξιόν γε τὸ
γεγονὸς ὀνείδους καὶ προφορᾶς.

34 Πάλιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ διότι μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι δόξας
τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν ἐκόλασε, τοῦτο πικρῶς ὠνεί-
2 δισας, ὅτι δὲ τιμωρίαν ἔλαβε παρὰ τῶν Περσῶν
ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὕβρεως, οὐκ
3 ἐποιήσω μνήμην, οὐδὲ διότι μεγάλων κακῶν
κοινῇ πάντας ἡμᾶς ἔλυσε, καταδουλωσάμενος
τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ παρελόμενος αὐτῶν τὰς
χορηγίας, αἷς ἐκεῖνοι χρώμενοι κατέφθειραν τοὺς

as actual facts have testified to posterity also. For it was not because he had injured the Thessalians, as Chlaeneas had the audacity to say, but because he was the benefactor of Greece, that they all chose him commander-in-chief both on sea and land, an honour previously conferred on no one. But we are told that he entered Laconia with his army. True, but, as you know it was not of his own choice, but it was after being frequently entreated and appealed to by his friends and allies in the Peloponnese that he reluctantly gave way. And when he arrived, pray consider, Chlaeneas, how he behaved. It was in his power to avail himself of the animosity of the neighbouring peoples to devastate the territory of Sparta and humiliate the city, winning thereby profound thanks, but instead of adopting such a course he struck equal terror into the Spartans and their enemies and compelled them to their common good to settle their differences by a congress, not assuming himself the right of judging their disputes, but appointing a court of arbitration selected from all the Greek states. How proper a subject for reproach and censure !

34. "Again, you have bitterly reproached Alexander for punishing Thebes when he believed that city had wronged him, but you never mentioned how he inflicted punishment on the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks, and how he delivered us all from the greatest evils by enslaving the barbarians and depriving them of the resources they used for the destruction of the Greeks, pitting now the

Ἕλληνας, ποτὲ μὲν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς τούτων προγόνους ἀγωνοθετοῦντες καὶ συμβάλλοντες, ποτὲ δὲ Θηβαίους, καὶ τέλος ὑπήκοον ἐποίησε τὴν
4 Ἀσίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησι. περὶ δὲ τῶν διαδεξαμένων πῶς καὶ τολμᾶτε μνημονεύειν; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κατὰ τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις οἷς μὲν ἀγαθῶν
5 οἷς δὲ κακῶν ἐγίνοντο παραίτιοι πολλάκις· περὶ ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἴσως ἂν ἐξείη μνησικακεῖν, ὑμῖν δ' οὐδαμῶς καθήκει τοῦτο ποιεῖν τοῖς ἀγαθοῦ μὲν μηδενὶ μηδενὸς παραιτίοις γεγονόσι, κακῶν δὲ
6 πολλοῖς καὶ πολλάκις. ἐπεὶ τίνες οἱ τὸν Ἀντίγονον εἰσὶ τὸν Δημητρίου παρακαλέσαντες ἐπὶ
7 διαιρέσει τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους; τίνες δ' οἱ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἠπειρώτην ὅρκους ποιησάμενοι καὶ συνθήκας ἐπ' ἐξανδραποδισμῷ
8 καὶ μερισμῷ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας; οὐχ ὑμεῖς; τίνες δὲ κατὰ κοινὸν τοιούτους ἡγεμόνας ἐξέπεμψαν οἵους ὑμεῖς; οἵ γε καὶ τοῖς ἀσύλοις ἱεροῖς ἐτόλ-
9 μησαν προσάγειν τὰς χεῖρας. ὧν Τίμαιος μὲν τό τ' ἐπὶ Ταινάρῳ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐν
10 Λούσοις ἱερὸν Ἀρτέμιδος ἐσύλησε, Φάρυκος δὲ καὶ Πολύκριτος, ὁ μὲν τὸ τῆς Ἥρας ἐν Ἄργει τέμενος, ὁ δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἐν Μαντινείᾳ
11 διήρπασε. τί δαὶ Λάτταβος καὶ Νικόστρατος; οὐ τὴν τῶν Παμβοιωτίων πανήγυριν εἰρήνης οὔσης παρεσπόνδησαν, Σκυθῶν ἔργα καὶ Γαλατῶν ἐπιτελοῦντες; ὧν οὐδὲν πέπρακται τοῖς διαδεξαμένοις.

35 Καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν τούτων ἀπολογηθῆναι δυνάμενοι σεμνύνεσθε, διότι τὴν ἐπὶ Δελφοὺς ἔφοδον τῶν βαρβάρων ὑπέστητε, καὶ φατὲ δεῖν διὰ ταῦτα
2 χάριν ἔχειν ὑμῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ μίαν

Athenians and now the Thebans against the ancestors of these Spartans, how in a word he made Asia subject to Greece. And as for his successors, how have you the assurance to mention them? They did indeed often, under changing circumstances, bestow benefits and inflict injuries on different people, and others might be justified in feeling resentment against them, but you Aetolians have not the least right to do so, you who have never done any good to a soul, but have done evil to many and at many times. Who, tell me, invited Antigonus the son of Demetrius to assist in dissolving the Achaean League? Who made a sworn treaty with Alexander of Epirus for the enslavement and partition of Acarnania? Was it not you? Who elected and sent out such commanders as you did, men who even ventured to lay hands on inviolable sanctuaries, Timaeus having plundered those of Poseidon on Taenarus and of Artemis at Lusi, while Pharycus pillaged the holy place of Hera at Argos and Polycritus that of Poseidon in Mantinea? And what shall we say of Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did they not violate in time of peace the sanctity of the Pamboeotian festival—conduct worthy of Scythians or Gauls? No such crimes were ever perpetrated by Alexander's successors.

35. "While you have no defence to offer for any of these acts you pride yourselves on having resisted the attack of the barbarians on Delphi, and say that the Greeks ought to be grateful to you for this. But

ταύτην χρείαν Αἰτωλοῖς χάρις ὀφείλεται, τίνος καὶ πηλίκης δεῖ τιμῆς ἀξιοῦσθαι Μακεδόνας, οἳ τὸν πλείω τοῦ βίου χρόνον οὐ παύονται διαγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων
3 ἀσφαλείας; ὅτι γὰρ αἰεί ποτ' ἂν ἐν μεγάλοις ἦν κινδύνοις τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, εἰ μὴ Μακεδόνας εἴχομεν πρόφραγμα καὶ τὰς ‹τῶν› παρὰ τούτοις βασιλέων φιλοτιμίας, τίς οὐ γινώσκει; μέγιστον
4 δὲ τούτου σημεῖον· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ Γαλάτας καταφρονῆσαι Μακεδόνων νικήσαντας Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Κεραυνὸν ἐπικαλούμενον, εὐθέως καταγνόντες τῶν ἄλλων ἦκον οἱ περὶ Βρέννον εἰς μέσην τὴν Ἑλλάδα μετὰ δυνάμεως. ὃ πολλάκις ἂν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι μὴ προκαθημένων Μακεδόνων.

5 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν γεγονότων ἔχων
6 πολλὰ λέγειν ἀρκεῖν ἡγοῦμαι· τῶν δὲ Φιλίππῳ πεπραγμένων εἰς ἀσέβειαν ὠνείδισαν τὴν τοῦ ναοῦ καταφθοράν, οὐ προσθέντες τὴν αὑτῶν ὕβριν καὶ παρανομίαν, ἣν ἐπετελέσαντο περὶ τοὺς ἐν Δίῳ καὶ Δωδώνῃ ναοὺς καὶ τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν.
7 ἐχρῆν δὲ λέγειν τοῦτο πρῶτον. ὑμεῖς δ' ἃ μὲν ἐπάθετε, τούτοις ἐξηγήσασθε, μείζω ποιοῦντες τῶν γεγονότων, ἃ δ' ἐποιήσατε πρότεροι, πολλα-
8 πλάσια γεγονότα παρεσιωπήσατε, σαφῶς εἰδότες ὅτι τὰς ἀδικίας καὶ ζημίας ἅπαντες ἀεὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι χειρῶν ἀδίκων ἐπιφέρουσι.

36 Περὶ δὲ τῶν κατ' Ἀντίγονον ἕως τούτου βούλομαι ποιήσασθαι τὴν μνήμην, [ἕως] τοῦ μὴ δόξαι καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεγονότων μηδ' ἐν παρέργῳ
2 τίθεσθαι τὴν τηλικαύτην πρᾶξιν. ἔγωγ' εὐεργεσίαν μείζω τῆς ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου γεγενημένης εἰς ὑμᾶς οὐδ' ἱστορεῖσθαι νομίζω· δοκεῖ γὰρ

if thanks are due to the Aetolians for this single service, how highly should we honour the Macedonians, who for the greater part of their lives never cease from fighting with the barbarians for the sake of the security of Greece? For who is not aware that Greece would have constantly stood in the greatest danger, had we not been fenced by the Macedonians and the honourable ambition of their kings? The best proof of it is this. The moment that the Gauls after defeating Ptolemy Ceraunus conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, Brennus making light of all other opponents marched into the middle of Greece with his army, a thing that would often have happened if our frontiers were not protected by the Macedonians.

"I have much more to say about the past, but have said, I think, enough. Among Philip's actions they cite his destruction of the temple as an instance of impiety, but they do not add a word about the criminal outrages they committed at the temples of Dium and Dodona and the precincts of the gods there. They should have mentioned these first. But you Aetolians while you tell this meeting of the evils you suffered, greatly exaggerating their gravity, are silent regarding the far more numerous evils you did to others unprovoked, well knowing that all impute the blame for injustice and injuries to those who first resort to such violence.

36. "As for the conduct of Antigonus, I will only mention it so far as to avoid seeming to make light of what happened or to regard as of minor importance such a performance as his. I do not for my part think there is an example in history of such benevolence as Antigonus showed to you. It seems to

ἔμοιγε μηδ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ γεγονός.
3 γνοίη δ' ἄν τις ἐκ τούτων. ἐπολέμησε πρὸς ὑμᾶς
Ἀντίγονος, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παραταξάμενος ἐνίκησε·
διὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἐγένετο κύριος τῆς χώρας ἅμα
4 καὶ τῆς πόλεως. ὤφειλε ποιεῖν τὰ τοῦ πολέμου·
τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι καθ' ὑμῶν δεινόν,
ὡς πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκβαλὼν τὸν τύραννον καὶ
τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ πάτριον ὑμῖν ἀποκατέστησε
5 πολίτευμα. ἀνθ' ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς πανη-
γύρεσι μάρτυρας ποιησάμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας εὐερ-
γέτην ἑαυτῶν καὶ σωτῆρα τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἀνεκη-
6 ρύξατε. τί οὖν ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς; ἐρῶ γὰρ τὸ
φαινόμενον, ἄνδρες. ὑμεῖς δ' ἀνέξεσθε· ποιήσω
γὰρ τοῦτο νῦν οὐκ ἀπροσλόγως ὀνειδίσαι βουλό-
μενος ὑμῖν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων περιστά-
σεως ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ κοινῇ συμφέροντι.
7 τί δὴ μέλλω λέγειν; ὅτι καὶ κατὰ τὸν προγεγονότα
πόλεμον οὐκ Αἰτωλοῖς, ἀλλὰ Μακεδόσιν ἔδει
συμμαχεῖν ὑμᾶς, καὶ νῦν παρακαλουμένους Φιλίππῳ
8 μᾶλλον ἢ τούτοις ἑαυτοὺς προσνέμειν. νὴ Δί',
9 ἀλλὰ παραβήσεσθε τὰς συνθήκας· καὶ πότερα
δεινότερον ἂν ποιήσαιτε, τὰ κατ' ἰδίαν πρὸς
Αἰτωλοὺς ὑμῖν συγκείμενα δίκαια παριδόντες ἢ
τὰ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον ἐν στήλῃ
10 γεγονότα καὶ καθιερωμένα; πῶς δὲ τούτους
ἀθετεῖν εὐλαβεῖσθε, παρ' ὧν οὐδεμίαν προειλήφατε
χάριν, Φίλιππον δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνας οὐκ ἐντρέπεσθε,
δι' οὓς ἔχετε καὶ τοῦ νῦν βουλεύεσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν;
11 ἢ τὸ μὲν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν ἀναγκαῖον
12 ἡγεῖσθε; καὶ μὴν οὐχ οὕτως ὅσιόν ἐστι τὸ τὰς

me in fact that it could not be surpassed. For what were the facts? Antigonus went to war with you and beat you in a pitched battle, and by force of arms took possession of your territory and town. Strictly, he should have exercised the rights of war. But he was so far from treating you with any severity, that besides all the rest he did for you he expelled your tyrant and re-established the reign of law and your ancient constitution. And in return for this you proclaimed Antigonus at public festivals in the hearing of all Greece to be your saviour and benefactor. Now what course should you have taken afterwards? I will tell you my opinion, sirs, and you must not take it ill; for I will do so not with any wish to heap pointless reproaches on you, but under the pressure of circumstances and for the general good. This is what I have to say. Both in the former war you should have taken the side not of the Aetolians but of Macedonia and now that these advances are made to you you should rather join Philip than the Aetolians. But I shall be told that you will be breaking a treaty. Now which is the most serious offence, to disregard the private convention you made with the Aetolians or the treaty made in the sight of all the Greeks and inscribed on a column and consecrated? Why should you have compunction about throwing over those from whom you never received any favour, but show no respect to Philip and the Macedonians to whom you owe even your power of deliberating on this occasion? Do you think it necessary to keep faith with your friends . . .[a] But the piety of

[a] Something, such as "and not with your benefactors," is missing.

ἐγγράπτους πίστεις βεβαιοῦν, ὡς ἀνόσιον τὸ τοῖς σώσασι πολεμεῖν· ὃ νῦν Αἰτωλοὶ πάρεισιν ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦντες.

37 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰρήσθω μέν μοι ταῦτα, κρινέσθω δὲ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοτιμότερον διακειμένοις ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἐνεστώτων. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ συνέχον, ὡς 2 οὗτοί φασιν, ἐπάνιμεν. τοῦτο δ' ἦν, εἰ μὲν ὁμοίωται τὰ πράγματα νῦν καὶ καθ' οὓς καιροὺς ἐποιεῖσθε τὴν πρὸς τούτους συμμαχίαν, διότι δεῖ μένειν καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν αἵρεσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ταῦτα 3 γὰρ ἐν ἀρχαῖς εἶναι· εἰ δ' ὁλοσχερῶς ἠλλοίωται, διότι δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ νῦν ὑμᾶς ἐξ ἀκεραίου βου- 4 λεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν παρακελευομένων. ἐρωτῶ τοι- γαροῦν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Κλεόνικε καὶ Χλαινέα, τίνας ἔχοντες συμμάχους τότε παρεκαλεῖτε τούτους εἰς τὴν κοινοπραγίαν; ἆρ' οὐ πάντας Ἕλληνας; 5 τίσι δὲ νῦν κοινωνεῖτε τῶν ἐλπίδων, ἢ πρὸς ποίαν 6 παρακαλεῖτε τούτους συμμαχίαν; ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων; ὅμοιά γε δοκεῖ τὰ πράγματ' ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν νῦν καὶ πρότερον, ἀλλ' οὐ τἀναντία· 7 τότε μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἡγεμονίας καὶ δόξης ἐφιλο- τιμεῖσθε πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ Μακεδόνας ὁμοφύλους καὶ τὸν τούτων ἡγεμόνα Φίλιππον· νῦν δὲ περὶ δουλείας ἐνίσταται πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι πρὸς 8 ἀλλοφύλους ἀνθρώπους, οὓς ὑμεῖς δοκεῖτε μὲν ἐπισπᾶσθαι κατὰ Φιλίππου, λελήθατε δὲ κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐπεσπασμένοι καὶ κατὰ πάσης 9 Ἑλλάδος. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ κατὰ τὰς πολεμικὰς περιστάσεις βαρυτέρας ἐπαγόμενοι φυλακὰς εἰς τὰς πόλεις τῆς αὑτῶν δυνάμεως χάριν τῆς ἀσφα- λείας ἅμα τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀπωθοῦνται φόβον καὶ ποιοῦσιν ὑποχειρίους σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ταῖς τῶν

observing a written treaty is less than the impiety of fighting against your preservers, as the Aetolians now come and ask you to do.

37. "Let what I have said on this head suffice, and let those who are disposed to be captious pronounce my words to have no bearing on the present situation. I will now revert to what my adversaries themselves speak of as the main question. And this is that if matters are now in the same state as when you made an alliance with them, you should decide to maintain your original attitude, for that is a matter of principle, but if the situation has radically changed, you are justified now in discussing the requests made to you afresh. I ask you, therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, what allies had you when you first invited the Spartans to act with you? Had you not the whole of Greece? But who make common cause with you at present or what kind of alliance do you invite them to enter? Is it not an alliance with barbarians? Far from being similar, the circumstances are now the reverse of what they formerly were. Then your rivals in the struggle for supremacy and renown were the Achaeans and Macedonians, peoples of your own race, and Philip was their commander. But now Greece is threatened with a war against men of a foreign race who intend to enslave her, men whom you fancy you are calling in against Philip, but are calling in really against yourselves and the whole of Greece. For just as those who when imperilled by war introduce into their cities garrisons stronger than their own forces for the sake of safety, repel indeed all danger from the enemy but at the same time subject themselves

φίλων ἐξουσίαις, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ νῦν Αἰτωλοὶ
10 διανοοῦνται. βουλόμενοι γὰρ περιγενέσθαι Φιλίπ-
που καὶ ταπεινῶσαι Μακεδόνας, λελήθασιν αὑτοῖς
ἐπισπασάμενοι τηλικοῦτο νέφος ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρας,
ὃ κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν ἴσως πρώτοις ἐπισκοτήσει
Μακεδόσι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ συνεχὲς πᾶσιν ἔσται τοῖς
Ἕλλησι μεγάλων κακῶν αἴτιον.

38 Ἅπαντας μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς Ἕλληνας προϊδέσθαι
τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον καιρόν, μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαιμο-
2 νίους. ἐπεὶ τίνος χάριν ὑπολαμβάνετε τοὺς ὑμε-
τέρους προγόνους, ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καθ' οὓς
καιροὺς ὁ Ξέρξης ἀπέστειλε πρεσβευτὴν πρὸς
ὑμᾶς, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν αἰτούμενος, ἀπώσαντας εἰς
τὸ φρέαρ τὸν παραγεγονότα καὶ προσεπιβαλόντας
τῆς γῆς κελεύειν ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ Ξέρξῃ διότι παρὰ
Λακεδαιμονίων ἔχει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν,
3 ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν; τίνος πάλιν ἐθελοντὴν καὶ προδήλως
4 ἐξορμᾶν ἀποθανουμένους τοὺς περὶ Λεωνίδην; ἆρ'
οὐχ ἵνα δόξωσι μὴ μόνον <ὑπὲρ> τῆς αὑτῶν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας
5 προκινδυνεύειν; ἄξιόν γε τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν ἀπο-
γόνους ὑπάρχοντας, κἄπειτα νῦν συμμαχίαν ποιη-
σαμένους τοῖς βαρβάροις, στρατεύειν μετ' ἐκείνων
καὶ πολεμεῖν Ἠπειρώταις, Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἀκαρνᾶσι,
Βοιωτοῖς, Θετταλοῖς, σχεδὸν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι
6 πλὴν Αἰτωλῶν. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ἔθος ἐστὶ ταῦτα
πράττειν καὶ μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν νομίζειν, εἰ μόνον
7 πρόσεστι τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, οὐ μὴν ὑμῖν. καὶ τί
δήποτε προσδοκᾶν δεῖ τούτους ἀπεργασομένους,
8 ἐπεὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων προσειλήφασι συμμαχίαν; οἵ
γε τῆς Ἰλλυριῶν ἐπιλαβόμενοι ῥοπῆς καὶ βοηθείας
κατὰ μὲν θάλατταν βιάζεσθαι καὶ παρασπονδεῖν

to the authority of their friends, so do the Aetolians contemplate doing. For in their anxiety to get the better of Philip and humiliate the Macedonians, they have without knowing it invoked such a cloud from the west as may, perhaps, at first only cast its shadow on Macedonia, but in time will be the cause of great evil to all Greece.

38. "All Greeks, therefore, should foresee the approaching storm and especially the Lacedaemonians. For why do you think it was, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, at the time when Xerxes sent you an envoy demanding water and earth, thrust the stranger into the well and heaped earth upon him, and bade him announce to Xerxes that he had received what was demanded, water and earth? Or why did Leonidas and his men march forth of their own will to meet certain death? Surely it was to show that they were risking their lives not for their own freedom alone, but for that of the other Greeks. It very well becomes you, the descendants of such men, to make an alliance now with barbarians, to take the field with them and make war on the Epirots, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, and Thessalians, in fact with almost all the Greeks except the Aetolians! They indeed are accustomed to act so and to think nothing disgraceful if only something is to be gained by it, but it is not so with you. And what feats do you expect they will accomplish when they have gained the alliance of Rome, the people who, when you were reinforced by the help of the Illyrians, attempted by sea

ἐπεβάλοντο Πύλον, κατὰ δὲ γῆν ἐπολιόρκησαν μὲν τὴν Κλειτορίων πόλιν, ἐξηνδραποδίσαντο δὲ
9 τὴν Κυναιθέων. καὶ πρότερον μὲν Ἀντιγόνῳ, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἐποιήσαντο συνθήκας οὗτοι περί τε τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τοῦ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων ἔθνους, νῦν δὲ πεποίηνται πρὸς Ῥωμαίους κατὰ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

39 Ἃ τίς οὐκ ἂν πυθόμενος ὑπίδοιτο μὲν τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔφοδον, μισήσαι δὲ τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ἀπόνοιαν, ὅτι τοιαύτας ἐθάρρησαν ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας;
2 ἤδη παρῄρηνται μὲν Ἀκαρνάνων Οἰνιάδας καὶ Νᾶσον· κατέσχον δὲ πρῴην τὴν τῶν ταλαιπώρων Ἀντικυρέων πόλιν, ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι μετὰ Ῥω-
3 μαίων αὐτήν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι, πεισόμενα δῆλον ὅτι ἅπερ εἰκός ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας· τὰ δ' ἐδάφη κληρονομοῦσι
4 τῶν ἠτυχηκότων Αἰτωλοί. καλόν γε ταύτης τῆς συμμαχίας μετασχεῖν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄλλως τε
5 καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ὑπάρχοντας, οἵ γε Θηβαίους τοὺς κατ' ἀνάγκην ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν βουλευσαμένους μόνους τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατὰ τὴν τῶν Περσῶν ἔφοδον ἐψηφίσαντο δεκατεύσειν τοῖς θεοῖς κρατήσαντες τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν βαρβάρων.

6 Καλὸν μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ πρέπον ὑμῖν ἐστι τὸ μνησθέντας μὲν τῶν προγόνων, εὐλαβηθέντας δὲ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔφοδον, ὑπιδομένους δὲ τὴν Αἰτωλῶν κακοπραγμοσύνην, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶν ἐξ Ἀντιγόνου γεγονότων μνησθέντας, ἔτι καὶ νῦν μισοπονηρῆσαι, καὶ τὴν

to surprise and treacherously take Pylus and on land laid siege to Cleitor and sold the citizens of Cynaetha into slavery? Formerly, as I already said, they made a treaty with Antigonus for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian Leagues, and now they have made one with the Romans against the whole of Greece.

39. "How, when one knows of this, can one help viewing with suspicion the advance of the Romans and with detestation the unprincipled conduct of the Aetolians in venturing to make such treaties? Already they have robbed the Acarnanians of Oeniadae and Nasus, and it is but the other day that they together with the Romans seized on the unhappy city of Anticyra, selling its inhabitants into slavery. So the Romans are carrying off the women and children to suffer, of course, what those must suffer who fall into the hands of aliens, while the Aetolians divide the houses of the unfortunate people among themselves by lot. A fine alliance this for anyone to determine to join and specially for you Lacedaemonians, who, when you conquered the barbarians, decreed that the Thebans were to pay a tithe to the gods for having decided under compulsion, but alone among the Greeks, to remain neutral during the Persian invasion.

"Your honour then and your dignity, men of Lacedaemon, require that you should remember who were your ancestors, that you should place yourselves on your guard against the aggression of Rome, and view with suspicion the evil designs of the Aetolians, but above all that you should bear in mind the favours conferred on you by Antigonus and still continue to be haters of wickedness, refusing the

μὲν Αἰτωλῶν ἀποστραφῆναι φιλίαν, Ἀχαιοῖς δὲ καὶ Μακεδόσι κοινωνῆσαι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων. εἰ
7 δ' ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτό τινες ἀντιπράττουσι τῶν πλεῖον δυναμένων παρ' ὑμῖν, πρός γε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ὁρμήσατε, καὶ μὴ μετάσχητε τῆς τούτων ἀδικίας." . . .

40 (4) Οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες, πυνθανόμενοι τὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ σφᾶς, τὰ μὲν ἀπαλγοῦντες ταῖς ἐλπίσι, τὰ δὲ καὶ θυμομαχοῦντες, ἐπί τινα παράστασιν κατήντησαν. . . .

5 Εἰ δέ τις λειπόμενος μὴ θάνοι, φύγοι δὲ τὸν κίνδυνον, τοῦτον μήτε πόλει δέχεσθαι μήτε πῦρ
6 ἐναύειν. περὶ τούτων ἀρὰς ἐποιήσαντο πᾶσι μέν, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Ἠπειρώταις, εἰς τὸ μηδένα τῶν φευγόντων δέξασθαι τῇ χώρᾳ. . . .

41 Προθέμενος δὲ τῆς πόλεως κατὰ δύο πύργους ποιεῖσθαι τὴν προσαγωγὴν κατὰ μὲν τούτους χελώνας κατεσκεύαζε χωστρίδας καὶ κριούς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μεσοπύργιον στοὰν ἐποίει μεταξὺ τῶν κριῶν
2 παράλληλον τῷ τείχει. τῆς δὲ προθέσεως συντελουμένης παραπλήσιος ἦ τῶν ἔργων ἐγίνετο
3 πρόσοψις τῇ τοῦ τείχους διαθέσει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ ταῖς χελώναις κατασκευάσματα πύργων ἐλάμβανε καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ διάθεσιν ἐκ τῆς τῶν γέρρων συνθέσεως, τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων τείχους, τῶν ἀνωτέρω γέρρων τῆς στοᾶς εἰς ἐπάλξεις τῇ
4 πλοκῇ διηρημένων. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κάτω μέρους τῶν πύργων οἵ τε προσχωννύντες τὰς ἀνωμαλίας

friendship of the Aetolians and throwing in your lot with the Achaeans and Macedonians. But if some of your most powerful citizens are opposed to this policy at least do all in your power to remain neutral and not participate in the iniquity of the Aetolians."

In 211 B.C. *the Acarnanians were threatened with invasion by the Aetolians and resorted to the desperate resolution to which these fragments relate. See Livy*, xxvi. 25.

40. The Acarnanians, on learning of the Aetolian invasion, partly from despondency and partly from fury came to a desperate resolution. . . .

If anyone survived and escaped from the battle no one might receive him in a city or give him fire. They delivered a solemn curse on all and especially on the Epirots who should receive any fugitives in their country. . . .

Siege of Echinus by Philip

41. Having decided to make his approaches to the city opposite the two towers, he constructed in front of each of them a shelter for sappers and a ram, and in the space between the towers a gallery from one ram to the other running parallel to the wall. When the design was carried out the appearance of the work was very similar in style to the wall. For the superstructures on the shelters were in appearance and arrangement like towers owing to the fashion of the wickerwork, while the space between them was like a wall, the upper row of wickerwork being divided into battlements by the way it was woven. From the ground floor of the towers the men employed in levelling the surface to enable the rollers 211 B.C.

τῶν τόπων ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν ἐσχαρίων ἐφόδῳ τὴν γῆν
5 ἐπέβαλλον ὅ τε κριὸς ἐξωθεῖτο. τὸ δὲ δεύτερον
ὑδρίας καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπυρισμοὺς εἶχε παρα-
6 σκευὰς καὶ τὰ καταπελτικὰ σὺν τούτοις. ἐπὶ
δὲ τοῦ τρίτου πλῆθος ἀνδρῶν ἐφειστήκει τῶν
ἀπομαχομένων πρὸς τοὺς κακοποιεῖν ἐπιβαλλο-
μένους τὸν κριόν. οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν ἰσοϋψεῖς τοῖς
7 τῆς πόλεως πύργοις. ἐκ δὲ τῆς μεταξὺ τῶν
πύργων στοᾶς ὀρύγματα διπλᾶ προσήγετο πρὸς
8 τὸ μεσοπύργιον. καὶ τρεῖς ἦσαν βελοστάσεις
λιθοβόλοις, ὧν ὁ μὲν εἷς ταλαντιαίους, οἱ δὲ δύο
9 τριακονταμναίους ἐξέβαλλον λίθους. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς
παρεμβολῆς ὡς πρὸς τὰς χελώνας τὰς χωστρίδας
ἐπεποίηντο σύριγγες κατάστεγοι χάριν τοῦ μήτε
τοὺς προσιόντας ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας μήτε τοὺς
ἀπιόντας ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων βλάπτεσθαι μηδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν
10 ἐκ τῆς πόλεως βελῶν. ἐν ὀλίγαις δὲ τελέως
ἡμέραις συνέβη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἔργων ἐπιτελεσθῆναι
συντέλειαν διὰ τὸ τὴν χώραν ἀφθόνους ἔχειν τὰς
11 εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος χορηγίας. οἱ γὰρ Ἐχιναιεῖς
κεῖνται μὲν ἐν τῷ Μηλιεῖ κόλπῳ, τετραμμένοι
πρὸς μεσημβρίαν, καταντίπεραν τῆς τῶν Θρονιέων
χώρας, καρποῦνται δὲ γῆν πάμφορον. δι' ἣν
αἰτίαν οὐδὲν ἐνέλειπε τὸν Φίλιππον τῶν πρὸς τὰς
12 ἐπιβολάς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, καθάπερ εἶπον, ἐπι-
τελεσθέντων τῶν ἔργων προσῆγον ἅμα τὰς τῶν
ὀρυγμάτων καὶ μηχανημάτων κατασκευάς.

42 Πόπλιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς καὶ Δωρί-
μαχος ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, τοῦ Φιλίππου πολιορ-
κοῦντος τὴν Ἐχιναιῶν πόλιν, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ
τεῖχος καλῶς ἀσφαλισαμένου καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν
ἐκτὸς ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ στρατοπέδου τάφρῳ καὶ

to advance threw up earth, and the ram was then propelled. On the second story there were water-jars and other appliances for putting out fires, and also the catapults, while on the third, level with the towers of the town, stood a number of men ready to engage those who attempted to damage the ram. From the gallery between the towers two trenches were opened and carried towards the wall of the city. There were also three batteries of ballistae of which one threw stones of a talent's weight, and the other two stones of half that weight. From the camp to the shelters for sappers roofed underground passages had been constructed, so that neither those coming from the camp nor those leaving the works should be wounded by missiles from the town. These works were entirely completed in the course of a few days, as the country round has abundance of the materials required. For Echinus is situated on the Malian Gulf, facing south, opposite the territory of Thronium, and the land is rich in every kind of produce, so that nothing was lacking for Philip's purpose. But, as I said, when the work was completed both the saps and the siege machines began to advance.

42. While Philip was besieging Echinus, and had both well secured his position on the side of the town and fortified his camp on the outer side with a trench and a wall, Publius Sulpicius, the Roman proconsul, and Dorimachus, the strategus of the

2 τείχει ὀχυρωσαμένου, παραγενόμενοι αὐτοί, ὁ μὲν Πόπλιος στόλῳ, ὁ δὲ Δωρίμαχος πεζικῇ καὶ ἱππικῇ δυνάμει, καὶ προσβαλόντες τῷ χάρακι καὶ ἀποκρουσθέντες, τοῦ Φιλίππου μᾶλλον ἰσχυρῶς
3 ἀγωνισαμένου, ἀπελπίσαντες οἱ Ἐχιναιεῖς παρέ-
4 δοσαν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ Φιλίππῳ. οὐ γὰρ οἷοί τε ἦσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον τῇ τῶν δαπανημάτων ἐνδείᾳ ἀναγκάζειν τὸν Φίλιππον, ἐκ θαλάττης ταῦτα ποριζόμενον.

5 Ὅτι τῆς Αἰγίνης ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἁλούσης, οἱ Αἰγινῆται συναθροισθέντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ὅσοι μὴ διεκλάπησαν, ἐδέοντο τοῦ στρατηγοῦ συγχωρῆσαι σφίσι πρεσβευτὰς ἐκπέμψαι πρὸς τὰς συγγενεῖς
6 πόλεις περὶ λύτρων· ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πικρῶς ἀντέφη, φάσκων, ὅτ' ἦσαν αὐτῶν κύριοι, τότε ‹δεῖν› διαπρεσβεύεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς κρείττους
7 περὶ σωτηρίας, μὴ νῦν δούλους γεγονότας· τὸ δὲ μικρῷ πρότερον αὐτοὺς μηδὲ λόγου καταξιώσαντας τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ πρεσβευτάς, νῦν ὑποχειρίους γεγο-
8 νότας ἀξιοῦν πρεσβεύειν πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς, πῶς οὐκ εὔηθες εἶναι; καὶ τότε μὲν ἀπέπεμψε τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ταῦτ' εἰπών· τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον συγκαλέσας ἅπαντας τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, Αἰγινήταις μὲν ‹οὐδὲν› ὀφείλειν ἔφη ποιεῖν φιλάνθρωπον, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕνεκα συγχωρεῖν ἔφη πρεσβεύειν περὶ τῶν λύτρων, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐστίν.

Achaeans, appeared in person, Publius with a fleet and Dorimachus with a force of infantry and cavalry. When they attacked the entrenched camp and were repulsed, Philip having fought more vigorously, the Echinaeans surrendered to Philip. For Dorimachus was unable to compel Philip to raise the siege by cutting off his supplies, as he got them by sea.

Aegina occupied by the Romans

When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the inhabitants as did not escape collected on the ships and begged the proconsul to allow them to send convoys to cities of kindred race to obtain ransom. Publius at first refused very sharply, saying that they ought to have sent envoys to their betters to come and save them while they were still their own masters and not now they were slaves. That they who a short time ago had not even deigned to reply to his envoys, now when they had fallen into his power should request leave to send envoys to their kinsmen was most foolish. So at the time he dismissed those who had approached him with these words, but next day summoning all the prisoners of war, he said he was under no obligation to be lenient to the Aeginetans, but for the sake of the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send envoys to get ransom, as such was their custom.

VIII. Res Asiae

43 Ὁ γὰρ Εὐφράτης τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν λαμβάνει τῆς συστάσεως ἐξ Ἀρμενίας, διαρρεῖ δὲ [τὸν] διὰ Συρίας καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς τόπων ὡς ἐπὶ Βαβυλωνίαν. 2 καὶ δοκεῖ μὲν εἰς τὴν Ἐρυθρὰν ἐμβάλλειν θάλατταν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε τοῦτο· ταῖς γὰρ διώρυξι ταῖς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἀγομέναις προεκδαπανᾶται πρὶν ἐκβολὴν 3 εἰς θάλατταν πεποιῆσθαι. διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν ὑπεναντίαν φύσιν ἔχειν τοῦτοι τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ποταμῶν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις αὔξεται τὸ ῥεῦμα, καθὼς ἂν πλείους διαφέρωνται τόπους, καὶ μέγιστοι μέν εἰσι κατὰ χειμῶνα, ταπεινότατοι δὲ 4 κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ θέρους· οὗτος δὲ καὶ πλεῖστος γίνεται τῷ ῥεύματι κατὰ κυνὸς ἐπιτολὴν καὶ μέγιστος ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Συρίαν τόποις, αἰεὶ δὲ 5 προϊὼν ἐλάττων. αἴτιον δὲ τούτων ὅτι συμβαίνει τὴν μὲν αὔξησιν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς συρρύσεως τῶν χειμερινῶν ὄμβρων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἀνατήξεως τῶν χιόνων ⟨γίνεσθαι⟩, τὴν δὲ μείωσιν διὰ τὰς ἐκτροπὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὸν μερισμὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν 6 ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρδεύσεις. ᾗ καὶ τότε βραδεῖαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν κομιδὴν τῶν δυνάμεων, ἅτε καταγόμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν πλοίων, ταπεινοτάτου δὲ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ τελέως βραχύ τι συνεργούσης τῆς τοῦ ῥεύματος βίας πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν.

VIII. Affairs of Asia

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The Euphrates

43. The Euphrates commences its course in Armenia and flows through Syria and the adjacent countries in the direction of Babylonia. It is supposed to fall into the Persian Gulf, but this is not the case ; for the canals which are carried over the country exhaust the water of the river before it can fall into the sea. So that its nature is the reverse of that of most rivers. In the case of other rivers the stream increases the more country they traverse, they are largest in winter and lowest in the height of summer, but the Euphrates is in highest flood at the rising of the Dog-star, and the stream is largest in Syria and gets smaller as it advances. The reason of this is that its rise is not due to the conflux of winter rains but to the melting of the snow, while its decrease is due to the diversion of the stream into the land and its subdivision for purposes of irrigation. So that on this occasion the conveyance of the troops was very slow, the boats being over full, while the river was at its lowest, and the force of its current only helped their progress to a very slight extent.

FRAGMENTA LIBRI X

I. Res Italiae

1 Ὄντων γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πορθμοῦ καὶ τῆς Ῥηγίνων πόλεως σταδίων εἰς Τάραντα πλειόνων ἢ δισχιλίων, εἰς τέλος ἀλίμενον εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν πλευρὰν τῆς Ἰταλίας ταύτην πλὴν τῶν ἐν Τάραντι λιμένων· 2 ἣ τέτραπται μὲν εἰς τὸ Σικελικὸν πέλαγος, νεύει δὲ πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους, ἔχει δὲ τῶν τε βαρβάρων ἐθνῶν τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα καὶ 3 τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας. Βρέττιοι γὰρ καὶ Λευκανοὶ καί τινα μέρη τῶν Δαυνίων, ἔτι δὲ Καλαβροὶ καὶ πλείους ἕτεροι τοῦτο τὸ 4 κλῖμα νέμονται τῆς Ἰταλίας· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων Ῥήγιον καὶ Καυλωνία καὶ Λοκροὶ καὶ Κρότων, ἔτι δὲ Μεταπόντιον καὶ 5 Θούριοι ταύτην ἐπέχουσι τὴν παραλίαν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Σικελίας καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος φερομένους ἐπί τινα τόπον τῶν προειρημένων κατ' ἀνάγκην ὁρμεῖν ἐν τοῖς τῶν Ταραντίνων λιμέσι, καὶ τὰς ἀμείψεις καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας πρὸς πάντας τοὺς κατέχοντας ταύτην τὴν πλευρὰν τῆς 6 Ἰταλίας ἐν ταύτῃ ποιεῖσθαι τῇ πόλει. τεκμήραιτο δ' ἄν τις τοῦ τόπου τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἐκ τῆς περὶ Κροτωνιάτας γενομένης εὐδαιμονίας. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK X

I. Affairs of Italy

The Recovery of Tarentum

1. The distance from the Sicilian strait and Rhegium to Tarentum is more than two thousand stades, but all this side of Italy has not a single harbour except those of Tarentum. This part of Italy faces the Sicilian Sea and verges towards Greece, and it contains the most populous barbarian tribes and the most famous Greek cities, being inhabited by the Bruttians, Lucanians, a portion of the Daunians, the Calabrians, and several other tribes, while on its coast lie Rhegium, Caulonia, Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii, so that those travelling either from Greece or from Sicily to any of the aforesaid places must of necessity anchor in the harbours of Tarentum, and make that city the seat of their exchange and traffic with all the inhabitants of this side of Italy. One can form some idea of the advantages of its situation from the prosperity of the people of Croton; for they, although they have 211-210 B.C.

θερινοὺς ἔχοντες ὅρμους καὶ βραχεῖάν τινα παντελῶς προσαγωγήν, μεγάλην εὐδαιμονίαν δοκοῦσι περιποιήσασθαι δι' οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυΐαν, ἣν οὐδὲ συγκρίνειν ἄξιόν ἐστι
7 τοῖς Ταραντίνων λιμέσι καὶ τόποις. τέτακται δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν λιμένας εὐφυῶς
8 καὶ νῦν μέν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἦν πρὸ τοῦ. ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄκρας Ἰαπυγίας ἕως εἰς Σιποῦντα πᾶς ὁ προσφερόμενος ἐκ τῶν ἀντιπέρας καὶ καθορμισθεὶς πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν εἰς Τάραντ' ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ ταύτῃ συνεχρῆτο τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὰς
9 ἀλλαγὰς καὶ μεταθέσεις οἷον [εἰ] ἐμπορίῳ· οὐδέπω γὰρ συνέβαινε τότε τὴν τῶν Βρεντεσίνων ἐκτίσθαι
10 πόλιν. διόπερ ὁ Φάβιος, ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθέμενος τὴν ἐπιβολήν, πάλλα παρεὶς πρὸς ταῖς εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἦν ἐπινοίαις.

II. Res Hispaniae

2 Ὅτι μέλλοντες ἱστορεῖν τὰ πραχθέντα Ποπλίῳ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, συλλήβδην δὲ πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιτελεσθείσας αὐτῷ πράξεις, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθα τὸ προεπιστῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ τὴν
2 αἵρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τἀνδρός. τῷ γὰρ σχεδὸν ἐπιφανέστατον αὐτὸν γεγονέναι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ, ζητοῦσι μὲν πάντες εἰδέναι τίς ποτ' ἦν καὶ ἀπὸ ποίας φύσεως ἢ τριβῆς ὁρμηθεὶς τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ
3 τοσαύτας ἐπετελέσατο πράξεις, ἀγνοεῖν δὲ καὶ ψευδοδοξεῖν ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐξηγουμένους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ παραπεπαικέναι τῆς ἀληθείας.
4 ὅτι δ' ἔστιν ὑγιὲς τὸ νυνὶ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐξηγήσεως τοῖς

but roadsteads suitable for the summer and though quite few ships put in there, have, it would seem, attained great wealth simply owing to the favourable situation of the place, which is in no way to be compared with the harbours and district of Tarentum. Tarentum is also very favourably situated with respect to the harbours of the Adriatic even at the present day, and was still more so formerly. For from the extremity of Iapygia, as far as Sipontum, everyone coming from the opposite coast to put in to an Italian harbour crossed to Tarentum and used that as an emporium for the exchange and sale of merchandise, the town of Brundisium having not yet been founded. So that Fabius, regarding this enterprise as of great moment, neglected other matters and turned his whole attention to this. . . .

II. Affairs of Spain

Character of Scipio

2. Now that I am about to recount Scipio's exploits in Spain, and in short everything that he achieved in his life, I think it necessary to convey to my readers, in the first place, a notion of his character and natural parts. For the fact that he was almost the most famous man of all time makes everyone desirous to know what sort of man he was, and what were the natural gifts and the training which enabled him to accomplish so many great actions. But none can help falling into error and acquiring a mistaken impression of him, as the estimate of those who have given us their views about him is very wide of the truth. That what I myself state here is sound will be evident to all who by means

ἐπισημαίνεσθαι δυναμένοις τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ παρα-
5 βολώτατα τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων. οἱ μὲν οὖν
ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτὸν ἐπιτυχῆ τινα καὶ τὸ πλεῖον
αἰεὶ παραλόγως καὶ ταὐτομάτῳ κατορθοῦντα τὰς
6 ἐπιβολὰς παρεισάγουσι, νομίζοντες ὡς ἂν εἰ
θειοτέρους εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστοτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους
ἄνδρας τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἐν ἑκάστοις πραττόντων,
ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπαινετόν, τὸ δὲ μακαριστὸν
εἶναι συμβαίνει τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ τὸ μὲν
7 κοινόν ἐστι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, τὸ δ' ἐπαινετὸν
μόνον ἴδιον ὑπάρχει τῶν εὐλογίστων καὶ φρένας
ἐχόντων ἀνδρῶν, οὓς καὶ θειοτάτους εἶναι καὶ
8 προσφιλεστάτους τοῖς θεοῖς νομιστέον. ἐμοὶ ‹δὲ›
δοκεῖ Πόπλιος Λυκούργῳ τῷ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων
νομοθέτῃ παραπλησίαν ἐσχηκέναι φύσιν καὶ προ-
9 αίρεσιν. οὔτε γὰρ Λυκοῦργον ἧττον δεισιδαιμο-
νοῦντα καὶ πάντα προσέχοντα τῇ Πυθίᾳ συστή-
σασθαι τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων πολίτευμα, οὔτε Πόπλιον
ἐξ ἐνυπνίων ὁρμώμενον καὶ κληδόνων τηλικαύτην
10 περιποιῆσαι τῇ πατρίδι δυναστείαν· ἀλλ' ὁρῶντες
ἑκάτεροι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ‹τὰ›
παράδοξα προσδεχομένους ῥᾳδίως οὔτε τοῖς δεινοῖς
τολμῶντας παραβάλλεσθαι χωρὶς τῆς ἐκ τῶν θεῶν
11 ἐλπίδος, Λυκοῦργος μὲν αἰεὶ προσλαμβανόμενος
ταῖς ἰδίαις ἐπιβολαῖς τὴν ἐκ τῆς Πυθίας φήμην
εὐπαραδεκτοτέρας καὶ πιστοτέρας ἐποίει τὰς ἰδίας
12 ἐπινοίας, Πόπλιος δὲ παραπλησίως ἐνεργαζόμενος
αἰεὶ δόξαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὡς μετά τινος θείας
ἐπιπνοίας ποιούμενος τὰς ἐπιβολάς, εὐθαρσε-
στέρους καὶ προθυμοτέρους κατεσκεύαζε τοὺς ὑπο-
13 ταττομένους πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ τῶν ἔργων. ὅτι δ'
ἕκαστα μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας ἔπραττε,

of my narrative are able to appreciate the most glorious and hazardous of his exploits. As for all other writers, they represent him as a man favoured by fortune, who always owed the most part of his success to the unexpected and to mere chance, such men being, in their opinion, more divine and more worthy of admiration than those who always act by calculation. They are not aware that one of the two things deserves praise and the other only congratulation, the latter being common to ordinary men, whereas what is praiseworthy belongs alone to men of sound judgement and mental ability, whom we should consider to be the most divine and most beloved by the gods. To me it seems that the character and principles of Scipio much resembled those of Lycurgus, the Lacedaemonian legislator. For neither must we suppose that Lycurgus drew up the constitution of Sparta under the influence of superstition and solely prompted by the Pythia, nor that Scipio won such an empire from his country by following the suggestion of dreams and omens. But since both of them saw that most men neither readily accept anything unfamiliar to them, nor venture on great risks without the hope of divine help, Lycurgus made his own scheme more acceptable and more easily believed in by invoking the oracles of the Pythia in support of projects due to himself, while Scipio similarly made the men under his command more sanguine and more ready to face perilous enterprises by instilling into them the belief that his projects were divinely inspired. That everything he did was done with calculation

καὶ διότι πάντα κατὰ λόγον ἐξέβαινε τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ, δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων.

3 Ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ὅτι μὲν ἦν εὐεργετικὸς καὶ μεγαλόψυχος ὁμολογεῖται, διότι δ' ἀγχίνους καὶ νήπτης καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὸ προτεθὲν ἐντεταμένος, οὐθεὶς ἂν συγχωρήσειε πλὴν τῶν συμβεβιωκότων
2 καὶ τεθεαμένων ὑπ' αὐγὰς αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. ὧν εἷς ἦν Γάιος Λαίλιος, ἀπὸ νέου μετεσχηκὼς αὐτῷ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ λόγου μέχρι τελευτῆς, ὁ ταύτην περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν ἡμῖν ἐνεργασάμενος διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν εἰκότα λέγειν καὶ σύμφωνα τοῖς
3 ὑπ' ἐκείνου πεπραγμένοις. ἔφη γὰρ πρώτην γεγονέναι Ποπλίου πρᾶξιν ἐπίσημον, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἱππομαχίαν συνεστήσατο πρὸς Ἀννίβαν περὶ τὸν Πάδον καλούμενον ποταμόν.
4 τότε γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἑπτακαιδέκατον ἔτος ἔχων καὶ πρῶτον εἰς ὕπαιθρον ἐξελήλυθώς, συστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς διαφερόντων ἱππέων οὐλαμὸν ἀσφαλείας χάριν, συνθεασάμενος ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ τὸν πατέρα περιειλημμένον ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων μετὰ δυεῖν ἢ τριῶν ἱππέων καὶ τετρωμένον ἐπισφαλῶς, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐπεβάλετο παρακαλεῖν
5 τοὺς μεθ' αὐτοῦ βοηθῆσαι τῷ πατρί, τῶν δ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν κατορρωδούντων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν περιεστώτων πολεμίων, αὐτὸς εἰσελάσαι παραβόλως δοκεῖ καὶ τολμηρῶς εἰς τοὺς περικεχυμένους.
6 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναγκασθέντων ἐμβαλεῖν οἱ μὲν πολέμιοι καταπλαγέντες διέστησαν, ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἀνελπίστως σωθεὶς πρῶτος αὐτὸς τὸν υἱὸν σωτῆρα προσεφώνησε πάντων ἀκουόντων.
7 περιγενομένης δ' αὐτῷ τῆς ἐπ' ἀνδρείᾳ φήμης

and foresight, and that all his enterprises fell out as he had reckoned, will be clear from what I am about to say.

3. It is generally agreed that Scipio was beneficent and magnanimous, but that he was also shrewd and discreet with a mind always concentrated on the object he had in view would be conceded by none except those who associated with him and to whom his character stood clearly revealed. One of these was Gaius Laelius, who from his youth up to the end had participated in his every word and deed, and who has produced the above impression upon myself, as his account seems both probable on the face of it and in accordance with the actual performances of Scipio. For he tells us that Scipio first distinguished himself on the occasion of the cavalry engagement between his father and Hannibal in the neighbourhood of the Po.[a] He was at the time seventeen years of age, this being his first campaign, and his father had placed him in command of a picked troop of horse in order to ensure his safety, but when he caught sight of his father in the battle, surrounded by the enemy and escorted only by two or three horsemen and dangerously wounded, he at first endeavoured to urge those with him to go to the rescue, but when they hung back for a time owing to the large numbers of the enemy round them, he is said with reckless daring to have charged the encircling force alone. Upon the rest being now forced to attack, the enemy were terror-struck and broke up, and Publius Scipio, thus unexpectedly delivered, was the first to salute his son in the hearing of all as his preserver. Having by this service gained

[a] Battle of the Ticino.

ὁμολογουμένης διὰ τὴν προειρημένην χρείαν, λοιπὸν ἤδη σπανίως[1] αὐτὸν ἐδίδου κατὰ τοὺς ὕστερον καιροὺς εἰς τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν κινδύνους, ὅτ' εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναρτηθεῖεν ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος αἱ τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδες· ὅπερ ἴδιόν ἐστιν οὐ τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύοντος, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἡγεμόνος.

4 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, πρεσβύτερον ἔχων ἀδελφὸν Λεύκιον, καὶ τούτου προσπορευομένου πρὸς τὴν ἀγορανομίαν, ἣν σχεδὸν ἐπιφανεστάτην ἀρχὴν
2 εἶναι συμβαίνει τῶν νέων παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις, ἔθους δ' ὄντος δύο πατρικίους καθίστασθαι, τότε δὲ καὶ πλειόνων προσπορευομένων, ἐκ πολλοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμα μεταπορεύεσθαι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν τἀδελφῷ·
3 συνεγγιζούσης δὲ τῆς καταστάσεως, λογιζόμενος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πλήθους φορᾶς οὐκ εὐμαρῶς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐφιξόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς, τὴν δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν εὔνοιαν τοῦ δήμου θεωρῶν μεγάλην ὑπάρχουσαν, καὶ μόνως οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων κἀκεῖνον καθίξεσθαι τῆς προθέσεως, εἰ συμφρονήσαντες ἅμα ποιήσαιντο τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἦλθεν ἐπί τινα τοιαύτην ἔννοιαν.
4 θεωρῶν γὰρ τὴν μητέρα περιπορευομένην τοὺς νεὼς καὶ θύουσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ τἀδελφοῦ καὶ καθόλου μεγάλην προσδοκίαν ἔχουσαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ
5 μέλλοντος, ἧς μόνης ἔμελεν αὐτῷ—τὸν μὲν γὰρ πατέρα τότε πλεῖν συνέβαινεν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν στρατηγὸν καθεσταμένον ἐπὶ τὰς προειρημένας πράξεις —οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔφη πρὸς αὐτὴν ὄνειρον τεθεωρη-
6 κέναι δὶς ἤδη τὸν αὐτόν. δοκεῖν γὰρ ἅμα τἀδελφῷ καθεσταμένος ἀγορανόμος ἀναβαίνειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, ἐκείνην δὲ συναντᾶν

[1] MSS. πάντως.

a universally acknowledged reputation for bravery, he in subsequent times refrained from exposing his person without sufficient reason,[a] when his country reposed her hopes of success on him—conduct characteristic not of a commander who relies on luck, but on one gifted with intelligence.

4. After this his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the aedileship, which is almost the highest office at Rome open to young men, it being the custom to elect two patricians ; but there being on this occasion several patrician candidates, Publius Scipio for long did not venture to stand for the same office as his brother. But on the approach of the election, judging from the disposition of the people that his brother had a poor chance of being elected, and seeing that he himself was exceedingly popular, he came to the conclusion that the only means by which his brother would attain his object would be by their coming to an agreement and both of them making the attempt, and so he hit on the following plan. Seeing that his mother was visiting the different temples and sacrificing to the gods on behalf of his brother and generally exhibiting great concern about the result—he had only to concern himself with her, his father having left for Spain, where he had been appointed to the command in the campaign I have described—he, as a fact, told her that he had twice had the same dream. He had dreamt that both he and his brother had been elected to the aedileship and were going up from the forum to their house, when she met them 212 B.C.

[a] I have left Mr. Paton's translation as it was, and since he gives no indication what reading he proposed to adopt, I alter *πάντως* to *σπανίως*.—Ed.

αὐτοῖς εἰς τὰς θύρας καὶ περιπτύξασαν ἀσπά-
7 σασθαι. τῆς δὲ παθούσης τὸ γυναικεῖον πάθος
καί τι προσεπιφθεγξαμένης "Εἰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ταύτην
ἰδεῖν γένοιτο τὴν ἡμέραν" "Βούλει" φησί "μῆτερ,
8 πεῖραν λάβωμεν;" τῆς δὲ συγκαταθεμένης, ὡς οὐ
τολμήσοντος αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν καιρὸν οἱονεὶ
προσπαίζοντος—καὶ γὰρ ἦν κομιδῇ νέος—ἠξίου
9 τήβενναν αὑτῷ λαμπρὰν εὐθέως ἑτοιμάσαι· τοῦτο
γὰρ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς μεταπορευομένοις.
5 καὶ τῇ μὲν οὐδ' ἐν νῷ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἦν, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν
πρῶτον λαμπρὰν ἐσθῆτα κοιμωμένης ἔτι τῆς
2 μητρὸς παρῆν εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους
καὶ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον καὶ διὰ τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν
εὔνοιαν ἐκπληκτικῶς αὐτὸν ἀποδεξαμένου, καὶ
μετὰ ταῦτα προελθόντος εἰς τὸν ἀποδεδειγμένον
3 τόπον καὶ στάντος παρὰ τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὐ μόνον
τῷ Ποπλίῳ περιέθεσαν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τἀδελφῷ δι' ἐκεῖνον, καὶ παρῆσαν ἐπὶ τὴν
4 οἰκίαν ἀμφότεροι γεγονότες ἀγορανόμοι. τῇ δὲ
μητρὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἄφνω προσπεσόντος, περι-
χαρὴς οὖσα πρὸς τὰς θύρας ἀπήντα καὶ μετὰ
5 παραστάσεως ἠσπάζετο τοὺς νεανίσκους, ὥστε
τὸν Πόπλιον ἐκ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος δοκεῖν πᾶσι
τοῖς προακηκοόσι τῶν ἐνυπνίων μὴ μόνον κατὰ
τὸν ὕπνον, ἔτι ‹δὲ› μᾶλλον ὕπαρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν
6 διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. ὢν οὐδὲν ἦν ἐνύπνιον,
ἀλλ' ὑπάρχων εὐεργετικὸς καὶ μεγαλόδωρος καὶ
προσφιλὴς κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν συνελογίσατο τὴν
7 τοῦ πλήθους πρὸς αὐτὸν εὔνοιαν. λοιπὸν πρός
τε τὸν τοῦ δήμου καὶ τὸν τῆς μητρὸς καιρὸν
ἁρμοσάμενος εὐστόχως οὐ μόνον καθίκετο τῆς
προθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετά τινος ἐδόκει θείας

at the door and fell on their necks and kissed them. She was affected by this, as a woman would be, and exclaimed, " Would I might see that day " or something similar. " Then would you like us to try, mother ? " he said. Upon her consenting, as she never dreamt he would venture on it, but thought it was merely a casual joke—for he was exceedingly young —he begged her to get a white toga ready for him at once, this being the dress that candidates are in the habit of wearing. What she had said had entirely gone out of her head, (5) and Scipio waiting until he received the white toga appeared in the forum while his mother was still asleep. The people, owing to the unexpectedness of the sight and owing to his previous popularity, received him with enthusiastic surprise, and afterwards when he went on to the station appointed for candidates and stood by his brother they not only conferred the office on Publius but on his brother too for his sake, and both appeared at their house elected aediles. When the news suddenly reached his mother's ears, she met them overjoyed at the door and embraced the young men with deep emotion, so that from this circumstance all who had heard of the dreams believed that Publius communed with the gods not only in his sleep, but still more in reality and by day. Now it was not a matter of a dream at all, but as he was kind and munificent and agreeable in his address he reckoned on his popularity with the people, and so by cleverly adapting his action to the actual sentiment of the people and of his mother he not only attained his object but was believed to have acted under a sort of divine inspira-

8 ἐπιπνοίας αὐτὸ πράττειν. οἱ γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενοι τοὺς καιροὺς μηδὲ τὰς αἰτίας καὶ διαθέσεις ἑκάστων ἀκριβῶς συνθεωρεῖν, ἢ διὰ φαυλότητα φύσεως ἢ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ῥαθυμίαν, εἰς θεοὺς καὶ τύχας ἀναφέρουσι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν δι' ἀγχίνοιαν ἐκ λογισμοῦ <καὶ> προνοίας ἐπιτελουμένων.

9 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τῶν ἀκουόντων, ἵνα μὴ συγκαταφερόμενοι ψευδῶς τῇ καθωμιλημένῃ δόξῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ παραπέμπωσι τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ κάλλιστα τἀνδρός, λέγω δὲ τὴν
10 ἐπιδεξιότητα καὶ φιλοπονίαν. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦτο συμφανὲς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων.

6 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε συνηθροισμένων τῶν δυνάμεων παρεκάλει μὴ καταπεπλῆχθαι τὴν προγεγενη-
2 μένην περιπέτειαν· οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἡττῆσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων οὐδέποτε, τῇ δὲ προδοσίᾳ τῇ Κελτιβήρων καὶ τῇ προπετείᾳ, διακλεισθέντων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διὰ
3 τὸ πιστεῦσαι τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων. ὧν ἑκάτερα νῦν ἔφη περὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπάρχειν· χωρὶς γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολὺ διεσπασμένους στρατοπεδεύειν, τοῖς τε συμμάχοις ὑβριστικῶς χρωμένους ἅπαντας ἀπηλλοτριωκέναι καὶ πολε-
4 μίους αὐτοῖς παρεσκευακέναι. διὸ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἤδη διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς, ὡς ἂν τάχιστα θαρρήσωσι καὶ διαβάντας ἴδωσι τὸν ποταμόν, ἀσμένως ἥξειν, οὐχ οὕτως εὐνοοῦντας σφίσι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀμύνεσθαι σπουδάζοντας τὴν
5 Καρχηδονίων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀσέλγειαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνας ἅθρους διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐ θελήσειν, κατὰ μέρος δὲ κινδυνεύοντας εὐχειρώτους

tion. For those who are incapable of taking an accurate view of opportunities, causes, and dispositions, either from lack of natural ability or from inexperience and indolence, attribute to the gods and to fortune the causes of what is accomplished by shrewdness and with calculation and foresight.

I have made these observations for the sake of my readers, that they may not by falsely accepting the generally received opinion of Scipio neglect to notice his finest qualities and those most worthy of respect, I mean his cleverness and laboriousness. This will be still more evident from my account of his actual exploits.

6. To resume my narrative—on this occasion he 210 B.C.
assembled his soldiers and exhorted them not to be cast down by their recent reverse. The Romans, he said, were never beaten by the Carthaginians owing to the superior courage of the latter, but it was all due to the treachery of the Celtiberians and to rashness, the generals having been cut off from each other owing to their trust in the alliance of that people. "Both of these disadvantages," he said, "now affect the enemy; for they are encamped at a long distance apart, and by their tyrannical treatment of their allies they have estranged them all and made them their enemies. So that some of them are already negotiating with us, while the rest, as soon as they have the courage to do it and see that we have crossed the river, will be glad to come in not so much out of affection for us as from eagerness to be avenged on the Carthaginians for their brutal conduct. But the chief point is that the enemy's commanders are on ill terms with each other and will not readily engage us with their united forces, while if they attack us separately it

6 ὑπάρχειν. διὸ βλέποντας εἰς ταῦτα παρεκάλει περαιοῦσθαι τὸν ποταμὸν εὐθαρσῶς· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑξῆς ἀνεδέχετο μελήσειν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλ-
7 λοις ἡγεμόσι. ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν τρισχιλίους μὲν ἔχοντα πεζοὺς καὶ πεντακοσίους ἱππεῖς Μάρκον ἀπέλειπε τὸν συνάρχοντα περὶ τὴν διάβασιν ἐφ-
εδρεύσοντα τοῖς ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ συμμάχοις· αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν ἄλλην ἐπεραίου δύναμιν, ἄδηλον
8 πᾶσι ποιῶν τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόθεσιν. ἦν γὰρ αὐτῷ κεκριμένον πράττειν ὧν μὲν εἶπε πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς μηδέν, προύκειτο δὲ πολιορκεῖν ἐξ ἐφόδου τὴν
9 ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ Καρχηδόνα προσαγορευομένην. ὃ δὴ καὶ πρῶτον ἄν τις λάβοι καὶ μέγιστον σημεῖον
10 τῆς ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἄρτι ῥηθείσης διαλήψεως. ἔτος γὰρ ἕβδομον ἔχων πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ πράξεις αὑτὸν ἔδωκε τελέως παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηλπισμένας διὰ <τὸ> μέγεθος τῶν προγεγονότων
11 ἐλαττωμάτων, δεύτερον δοὺς αὑτὸν τὰ μὲν κοινὰ καὶ προφαινόμενα πᾶσι παρέλειπε, τὰ δὲ μήτε παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις μήτε παρὰ τοῖς φίλοις, ταῦτ'
12 ἐπενόει καὶ προετίθετο πράττειν. ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν χωρὶς ἐκλογισμῶν τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων.

7 Ἔτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἱστορῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ πυνθανόμενος ἐπιμελῶς τήν τε προδοσίαν τῶν Κελτιβήρων καὶ τὸν διαζευγμὸν τῶν ἰδίων στρατοπέδων, καὶ συλλογιζόμενος ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς περὶ τὸν πατέρα γενέσθαι
2 τὴν περιπέτειαν, οὐ κατεπέπληκτο τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐδ' ἥττητο τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοί.
3 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐντὸς Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ συμμάχους ἀκούων μένειν ἐν τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνας στασιάζειν

will be easy to overcome them." He therefore begged his soldiers to take all this into consideration and cross the river confidently. After that it would be the business of himself and the other commanders to decide what was next to be done. Having made this speech he left his colleague Marcus Silanus with three thousand foot and five hundred horse at the ford to watch over the allies on the near side of the river, and himself began to cross with the rest of his forces, revealing his plan to no one. The fact was, he had decided not to do any of the things he had publicly announced, but to invest suddenly the town in Spain to which they had given the name of Carthage. This we take as the first and strongest confirmation of the view I have just expressed. He was now but twenty-seven years of age, and yet he in the first place took in hand a situation pronounced by most people as desperate owing to the serious nature of the recent reverses, and secondly in dealing with it he put aside the measures obvious to anyone and planned out and decided on a course which neither his enemies nor his friends expected. There was nothing in all this that was not due to most close calculation.

7. For from the very outset, having learnt by careful inquiries at Rome the facts about the treachery of the Celtiberians and the separation of the Roman armies, and reaching the conclusion that his father's defeat was due to these causes, he was not in terror of the Carthaginians nor broken in spirit like most people. When subsequently he heard that the allies on the Roman side of the Ebro remained friendly, and that the Carthaginian com-

μὲν πρὸς σφᾶς, ὑβρίζειν δὲ τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, εὐθαρσῶς διέκειτο πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, οὐ τῇ τύχῃ
4 πιστεύων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς. παραγενόμενός γε μὴν εἰς τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, πάντας ἀνακινῶν καὶ παρ' ἑκάστου πυνθανόμενος τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους, ηὗρισκε τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις τῶν Καρχηδο-
5 νίων εἰς τρία μέρη διηρημένας· ὧν Μάγωνα μὲν ἐπυνθάνετο διατρίβειν ἐντὸς Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἐν τοῖς Κονίοις προσαγορευομένοις, Ἀσδρούβαν δὲ τὸν Γέσκωνος περὶ Τάγου ποταμοῦ στόμα κατὰ τὴν Λυσιτανήν, τὸν δ' ἕτερον Ἀσδρούβαν πολιορκεῖν τινα πόλιν ἐν τοῖς Καρπητανοῖς, οὐδένα ‹δὲ› τῶν προειρημένων ἐλάττω δέχ' ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἀπέχειν
6 τῆς Καινῆς πόλεως. νομίζων οὖν, ἐὰν μὲν εἰς μάχην συνιέναι κρίνῃ τοῖς πολεμίοις, τὸ μὲν πρὸς πάντας ἅμα κινδυνεύειν ‹ἐπισφαλὲς εἶναι› τελέως καὶ διὰ τὸ προηττῆσθαι τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τὸ
7 πολλαπλασίους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς ἕνα συμβαλεῖν σπεύδων, κἄπειτα τούτου φυγομαχήσαντος, ἐπιγενομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων, συγκλεισθῇ που, κατάφοβος ἦν μὴ ταῖς αὐταῖς Γναίῳ τῷ θείῳ καὶ Ποπλίῳ τῷ
8 πατρὶ περιπέσῃ συμφοραῖς. διὸ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ μέρος ἀπεδοκίμασε, πυνθανόμενος δὲ τὴν προειρημένην Καρχηδόνα μεγίστας μὲν χρείας παρέχεσθαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, μέγιστα δὲ βλάπτειν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον αὐτόν, ἐξητάκει τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ ‹διὰ› τῶν
2 εἰδότων. ἀκούων δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι λιμένας ἔχει στόλῳ καὶ ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσι μόνη σχεδὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διότι πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Λιβύης πλοῦν καὶ πελάγιον δίαρμα λίαν

manders had fallen out with each other and were treating their subjects tyrannically, he felt full confidence in the result of his expedition, relying not on chance but on inference from the facts. For on his arrival in Spain he set everyone on the alert and inquired from everyone about the circumstances of the enemy, and thus learnt that the Carthaginian forces were divided into three bodies. Mago, he heard, was posted on this side of the pillars of Hercules in the country of the people called Conii; Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, was in Lusitania near the mouth of the Tagus; and the other Hasdrubal was besieging a city in the territory of the Carpetani: none of them being within less than ten days' march from New Carthage. He thought, then, that if he decided to engage the enemy it would be extremely dangerous to risk a battle with all the three at once, both because his predecessors had been defeated and because the enemy were greatly superior in numbers, while if he made a dash at one of the three and upon his declining an engagement found himself shut in somewhere by the other hostile forces coming up to help, he feared that he might meet with a disaster such as befel his uncle and father. 8. He therefore rejected any such course; and on learning that the above city, New Carthage, was of very great service to the enemy, and a cause of great damage to himself in the present war, he made detailed inquiries about it during the winter from people acquainted with it. He learnt in the first place that it stood almost alone among Spanish cities in possessing harbours fit for a fleet and for naval forces, and that it was at the same time very favourably situated for the Carthaginians to make the direct sea crossing from

3 εὐφυῶς κεῖται τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διότι καὶ τὸ τῶν χρημάτων πλῆθος καὶ τὰς ἀποσκευὰς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἁπάσας ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει συνέβαινε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ὁμήρους τοὺς ἐξ ὅλης τῆς Ἰβηρίας, τὸ δὲ
4 μέγιστον, ὅτι μάχιμοι μὲν ἄνδρες εἴησαν εἰς χιλίους οἱ τὴν ἄκραν τηροῦντες διὰ τὸ μηδένα μηδέποτ' ἂν ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι κρατούντων Καρχηδονίων σχεδὸν ἁπάσης Ἰβηρίας ἐπινοήσει τις
5 τὸ παράπαν πολιορκῆσαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν, τὸ δ' ἄλλο πλῆθος ὅτι πολὺ μὲν εἴη διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ, πᾶν δὲ δημιουργικὸν καὶ βάναυσον καὶ θαλαττουργὸν καὶ πλεῖστον ἀπέχον πολεμικῆς ἐμπειρίας, ὃ κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι,
6 παραδόξου γενομένης ἐπιφανείας. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν θέσιν τῆς Καρχηδόνος οὐδὲ τὴν κατασκευὴν οὐδὲ τὴν τῆς περιεχούσης αὐτὴν λίμνης διάθεσιν
7 ἠγνόει, διὰ δέ τινων ἁλιέων τῶν ἐνειργασμένων τοῖς τόποις ἐξητάκει διότι καθόλου μέν ἐστι τεναγώδης ἡ λίμνη καὶ βατὴ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον, ὡς δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ γίνεταί τις αὐτῆς ἀποχώρησις
8 καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπὶ δείλην ὀψίαν. ἐξ ὧν συλλογισάμενος ὅτι καθικόμενος μὲν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὐ μόνον βλάψει τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σφετέροις
9 πράγμασι μεγάλην ἐπίδοσιν παρασκευάσει, διαπεσὼν δὲ τῆς προθέσεως, ὅτι δύναται σῴζειν τοὺς ὑποταττομένους διὰ τὸ θαλαττοκρατεῖν, ἐὰν ἅπαξ ἀσφαλίσηται τὴν στρατοπεδείαν—τοῦτο δ' ἦν εὐχερὲς διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπεσπάσθαι τὰς τῶν
10 ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεις—οὕτως ἀφέμενος τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ταύτην ἐγίνετο τὴν παρασκευὴν ἐν τῇ παρα-
9 χειμασίᾳ. καὶ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν ἐπιβολὴν καὶ

Africa. Next he heard that the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and their war material in this city, as well as their hostages from the whole of Spain, and, what was of most importance, that the trained soldiers who garrisoned the citadel were only about a thousand in number, because no one dreamt that while the Carthaginians were masters of nearly the whole of Spain it would enter anyone's head to besiege the city, while the remaining population was exceedingly large but composed of artisans, tradesmen, and sailors, men very far from having any military experience. This he considered to be a thing that would tell against the city, if he appeared suddenly before it. Nor was he ignorant of the position and plan of New Carthage and of the nature of the lagoon which surrounded it, but had learnt from some fishermen who plied their craft there that the whole lagoon was shallow and in most parts fordable, and that usually the water in it receded every day towards evening. Taking all these facts into consideration he came to the conclusion that if he succeeded in his enterprise he would not only damage the enemy, but would much advance the Roman cause, while in the event of failure he could, since he was master of the sea, place his troops in a position of safety, once he had secured his camp—an easy matter as the forces of the enemy were at so great a distance. Abandoning, therefore, all other projects he spent his time while in winter quarters in preparing for this, (9) and though he had formed such a great project and was only of the

τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἣν ἀρτίως εἶπα, πάντας ἀπεκρύψατο χωρὶς Γαΐου Λαιλίου, μέχρι πάλιν αὐτὸς ἔκρινε φανερὸν ποιεῖν.

2 Τούτοις δὲ τοῖς ἐκλογισμοῖς ὁμολογοῦντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἔλθωσι τῆς πράξεως, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν τούτου πρόνοιαν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὴν τύχην �ανα-
3 φέρουσι τὸ γεγονὸς κατόρθωμα, καὶ ταῦτα χωρὶς τῶν εἰκότων καὶ τῆς τῶν συμβεβιωκότων μαρτυρίας, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ποπλίου σαφῶς ἐκτεθεικότος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς ἐκλογισμοῖς χρησάμενος, οἷς ἡμεῖς ἀνώτερον ἐξελογισάμεθα, καθόλου τε τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλοιτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῇ τῆς Καρχηδόνος πολιορκίᾳ.

4 Πλὴν τότε γε τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ στόλου Γαΐῳ Λαι-
λίῳ δι' ἀπορρήτων ἐντειλάμενος παρήγγειλε πλεῖν
5 ἐπὶ τὴν προειρημένην πόλιν—μόνος γὰρ οὗτος αὐτῷ συνῄδει τὴν ἐπιβολήν, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον
6 εἶπον—αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις ἀναλαβὼν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν μετὰ σπουδῆς. εἶχε δὲ τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πλῆθος εἰς δισμυρίους καὶ πενται-
7 κισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δ' εἰς δισχιλίους καὶ πενταακοσίους. ἀφικόμενος δ' ἑβδομαῖος κατεστρατοπέδευσε κατὰ τὸ πρὸς ἄρκτους μέρος τῆς πόλεως, καὶ περιεβάλετο κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐκτὸς ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς στρατοπεδείας τάφρον καὶ χάρακα διπλοῦν ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἁπλῶς οὐδέν. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ τόπου φύσις ἱκανὴν ἀσφάλειαν αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζε.

8 Μέλλοντες δὲ καὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν καὶ τὴν ἅλωσιν τῆς πόλεως δηλοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθ' εἶναι τὸ

age I just stated he concealed the plan from everyone except Gaius Laelius, until the time when he judged it proper to make it public.

Although authors agree that he made these calculations, yet when they come to the accomplishment of his plan, they attribute for some unknown reason the success not to the man and his foresight, but to the gods and to chance, and that in spite of all probability and in spite of the testimony of those who lived with him, and of the fact that Scipio himself in his letter to Philip explained clearly that it was after making the calculations which I have just recited that he undertook all his operations in Spain and particularly the siege of New Carthage.

Be that as it may, he now gave secret orders to Gaius Laelius, who commanded the fleet, to sail to that city—it was Laelius alone, as I above stated, who was aware of the project—while he himself with his land forces marched rapidly against it. He had about twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse. Arriving on the seventh day he encamped to the north of the city, defending the outer side of his camp by a palisade and double trench reaching from sea to sea, but erecting no defences at all on the side facing the town, where the nature of the ground sufficiently secured his position.

Now that I am about to narrate the siege and capture of the place, I think it behoves me to make

καὶ τοὺς παρακειμένους τόπους καὶ τὴν θέσιν
10 αὐτῆς ἐπὶ ποσὸν ὑποδεῖξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι. κεῖται
μὲν οὖν τῆς Ἰβηρίας κατὰ μέσην τὴν παραλίαν
ἐν κόλπῳ νεύοντι πρὸς ἄνεμον λίβα· οὗ τὸ μὲν
βάθος ἐστὶν ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίων, τὸ δὲ πλάτος
ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὡς δέκα· λαμβάνει ‹δὲ› διά-
θεσιν λιμένος ὁ πᾶς κόλπος διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν.
2 νῆσος ἐπὶ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ κεῖται βραχὺν ἐξ
ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους εἴσπλουν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀπο-
3 λείπουσα. ταύτης ἀποδεχομένης τὸ πελάγιον κῦμα
συμβαίνει τὸν κόλπον ὅλον εὐδίαν ἴσχειν, πλὴν
ἐφ' ὅσον οἱ λίβες καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸν εἴσπλουν παρ-
4 εισπίπτοντες κλύδωνας ἀποτελοῦσι. τῶν γε μὴν
ἄλλων πνευμάτων ἀκλυδώνιστος ὢν τυγχάνει διὰ
5 τὴν περιέχουσαν αὐτὸν ἤπειρον. ἐν δὲ τῷ μυχῷ
τοῦ κόλπου πρόκειται χερρονησίζον ὄρος, ἐφ' οὗ
κεῖσθαι συμβαίνει τὴν πόλιν, περιεχομένην θαλάττῃ
μὲν ἀπ' ἀνατολῶν καὶ μεσημβρίας, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν
δύσεων λίμνῃ προσεπιλαμβανούσῃ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς
6 ἄρκτον μέρους, ὥστε τὸν λοιπὸν τόπον μέχρι τῆς
ἐπὶ θάτερα θαλάττης, ὃς καὶ συνάπτει τὴν πόλιν
πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον, μὴ πλέον ὑπάρχειν ἢ δυεῖν
7 σταδίων. ἡ δὲ πόλις αὐτὴ μεσόκοιλός ἐστι· κατὰ
δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας πλευρὰν ἐπίπεδον ἔχει
τὴν ἀπὸ θαλάττης πρόσοδον· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ περι-
έχεται λόφοις, δυσὶ μὲν ὀρεινοῖς καὶ τραχέσιν,
ἄλλοις δὲ τρισὶ πολὺ μὲν χθαμαλωτέροις, σπιλώδεσι
8 δὲ καὶ δυσβάτοις· ὧν ὁ μὲν μέγιστος ἀπὸ τῆς
ἀνατολῆς αὐτῇ παράκειται, προτείνων εἰς θάλατταν,
9 ἐφ' οὗ καθίδρυται νεὼς Ἀσκληπιοῦ. τούτῳ δ'
ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως ἀντίκειται, παραπλησίαν θέσιν
ἔχων, ἐφ' οὗ καὶ βασίλεια κατεσκεύασται πολυ-

my readers acquainted to some extent with its surroundings and actual position. 10. New Carthage lies half way down the coast of Spain, in a gulf which faces south-west and is about twenty stades long and ten stades broad at the entrance. This gulf serves as a harbour for the following reason. At its mouth lies an island which leaves only a narrow passage on either side, and as this breaks the waves of the sea, the whole gulf is perfectly calm, except that the south-west wind sometimes blows in through both the channels and raises some sea. No other wind, however, disturbs it as it is quite land-locked. In the innermost nook of the gulf a hill in the form of a peninsula juts out, and on this stands the city, surrounded by the sea on the east and south and on the west by a lagoon which extends so far to the north that the remaining space, reaching as far as the sea on the other side and connecting the city with the mainland, is not more than two stades in breadth. The town itself is low in the centre, and on its southern side the approach to it from the sea is level. On the other sides it is surrounded by hills, two of them lofty and rugged, and the other three, though much lower, yet craggy and difficult of access. The biggest of these hills lies on the east side of the town and juts out into the sea, and on it is built a temple of Aesculapius. The second is opposite it on the western side in a similar position, and on it stands a magnificent palace said to have

τελῶς, ἃ φασιν Ἀσδρούβαν ποιῆσαι, μοναρχικῆς
10 ὀρεγόμενον ἐξουσίας. αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τρεῖς τῶν
ἐλαττόνων βουνῶν ὑπεροχαὶ τὸ πρὸς ἄρκτον αὐτῆς
11 μέρος περιέχουσι. καλεῖται δὲ τῶν τριῶν ὁ μὲν
πρὸς ἀνατολὰς νεύων Ἡφαίστου, τούτῳ δ' ὁ
συνεχὴς Ἀλήτου—δοκεῖ δ' οὗτος εὑρετὴς γενό-
μενος τῶν ἀργυρείων μετάλλων ἰσοθέων τετευχέναι
12 τιμῶν—ὁ δὲ τρίτος προσαγορεύεται Κρόνου. συμ-
βαίνει δὲ τὴν λίμνην τῇ παρακειμένῃ θαλάττῃ
σύρρουν γεγονέναι χειροποιήτως χάριν τῶν θαλατ-
13 τουργῶν. κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ διείργοντος αὐτὰς
χείλους διακοπὴν γέφυρα κατεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ
καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια καὶ τὰς ἁμάξας ταύτῃ ποιεῖσθαι
τὴν παρακομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀναγκαίων.

11 Τοιαύτης δ' ὑπαρχούσης τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν
τόπων, ἀσφαλίζεσθαι συνέβαινε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις
τὴν στρατοπεδείαν κατὰ τὴν ἐντὸς ἐπιφάνειαν
ἀκατασκεύως ὑπό τε τῆς λίμνης καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ
2 θάτερα θαλάττης. τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων διάστημα
τὸ συνάπτον τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον ἀχαράκωτον
εἴασε, κατὰ μέσην ὑπάρχον τὴν αὐτοῦ στρατοπε-
3 δείαν, εἴτε καὶ καταπλήξεως χάριν εἴτε καὶ πρὸς
τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἁρμοζόμενος, ὅπως ἀνεμποδίστους
ἔχῃ καὶ τὰς ἐξαγωγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀναχωρήσεις εἰς
4 τὴν παρεμβολήν. ὁ δὲ περίβολος τῆς πόλεως οὐ
πλεῖον εἴκοσι σταδίων ὑπῆρχε τὸ πρότερον—
καίτοι γ' οὐκ ἀγνοῶ διότι πολλοῖς εἴρηται τετ-
ταράκοντα· τὸ δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκοῆς
ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' αὐτόπται γεγονότες μετ' ἐπιστάσεως
ἀποφαινόμεθα—νῦν δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι συνῄρηται.
5 Πλὴν ὅ γε Πόπλιος, συνάψαντος καὶ τοῦ στόλου
πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρόν, ἐπεβάλετο συναθροίσας

been built by Hasdrubal when he aspired to royal power. The three other smaller eminences are to the north of the city, the most easterly being called the hill of Vulcan, the next one the hill of Aletes, who is said to have received divine honours for his discovery of the silver mines, while the third is known as the hill of Saturn. An artificial communication has been opened between the lagoon and the neighbouring sea for the convenience of shipping, and over the channel thus cut through the tongue of land that separates lagoon and sea a bridge has been built for the passage of beasts of burden and carts bringing in supplies from the country.

11. Such being the situation of the place, the Roman camp was protected on its inner side without any fortification by the lagoon and by the outer sea. The intervening space, which connects the city with the mainland and which lay in the middle of his camp, was also left unintrenched by Scipio, either to intimidate the enemy or to adapt it to his own particular purpose, so that there should be no impediment to sorties from his camp and subsequent retirement into it. The circumference of the city was formerly not more than twenty stades—I am quite aware that many state it to be forty, but this is not true, as I speak not from report but from my own careful observation—and at the present day it has still further shrunk.

Scipio, then, when the fleet arrived in due time, decided to call a meeting of his troops and address

τὰ πλήθη παρακαλεῖν, οὐχ ἑτέροις τισὶ χρώμενος ἀπολογισμοῖς, ἀλλ' οἷς ἐτύγχανε πεπεικὼς αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἄρτι πεποιήμεθα
6 λόγον. ἀποδείξας δὲ δυνατὴν οὖσαν τὴν ἐπιβολήν, καὶ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατορθώματος ἐλάττωσιν ‹τῶν ὑπεναντίων, αὔξησιν› δὲ τῶν σφετέρων πραγμάτων, λοιπὸν χρυσοῦς στεφάνους ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς πρώτοις ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναβᾶσι καὶ τὰς εἰθισμένας δωρεὰς τοῖς ἐπιφανῶς ἀνδραγα-
7 θήσασι· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔφη τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῷ ταύτην ὑποδεδειχέναι τὸν Ποσειδῶνα παραστάντα κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον, καὶ φάναι συνεργήσειν ἐπιφανῶς κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς πράξεως καιρὸν οὕτως ὥστε παντὶ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ
8 χρείαν ἐναργῆ γενέσθαι. τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν παράκλησιν λόγων ἅμα μὲν ἀπολογισμοῖς ἀκριβέσι μεμιγμένων, ἅμα δ' ἐπαγγελίαις χρυσῶν στεφάνων, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις θεοῦ προνοίᾳ, τελέως μεγάλην ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν παρίστασθαι συνέβαινε τοῖς νεανίσκοις.

12 Τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης τόπους περιστήσας ναῦς παντοδαποῖς βέλεσιν ἐξηρτυμένας καὶ δοὺς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν Γαΐῳ, κατὰ δὲ γῆν τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους τῶν ἀνδρῶν εἰς δισχιλίους ὁμόσε τοῖς κλιμακοφόροις ἐπιστήσας, ἐνήρχετο
2 τῆς πολιορκίας κατὰ τρίτην ὥραν. ὁ δὲ Μάγων ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως τὸ μὲν τῶν χιλίων σύνταγμα διελὼν τοὺς μὲν ἡμίσεις ἐπὶ τῆς ἄκρας ἀπέλιπε, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἀνατολὰς
3 λόφου παρενέβαλε· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους περὶ δισχιλίους κατεσκευακὼς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὅπλοις ἐπέστησε κατὰ τὴν πύλην

them, using no other arguments than those which had carried conviction to himself and which I have above stated in detail. After proving to them that the project was feasible, and pointing out briefly what loss its success would entail on the enemy and what an advantage it would be to themselves, he went on to promise gold crowns to those who should be the first to mount the wall and the usual rewards to such as displayed conspicuous courage. Finally he told them that it was Neptune who had first suggested this plan to him, appearing to him in his sleep, and promising that when the time for the action came he would render such conspicuous aid that his intervention would be manifest to the whole army. The combination in this speech of accurate calculation, of the promise of gold crowns, and therewithal of confidence in the help of Providence created great enthusiasm and ardour among the lads.

12. Next day, encircling the city from the sea by ships furnished with all kinds of missiles under the command of Laelius, and sending forward on the land side two thousand of his strongest men together with the ladder-bearers, he began the assault at about the third hour. Mago, who was in command of the place, divided his regiment of a thousand men into two, leaving half of them on the citadel and stationing the others on the eastern hill. As for the rest, he armed two thousand of the strongest with such arms as were to be found in the town, and

τὴν φέρουσαν ἐπὶ τὸν ἰσθμὸν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων στρατοπεδείαν· τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς παρήγγειλε βοηθεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν πρὸς πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ τείχους. 4 ἅμα δὲ τῷ τὸν Πόπλιον ταῖς σάλπιγξι διασημῆναι [καὶ] τὸν καιρὸν τῆς προσβολῆς, ἐξαφίησι τοὺς καθωπλισμένους ὁ Μάγων διὰ τῆς πύλης, πεπεισμένος ὅτι καταπλήξεται τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ τὸ 5 παράπαν ἀφελεῖται τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῶν. προσπεσόντων δὲ τούτων ἐρρωμένως τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου κατὰ τὸν ἰσθμὸν παρατεταγμένοις ἐγίνετο μάχη λαμπρὰ καὶ παρακελευσμὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐναγώνιος, τῶν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, τῶν δ' ἐκ τῆς 6 πόλεως τοῖς ἰδίοις ἑκατέρων ἐπιβοώντων. τῆς δὲ διὰ τῶν βοηθούντων ἐπικουρίας οὐχ ὁμοίας ὑπαρχούσης διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις διὰ μιᾶς πύλης καὶ σχεδὸν ἀπὸ δυεῖν σταδίοιν γίνεσθαι τὴν παρουσίαν, τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατὰ πολὺν τόπον, ἄνισος ἦν ἡ μάχη παρὰ ταύτην τὴν 7 αἰτίαν. ὁ γὰρ Πόπλιος ἑκὼν ἐπέστησε τοὺς αὑτοῦ παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν στρατοπεδείαν χάριν τοῦ προκαλέσασθαι τοὺς πολεμίους πορρωτάτω, σαφῶς γινώσκων, ἐὰν διαφθείρῃ τούτους, ὄντας οἷον εἰ στόμα τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πλήθους, ὅτι διατραπήσεται τὰ ὅλα καὶ τὴν πύλην οὐκέτι τῶν ἔνδον οὐδεὶς 8 ἐξιέναι θαρρήσει. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἕως μέν τινος ἐφάμιλλον συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν μάχην, ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν προκεκριμένων· τέλος δ' ἐξωθούμενοι τῷ βάρει διὰ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς προσγινομένους ἐτράπησαν οἱ 9 παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων, καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ τῆς μάχης καιρῷ διεφθάρησαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἐν τῷ παραπίπτειν

posted them near the gate leading to the isthmus and the enemy's camp: the others he ordered to do their best to defend the whole of the wall. As soon as Scipio had given the signal for the assault by bugle, Mago sent the armed citizens out through the gate, feeling sure of striking terror into the enemy and entirely defeating their design. They delivered a vigorous assault on the Romans who had issued from the camp and were now drawn up on the isthmus, and a sharp engagement ensued, accompanied by vehement shouts of encouragement from both sides, those in the camp and those in the town respectively cheering on their own men. But as the assistance sent to either side was not equal, the Carthaginians arriving through a single gate and from a distance of nearly two stades and the Romans from close by and from several points, the battle for this reason was an unequal one. For Scipio had purposely posted his men close to the camp itself in order to entice the enemy as far out as possible, well knowing that if he destroyed those who were so to speak the steel edge of the population of the town he would cause universal dejection, and none of those inside would venture out of the gate. However, for some time the battle was hotly contested, as both sides had picked out their best men. But finally, as reinforcements continued to come up from the camp, the Carthaginians were forced back, by sheer weight, and took to flight, many of them falling in the actual battle or in the retreat but the greater number being trodden down by

10 εἰς τὴν πύλην ὑφ' αὑτῶν ἠλοήθησαν. οὗ συμβαί-
νοντος ὁ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὄχλος οὕτως ἐπτοήθη
11 πᾶς ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν φεύγειν. παρ'
ὀλίγον μὲν οὖν ἦλθον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τοῦ συνεισπεσεῖν
τότε μετὰ τῶν φευγόντων· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τάς γε
κλίμακας τῷ τείχει μετ' ἀσφαλείας προσήρεισαν.

13 Ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἐδίδου μὲν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν κίνδυ-
2 νον, ἐποίει δὲ τοῦτο κατὰ δύναμιν ἀσφαλῶς· εἶχε
γὰρ μεθ' αὑτοῦ τρεῖς ἄνδρας θυρεοφοροῦντας, οἳ
παρατιθέντες τοὺς θυρεοὺς καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους
ἐπιφάνειαν σκεπάζοντες ἀσφάλειαν αὐτῷ παρε-
3 σκεύαζον. διὸ παρὰ τὰ πλάγια καὶ τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους
τόπους ἐπιπαριὼν μεγάλα συνεβάλλετο πρὸς τὴν
4 χρείαν· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἑώρα τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δ'
αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος ἐνειργάζετο προθυμίαν
5 τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις. ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε μηδὲν ἐλλιπὲς
γίνεσθαι τῶν πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλ' ὁπότε τιν'
αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ὁ καιρὸς ὑποδείξειε,
πᾶν ἐκ χειρὸς ἀεὶ συνηργεῖτο πρὸς τὸ δέον.
6 Ὁρμησάντων δὲ ταῖς κλίμαξι περὶ τὴν ἀνάβασιν
τῶν πρώτων τεθαρρηκότως, οὐχ οὕτως τὸ πλῆθος
τῶν ἀμυνομένων ἐπικίνδυνον ἐποίει τὴν προσβολὴν
7 ὡς τὸ μέγεθος τῶν τειχῶν. διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπερ-
ρώσθησαν οἱ κατὰ ‹τὰ› τείχη, θεωροῦντες τὴν
8 δυσχρηστίαν τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἔνιαι μὲν γὰρ
συνετρίβοντο τῶν κλιμάκων, πολλῶν ἅμα διὰ τὸ
μέγεθος συνεπιβαινόντων· ἐφ' αἷς δ' οἱ πρῶτοι
προσβαίνοντες ἐσκοτοῦντο διὰ τὴν εἰς ὕψος ἀνάτασιν
καὶ βραχείας προσδεόμενοι τῆς ἐκ τῶν ἀμυνομένων
ἀντιπράξεως ἐρρίπτουν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν
9 κλιμάκων. ὅτε δὲ καὶ δοκοὺς ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἐγ-
χειρήσαιεν ἐπιρρίπτειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων, ὁμοῦ

each other in entering the gate. When this took place the city people were thrown into such panic that even the defenders of the walls fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in entering together with the fugitives, and at any rate set up their scaling-ladders in full security.

13. Scipio took part in the battle, but consulted his safety as far as possible ; for he had with him three men carrying large shields, who holding these close covered the surface exposed to the wall and thus afforded him protection. So that passing along the side of his line on higher ground he contributed greatly to the success of the day ; for he could both see what was going on and being seen by all his men he inspired the combatants with great spirit. The consequence was that nothing was omitted which was necessary in the engagement, but the moment that circumstances suggested any step to him he set to work at once to do what was necessary.

When the front rank advanced confidently to mount the ladders, it was not so much the numbers of the defenders which made the assault hazardous as the great height of the wall. Those on the wall consequently plucked up courage when they saw the difficulties of the assailants. For some of the ladders broke, as owing to their height so many mounted them at the same time, while on others those who led the way grew dizzy owing to their elevated position, and a very slight resistance on the part of the besieged sufficed to make them throw themselves off the ladders. Also whenever the defenders adopted the expedient of throwing beams or suchlike things from the battlements the

πάντες ἀπεσύροντο καὶ κατεφέροντο πρὸς τὴν γῆν.
10 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων ἀπαντωμένων οὐδὲν ἱκανὸν
ἦν πρὸς τὸ κωλύειν τὴν ἐπιφορὰν καὶ τὴν ὁρμὴν
τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλ' ἔτι καταφερομένων τῶν
πρώτων ἐπέβαινον οἱ συνεχεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκλείπουσαν
11 ἀεὶ χώραν. ἤδη δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας προβαινούσης,
καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τετρυμμένων ὑπὸ τῆς κακο-
παθείας, ἀνεκαλέσατο ταῖς σάλπιγξιν ὁ στρατηγὸς
τοὺς προσβάλλοντας.

14 Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἔνδον περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν ὡς ἀποτε-
2 τριμμένοι τὸν κίνδυνον· ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος, προσδοκῶν
ἤδη τὸν τῆς ἀμπώτεως καιρόν, κατὰ μὲν τὴν λίμνην
ἡτοίμασε πεντακοσίους ἄνδρας μετὰ κλιμάκων,
3 κατὰ δὲ τὴν πύλην καὶ τὸν ἰσθμὸν νεαλεῖς ποιήσας
τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ παρακαλέσας προσανέδωκε
κλίμακας πλείους τῶν πρότερον, ὥστε συνεχῶς
πλῆρες γενέσθαι τὸ τεῖχος τῶν προσβαινόντων.
4 ἅμα δὲ τῷ σημῆναι τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ προσθέντας
τῷ τείχει τὰς κλίμακας προσβαίνειν κατὰ πάντα
τὰ μέρη τεθαρρηκότως μεγάλην συνέβαινε ταραχὴν
5 καὶ διατροπὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἔνδον. νομίζοντες
γὰρ ἀπολελύσθαι τῆς περιστάσεως, αὖθις ἀρχὴν
ἑώρων λαμβάνοντα τὸν κίνδυνον ἐξ ἄλλης ὁρμῆς·
6 ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῶν βελῶν αὐτοὺς ἤδη λειπόντων, καὶ
τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀπολωλότων εἰς ἀθυμίαν ἄγοντος,
δυσχερῶς μὲν ἔφερον τὸ γινόμενον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
7 ἠμύνοντο δυνατῶς. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ διὰ
τῶν κλιμάκων ἀγῶνος ἤρχετο τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἄμπωτιν,
8 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῆς λίμνης ἀπέλειπε τὸ ὕδωρ κατὰ
βραχύ, διὰ δὲ τοῦ στόματος ὁ ῥοῦς εἰς τὴν συνεχῆ
θάλατταν ἄθρους ἐφέρετο καὶ πολύς, ὥστε τοῖς
ἀπρονοήτως θεωμένοις ἄπιστον φαίνεσθαι τὸ γινό-

whole of those on the ladders would be swept off and fall to the ground. Yet in spite of all these difficulties nothing could restrain the dash and fury of the Romans, but while the first scalers were still falling the vacant places were instantly taken by the next in order. The hour, however, was now advanced, and as the soldiers were worn out by fatigue, Scipio recalled the assailants by bugle.

14. The garrison were now overjoyed at having, as they thought, repelled the danger, but Scipio, who was now waiting for the fall of the tide, got ready five hundred men with ladders on the shore of the lagoon and recruited his force at the isthmus and by the gate. Then after addressing the soldiers he gave them still more ladders than before so that the whole extent of the wall was covered with escaladers. When the signal for attack was sounded and the assailants setting up the ladders against the wall mounted it everywhere in the most daring manner, the defenders were thrown into great confusion and became very despondent. They had thought they were delivered from peril, and now they saw they were menaced again by a new assault. As at the same time they had run out of ammunition and their losses were so severe as to dispirit them, they supported the assault with difficulty, but nevertheless offered a stubborn resistance. Just when the escalading attack was at its height the tide began to ebb and the water gradually receded from the edge of the lagoon, a strong and deep current setting in through the channel to the neighbouring sea, so that to those who were not prepared for the sight the thing appeared incredible. But

9 μενον. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἔχων ἑτοίμους τοὺς καθηγε-
μόνας ἐμβαίνειν παρεκελεύετο καὶ θαρρεῖν τοὺς
10 πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ταύτην ἡτοιμασμένους· καὶ γὰρ
ἦν εὖ πεφυκώς, εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, πρὸς τὸ θάρσος
ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιῆσαι τοὺς παρακαλου-
11 μένους. τότε δὴ πειθαρχησάντων αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ
τοῦ τέλματος ἁμιλλωμένων, ἅπαν τὸ στρατόπεδον
ὑπέλαβε μετά τινος θεοῦ προνοίας γίνεσθαι τὸ
12 συμβαῖνον. ἐξ οὗ καὶ μνησθέντες τῶν κατὰ τὸν
Ποσειδῶ καὶ τῆς τοῦ Ποπλίου κατὰ τὴν παράκλησιν
ἐπαγγελίας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο ταῖς ψυχαῖς παρωρμήθησαν
ὡς συμφράξαντες καὶ βιασάμενοι πρὸς τὴν πύλην
ἔξωθεν ἐπεχείρουν διακόπτειν τοῖς πελέκεσι καὶ
13 ταῖς ἀξίναις τὰς θύρας. οἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν τελμάτων
ἐγγίσαντες τῷ τείχει, καὶ καταλαβόντες ἐρήμους
τὰς ἐπάλξεις, οὐ μόνον προσέθεσαν ἀσφαλῶς τὰς
κλίμακας, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατέσχον ἀναβάντες ἁμαχητὶ τὸ
14 τεῖχος, ἅτε τῶν ἔνδον περισπωμένων μὲν περὶ
τοὺς ἄλλους τόπους, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς κατὰ τὸν
ἰσθμὸν καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ πύλην, οὐδέποτε δ' ἂν ἐλπι-
σάντων ἐγγίσαι τῷ τείχει τοὺς πολεμίους κατὰ
15 τὸν τῆς λίμνης τόπον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον, ὑπὸ τῆς
ἀτάκτου κραυγῆς καὶ τῆς συμμίκτου πολυοχλίας
οὐ δυναμένων οὔτ' ἀκούειν οὔτε συνορᾶν τῶν
δεόντων οὐδέν.

15 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι κρατήσαντες τοῦ τείχους τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ἐπεπορεύοντο κατὰ τὴν ἐφοδείαν ἀποσύρον-
τες τοὺς πολεμίους, μεγάλα συμβαλλομένης αὐτοῖς
τῆς ὁπλίσεως πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῆς χρείας·
2 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὴν πύλην, οἱ μὲν κατα-
βάντες διέκοπτον τοὺς μοχλούς, οἱ δ' ἔξωθεν εἰσ-
έπιπτον, οἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν κλιμάκων βιαζόμενοι κατὰ

Scipio had his guides ready and bade all the men he had told off for this service enter the water and have no fear. He indeed possessed a particular talent for inspiring confidence and sympathy in his troops when he called upon them. Now when they obeyed and raced through the shallow water, it struck the whole army that it was the work of some god. So that now remembering Scipio's reference to Neptune and the promise he made in his speech their courage was redoubled, and under cover of their shields they forced their way in dense order to the gate and began to try to cut down the doors with axes and hatchets. Meanwhile those who reached the wall through the lagoon finding the battlements deserted not only set up their ladders unmolested, but ascended them and occupied the wall without striking a blow, the defenders having been diverted to other quarters, especially to the isthmus and gate there, and having never conceived it possible that the enemy would reach the wall from the lagoon, while above all there was such disorderly shouting and such crowding and confusion that they could neither hear nor see to any effect.

15. The Romans, having once taken the wall, at first marched along it sweeping the enemy off it, the nature of their arms being very well adapted for such a service. Upon reaching the gate some of them descended and began to cut through the bolts, upon which those outside began to force their way in, while the escaladers at the isthmus had

τὸν ἰσθμόν, ἤδη κρατοῦντες τῶν ἀμυνομένων, ἐπ-
3 έβαινον ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις. καὶ τέλος τὰ μὲν
τείχη τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ κατείληπτο, τὸν δὲ λόφον
οἱ διὰ τῆς πύλης εἰσπορευόμενοι κατελάμβανον
τὸν πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολάς, τρεψάμενοι τοὺς φυλάττον-
4 τας. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἐπεὶ τοὺς εἰσεληλυθότας
ἀξιόχρεως ὑπελάμβανεν εἶναι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους
ἐφῆκε κατὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ
πόλει, παραγγείλας κτείνειν τὸν παρατυχόντα
καὶ μηδενὸς φείδεσθαι, μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς ὠφελείας
5 ὁρμᾶν, μέχρις ἂν ἀποδοθῇ τὸ σύνθημα. ποιεῖν
δέ μοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο καταπλήξεως χάριν· διὸ καὶ
πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων κατα-
λήψεσι τῶν πόλεων οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
πεφονευμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κύνας δεδιχοτομη-
μένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων μέλη παρακεκομμένα.
6 τότε δὲ καὶ τελέως πολὺ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦν διὰ τὸ
7 πλῆθος τῶν κατειλημμένων. αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ χιλίους
ἔχων ὥρμησε πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν. ἐγγίσαντος δ'
αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλλετο Μάγων ἀμύ-
νεσθαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συννοήσας βεβαίως ἤδη
κατειλημμένην τὴν πόλιν διεπέμψατο περὶ τῆς
ἀσφαλείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, καὶ παρέδωκε τὴν ἄκραν.
8 οὗ γενομένου, καὶ τοῦ συνθήματος ἀποδοθέντος,
τοῦ μὲν φονεύειν ἀπέστησαν, ὥρμησαν δὲ πρὸς
9 τὰς ἁρπαγάς. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς οἱ
μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἔμενον, οἷς ἦν οὕτω
διατεταγμένον· μετὰ δὲ τῶν χιλίων ὁ στρατηγὸς
ἐπὶ τῆς ἄκρας ηὐλίσθη, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διὰ τῶν
χιλιάρχων ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἐκκαλεσάμενος ἐπέταξε
συναθροίσαντας εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ διηρπασμένα
10 κατὰ σημαίας ἐπὶ τούτων κοιτάζεσθαι. τοὺς δὲ

now overpowered the defence and established themselves on the battlements. Finally, when the walls had been taken in this manner, those who entered through the gate occupied the hill on the east after dislodging its defenders. When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had entered he sent most of them, as is the Roman custom, against the inhabitants of the city with orders to kill all they encountered, sparing none, and not to start pillaging until the signal was given. They do this, I think, to inspire terror, so that when towns are taken by the Romans one may often see not only the corpses of human beings, but dogs cut in half, and the dismembered limbs of other animals, and on this occasion such scenes were very many owing to the numbers of those in the place. Scipio himself, with about a thousand men, proceeded to the citadel. On his approach Mago at first attempted to resist, but afterwards, when he saw that the city had undoubtedly been captured, he sent a message begging for his life and surrendered the citadel. After this, upon the signal being given, the massacre ceased and they began pillaging. At nightfall such of the Romans as had received orders to that effect, remained in the camp, while Scipio with his thousand men bivouacked in the citadel, and recalling the rest from the houses ordered them, through the tribunes, to collect the booty in the market, each maniple separately, and sleep there, keeping guard over it. Summoning also the light-

γροσφομάχους ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς καλέσας ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον ἐπέστησε τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνατολῶν.

11 Καὶ τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν Καρχηδόνος
16 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐγένοντο κύριοι Ῥωμαῖοι· εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον ἀθροισθείσης εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τῆς τε τῶν στρατευομένων παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἀποσκευῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐργαστικῶν κατασκευῆς, ταῦτα μὲν ἐμέριζον οἱ χιλίαρχοι τοῖς ἰδίοις στρατοπέδοις κατὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος.

2 ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τοιαύτη τις ἡ περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεων καταλήψεις οἰκονομία. ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστης σημαίας πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀπομερίζονταί τινες τῶν ἀνδρῶν κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως,

3 ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ σημαίας μερίζουσιν αὐτούς. οὐδέποτε ‹δὲ› πλείους ἀποτάττονται πρὸς τοῦτο τῶν ἡμίσεων· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ μένοντες κατὰ τὰς τάξεις ἐφεδρεύουσι, ποτὲ μὲν ἐκτὸς τῆς πόλεως, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐντός,

4 ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ δεικνύειν. τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως διῃρημένης αὐτοῖς κατὰ μὲν τὸ πλεῖον εἰς δύο στρατόπεδα Ῥωμαϊκὰ καὶ δύο τῶν συμμάχων, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σπανίως ἀθροιζομένων ὁμοῦ τῶν τεττάρων, πάντες οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἁρπαγὴν ἀπομερισθέντες ἀναφέρουσι τὰς ὠφελείας ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδοις,

5 κἄπειτα πραθέντων τούτων οἱ χιλίαρχοι διανέμουσι πᾶσιν ἴσον, οὐ μόνον τοῖς μείνασιν ἐν ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς τὰς σκηνὰς φυλάττουσι τοῖς τ' ἀρρωστοῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἐπί τινα λειτουργίαν ἀπεσταλ-

6 μένοις. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηδένα νοσφίζεσθαι μηδὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς διαρπαγῆς, ἀλλὰ τηρεῖν τὴν πίστιν κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον, ‹ὃν› ὀμνύουσι πάντες, ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσι πρῶτον εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, ἐξιέναι μέλλοντες

7 εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν, ὑπὲρ τούτου δὲ τοῦ μέρους

armed troops from the camp he stationed them on the easternmost hill.

16. Such was the manner in which the Romans gained possession of Spanish Carthage. Next day the booty, both the baggage of the troops in the Carthaginian service and the household stuff of the townsmen and working classes, having been collected in the market, was divided by the tribunes among the legions on the usual system. The Romans after the capture of a city manage matters more or less as follows: according to the size of the town sometimes a certain number of men from each maniple, at other times certain whole maniples are told off to collect booty, but they never thus employ more than half their total force, the rest remaining in their ranks at times outside and at times inside the city, ready for the occasion. As their armies are usually composed of two Roman legions and two legions of allies, the whole four legions being rarely massed, all those who are told off to spoil bring the booty back, each man to his own legion, and after it has been sold the tribunes distribute the profits equally among all, including not only those who were left behind in the protecting force, but the men who are guarding the tents, the sick, and those absent on any special service. I have already stated at some length in my chapters on the Roman state how it is that no one appropriates any part of the loot, but that all keep the oath they

εἴρηται πρότερον ἡμῖν διὰ πλειόνων ἐν τοῖς περὶ
8 τῆς πολιτείας. λοιπὸν ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἡμίσεις τράπων-
ται πρὸς τὰς ἁρπαγάς, οἱ δ' ἡμίσεις διαφυλάττοντες
τὰς τάξεις ἐφεδρεύωσι τούτοις, οὐδέποτε κινδυνεύει
9 Ῥωμαίοις τὰ ὅλα διὰ πλεονεξίαν. τῆς γὰρ ἐλπίδος
τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὠφέλειαν οὐκ ἀπιστουμένης ἀλλήλοις,
ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἴσης ἑστηκυίας τοῖς μένουσι κατὰ τὰς
ἐφεδρείας καὶ τοῖς διαρπάζουσιν, οὐδεὶς ἀπολείπει
τὰς τάξεις· ὃ μάλιστα τοὺς ἄλλους εἴωθε βλάπτειν.
17 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων κακοπαθοῦσι
καὶ κινδυνεύουσι τοῦ κέρδους ἕνεκεν, φανερὸν
ὡς, ὅταν ὁ καιρὸς οὗτος ὑποπέσῃ, δυσχερῶς εἰκὸς
ἀπέχεσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις ἢ στρατοπεδείαις
ἀπολειπομένους διὰ τὸ [τοὺς] παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις
2 πᾶν τὸ ληφθὲν εἶναι τοῦ κυριεύσαντος· καὶ γὰρ ἂν
ὅλως μόναρχος ἢ στρατηγὸς ἐπιμελὴς ἀναφέρειν
εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιτάξῃ τὰς ὠφελείας, ὅμως τὰ
3 δυνατὰ κρύπτεσθαι πάντες ἴδια νομίζουσι. διὸ
τῶν πολλῶν ὁρμώντων ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος οὐ
4 δυνάμενοι κρατεῖν κινδυνεύουσι τοῖς ὅλοις· καὶ
πολλοὶ δή τινες κατορθώσαντες τὰς ἐπιβολάς,
καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπιπεσόντες ταῖς τῶν πολεμίων
παρεμβολαῖς, ποτὲ δὲ καταλαβόμενοι πόλεις, οὐ
μόνον ἐξέπεσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφάλησαν
5 παρ' οὐδὲν ἢ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν. διὸ δεῖ
περὶ μηδὲν οὕτω σπουδάζειν καὶ προνοεῖσθαι τοὺς
ἡγουμένους ὡς περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ἵνα, καθ'
ὅσον ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ὑπάρχῃ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἐλπὶς ὡς ἐξ ἴσου πᾶσι τῆς ὠφελείας οὔσης, ἐάν
τις ὑποπίπτῃ τοιοῦτος καιρός.

6 Πλὴν οἱ μὲν χιλίαρχοι τότε περὶ τὴν τῶν λα-
φύρων ἦσαν οἰκονομίαν· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν

make when first assembled in camp on setting out for a campaign. So that when half of the army disperse to pillage and the other half keep their ranks and afford them protection, there is never any chance of the Romans suffering disaster owing to individual covetousness. For as all, both the spoilers and those who remain to safeguard them, have equal confidence that they will get their share of the booty, no one leaves the ranks, a thing which usually does injury to other armies. 17. For since most men endure hardship and risk their lives for the sake of gain, it is evident that whenever the chance presents itself it is not likely that those left in the protecting force or in the camp will refrain, since the general rule among us is that any man keeps whatever comes into his hands. And even if any careful king or general orders the booty to be brought in to form a common fund, yet everyone regards as his own whatever he can conceal. So that, as most of the men start pillaging, commanders cannot maintain any control and run the risk of disaster, and indeed many who have been successful in their object have, after capturing the enemy's camp or a town, not only been driven out but have met with complete disaster simply for the above reason. Commanders should therefore exercise the utmost care and foresight about this matter, so that as far as is possible the hope of equal participation in the booty when such a chance presents itself may be common to all.

The tribunes, then, were now dealing with the

Ῥωμαίων, ἐπεὶ συνήχθη τὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλῆθος, ὃ συνέβη γενέσθαι μικρῷ λεῖπον τῶν μυρίων, συνέταξε χωρισθῆναι πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ τούτων τέκνα, 7 δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς χειροτέχνας. γενομένου δὲ τούτου, τοὺς μὲν πολιτικοὺς παρακαλέσας εὐνοεῖν Ῥωμαίοις καὶ μνημονεύειν τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀπέλυσε 8 πάντας ἐπὶ τὰς ἰδίας οἰκήσεις. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἅμα δακρύοντες καὶ χαίροντες ἐπὶ τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς σωτηρίας, προσκυνήσαντες τὸν στρατηγὸν 9 διελύθησαν· τοῖς δὲ χειροτέχναις κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εἶπε διότι δημόσιοι τῆς Ῥώμης εἰσί· παρασχομένοις δὲ τὴν εὔνοιαν καὶ προθυμίαν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὰς αὑτῶν τέχνας ἐπηγγείλατο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κατὰ νοῦν χωρήσαντος τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχη- 10 δονίους πολέμου. καὶ τούτους μὲν ἀπογράφεσθαι προσέταξε πρὸς τὸν ταμίαν, συστήσας Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἐπιμελητὴν κατὰ τριάκοντα· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πλῆθος 11 ἐγένετο τούτων περὶ δισχιλίους. ἐκ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἐκλέξας τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀκμαιοτάτους προσ- 12 έμιξε τοῖς αὑτοῦ πληρώμασι, καὶ ποιήσας ἡμιολίους τοὺς πάντας ναύτας ἢ πρόσθεν συνεπλήρωσε καὶ τὰς αἰχμαλώτους νῆας, ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας ἑκάστῳ σκάφει βραχύ τι λείπειν τοῦ διπλασίους εἶναι 13 τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας τῶν προγενομένων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰχμάλωτοι νῆες ἦσαν ὀκτωκαίδεκα τὸν ἀριθμόν, 14 αἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τούτοις ἐπηγγείλατο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, παρασχομένοις τὴν αὑτῶν εὔνοιαν καὶ προθυμίαν, ἐπειδὰν κρατήσωσι τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. 15 τοῦτον δὲ χειρίσας τὸν τρόπον τὰ κατὰ τοὺς

booty, but the Roman commander, when the whole of the prisoners, numbering little less than ten thousand, had been collected, ordered first the citizens with their wives and children, and next the working men, to be set apart. Upon this being done, after exhorting the citizens to be well disposed to the Romans and to be mindful of the kindness shown to them, he dismissed them all to their houses. Weeping and rejoicing at one and the same time, owing to their unexpected delivery, they made obeisance to Scipio and dispersed. He told the working men that for the time being they were public slaves of Rome, but if they showed goodwill and industry in their several crafts be promised them freedom upon the war against Carthage terminating successfully. He ordered them to enrol themselves in the quaestor's office, appointing a Roman superintendent over every thirty, the whole number being about two thousand. Selecting from the other prisoners those who were strongest, finest looking, and in the prime of youth, he incorporated them with the crews of his ships, and having thus got half as many sailors again as before, he manned the captured vessels also, and made the complement of each ship nearly double what it had been, the captured vessels numbering eighteen sail and his original fleet thirty-five. He promised these men also their liberty after the final defeat of Carthage if they displayed good will and zeal. By this treatment of the prisoners

αἰχμαλώτους μεγάλην μὲν εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν ἐνειργάσατο τοῖς πολιτικοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα, μεγάλην δὲ προθυμίαν τοῖς χειροτέχναις διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ἐλευθερίας.
16 ἡμιόλιον δὲ ποιήσας τὸ ναυτικὸν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόνοιαν . . .

18 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Μάγωνα καὶ τοὺς ἅμα τούτῳ Καρχηδονίους ἐχώριζε. δύο μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν κατειλημμένοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας, πέντε δὲ καὶ
2 δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου. καὶ τούτους μὲν συνέστησε Γαΐῳ Λαιλίῳ, συντάξας τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν
3 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἀνδρῶν· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς ὁμήρους προσεκαλέσατο, πλείους ὄντας τῶν τριακοσίων. καὶ τοὺς μὲν παῖδας καθ' ἕνα προσαγαγόμενος καὶ καταψήσας θαρρεῖν ἐκέλευε, διότι μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἐπόψονται τοὺς αὑτῶν
4 γονεῖς· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ὁμοῦ παρεκάλεσε πάντας θαρρεῖν καὶ γράφειν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰς ἰδίας πόλεις
5 πρὸς αὑτῶν ἀναγκαίους πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι σώζονται καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῖς ἐστι, δεύτερον δὲ διότι θέλουσι Ῥωμαῖοι πάντας αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀποκαταστῆσαι μετ' ἀσφαλείας, ἑλομένων τῶν ἀναγκαίων
6 σφίσι τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους συμμαχίαν. ταῦτα δ' εἰπών, καὶ παρεσκευακὼς πρότερον ἐκ τῶν λαφύρων τὰ λυσιτελέστερα πρὸς τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, τότε κατὰ γένη καὶ καθ' ἡλικίαν ἑκάστοις ἐδωρεῖτο τὰ πρέποντα, ταῖς μὲν παισὶ κόνους καὶ ψέλλια,
7 τοῖς δὲ νεανίσκοις ῥαμφὰς καὶ μαχαίρας. ἐκ δὲ τῶν αἰχμαλωτίδων τῆς Μανδονίου γυναικός, ὃς ἦν ἀδελφὸς Ἀνδοβάλου τοῦ τῶν Ἱλεργητῶν βασιλέως, προσπεσούσης αὐτῷ καὶ δεομένης μετὰ δακρύων ἐπιστροφὴν ποιήσασθαι τῆς αὑτῶν εὐ-

he produced in the citizens great affection and loyalty to himself and to the common cause, while the workmen were most zealous owing to their hope of being set free. Having thus by his foresight seized the opportunity of making his fleet half as large again . . .

18. After this he set apart Mago and the Carthaginians who were with him, two of them being members of the council of elders and fifteen members of the senate. He committed these to the custody of Laelius, ordering him to pay them due attention. Next he invited the hostages, over three hundred in number, to visit him, and calling the children to him one by one and caressing them bade them be of good cheer, as in a few days they would see their parents. He also bade the rest take heart and asked them all to write to their relations at home, firstly, that they were safe and well, and secondly, that the Romans were willing to restore them all in safety to their homes if their relatives chose to become allies of Rome. After speaking thus, having reserved from the booty the most suitable objects for this purpose, he gave them such gifts as became their sex and age, presenting the girls with earrings and bracelets and the young men with poniards and swords. When one of the captive women, the wife of Mandonius, who was the brother of Andobales,[a] king of the Ilergetes, fell at his feet and entreated him with tears to treat them with more proper consideration than the

[a] *Indibilis* in Livy.

σχημοσύνης ἀμείνω Καρχηδονίων, συμπαθὴς γενό-
8 μενος ἤρετο τί λείπει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων αὐταῖς· καὶ
γὰρ ἦν ἡ γυνὴ πρεσβυτέρα καί τινα προστασίαν
9 ἀξιωματικὴν ἐπιφαίνουσα. τῆς δὲ κατασιωπώσης
ἐκάλει τοὺς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν γυναικῶν
10 ἀποτεταγμένους. ὧν παραγενομένων καὶ δια-
σαφούντων ὅτι πάντα τὰ δέοντα δαψιλῶς αὐταῖς
παρασκευάζοιεν, πάλιν ὁμοίως ἁψαμένης αὐτοῦ
τῶν γονάτων τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἰπούσης
λόγον, μᾶλλον ἔτι διαπορήσας ὁ Πόπλιος, καί
τινα λαβὼν ἔννοιαν ὡς ὀλιγωρούντων καὶ ψευδῶς
πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀποφαινομένων τῶν πρὸς τὴν
ἐπιμέλειαν ἀποτεταγμένων, θαρρεῖν ἐκέλευε τὰς
11 γυναῖκας· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἑτέρους ἐπιστήσειν τοὺς
φροντιοῦντας ἵνα μηδὲν αὐτὰς ἐλλείπῃ τῶν ἐπιτη-
12 δείων. ἡ δ' ἐπισχοῦσα μικρόν "Οὐκ ὀρθῶς" ἔφη
"στρατηγέ, τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἐκδέχῃ λόγους, εἰ
νομίζεις ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ τῆς γαστρὸς δεῖσθαί σου
13 νῦν"· καὶ τότε λαβὼν ὁ Πόπλιος ἐν νῷ τὸ βούλημα
τῆς γυναικός, καὶ θεωρῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὴν ἀκμὴν
τῶν Ἀνδοβάλου θυγατέρων καὶ πλειόνων ἄλλων
δυναστῶν, ἠναγκάσθη δακρῦσαι, τῆς γυναικὸς ἐν
ὀλίγῳ τὴν τῆς περιστάσεως ἔμφασιν ὑποδεικ-
14 νυούσης. διὸ δὴ καὶ τότε φανερὸς γενόμενος
ὅτι συνῆκε τὸ ῥηθέν, καὶ λαβόμενος τῆς δεξιᾶς,
θαρρεῖν αὐτήν τε ταύτην ἐκέλευε καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
15 ὁμοίως· ποιήσεσθαι γὰρ πρόνοιαν ὡς ἰδίων ἀδελ-
φῶν καὶ τέκνων, συστήσεσθαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν
τούτων ἐπιμέλειαν ἀκολούθως τοῖς προειρημένοις
πιστοὺς ἄνδρας.

19 Μετὰ ταῦτα παρεδίδου τοῖς ταμίαις [τὰ χρή-
ματα], ὅσα δημόσια κατελήφθη τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

Carthaginians had done, he was touched and asked her what they stood in need of. The lady was indeed of advanced age, and bore herself with a certain majestic dignity. Upon her making no reply he sent for the officials appointed to attend on the women. When they presented themselves and informed him that they kept the women generously supplied with all they required, the lady again clasped his knees and addressed him in the same words, upon which Scipio was still more puzzled, and conceiving the idea that the officials who attended on the women were neglecting them and had now made a false statement, he bade the ladies be of good cheer, for he said he would himself appoint other attendants who would see to it that they were in want of nothing. The old lady after some hesitation said, "General, you do not take me rightly if you think that our present petition is about our food." Scipio then understood what the lady meant, and noticing the youth and beauty of the daughters of Andobales and other princes he was forced to tears, recognizing in how few words she had pointed out to him the danger to which they were exposed. So now he made it clear to her that he had taken her meaning, and grasping her by the right hand bade her and the rest be of good cheer, for he would look after them as if they were his own sisters and children and would accordingly appoint trustworthy men to attend on them.

19. After this he handed over to the quaestors all the public funds of the Carthaginians which had

2 ἦν δὲ ταῦτα πλείω τῶν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων, ὥστε προστεθέντων τούτων οἷς παρῆν αὐτὸς ἐκ Ῥώμης ἔχων τετρακοσίοις, τὴν ὅλην παράθεσιν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τῆς χορηγίας πλείω τῶν χιλίων.
3 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον νεανίσκοι τινὲς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιτυχόντες παρθένῳ κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ κάλλος διαφερούσῃ τῶν ἄλλων γυναικῶν, καὶ συνιδόντες φιλογύνην ὄντα τὸν Πόπλιον, ἦκον αὐτὴν ἄγοντες καὶ παραστήσαντες ἔφασκον
4 αὐτῷ δωρεῖσθαι τὴν κόρην. ὁ δὲ καταπλαγεὶς καὶ θαυμάσας τὸ κάλλος, ἰδιώτης μὲν ὢν οὐδεμίαν ἥδιον ἂν ἔφη δέξασθαι ταύτης τῆς δωρεᾶς, στρα-
5 τηγὸς δ' ὑπάρχων οὐδ' ὁποίαν ἧττον, ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' αἰνιττόμενος διὰ τῆς ἀποφάσεως, διότι κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἀναπαύσεις ἐνίοτε καὶ ῥᾳθυμίας ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἡδίστας τοῖς νέοις ἀπολαύσεις τὰ τοιαῦτα παρέχεται καὶ διατριβάς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοῦ πράττειν καιροῖς μέγιστα γίνεται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ
6 ψυχὴν ἐμπόδια τοῖς χρωμένοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν νεανίσκοις ἔφη χάριν ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τῆς παρθένου πατέρα καλέσας καὶ δοὺς αὐτὴν ἐκ χειρὸς ἐκέλευε συνοικίζειν ᾧ ποτ' ἂν προαιρῆται τῶν πολιτῶν.
7 δι' ὧν καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐγκρατείας καὶ τὰ τῆς μετριότητος ἐμφαίνων μεγάλην ἀποδοχὴν ἐνειργάζετο τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις.
8 Ταῦτα δὲ διοικησάμενος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων παραδοὺς τοῖς χιλιάρχοις, ἐξέπεμψε Γάιον τὸν Λαίλιον ἐπὶ πεντήρους εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, τούς τε Καρχηδονίους συστήσας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰχμαλώτων τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους, δηλώσοντα τοῖς
9 ἐν τῇ πατρίδι τὰ γεγονότα. τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον αὐτῶν ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀπηλπικότων, σαφῶς

been captured. There were more than six hundred talents, so that when these were added to the four hundred he had brought from Rome, the total sum at his disposal was more than a thousand talents.

It was at this time that some young Romans came across a girl of surpassing bloom and beauty, and being aware that Scipio was fond of women brought her to him and introduced her, saying that they wished to make a present of the damsel to him. He was overcome and astonished by her beauty, but he told them that had he been in a private position, no present would have been more welcome to him, but as he was the General it would be the least welcome of any, giving them to understand, I suppose, by this answer that sometimes, during seasons of repose and leisure in our life, such things afford young men most delightful enjoyment and entertainment, but that in times of activity they are most prejudicial to the body and the mind alike of those who indulge in them. So he expressed his gratitude to the young men, but called the girl's father and delivering her over to him at once bade him give her in marriage to whomever of the citizens he preferred. The self-restraint and moderation he displayed on this occasion secured him the warm approbation of his troops.

Having arranged these matters and handed over the rest of the prisoners to the tribunes, he dispatched Laelius on a quinquereme to Rome, to convey the news, placing under his charge the Carthaginians and the most distinguished among the other prisoners. For as the Romans had for the most part regarded the situation in Spain as desperate

ἤδει διότι τούτων προσαγγελθέντων αὖθις ἀναθαρρήσαντες πολλαπλασίως συνεπιλήψονται τῶν πραγμάτων.

20 Αὐτὸς δὲ χρόνον μέν τιν' ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι τάς τε ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ἐγύμναζε συνεχῶς καὶ τοῖς χιλιάρχοις ὑπέδειξε τοιοῦτόν τινα τρόπον τῆς τῶν
2 πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων γυμνασίας. τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἡμέραν ἐκέλευσε τροχάζειν ἐπὶ τριάκοντα σταδίους ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν πάντας ἐκτρίβειν καὶ θεραπεύειν καὶ κατασκοπεῖν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ τὰς πανοπλίας, τῇ δ' ἑξῆς ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ
3 ῥᾳθυμεῖν, τῇ δὲ μετὰ ταύτην τοὺς μὲν μαχαιρομαχεῖν ξυλίναις ἐσκυτωμέναις μετ' ἐπισφαιρῶν μαχαίραις, τοὺς δὲ τοῖς ἐσφαιρωμένοις γρόσφοις ἀκοντίζειν, τῇ δὲ πέμπτῃ πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς
4 δρόμους καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπανάγειν. ἵνα δὲ μήτε τῶν πρὸς τὰς μελέτας ὅπλων μήτε τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ, τὴν πλείστην ἐποιεῖτο
5 σπουδὴν πρὸς τοὺς χειροτέχνας. κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν ἄνδρας ἐπιμελεῖς ἐφεστάκει πρὸς ταύτην τὴν χρείαν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον· αὐτὸς δὲ καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπεπορεύετο, καὶ δι' αὑτοῦ τὰς
6 χορηγίας ἑκάστοις παρεσκεύαζε. λοιπὸν τῶν μὲν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων κατὰ τοὺς πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τόπους χρωμένων ταῖς μελέταις καὶ ταῖς γυμνασίαις, τῶν δὲ ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων κατὰ θάλατταν ταῖς ἀναπείραις καὶ ταῖς εἰρεσίαις, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἀκονώντων τε καὶ χαλκευόντων καὶ τεκταινομένων, καὶ συλλήβδην ἁπάντων σπου-
7 δαζόντων περὶ τὰς τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευάς, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃς οὐκ ἂν εἶπε κατὰ τὸν Ξενοφῶντα τότε θεασάμενος ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν ἐργαστήριον εἶναι

he knew that this intelligence would revive their spirits and that they would redouble their efforts to support him.

20. He himself remaining for some time in New Carthage constantly exercised his navy and instructed the tribunes to train the land forces in the following manner. He ordered the soldiers on the first day to go at the double for thirty stades in their armour. On the second day they were all to polish up, repair, and examine their arms in full view, and the third day to rest and remain idle. On the following day they were to practise, some of them sword-fighting with wooden swords covered with leather and with a button on the point, while others practised casting with javelins also having a button at the point. On the fifth day they were to begin the same course of exercise again. In order that there should be no lack of weapons for practice and for real warfare he paid particular attention to the artificers. As I before stated, he had appointed skilled supervisors of the different sections of this branch, and he used himself to visit the workshops daily and personally distribute the materials required. So with the infantry exercising and drilling on the ground outside the town, with the fleet at sea practising manœuvres and rowing, and with the men in the town sharpening weapons, forging brass or carpentering, in a word, with everyone busily engaged upon the preparation of weapons, no one could have helped when he saw that town saying, in the words of Xenophon, that it was " a workshop

8 πολέμου. ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτῷ πάντα καλῶς ἐδόκει καὶ δεόντως ἐξησκῆσθαι τὰ πρὸς τὰς χρείας, μετὰ ταῦτα ταῖς τε φυλακαῖς καὶ ταῖς τῶν τειχῶν κατασκευαῖς ἀσφαλισάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἀνέζευξε καὶ τῇ πεζικῇ καὶ ναυτικῇ δυνάμει, καὶ προῆγε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ Ταρράκωνος, ἔχων μεθ' αὑτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους.

III. Res Graeciae

21 Ὅτι Εὐρυλέων ὁ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἄτολ-
(24) 2 μος ἦν καὶ πολεμικῆς χρείας ἀλλότριος. τοῦ δὲ καιροῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν διήγησιν ἐφεστακότος ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν Φιλοποίμενος πράξεων, καθήκειν ἡγούμεθα, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν τὰς ἑκάστων ἀγωγὰς καὶ φύσεις ἐπειράθημεν ὑποδεικνύναι, καὶ περὶ τούτου
3 ποιῆσαι τὸ παραπλήσιον. καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὰς μὲν τῶν πόλεων κτίσεις τοὺς συγγραφέας, καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐκτίσθησαν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς διαθέσεις καὶ περιστάσεις μετ' ἀποδείξεως ἐξαγγέλλειν, τὰς δὲ τῶν τὰ ὅλα χειρισάντων ἀνδρῶν ἀγωγὰς καὶ ζήλους παρασιωπᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα τῆς χρείας μεγάλην ἐχούσης τὴν διαφοράν·
4 ὅσῳ γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ζηλῶσαι καὶ μιμήσαισθαι δυνηθείη μᾶλλον τοὺς ἐμψύχους ἄνδρας τῶν ἀψύχων κατασκευασμάτων, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον διαφέρειν εἰκὸς <πρὸς> ἐπανόρθωσιν
5 τῶν ἀκουόντων. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπεποιήμεθα τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνταξιν, ἐν ᾗ διεσαφοῦμεν καὶ τίς ἦν καὶ τίνων καὶ τίσιν ἀγωγαῖς ἐχρήσατο νέος ὤν, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου τῶν προειρη-

of war." As soon as he considered that all the requirements of the service had been properly met, he secured the town by placing guards and repairing the wall, and setting forth with his army and navy began to advance towards Tarracon, taking the hostages with him.

III. Affairs of Greece

Philopoemen

21. Euryleon, the strategus of the Achaeans, was a timid man, without any military capacity. Now that the course of my narrative has brought me to the beginning of the achievements of Philopoemen, I think it is incumbent on me, just as in the case of other eminent men I have attempted to sketch their training and character, to do now the like for him. It is indeed a strange thing that authors should narrate circumstantially the foundations of cities, telling us when, how, and by whom they were founded, and detailing the precise conditions and the difficulties of the undertaking, while they pass over in silence the previous training and the objects of the men who directed the whole matter, though such information is more profitable. For inasmuch as it is more possible to emulate and to imitate living men than lifeless buildings, so much more important for the improvement of a reader is it to learn about the former. Now had I not dealt with Philopoemen in a special work in which I explain who he and his family were, and the nature of his training when young, I should be compelled

μένων φέρειν ἀπολογισμόν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πρότερον ἐν τρισὶ βυβλίοις ἐκτὸς ταύτης τῆς συντάξεως τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πεποιήμεθα λόγον, τήν τε παιδικὴν ἀγωγὴν διασαφοῦντες καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας
7 πράξεις, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τῇ νῦν ἐξηγήσει πρέπον ἂν εἴη τῆς μὲν νεωτερικῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ τῶν νεωτερικῶν ζήλων κατὰ μέρος ἀφελεῖν, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν αὐτοῦ κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐκεῖ δεδηλωμένοις ἔργοις προσθεῖναι καὶ κατὰ μέρος, ἵνα τὸ πρέπον
8 ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν συντάξεων τηρῶμεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὁ τόπος, ὑπάρχων ἐγκωμιαστικός, ἀπήτει τὸν κεφαλαιώδη καὶ μετ' αὐξήσεως τῶν πράξεων ἀπολογισμόν, οὕτως ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας, κοινὸς ὢν ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου, ζητεῖ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν μετ' ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῶν ἑκάστοις παρεπομένων συλλογισμῶν.

22 Φιλοποίμην τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν ἔφυ καλῶς· ἦν
(25) γὰρ ἐξ ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων κατ' Ἀρκαδίαν, τραφεὶς δὲ καὶ παιδευθεὶς ὑπὸ Κλέανδρον τὸν Μαντινέα, πατρικὸν μὲν αὐτῷ ξένον ὑπάρχοντα, φυγαδεύοντα δὲ κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιρούς, ὄντα
2 δὲ Μαντινέων ἐπιφανέστατον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραγενόμενος εἰς ἡλικίαν ἐγένετο ζηλωτὴς Ἐκδήμου καὶ Δημοφάνους, οἳ τὸ μὲν γένος ἦσαν ἐκ Μεγάλης πόλεως, φεύγοντες δὲ τοὺς τυράννους καὶ συμβιώσαντες Ἀρκεσίλᾳ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν ἠλευθέρωσαν μὲν τὴν αὑτῶν πατρίδα, συστησάμενοι κατ' Ἀριστοδήμου τοῦ τυράννου
3 πρᾶξιν, συνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ Σικυωνίων τυράννου Νικοκλέους, κοινωνήσαντες Ἀράτῳ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς· ἔτι δὲ Κυρηναίων αὐτοὺς μεταπεμψαμένων ἐπιφανῶς προύστησαν

to give an account of all these matters here. Since, however, I have formerly in three books, which do not form part of the present work, treated of him, stating what was his training as a boy and enumerating his most famous actions, it is evident that in the present narrative my proper course is to omit details concerning his early training and the ambitions of his youth, but to add detail to the summary account I there gave of the achievements of his riper years, in order that the proper character of each work may be preserved. For just as the former work, being in the form of an encomium, demanded a summary and somewhat exaggerated account of his achievements, so the present history, which distributes praise and blame impartially, demands a strictly true account and one which states the ground on which either praise or blame is based.

22. Philopoemen, then, came of a good stock, his family being one of the noblest in Arcadia. He was brought up and educated under the charge of Cleander of Mantinea, an old family friend and the most distinguished of the Mantineans, but living at the time in exile. When he grew up he became an admirer of Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were natives of Megalopolis, but had escaped from the oppression of the tyrants, and after being with Arcesilaus the philosopher during their exile liberated their country by organizing a plot against the tyrant Aristodemus, and also took part in the overthrow of Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon, joining Aratus in that enterprise. In addition to this, when the people of Cyrene sent for them they had championed their

καὶ διεφύλαξαν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, οἷς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν ἐπὶ πολὺ συμβιώσας διέφερε μὲν εὐθέως τῶν καθ' αὑτὸν περί τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς κυνηγίοις κακοπαθείας καὶ τόλμας περί τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἦν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιμελὴς καὶ λιτὸς κατὰ τὴν περικοπήν, παρειληφὼς παρὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἀνδρῶν τοιαύτας τινὰς δόξας ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε τῶν κοινῶν προστατεῖν καλῶς τὸν ὀλιγωροῦντα τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον βίον, οὔτε μὴν ἀποσχέσθαι τῶν τῆς πατρίδος, ὅστις πολυτελέστερον ζῇ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὕπαρξιν χορηγίας.

Πλὴν κατασταθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἱππάρχης ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις καιροῖς, καὶ παραλαβὼν τὰ συντάγματα τῶν ἱππέων παντὶ τρόπῳ κατεφθαρμένα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡττημένας, οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν βελτίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων κρείττους ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κατεσκεύασε, πάντας εἰς ἀληθινὴν ἄσκησιν καὶ ζῆλον ἐπιτευκτικὸν ἐμβιβάσας. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν καθισταμένων ἐπὶ τὴν προειρημένην ἀρχήν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀδυναμίαν ἐν τοῖς ἱππικοῖς οὐδὲ τοῖς πλησίον τολμῶσιν οὐδὲν ὧν καθήκει προστάττειν, οἱ δὲ τῆς στρατηγίας ὀρεγόμενοι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξεριθεύονται τοὺς νέους καὶ παρασκευάζουσιν εὐνους συναγωνιστὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον, οὐκ ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ δεομένῳ, δι' οὗ τρόπου σῴζεται τὰ κοινά, <ἀλλὰ> συμπεριστέλλοντες τὰς ἁμαρτίας καὶ μικρᾷ χάριτι μεγάλα βλάπτοντες τοὺς πιστεύοντας. εἰ δέ ποτε γένοιντο τῶν ἀρχόντων τινὲς τῇ τε κατὰ σῶμα χρείᾳ δυνατοὶ πρός τε τὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἀπέχεσθαι

cause in a brilliant manner and preserved their liberty. Spending much of his time with these two men in his early youth he soon came to excel all his contemporaries in endurance and courage both in the chase and in war. He was also strict in his way of living and simple in dress and other such matters, for these men had instilled into him such convictions as that it was impossible for a man who was careless about the conduct of his own life to administer public affairs well, and that it was impossible for a man who lived more extravagantly than his own resources allowed to keep his hands off public money.

Being appointed by the Achaeans to the command of the cavalry at this time and finding the regiments in every way disorganized and the men dispirited, he made them in a short time not only superior to what they had been but superior to the enemy by submitting them to a course of real training and inspiring them with such zeal as could not fail to assure success. For, as for most of the others who are appointed to this office, some of them owing to their own incapacity in horse exercise do not even dare to give any proper orders to the men they have under them, while others who treat this office as a step to that of strategus, canvass the soldiers and secure their future support, never rebuking a man who deserves it, which is the way to safeguard public interests, but screening all faults and by conferring a small favour doing infinite harm to those who trust them. And if at any time some commanders are personally efficient and are also anxious to keep their hands off public money, they

πρόθυμοι, πλείω κατὰ τῶν ὀλιγωρούντων διὰ τὴν κακοζηλωσίαν ἀπεργάζονται τοὺς πεζούς, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς ἱππεῖς.

23 (21) 1 Ἦσαν δὲ κινήσεις, ἃς ὑπελάμβανε πρὸς πάντα καιρὸν ἁρμόζειν, αἷς ἔδει συνειθίσθαι τοὺς ἱππεῖς, 2 αὗται· αἱ καθ' ἵππον μὲν κλίσεις ἐφ' ἡνίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ δόρυ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀναστροφὴ καὶ 3 μεταβολή, κατ' οὐλαμὸν δ' ἐπιστροφὴ καὶ περι- 4 σπασμός, ἔτι δ' ἐκπερισπασμός, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐξαγωγαὶ κατὰ λόχους καὶ διλοχίας ἀφ' ἑκατέρων τῶν κεράτων μετὰ τάχους, ποτὲ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων, καὶ συναγωγαὶ πάλιν μετ' ἐποχῆς εἰς 5 οὐλαμούς, εἰς ἴλας, εἰς ἱππαρχίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐκτάξεις ἐφ' ἑκατέρων τῶν κεράτων ἢ διὰ παρεμ- βολῆς ἢ διὰ παραγωγῆς τῆς παρὰ τοὺς οὐραγούς. 6 τὰς μὲν γὰρ κατὰ περίκλασιν οὐ προσδεῖσθαι μελέτης ἔφη· σχεδὸν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πορείας ἔχειν 7 διάθεσιν. ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰς ἐπαγωγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους καὶ τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἔδει συν- εθίζειν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κινήσεσιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε δεινῷ τῷ τάχει προσάγειν, ἐφ' ὅσον συ- ζυγοῦντας καὶ συστοιχοῦντας διαμένειν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὰ διαστήματα κατὰ τοὺς οὐλαμοὺς τηρεῖν, 8 ὡς ἱππέων λευκότων τὴν τάξιν τὴν ἐν οὐλαμοῖς, αἱρουμένων κινδυνεύειν, οὐδὲν ἐπισφαλέστερον 9 ὑπάρχον οὐδ' ἀχρειότερον. ταῦτα δ' ὑποδείξας τοῖς τε πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀποτελείοις, αὖθις ἐπεπο- ρεύετο τὰς πόλεις, ἐξετάζων πρῶτον μὲν εἰ συμ- περιφέρονθ' οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις, δεύτερον δ' εἰ κρατοῦσιν οἱ κατὰ πόλεις ἄρχοντες τοῦ σαφῶς καὶ δεόντως διδόναι τὰ παραγγέλματα,

manage by their unhappy ambition to do more harm to the infantry than the negligent ones, and they do still more mischief to the cavalry.

23. The movements in which he thought the cavalry should be trained, as being applicable to all circumstances, were as follows. Each separate horseman must learn to wheel his horse to the left or to the right and also to wheel round and again return. In sections and double sections they were to learn to wheel so as to describe either a quarter, a half, or three-quarters of a circle and next to dash out at full speed from either of the wings or from the centre in single or double companies and then reining in to resume their formation in troops, squadrons, or regiments. Besides this they must be able to extend their line on either wing either by filling up intervals or by bringing up men from the rear. He considered that deployment by wheeling required no practice, as it was much the same thing as falling into marching order. After this they were to practise charging and retiring in every kind of formation until they could advance at a tremendous pace but without falling out of line or column, keeping at the same time the proper distances between the squadrons, as he considered that nothing was more dangerous or ineffectual than cavalry which have broken their order in squadrons and choose to engage the enemy while in this state.

When he had given these instructions to the people and the municipal magistrates, he paid a second visit to the towns to inquire in the first place if the soldiers were obeying orders, and next if the municipal magistrates were thoroughly capable of giving the words of command clearly and properly, as he con-

κρίνων πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν ἀναγκαιότερον εἶναι τῆς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνων ἐμπειρίας.

24 (22) προκατασκευασάμενος δὲ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, συνῆγε τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων εἰς ἕνα τόπον, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τὰς κινήσεις ἐπετέλει καὶ τὸν ὅλον χειρισμὸν αὐτὸς ἐποιεῖτο τῆς ἐξ-
2 οπλισίας, οὐ προηγούμενος πάντων, ὅπερ οἱ νῦν ποιοῦσιν ἡγεμόνες, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἡγεμονικὴν
3 εἶναι τὴν πρώτην χώραν. τί γὰρ ἀπειρότερον, ἅμα δ' ἐπισφαλέστερον ἄρχοντος, <ὃς> ὁρᾶται μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, ὁρᾷ δ'
4 οὐδένα; οὐ γὰρ στρατιωτικῆς ἐξουσίας, ἀλλ' ἡγεμονικῆς ἐμπειρίας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυνάμεως δεῖγμα δεῖ φέρειν τὸν ἱππάρχην ἐν ταῖς ἐξοπλισίαις, ποτὲ μὲν ἐν πρώτοις, ποτὲ δ' ἐν ἐσχάτοις, ποτὲ
5 δὲ κατὰ μέσους γινόμενον. ὅπερ ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ ἐποίει, παριππεύων καὶ πάντας ἐφορῶν αὐτός, καὶ προσδιασαφῶν αὐτοῖς ἀποροῦσι καὶ
6 διορθῶν ἐν ἀρχαῖς πᾶν τὸ διαμαρτανόμενον. ἦν δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τελέως βραχέα καὶ σπάνια διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἐπιμέλειαν.
7 Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἕως λόγου τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέδειξε, φήσας ὅτι καθάπερ ἐν οἰκοδομίαις, ἐὰν κατὰ μίαν πλίνθον θῇς καὶ καθ' ἕνα δόμον ἐπιμελείας τύχῃ τὸ παρατεθέν, οὕτως ἐν στρατοπέδῳ τὸ κατ' ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ λόχον ἀκριβωθὲν ὅλην ποιεῖ τὴν δύναμιν ἰσχυράν.—

25 (23) 2 Εἶναι γὰρ τὸ νῦν γινόμενον ὁμοιότατον τῇ περὶ τὰς παρατάξεις οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ χειρισμῷ. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων προκινδυνεύει μὲν ὡς ἐπίπαν καὶ προαπόλλυται τὰ κοῦφα καὶ τὰ πρακτικώτατα

sidered that for actual warfare nothing was more essential than the efficiency of particular officers. 24. After thus making his preliminary preparations, he collected the cavalry from the different towns at one spot, where he personally supervised their evolutions and directed the whole of their drill, not riding at the head of them as is done by the generals of our day, who fancy that the foremost place is the proper one for a commander. What, I should like to know, can be less practical or more dangerous than a commander's being seen by all his troops, but seeing none of them? A leader of cavalry should during exercise not make a display of his military rank but of his capability and power as a commander, placing himself now in front, now in the rear, and now in the centre. This was what Philopoemen did, riding alongside and personally inspecting all his men, making matters clear to those who were in doubt and correcting all mistakes at the outset. Such mistakes, however, were quite trivial and rare owing to the care which had been taken previously in exercising each part in particular. Demetrius of Phaleron pointed this out, if not in practice in a phrase at least, when he said that just as a building will be solid if each brick is placed rightly and every course laid with care, so in an army it is the careful instruction of each man and each company which makes the whole force strong.

Fragment of the Speech of a Macedonian Orator

25. What is happening now is exceedingly like the disposition and management of an army for battle. For in that case also the first to be exposed to danger and to suffer loss are the light and most

τῆς δυνάμεως, τὴν δ' ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ἐκβαινόντων
ἡ φάλαγξ καὶ τὰ βαρέα λαμβάνει τῶν ὅπλων.
3 νῦν δὲ παραπλησίως προκινδυνεύουσι μὲν Αἰτωλοὶ
καὶ Πελοποννησίων οἱ τούτοις συμμαχοῦντες,
ἐφεδρεύουσι δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, φάλαγγος ἔχοντες διά-
4 θεσιν. κἂν μὲν οὗτοι πταίσαντες καταφθαρῶσιν,
ἀναστρέψαντες ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀβλαβεῖς ἀπο-
5 λυθήσονται Ῥωμαῖοι· νικησάντων δὲ τούτων, ὃ μὴ
δόξειε τοῖς θεοῖς, ἅμα τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Ἕλληνας ὑφ' αὑτοὺς ἐκεῖνοι ποιήσονται. . . .

26 Ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς Μακεδόνων μετὰ τὸ
ἐκτελέσαι τὸν τῶν Νεμέων ἀγῶνα αὖθις εἰς
Ἄργος ἐπανῆλθε καὶ τὸ μὲν διάδημα καὶ τὴν
πορφύραν ἀπέθετο, βουλόμενος αὑτὸν ἴσον τοῖς
πολλοῖς καὶ πρᾷόν τινα καὶ δημοτικὸν ὑπογράφειν.
2 ὅσῳ δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆτα δημοτικωτέραν περιετίθετο,
τοσούτῳ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐλάμβανε μείζω καὶ μοναρ-
3 χικωτέραν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τὰς χήρας ἐπείρα γυναῖκας
οὐδὲ τὰς ὑπάνδρους ἠρκεῖτο μοιχεύων, ἀλλ' ἐκ
προστάγματος ἣν αὐτῷ φανείη, προσπέμψας ἐκάλει,
ταῖς δὲ μὴ προχείρως συνυπακουούσαις ἐνύβριζε,
4 κώμους ποιούμενος ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας. καὶ τῶν μὲν
τοὺς υἱεῖς, τῶν δὲ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀνακαλούμενος
ἐπὶ προφάσεσιν ἀλόγοις διέσειε, καὶ πολλὴν ἀ-
5 σέλγειαν ἐναπεδείκνυτο καὶ παρανομίαν. διὸ καὶ
χρώμενος τῇ κατὰ τὴν παρεπιδημίαν ἐξουσίᾳ . . .
ἀνέδην πολλοὺς ἐλύπει τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ μάλιστα
6 τοὺς μετρίους ἄνδρας. πιεζόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὸ
πανταχόθεν αὐτοῖς περιεστάναι τὸν πόλεμον ἠναγ-
κάζοντο καρτερεῖν καὶ φέρειν τὰ παρὰ φύσιν. . . .

active part of the force, whereas the phalanx and the heavy-armed troops get the credit for the result. Similarly at present those who bear the brunt of the danger are the Aetolians and those Peloponnesians who are in alliance with them, while the Romans, like a phalanx, hold themselves in reserve. If the former are beaten and destroyed, the Romans will get away unharmed from the struggle, but should the Aetolians be victorious, which Heaven forbid, the Romans will subjugate them as well as all the other Greeks. . . .

Philip V

26. Philip, king of Macedon, after celebrating the Nemean games, returned to Argos and laid aside his diadem and purple robe, wishing to produce the impression that he was on a level with others and a lenient and popular prince. But the more democratic the clothes he wore, the greater and more absolute was the power he assumed. For he no longer confined himself to attempting to seduce widows or to corrupting married women, but used to send and order any woman he chose to come to him, and insulted those who did not at once obey his behests, making noisy processions to their houses. Summoning their sons or husbands on absurd pretexts he intimidated them, and on the whole behaved in a most outrageous and lawless manner. Consequently by this excessive exercise of arbitrary power during his stay in the country he vexed many of the Achaeans and especially the most respectable men, but pressed as they were on all sides by war they had perforce to put up with what was naturally offensive to them. . . .

7 Ὅτι [Φιλίππου] οὐκ ‹ἂν› ἀγαθὰ μείζω τις
σχοίη πρὸς βασιλείαν οὐδεὶς τῶν πρότερον οὐδὲ
8 κακὰ τούτου τοῦ βασιλέως. καί μοι δοκεῖ τὰ
μὲν ἀγαθὰ φύσει περὶ αὐτὸν ὑπάρξαι, τὰ δὲ κακὰ
προβαίνοντι κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐπιγενέσθαι, καθάπερ
9 ἐνίοις ἐπιγίνεται γηράσκουσι τῶν ἵππων. καίπερ
ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, ὥσπερ τῶν λοιπῶν
συγγραφέων, προφερόμεθα τὰς τοιαύτας διαλήψεις,
ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀεὶ τὸν καθήκοντα
λόγον ἁρμόζοντες ἀποφαινόμεθα περί τε τῶν
10 βασιλέων καὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν, νομίζοντες
ταύτην οἰκειοτέραν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς γράφουσι καὶ
τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι τὴν ἐπισημασίαν.

IV. Res Asiae

27 Ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ Μηδία κατά τε τὸ μέγεθος τῆς
χώρας ἀξιοχρεωτάτη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν δυνα-
στειῶν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς
2 τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων· τοῖς
γὰρ ζῴοις τούτοις σχεδὸν ἅπασαν χορηγεῖ τὴν
Ἀσίαν τῷ καὶ τὰ βασιλικὰ συστήματα τῶν
ἱπποτροφιῶν Μήδοις ἐπιτετράφθαι ‹διὰ τὴν τῶν
3 τόπων› εὐφυΐαν. περιοικεῖται δὲ πόλεσιν Ἑλλη-
νίσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου, φυλακῆς
ἕνεκεν τῶν συγκυρούντων αὐτῇ βαρβάρων πλὴν
4 Ἐκβατάνων. αὕτη δ' ἔκτισται μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς
τὰς ἄρκτους μέρεσι τῆς Μηδίας, ἐπίκειται δὲ τοῖς
περὶ τὴν Μαιῶτιν καὶ τὸν Εὔξεινον μέρεσι τῆς
5 Ἀσίας, ἣν δὲ βασίλειον ἐξ ἀρχῆς Μήδων, πλούτῳ
δὲ καὶ τῇ τῆς κατασκευῆς πολυτελείᾳ μέγα τι
6 παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας δοκεῖ διενηνοχέναι πόλεις. κεῖται

None of the former kings possessed more of the qualities which make a good or bad ruler than Philip, and in my opinion his good qualities were natural to him, but his defects were acquired as he advanced in age, as is the case with some horses when they grow old. I, however, do not, like other writers, deliver such judgements in the preface of my work, but always in dealing with actual facts employ terms suited to the situation to convey my opinion of kings and other prominent men, thinking that this method of indicating it is most proper for writers and most agreeable to readers.

IV. Affairs of Asia

Expedition of Antiochus against Arsaces

27. Media is the most notable principality in Asia, 210 B.C. both in the extent of its territory and the number and excellence of the men and also of the horses it produces. It supplies nearly the whole of Asia with these animals, the royal stud farms being entrusted to the Medes owing to the excellence of the pastures. On its borders a ring of Greek cities was founded by Alexander to protect it from the neighbouring barbarians. Ecbatana is an exception. This city is situated in the northern part of Media and commands that portion of Asia which borders on the Maeotis and Euxine. It had always been the royal residence of the Medes and is said to have greatly exceeded all the other cities in wealth and the magnificence

μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τὴν παρώρειαν τὴν παρὰ τὸν Ὀρόντην, ἀτείχιστος οὖσα, ἄκραν δ' ἐν αὑτῇ χειροποίητον ἔχει, θαυμασίως πρὸς ὀχυρότητα κατεσκευασμέ-
7 νην. ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην ἐστὶ βασίλεια, περὶ ὧν καὶ τὸ λέγειν κατὰ μέρος καὶ τὸ παρασιωπᾶν ἔχει τιν'
8 ἀπορίαν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἱρουμένοις τὰς ἐκπληκτικὰς τῶν διηγήσεων προφέρεσθαι καὶ μετ' αὐξήσεως ἔνια καὶ διαθέσεως εἰθισμένοις ἐξαγγέλλειν καλλίστην ὑπόθεσιν ἡ προειρημένη πόλις ἔχει, τοῖς δ' εὐλαβῶς προσπορευομένοις πρὸς πᾶν ‹τὸ› παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν λεγόμενον ἀπορίαν παρα-
9 σκευάζει καὶ δυσχρηστίαν. πλὴν ἔστι γε τὰ βασίλεια τῷ μὲν μεγέθει σχεδὸν ἑπτὰ σταδίων ἔχοντα τὴν περιγραφήν, τῇ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος κατασκευασμάτων πολυτελείᾳ μεγάλην ἐμφαίνοντα τὴν τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβαλλομένων εὐκαιρίαν.
10 οὔσης γὰρ τῆς ξυλείας ἁπάσης κεδρίνης καὶ κυπαριττίνης, οὐδεμίαν αὐτῶν γεγυμνῶσθαι συνέβαινεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς δοκοὺς καὶ τὰ φατνώματα καὶ τοὺς κίονας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στοαῖς καὶ περιστύλοις, τοὺς μὲν ἀργυραῖς, τοὺς δὲ χρυσαῖς λεπίσι περιειλῆφθαι, τὰς δὲ κεραμίδας ἀργυρᾶς εἶναι
11 πάσας. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα συνέβη λεπισθῆναι κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Μακεδόνων ἔφοδον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνου καὶ
12 Σελεύκου τοῦ Νικάνορος δυναστείαν. ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἀντιόχου παρουσίαν ὅ τε ναὸς αὐτὸς ὁ τῆς Ἀΐνης προσαγορευόμενος ἔτι τοὺς κίονας εἶχε τοὺς πέριξ κεχρυσωμένους, καὶ κεραμίδες ἀργυραῖ καὶ πλείους ἐν αὐτῷ συνετέθειντο, πλίνθοι δὲ χρυσαῖ τινες ὀλίγαι μὲν ἦσαν, ἀργυραῖ δὲ καὶ
13 πλείους ὑπέμενον. ἐκ δὲ πάντων τῶν προυει-

of its buildings. It lies on the skirts of Mount Orontes and has no wall, but possesses an artificial citadel the fortifications of which are of wonderful strength. Beneath this stands the palace, regarding which I am in doubt if I should go into details or keep silence. For to those who are disposed to recount marvellous tales and are in the habit of giving exaggerated and rhetorical reports of certain matters this city affords an admirable theme, but to such as approach with caution all statements which are contrary to ordinary conceptions it is a source of doubt and difficulty. The palace, however, is about seven stades in circumference, and by the magnificence of the separate structures in it conveys a high idea of the wealth of its original founders. For the woodwork was all of cedar and cypress, but no part of it was left exposed, and the rafters, the compartments of the ceiling, and the columns in the porticoes and colonnades were plated with either silver or gold, and all the tiles were silver. Most of the precious metals were stripped off in the invasion of Alexander and his Macedonians, and the rest during the reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus the son of Nicanor, but still, when Antiochus reached the place, the temple of Aene alone had the columns round it still gilded and a number of silver tiles were piled up in it, while a few gold bricks and a considerable quantity of silver ones remained. From all the objects I have mentioned sufficient was collected

ρημένων τὸ χαραχθὲν εἰς τὸ βασιλικὸν ἠθροίσθη νόμισμα μικρῷ λεῖπον τετρακισχιλίων ταλάντων.

28 Ἕως μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἤλπισεν αὐτὸν ἥξειν Ἀρσάκης, τὴν δ' ἔρημον τὴν τούτοις πρόσχωρον οὐ τολμήσειν ἔτι δυνάμει τηλικαύτῃ δι-
2 εκβαλεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀυδρίαν. ἐπιπολῆς μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι φαινόμενον ὕδωρ ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις τόποις, ὑπόνομοι δὲ πλείους εἰσὶ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐρήμου φρεατίας ἔχοντες ἀγνοουμένας
3 τοῖς ἀπείροις. περὶ δὲ τούτων ἀληθὴς παραδίδοται λόγος διὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων, ὅτι καθ' οὓς χρόνους Πέρσαι τῆς Ἀσίας ἐπεκράτουν, ἔδωκαν τοῖς ἐπί τινας τόπους τῶν μὴ πρότερον ἀρδευομένων ἐπεισαγομένοις ὕδωρ πηγαῖον ἐπὶ πέντε
4 γενεὰς καρπεῦσαι τὴν χώραν· ὅθεν ἔχοντος τοῦ Ταύρου πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ὑδάτων ἀπορρύσεις, πᾶσαν ἐπεδέχοντο δαπάνην καὶ κακοπάθειαν, ἐκ μακροῦ κατασκευάζοντες τοὺς ὑπονόμους, ὥστε κατὰ τοὺς νῦν καιροὺς μηδὲ τοὺς χρωμένους τοῖς ὕδασι γινώσκειν τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὑπονόμων πόθεν
5 ἔχουσι τὰς ἐπιρρύσεις. πλὴν ὁρῶν Ἀρσάκης ἐπιβαλόμενον αὐτὸν τῇ διὰ τῆς ἐρήμου πορείᾳ, τὸ τηνικάδε χωννύειν καὶ φθείρειν ἐνεχείρησε τὰς
6 φρεατίας. ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς, ἐξαγγελθέντος αὐτῷ, πάλιν ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς περὶ Νικομήδην μετὰ χιλίων ἱππέων, οἳ καὶ καταλαβόντες τὸν Ἀρσάκην μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ὑποκεχωρηκότα, τινὰς δὲ τῶν ἱππέων φθείροντας τὰ στόματα τῶν ὑπονόμων, τούτους μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου τρεψάμενοι φυγεῖν ἠνάγκασαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν ἀνεχώρησαν ὡς τὸν Αν-
7 τίοχον. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς διανύσας τὴν ἔρημον ἦκε πρὸς τὴν Ἑκατόμπυλον προσαγορευομένην, ἣ

to coin money with the king's effigy amounting to very nearly four thousand talents.

28. Arsaces had expected Antiochus to advance as far as this region, but he did not think he would venture with such a large force to cross the adjacent desert, chiefly owing to the scarcity of water. For in the region I speak of there is no water visible on the surface, but even in the desert there are a number of underground channels communicating with wells unknown to those not acquainted with the country. About these a true story is told by the inhabitants. They say that at the time when the Persians were the rulers of Asia they gave to those who conveyed a supply of water to places previously unirrigated the right of cultivating the land for five generations, and consequently as the Taurus has many large streams descending from it, people incurred great expense and trouble in making underground channels reaching a long distance, so that at the present day those who make use of the water do not know whence the channels derive their supply. Arsaces, however, when he saw that Antiochus was attempting to march across the desert, endeavoured instantly to fill up and destroy the wells. The king when this news reached him sent off Nicomedes with a thousand horse, who, finding that Arsaces had retired with his army, but that some of his cavalry were engaged in destroying the mouths of the channels, attacked and routed these, forcing them to fly, and then returned to Antiochus. The king having traversed the desert came to the city called Heca-

κεῖται μὲν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ Παρθυηνῇ, τῶν δὲ διόδων ‹τῶν› φερουσῶν ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πέριξ τόπους ἐνταῦθα συμπιπτουσῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ὁ τόπος εἴληφε τὴν προσηγορίαν.

29 Πλὴν αὐτοῦ διαναπαύσας τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ συλλογισάμενος ὡς εἰ μὲν οἷός ‹τ'› ἦν Ἀρσάκης διὰ μάχης κρίνεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς, οὔτ' ἂν ἐξεχώρει λιπὼν τὴν αὑτοῦ χώραν οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιτηδειοτέρους τόπους ἐζήτει πρὸς ἀγῶνα ταῖς σφετέραις δυνάμεσι
2 τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑκατόμπυλον· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκχωρεῖ, δῆλός ἐστι τοῖς ὀρθῶς σκοπουμένοις ἐπ' ἄλλης ὧν γνώμης· διόπερ ἔκρινε προάγειν εἰς τὴν
3 Ὑρκανίαν. παραγενόμενος δ' ἐπὶ Ταγάς, καὶ πυνθανόμενος τῶν ἐγχωρίων τήν τε δυσχέρειαν τῶν τόπων, οὓς ἔδει διεκβάλλειν αὐτόν, ἕως εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διεξίκοιτο τοῦ Λάβου τὰς νευούσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ὑρκανίαν, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν κατὰ τόπους ἐφεστώτων ταῖς δυσχωρίαις
4 αὐτοῦ, προέθετο διατάττειν τὸ τῶν εὐζώνων πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς τούτων ἡγεμόνας μερίζειν, ὡς ἑκάστους δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς λειτουργούς, οὓς ἔδει παραπορευομένους τὸν καταλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εὐζώνων τόπον εὔβατον παρασκευάζειν τῇ τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν
5 ὑποζυγίων πορείᾳ. ταῦτα δὲ διανοηθεὶς τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἔδωκε τάξιν Διογένει, συστήσας αὐτῷ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τῶν ὀρείων τοὺς ἀκοντίζειν καὶ λιθάζειν δυναμένους, οἵτινες τάξιν μὲν οὐκ ἔνεμον, αἰεὶ δὲ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν καὶ τόπον κατ' ἄνδρα ποιούμενοι τὸν κίνδυνον πραγματικωτάτην παρείχοντο χρείαν ἐν ταῖς δυσ-
6 χωρίαις. τούτοις δὲ συνεχεῖς Κρῆτας ἀσπιδιώτας

tompylus, which lies in the centre of Parthia. This city derives its name from the fact that it is the meeting-place of all the roads leading to the surrounding districts.

29. Here he gave his army a rest, and now came to the conclusion that had Arsaces been able to risk a battle he would not have withdrawn from his own country and could not have chosen a place more favourable to his army for the struggle than the neighbourhood of Hecatompylus. It was evident then to anyone who gave proper consideration to the matter that as he was retreating he had other intentions. Antiochus therefore decided to advance into Hyrcania. Upon reaching Tagae and learning from the inhabitants what a difficult country he would have to pass through before reaching the pass over Mount Labus, which leads down to Hyrcania, and how great numbers of barbarians were posted at different spots where his march would be particularly hard, he decided to break up his light-armed troops into several bodies and divide their officers among them, with instructions as to the route they should take. He also resolved to break up the pioneers whose duty it was to march together with the light-armed troops and make the ground occupied by these passable for the phalanx and the pack-train. Having made this plan he gave the command of the first division to Diogenes, entrusting him with archers and slingers and those of the mountaineers who were expert in throwing javelins and stones, who also, whenever time and place called for it, fought singly and rendered most useful service on difficult ground. After these he placed about two thousand

ἐπέταξε περὶ δισχιλίους, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Πολυξενίδας Ῥόδιος, τελευταίους δὲ θωρακίτας καὶ θυρεοφόρους, ὧν εἶχον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Νικομήδης Κῷος καὶ Νικόλαος Αἰτωλός.

30 Προαγόντων δὲ τούτων εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, πολλῷ δυσχερεστέρας συνέβαινε φαίνεσθαι τὰς τῶν τόπων τραχύτητας καὶ στενότητας τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως
2 προσδοκίας. ἦν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὅλον μῆκος τῆς ἀναβάσεως περὶ τριακοσίους σταδίους· ταύτης δὲ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος ἔδει ποιεῖσθαι τῆς πορείας διὰ χαράδρας χειμάρρου καὶ βαθείας, εἰς ἣν πολλαὶ μὲν αὐτομάτως ἐκ τῶν ὑπερκειμένων κρημνῶν πέτραι κατενηνεγμέναι καὶ δένδρα δύσβατον ἐποίουν τὴν δι' αὐτῆς πορείαν, πολλὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος συνηργεῖτο.
3 καὶ γὰρ ἐκκοπὰς δένδρων ἐπεποίηντο συνεχεῖς καὶ λίθων πλήθη μεγέθει ‹διαφερόντων› συνηθροίκεισαν· αὐτοί τε παρ' ὅλην τὴν φάραγγα τὰς εὐκαίρους ὑπεροχὰς καὶ δυναμένας σφίσιν ἀσφάλειαν παρέχεσθαι κατειληφότες ἐτήρουν, ὥστ', εἰ μὴ διήμαρτον, ἐντελῶς ἂν ἐξαδυνατήσαντα τὸν
4 Ἀντίοχον ἀποστῆναι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. ὡς γὰρ δέον τοὺς πολεμίους πάντας κατ' ἀνάγκην ποιεῖσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῆς φάραγγος τὴν ἀνάβασιν, οὕτως παρεσκευάσαντο καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο κατελάβοντο
5 τοὺς τόπους. ἐκεῖνο δ' οὐκ ἔβλεψαν ὅτι τὴν μὲν φάλαγγα ‹καὶ› τὴν ἀποσκευὴν οὐκ ἄλλως δυνατὸν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκεῖνοι διέλαβον, ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ παρακείμενα τῶν ὀρῶν οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦν τούτοις προσβαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ψιλοῖς καὶ τοῖς εὐζώνοις οὐκ ἀδύνατος ἦν ἡ δι' αὐτῶν
6 τῶν λευκοπέτρων ἀναβολή. ὅθεν ἅμα ‹τῷ› πρὸς

Cretans armed with bucklers under the command of Polyxenidas of Rhodes, and lastly the light troops armed with breastplate and shield under Nicomedes of Cos and Nicolaus the Aetolian.

30. As these separate bodies advanced they found the road much rougher and narrower than the king had expected. For the total length of the ascent was about three hundred stades, and for the greater part of this distance it was through a deep torrent bed, in which progress was rendered difficult by quantities of rock and trees that had fallen of their own accord from the precipices above, while numerous other obstacles placed there by the barbarians contributed to the result. For they had constructed a series of barricades of felled trees and had collected a quantity of huge rocks, while they themselves along the whole defile had occupied favourable positions on the heights where they fancied themselves in security. So that Antiochus would have found it perfectly impossible to execute his project had they not miscalculated: for these preparations had been made and these positions occupied under the idea that the whole enemy army must necessarily ascend through the defile itself; but they never saw that though the phalanx and pack-train could not march by any other route than the one they supposed, since it was impossible for that part of the army to attack the mountain slopes, yet it was by no means beyond the power of unburdened and light-armed troops to ascend over the bare rocks.

τὸ πρῶτον φυλακεῖον προσμῖξαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Διογένην, ἔξωθεν τῆς χαράδρας ποιουμένους τὴν
7 ἀνάβασιν, ἀλλοιοτέραν ἐλάμβανε διάθεσιν. εὐθέως γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος διδάσκοντος, ὑπερτιθέμενοι καὶ προσβαίνοντες πρὸς τὰ πλάγια τῶν χωρίων οἱ περὶ τὸν Διογένην, ὑπερδέξιοι τῶν πολεμίων ἐγίνοντο, καὶ χρώμενοι πυκνοῖς τοῖς ἀκοντίσμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ χειρὸς λίθοις κακῶς διετίθεσαν τοὺς βαρβάρους, καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς σφενδόναις ἐκακοποίουν ἐξ ἀπο-
8 στήματος βάλλοντες. ὅτε δὲ τοὺς πρώτους ἐκβιασάμενοι κατάσχοιεν τὸν τούτων τόπον, ἐδίδοτο τοῖς λειτουργοῖς καιρὸς εἰς τὸ πᾶν τὸ πρὸ ποδῶν ἀνακαθαίρειν καὶ λεαίνειν μετ' ἀσφαλείας. ἐγίνετο
9 δὲ τοῦτο ταχέως διὰ τὴν πολυχειρίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν μὲν σφενδονητῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν ἔτι δ' ἀκοντιστῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους πορευομένων σποράδην, ποτὲ δὲ συναθροιζομένων καὶ καταλαμβανομένων τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους, τῶν ‹δ'› ἀσπιδιωτῶν ἐφεδρευόντων, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν χαράδραν παραπορευομένων ‹ἐν› τάξει καὶ βάδην, οὐκ ἔμενον οἱ βάρβαροι, πάντες δὲ λιπόντες τοὺς τόπους ἠθροίσθησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

31 Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἀσφαλῶς διέβησαν τὰς δυσχωρίας τῷ προειρημένῳ τρόπῳ, βραδέως δὲ καὶ δυσχερῶς· μόλις γὰρ ὀγδοαῖοι πρὸς τὰς
2 κατὰ τὸν Λάβον ὑπεροχὰς ἀφίκοντο. τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων συνηθροισμένων ἐκεῖ, καὶ πεπεισμένων κωλύειν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀγὼν συνέστη νεανικός. ἐξεώσθησαν δ' οἱ βάρβαροι
3 διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας. συστραφέντες γὰρ ἐμάχοντο

So that as soon as Diogenes, advancing outside the defile, came in contact with the first barbarian post the face of things was entirely changed. For at once upon encountering the enemy he acted as circumstances suggested and making a further flank movement up hill got on higher ground, and by throwing showers of javelins and stones from the hand inflicted severe punishment on them, the greatest damage being done by the stones slung from a distance. As soon as they had forced this first post to withdraw and occupied their position the pioneers had time to clear and level the ground in front of them at their ease, a task soon accomplished owing to their large numbers. In fact, by this means, with the slingers, archers and javelineers marching along the high ground in loose order, but closing up and occupying favourable positions, and with the Cretans covering their movements and marching parallel to them close to the defile slowly and in good order, the barbarians no longer stood their ground, but abandoning their positions collected on the actual summit of the pass.

31. Antiochus traversed the worst part of the road in the manner I have described, safely but very slowly and with difficulty, only just reaching the pass of Mount Labus on the eighth day. The barbarians were collected there, convinced that they would prevent the enemy from crossing, and a fierce struggle now took place, in which the barbarians were forced back for the following reason. Formed in a dense mass

πρὸς τοὺς φαλαγγίτας κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐκθύμως· τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἔτι τῶν εὐζώνων ἐκπεριελθόντων ἐκ πολλοῦ, καὶ καταλαβομένων ‹τοὺς› ὑπερδεξίους καὶ κατὰ νώτου τόπους, ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν οἱ βάρβαροι τὸ γεγονὸς εὐθέως πτοηθέντες ὥρμησαν
4 πρὸς φυγήν. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ὁρμὴν τῶν διωκόντων παρακατέσχε μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς, ἀνακαλεσάμενος ταῖς σάλπιγξι, διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι καταβαίνειν ἄθρους καὶ συντεταγμένους
5 εἰς τὴν Ὑρκανίαν. συστησάμενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐβούλετο καὶ παραγενόμενος ἐπὶ Τάμβρακα, πόλιν ἀτείχιστον, ἔχουσαν δὲ βασίλεια καὶ μέγεθος,
6 αὐτοῦ κατεσκήνωσε. τῶν δὲ πλείστων πεποιημένων τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἔκ τε τῆς μάχης καὶ τῆς περικειμένης χώρας εἰς τὴν προσαγορευομένην Σίρυγκα πόλιν—συνέβαινε κεῖσθαι ‹’κείνην› οὐ μακρὰν τῆς Τάμβρακος, εἶναι δὲ τῆς Ὑρκανίας ὡς ἂν εἰ βασίλειον διά τε τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐκαιρίαν—ἔκρινε ταύτην ἐξελεῖν μετὰ βίας.
7 ἀναλαβὼν οὖν τὴν δύναμιν προῆγε, καὶ περιστρατο-
8 πεδεύσας ἤρχετο τῆς πολιορκίας. ἦν δὲ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἐν ταῖς χωστρίσι χελώναις. τάφροι γὰρ ἦσαν τριτταί, πλάτος μὲν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔχουσαι τριάκοντα πηχῶν, βάθος δὲ πεντεκαίδεκα· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς χείλεσιν ἑκάστης ἐπέκειτο χαρακώματα διπλᾶ καὶ τελευταῖον προτείχισμα δυνατόν.
9 συμπλοκαὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγίνοντο συνεχεῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἦνυον ἑκάτεροι φέροντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τοὺς τραυματίας διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον ὑπὲρ γῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ γῆς διὰ τῶν ὀρυγμάτων
10 ἐκ χειρὸς γίνεσθαι τοὺς κινδύνους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῷ πλήθει καὶ τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐνεργείᾳ ταχέως

they fought desperately against the phalanx face to face, but while it was still night the light-armed troops had made a wide detour and occupied the heights in their rear, and the barbarians, the moment they noticed this, were panic-stricken and took to flight. The king made every effort to restrain his men from continuing the pursuit, summoning them back by bugle-call, as he wanted his army to descend into Hyrcania unbroken and in good order. Having regulated his march in the manner he wished he reached Tambrax, an unwalled city, but of large size and containing a large royal palace, and encamped there. Most of the enemy, both from the scene of the battle and from the surrounding country, had retreated to a town called Sirynx, which was at no great distance from Tambrax, and was as it were the capital of Hyrcania owing to its strength and favourable situation, and he decided to take this city by storm. He advanced therefore with his army and encamping round it began the siege. The chief means he employed was the use of mantelets for sappers. There were three moats, each not less than thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep, and each defended at its edge by a double row of palisades, and behind all there was a strong wall. There were constant combats at the works, in which neither side could bring off their dead and wounded, as the hand-to-hand fighting took place not only on the surface of the ground but beneath it in the mines. But in spite of all, owing to superiority of numbers and the

συνέβη καὶ τὰς τάφρους χωσθῆναι καὶ τὸ τεῖχος
11 πεσεῖν διὰ τῶν ὀρυγμάτων. οὗ συμβάντος διατραπέντες οἱ βάρβαροι τοῖς ὅλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας κατασφάξαντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ δ' ἐπιφανέστατα τῶν σκευῶν διαρπάσαντες, νυκτὸς
12 ἀπεχώρησαν. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς συνθεασάμενος Ὑπερβάσαν ἀπέστειλε μετὰ τῶν μισθοφόρων· οὗ συμμίξαντος οἱ βάρβαροι ῥίψαντες τὰς ἀποσκευὰς αὖθις εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἔφυγον. τῶν δὲ
13 πελταστῶν ἐνεργῶς βιαζομένων διὰ ‹τοῦ› πτώματος, ἀπελπίσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παρέδοσαν.

V. Res Italiae

32 Βουλόμενοι δ' οἱ ὕπατοι κατοπτεῦσαι σαφῶς τὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων στρατοπεδείαν κεκλιμένα μέρη τοῦ λόφου, τοῖς μὲν ἐν τῷ χάρακι
2 μένειν κατὰ χώραν ἐπήγγειλαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν ἱππέων ἀναλαβόντες ἴλας δύο καὶ γροσφομάχους μετὰ τῶν ῥαβδοφόρων εἰς τριάκοντα προῆγον,
3 κατασκεψόμενοι τοὺς τόπους. τῶν δὲ Νομάδων εἰθισμένοι τινὲς τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις καὶ καθόλου προπορευομένοις ἐκ τοῦ τῶν ὑπεναντίων χάρακος ἐνέδρας ποιεῖν, ὑπεστάλκεισαν κατά τινα συν-
4 τυχίαν ὑπὸ τὸν λόφον. οἷς τοῦ σκοποῦ σημήναντος ὅτι παραγίνονταί τινες κατ' ἄκρον τὸν βουνὸν ὑπερδέξιοι ’κείνων, ἐξαναστάντες καὶ παρὰ πλάγια ποιησάμενοι τὴν πορείαν ἀποτέμνονται τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ διακλείουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς.
5 καὶ τὸν μὲν Κλαύδιον εὐθέως ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ συμπλοκῇ καί τινας ἑτέρους ἅμα τούτῳ κατέβαλον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς κατατραυματίσαντες διὰ τῶν

personal activity of the king, the moats were very soon filled up and the wall was undermined and fell, upon which the barbarians were thoroughly discouraged, and after killing all the Greeks in the town and pillaging all the finest things they made off by night. When the king became aware of this he sent Hyperbas after them with the mercenaries, and the barbarians when overtaken by him threw away their encumbrances and fled again into the town. When the peltasts now vigorously forced their way through the breach, they surrendered in despair.

V. Affairs of Italy

Death of the Consul Claudius Marcellus

32. The consuls, wishing to survey accurately the side of the hill which was turned towards the enemy's camp, ordered the rest of their forces to remain in the entrenched camp, and themselves taking two troops of cavalry and about thirty velites together with their lictors advanced to reconnoitre the ground. Certain Numidians, who were in the habit of lying in ambush for skirmishers and in general for any of the enemy who advanced out of their camp, were by hazard hidden at the foot of the hill. Upon their look-out signalling to them that some of the enemy had appeared on the crest of the hill just above them, they rose, and marching up the slope obliquely, cut off the consuls and prevented their return to their camp. Marcellus and some others with him were cut down at the first onset, and the others were wounded and compelled to take to flight down the 208 B.C.

6 κρημνῶν ἠνάγκασαν ἄλλον ἄλλῃ φεύγειν. οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ θεωροῦντες τὸ γινόμενον οὐδαμῶς ἠδυνήθησαν ἐπικουρῆσαι τοῖς κινδυνεύουσιν· ἔτι γὰρ ἀναβοώντων καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐκπεπληγμένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν χαλινούντων τοὺς ἵππους, τῶν δὲ καθοπλιζομένων, πέρας εἶχε τὸ πρᾶγμα. καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Κλαυδίου τραυματίαν, μόλις καὶ παραδόξως τὸν κίνδυνον διαπεφευγότα.

7 Μάρκος μὲν οὖν ἀκακώτερον ἢ στρατηγικώτερον αὑτῷ χρησάμενος τοῖς δεδηλωμένοις περιέπεσε
8 συμπτώμασιν· ἐγὼ δὲ παρ' ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν πολλάκις ἀναγκάζομαι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπομιμνήσκειν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, θεωρῶν, εἰ καὶ περί ‹τι τῶν› τῆς στρατηγίας μερῶν ἄλλο, καὶ περὶ τοῦτο διαμαρτάνοντας τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, καίτοι προ-
9 δήλου τῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπαρχούσης. τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἡγεμόνος ἢ στρατηγοῦ μὴ διειληφότος διότι τῶν κατὰ μέρος κινδύνων, οἷς μὴ συμπάσχει τὰ ὅλα,
10 πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν δεῖ τὸν ἡγούμενον; τί δ' ἀγνοοῦντος ὅτι, κἄν ποτ' ἀναγκάζωσιν οἱ καιροὶ πράττειν τι τῶν κατὰ μέρος, πολλοὺς δεῖ πρότερον ἀποθανεῖν τῶν συνόντων πρὶν ἢ τὸ δεινὸν ἐγγίσαι τοῖς προ-
11 εστῶσι τῶν ὅλων; δεῖ γὰρ ἐν Καρὶ τὴν πεῖραν, ὡς ἡ παροιμία φησίν, οὐκ ἐν τῷ στρατηγῷ γίνεσθαι.
12 τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν ὡς "οὐκ ἂν ᾠόμην" "τίς γὰρ ἂν ἤλπισε τοῦτο γενέσθαι;" μέγιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ σημεῖον ἀπειρίας στρατηγικῆς καὶ βραδυτῆτος.

cliffs in different directions. The Romans in the camp, though they were spectators of what was happening, had no means of coming to the help of their comrades who were in danger. For while they were still shouting out in a state of great consternation, some of them bridling their horses and others putting on their armour, the whole affair was over. The son of Marcellus was wounded, and with great difficulty and beyond expectation escaped.

Marcellus, it must be confessed, brought this misfortune on himself by behaving not so much like a general as like a simpleton. Throughout this work I am often compelled to call the attention of my readers to such occurrences, as I observe that generals are more liable to make mistakes in this matter than in any other parts of their duty as commanders, although the error is such an obvious one. For what is the use of a general or commander who does not comprehend that he must keep himself as far away as possible from all partial encounters in which the fate of the whole army is not involved? Of what use is he if he does not know that, if circumstances at times compel commanders to undertake in person such partial encounters, they must sacrifice many of their men before the danger is suffered to approach the supreme commander of the whole? Let the risk be for the Carian, as the proverb has it, and not for the general.[a] And as for saying "I should never have thought it" or "Who would have expected it to happen?" that in a general is a most manifest sign of incompetence and dullness.

[a] ἐν Καρὶ κινδυνεύειν, *periculum facere in corpore vili*, the Carian being, according to the current explanation, a slave of little value.

33 Διὸ καὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους
2 ἀγαθὸν ἡγεμόνα κρίνων, κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστά τις
ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο, διότι πολλοὺς μὲν χρόνους ἐν
τῇ πολεμίᾳ διατρίψας, πολλοῖς δὲ καιροῖς καὶ
ποικίλοις χρησάμενος, ἔσφηλε μὲν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους
πολλάκις ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος χρείαις διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν
ἀγχίνοιαν, ἐσφάλη δ' οὐδέποτε τοσούτους καὶ
3 τηλικούτους ἀγῶνας χειρίσας· τοιαύτην ἐποιεῖτο
τὴν πρόνοιαν, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ τῆς ἀσφαλείας αὑτοῦ.
4 καὶ μάλ' εἰκότως· ἀκεραίου μὲν γὰρ καὶ σῳζομένου
τοῦ προεστῶτος, κἂν ποτε πέσῃ τὰ ὅλα, πολλὰς
ἀφορμὰς ἡ τύχη δίδωσι πρὸς τὸ πάλιν ἀνακτήσασθαι
5 τὰς ἐκ τῶν περιπετειῶν ἐλαττώσεις· πταίσαντος
δέ, καθάπερ ἐν νηὶ τοῦ κυβερνήτου, κἂν [τὸ νικᾶν]
ἡ τύχη τοῖς πολλοῖς παραδιδῷ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν,
οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεται διὰ τὸ πάσας ἐξηρτῆσθαι
6 τὰς ἐλπίδας ἑκάστοις ἐκ τῶν ἡγουμένων. ταῦτα
μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι πρὸς τοὺς ἢ διὰ κενοδοξίαν
ἢ μειρακιώδει <παρα>στάσει περιπίπτοντας τοῖς
τοιούτοις ἀλογήμασιν ἢ δι' ἀπειρίαν ἢ διὰ κατα-
7 φρόνησιν· ἓν γὰρ ἀεί τι τῶν προειρημένων αἴτιον
γίνεται τῶν τοιούτων περιπετειῶν. . . .
8 Οἱ δὲ καταρράκτας, οὓς εἶχον ὀλίγον ἐξωτέρω
διὰ μηχανημάτων ἀνημμένους, αἰφνίδιον καθῆκαν
καὶ ἐπεβάλοντο, καὶ τούτους κατασχόντες πρὸ τοῦ
τείχους ἀνεσκολόπισαν.

VI. Res Hispaniae

34 Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν Πόπλιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων
στρατηγός, ποιούμενος τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐν Ταρ-
ράκωνι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων δεδηλώκαμεν,

33. For this reason while we regard Hannibal as being a good general in very many ways, we should lay especial stress on the fact that after spending many years in a hostile country and meeting with great variety of fortune he frequently by his cleverness worsted the enemy in partial engagements, whereas he never met with disaster to himself in spite of the numerous and severe battles in which he engaged, so great was the care he took of his own safety. And very properly too; for when the commander is safe and sound, even if a total defeat takes place, Fortune furnishes many means for retrieving the loss, but if he falls, just as in the case of the pilot of a ship, even if Fortune give victory to the soldiers, it is of no service to them, as all their hopes depend upon their leaders. So much for those who fall into such errors from ostentation and childish vanity or from inexperience or contempt of the enemy. One or other of these is always the cause of such accidents. . . .

Incident in Hannibal's attempt to capture Salapia after the above event

Suddenly letting down the portcullis which they had raised somewhat higher by mechanical means, they attacked the intruders and capturing them crucified them before the wall.

VI. Affairs of Spain

34. In Spain Publius Scipio, the Roman commander, who, as I above stated, was wintering at Tarraco, first of all secured the confidence and 210-2 B.C.

πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς Ἴβηρας εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν φιλίαν καὶ
πίστιν ἐνεδήσατο διὰ τῆς τῶν ὁμήρων ἑκάστοις
2 ἀποδόσεως, λαβὼν συναγωνιστὴν ἐκ ταὐτομάτου
πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος Ἐδεκῶνα τὸν Ἐδετανῶν
δυνάστην, ὃς ἅμα τῷ προσπεσεῖν τὴν Καρχηδόνος
ἅλωσιν καὶ γενέσθαι κύριον τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ
καὶ τῶν υἱῶν τὸν Πόπλιον, εὐθέως συλλογισάμενος
τὴν ἐσομένην τῶν Ἰβήρων μεταβολὴν ἀρχηγὸς
3 ἐβουλήθη ‹γενέσθαι› τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμῆς, μάλιστα
πεπεισμένος οὕτως τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα
κομιεῖσθαι καὶ δόξειν οὐ κατ' ἀνάγκην, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
πρόθεσιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὰ Ῥωμαίων· ἃ καὶ συνέβη
4 γενέσθαι. τῶν γὰρ δυνάμεων ἄρτι διαφειμένων
εἰς τὴν παραχειμασίαν παρῆν εἰς τὴν Ταρράκωνα
5 μετὰ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων. ἐλθὼν δ' εἰς λόγους
τῷ Ποπλίῳ ταύτην ἔφη τοῖς θεοῖς μεγίστην χάριν
ἔχειν, ὅτι πρῶτος τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν δυναστῶν
6 ἥκει πρὸς αὐτόν. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους ἀκμὴν
διαπέμπεσθαι καὶ βλέπειν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους,
τὰς δὲ χεῖρας ἐκτείνειν Ῥωμαίοις· αὐτὸς δὲ παρα-
γεγονέναι διδοὺς οὐ μόνον αὑτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν.
7 διόπερ ἂν νομισθῇ παρ' αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος,
μεγάλην μὲν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἔφη, μεγάλην δ'
8 εἰς τὸ μέλλον παρέξεσθαι χρείαν. παραυτίκα μὲν
γὰρ θεασαμένους τοὺς Ἴβηρας πρός τε τὴν φιλίαν
αὐτὸν προσδεδεγμένον καὶ τετευχότα τῶν ἀξιου-
μένων πάντας ἐπὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον ἥξειν, σπουδά-
ζοντας κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἀναγκαίους καὶ τυχεῖν
9 τῆς Ῥωμαίων συμμαχίας· εἰς δὲ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα
χρόνον προκαταληφθέντας τῇ τοιαύτῃ τιμῇ καὶ
φιλανθρωπίᾳ συναγωνιστὰς ἀπροφασίστους ὑπάρξειν

friendship of the Iberians by the restoration of the hostages to their respective homes, availing himself in the matter of the assistance voluntarily proffered by Edeco the prince of the Edetani, who on receiving the news of the capture of New Carthage and learning that his wife and sons were in Scipio's power, at once anticipated the change that would take place in the attitude of the Iberians and desired to be leader of this movement, chiefly owing to his conviction that by this reason he would recover his wife and children and would appear to have taken the part of the Romans not under compulsion but deliberately. And this proved to be so. For just after the troops had been dispersed to their winter quarters he appeared at Tarraco with his relatives and friends. Seeking an interview with Scipio he said he gave thanks to Heaven that he was the first of the Spanish princes to come to him. The others, he said, were still communicating with Carthage and looking to that quarter, while at the same time stretching out their hands to the Romans, but he himself had come in and put not only his own person but his friends and relatives at the mercy of the Romans. So, if Scipio would regard him as a friend and ally, he would be of the greatest service to him both at present and in the future. For the Iberians at once, upon seeing that he had been received into Scipio's friendship and that his requests had been granted, would all come with the same object, desirous of recovering their relatives and securing the alliance of Rome, and their affections would be so much engaged for the future by such honour and kindness that they would unreservedly

10 αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ κατάλοιπα τῶν ἔργων. διόπερ
ἠξίου τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα κομίσασθαι, καὶ
κριθεὶς φίλος ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, ἵνα λαβὼν
ἀφορμὴν εὔλογον ἐναποδείξηται τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν
φιλων εὔνοιαν κατὰ δύναμιν εἴς τε τὸν Πόπλιον
11 αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα. Ἐδεκὼν
35 μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα διαλεχθεὶς ἐπέσχεν· ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος,
καὶ πάλαι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἕτοιμος ὢν καὶ
συλλελογισμένος παραπλήσια τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐδε-
κῶνος εἰρημένοις, τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα
2 παρέδωκεν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν συνέθετο. πρὸς
δὲ τούτοις παρὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ποικίλως ψυχα-
γωγήσας τὸν Ἴβηρα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς αὑτοῦ μεγάλας
εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐλπίδας ὑπογράψας, οὕτως εἰς τὴν
3 οἰκείαν ἐξαπέστειλε. τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ταχέως
περιβοήτου γενομένου πάντας συνέβη τοὺς ἐντὸς
Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ κατοικοῦντας οἷον ἀπὸ μιᾶς
ὁρμῆς ἑλέσθαι τὰ Ῥωμαίων, ὅσοι μὴ πρότερον
αὐτῶν ὑπῆρχον φίλοι.

4 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καλῶς κατὰ νοῦν ἐχώρει τῷ
5 Ποπλίῳ· μετὰ δὲ τὸν τούτων χωρισμὸν τὰς μὲν
ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις διέλυσε, θεωρῶν οὐδὲν ἀντίπαλον
ὑπάρχον κατὰ θάλατταν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐκλέξας
τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἐπὶ τὰς σημαίας ἐμέρισε. καὶ
συνηύξησε τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις.

6 Ἀνδοβάλης δὲ καὶ Μανδόνιος, μέγιστοι μὲν
ὄντες δυνάσται τότε τῶν κατ' Ἰβηρίαν, ἀληθινώ-
τατοι δὲ Καρχηδονίων φίλοι δοξαζόμενοι, πάλαι
μὲν ὑπούλως διέκειντο καὶ καιρὸν ἐπετήρουν, ἐξ
ὅτου προσποιηθέντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν
ἀπιστεῖν αὐτοῖς ᾔτησαν χρημάτων τε πλῆθος καὶ

co-operate with Scipio in the rest of his operations. He therefore begged that his wife and children might be restored to him and that before returning to his home he should be pronounced to be a friend, so that he might have a plausible pretext for dis playing by every means in his power the goodwill that he himself and his friends bore to Scipio and the Roman cause. 35. Edeco after speaking somewhat in these terms ended his discourse, and Scipio, who had been previously disposed to take such a course, and whose views corresponded with those expressed by Edeco, returned his wife and children and made him his friend. And not only this, but he captivated the Spaniard by diverse means during the time they spent together, and holding out high hopes of future advantage to all those with him, he sent them back to their home. The matter was soon bruited abroad, and all the Iberians on the side of the Ebro who had not previously been friendly to the Romans now as with one consent embraced their cause.

These matters, then, were proceeding as well as Scipio could wish, and after the departure of the Iberians he broke up his navy, as no enemy was visible at sea, and selecting the most capable men from the crews distributed them among the maniples and thus increased his land forces.

Andobales and Mandonius were at this time two of the greatest princes in Spain and were supposed to be the most trusty adherents of Carthage, but they had long been disaffected and were watching for an opportunity of revolt, ever since Hasdrubal, as I above stated, on the pretext that he mistrusted them, had demanded from them the payment of a

τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας εἰς ὁμηρείαν,
7 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐδηλώσαμεν· τότε
δὲ νομίσαντες ἔχειν εὐφυῆ καιρόν, ἀναλαβόντες
τὰς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεις ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδονίων παρ-
εμβολῆς νυκτὸς ἀπεχώρησαν εἴς τινας ἐρυμνοὺς
τόπους καὶ δυναμένους αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν
8 παρασκευάζειν. οὗ γενομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
Ἰβήρων συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους ἀπολιπεῖν Ἀσδρού-
βαν, πάλαι μὲν βαρυνομένους ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν Καρ-
χηδονίων ἀγερωχίας, τότε δὲ πρῶτον καιρὸν
λαβόντας εἰς τὸ φανερὰν ποιῆσαι τὴν αὑτῶν
προαίρεσιν.

36 Ὁ δὴ καὶ περὶ πολλοὺς ἤδη γέγονε. μεγάλου
γὰρ ὄντος, ὡς πλεονάκις ἠμῖν εἴρηται, τοῦ κατορ-
θοῦν ἐν πράγμασι καὶ περιγίνεσθαι τῶν ἐχθρῶν
ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, πολλῷ μείζονος ἐμπειρίας
προσδεῖται καὶ φυλακῆς τὸ καλῶς χρήσασθαι τοῖς
2 κατορθώμασι· διὸ καὶ πολλαπλασίους ἂν εὕροι
τις τοὺς ἐπὶ προτερημάτων γεγονότας τῶν καλῶς
τοῖς προτερήμασι κεχρημένων. ὃ καὶ τότε περὶ
3 τοὺς Καρχηδονίους συνέβη γενέσθαι. μετὰ γὰρ
τὸ νικῆσαι μὲν τὰς Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις, ἀποκτεῖναι
δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀμφοτέρους, Πόπλιον καὶ
Γνάϊον, ὑπολαβόντες ἀδήριτον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν
τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ὑπερηφάνως ἐχρῶντο τοῖς κατὰ τὴν
4 χώραν. τοιγαροῦν ἀντὶ συμμάχων καὶ φίλων
πολεμίους ἔσχον τοὺς ὑποταττομένους. καὶ τοῦτ'
5 εἰκότως ἔπαθον· ἄλλως μὲν <γὰρ ἐπειδήπερ> ὑπ-
έλαβον δεῖν κτᾶσθαι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἄλλως δὲ τηρεῖν,
οὐκ ἔμαθον διότι κάλλιστα φυλάττουσι τὰς ὑπεροχὰς
οἱ κάλλιστα διαμείναντες ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν προαιρέ-
σεων, αἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεκτήσαντο τὰς δυναστείας,

large sum of money and the surrender of their wives and daughters as hostages. Thinking that the present time was favourable, they left the Carthaginian camp with all their forces by night and withdrew to a strong position where they would be in safety. Upon this most of the other Iberians also deserted Hasdrubal. They had long been offended by the arrogance of the Carthaginians, but this was the first opportunity they had of manifesting their inclinations.

36. The same thing has happened before to many people. For, as I have often said, while success in policy and victory in the field are great things, it requires much more skill and caution to make a good use of such success. So that you will find that those who have won victories are far more numerous than those who have used them to advantage. This is exactly what happened to the Carthaginians at this period. For after having defeated the Roman forces and killed the two commanders Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, they regarded their position in Spain as undisputed and treated the natives in an overbearing manner. In consequence their subjects, instead of being their allies and friends, were their enemies. And quite naturally; for they fancied that there is one method by which power should be acquired and another by which it should be maintained; they had not learnt that those who preserve their supremacy best are those who adhere to the same principles by which they originally

6 καίτοι γε προφανοῦς ὄντος καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἤδη τεθεωρημένου διότι κτῶνται μὲν ἄνθρωποι τὰς εὐκαιρίας εὖ ποιοῦντες καὶ προτεινόμενοι τὴν
7 ἀγαθὴν ἐλπίδα τοῖς πέλας, ἐπειδὰν δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων τυχόντες κακῶς ποιῶσι καὶ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχωσι τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, εἰκότως ἅμα ταῖς τῶν προεστώτων μεταβολαῖς συμμεταπίπτουσι καὶ τῶν ὑποταττομένων αἱ προαιρέσεις. ὃ καὶ τότε συνέβη τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

37 Ἀσδρούβας μὲν οὖν ἐν τοιαύταις περιστάσεσι πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τῶν ἐπιφερο-
2 μένων πραγμάτων ἐννοίας. ἐλύπει μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἡ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην ἀπόστασις, ἐλύπει δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀντιπαραγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἀλλοτριότητα τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ πρὸς <τοὺς> ἄλλους στρατηγούς· ἠγωνία δὲ καὶ τὴν Ποπλίου παρουσίαν.
3 καὶ <τὸ λοιπὸν> ἤδη προσδοκῶν αὐτὸν ἥξειν μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, θεωρῶν δ' αὐτὸν μὲν ἐγκαταλειπόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰβήρων, τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις πάντας ὁμοθυμαδὸν προσχωροῦντας, ἐπί τινας λογισμοὺς
4 κατήντησε τοιούτους. προέθετο γὰρ διότι δεῖ παρεσκευασμένον τὰ δυνατὰ συμβαλεῖν πρὸς μάχην τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, κἂν μὲν ἡ τύχη δῷ τὸ νικᾶν, βουλεύσασθαι μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς ἀσφαλῶς·
5 ἂν δ' ἀντιπίπτῃ <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν μάχην, ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν μετὰ τῶν διασωζομένων ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰς Γαλατίαν, κἀκεῖθεν παραλαβόντα τῶν βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστους βοηθεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ κοινωνεῖν Ἀννίβᾳ τἀδελφῷ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων

6 Ἀσδρούβας <μὲν> δὴ ταῦτα διανοηθεὶς πρὸς τούτοις ἦν· Πόπλιος δὲ προσδεξάμενος Γάιον τὸν Λαίλιον καὶ διακούσας τῶν παραγγελλομένων ὑπὸ

established it, and this although it is evident and has been observed by many that it is by kind treatment of their neighbours and by holding out the prospect of further benefits that men acquire power, but when having attained their wish they treat their subjects ill and rule over them tyrannically it is only natural that with the change of character in the rulers the disposition of their subjects should change likewise, as actually happened now to the Carthaginians.

37. As for Hasdrubal, beset by these difficulties, he was disturbed by many and various apprehensions regarding the dangers that menaced him. To begin with he was troubled by the revolt of Andobales and next by the opposition and estrangement of the other commanders. The prospect of Scipio's arrival also caused him much anxiety. Expecting him as he did to be soon on the spot with his army, and seeing himself deserted by the Iberians, who all with one accord were joining the Romans, he more or less decided on the following course. He proposed to make all possible preparations and meet the enemy in battle. Should Fortune give him victory, he would afterwards deliberate in security as to his future action, but if he met with a reverse in the battle he would retreat from the field with the survivors to Gaul and getting as many of the natives as he could to join him would pass into Italy and throw in his fortunes with his brother Hannibal.

Hasdrubal, then, having resolved on this course was making his preparations. Meanwhile Scipio, having received Gaius Laelius and heard from him

τῆς συγκλήτου, προῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας, ἀπαντώντων αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν δίοδον τῶν Ἰβήρων, ἑτοίμως καὶ προθύμως
7 συνεξορμώντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην πάλαι μὲν διεπέμποντο πρὸς τὸν Πόπλιον, τότε δὲ πλησιάσαντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς τόποις ἦκον ὡς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἅμα τοῖς φίλοις, καὶ συμμίξαντες ἀπελογίσαντο περὶ τῆς προγεγενημένης σφίσι φιλίας πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς χρείας καὶ τὴν ὅλην πίστιν ἐνεφάνιζον, ἣν ἐτύγχανον
8 ἐκείνοις παρεσχημένοι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς ἀδικίας ἐξηγοῦντο καὶ τὰς ὕβρεις τὰς ἐξ ἐκείνων ἀπηντη-
9 μένας. διόπερ ἠξίουν τὸν Πόπλιον αὐτὸν κριτὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν λεγομένων, κἂν μὲν φανῶσιν ἀδίκως ἐγκαλοῦντες Καρχηδονίοις, σαφῶς γινώσκειν αὐτὸν ὡς οὐδὲ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους δύνανται τηρεῖν
10 πίστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πολλὰς ἀδικίας ἀναλογιζόμενοι κατ' ἀνάγκην ἀφιστῶνται τῆς εὐνοίας τῆς ἐκείνων, καλὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν διότι νῦν ἑλόμενοι τὰ Ῥωμαίων βεβαίως τηρήσουσι τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὔνοιαν.

38 Καὶ πλείω πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτῶν διαλεχθέντων, ἐπεὶ κατέπαυσαν τὸν λόγον, μεταλαβὼν ὁ Πόπλιος καὶ τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων εἰρημένοις ἔφη πιστεύειν, μάλιστα δὲ γινώσκειν τὴν Καρχηδονίων ὕβριν ἔκ τε τῆς εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἴβηρας καὶ μάλιστα τῆς εἰς τὰς ἐκείνων γυναῖκας καὶ θυγατέρας ἀσελ-
2 γείας, ἃς αὐτὸς παρειληφὼς νῦν οὐχ ὁμήρων ἐχούσας διάθεσιν, ἀλλ' αἰχμαλώτων καὶ δούλων, οὕτως τετηρηκέναι τὴν πίστιν ὡς οὐδ' ἂν αὐτοὺς
3 ἐκείνους τηρῆσαι πατέρας ὑπάρχοντας. τῶν δ' ἀνθομολογησαμένων διότι παρακολουθοῦσι καὶ προσκυνησάντων αὐτὸν καὶ προσφωνησάντων βασιλέα

the senate's orders, withdrew his troops from their winter quarters and advanced, being met on his march by the Iberians who joined him with hearty alacrity. Andobales had been for long communicating with Scipio, and now that he was in the neighbourhood came to him from his camp together with his friends, and when they met, justified his former friendship with the Carthaginians and likewise pointed out all the services he had rendered them and how loyal he had been to their cause. He next gave an account of the injuries and insults he had met with at their hands. He therefore begged Scipio to judge for himself as to his statements, and if it appeared to him that he was accusing the Carthaginians unjustly, he might be perfectly sure that he was not capable of remaining loyal to Rome. But if, taking into consideration their many acts of injustice, he had been forced to abandon his friendly attitude, Scipio might feel confident that now he had chosen the cause of Rome he would be firm in his affection.

38. Andobales spoke still further on the subject, and when he had finished Scipio in reply said that he perfectly believed his statements and himself had the clearest evidence of the tyrannical conduct of the Carthaginians in their licentious treatment of the wives and daughters of the speaker and his friends, whom he himself had found in the position not so much of hostages as of prisoners and slaves, adding that he had kept faith to them with a loyalty that not even they, their fathers, could have displayed. When they acknowledged that they agreed and did obeisance and all saluted him as king,

<πάντων>, οἱ μὲν παρόντες ἐπεσημήναντο <τὸ> ῥηθέν, ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἐντραπεὶς θαρρεῖν αὐτοῖς παρῄνει· τεύξεσθαι γὰρ ἔφη σφᾶς ἁπάντων τῶν
4 φιλανθρώπων ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων. καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν ἐκ χειρὸς τὰς θυγατέρας ἀπέδωκε, τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον
5 ἐποιεῖτο τὰς συνθήκας πρὸς αὐτούς. ἦν δὲ τὸ συνέχον τῶν ὁμολογηθέντων ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς Ῥωμαίων ἄρχουσι καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τούτων
6 παραγγελλομένοις. γενομένων δὲ τούτων ἀναχωρήσαντες εἰς τὰς αὑτῶν παρεμβολὰς καὶ παραλαβόντες τὰς δυνάμεις, ἦκον πρὸς τὸν Πόπλιον, καὶ στρατοπεδεύσαντες ὁμοῦ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις προῆγον ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν.
7 Ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς ἐτύγχανε μὲν διατρίβων ἐν τοῖς περὶ Κασταλῶνα τόποις περὶ Βαίκυλα πόλιν οὐ μακρὰν τῶν ἀργυρείων
8 μετάλλων· πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Ῥωμαίων μετεστρατοπέδευσε, καὶ λαβὼν ἐκ μὲν τῶν ὄπισθεν ποταμὸν ἀσφαλῆ, παρὰ δὲ τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον πλευρὰν τοῦ χάρακος ἐπίπεδον τόπον, ὀφρὺν προβεβλημένην ἔχοντα καὶ βάθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ μῆκος πρὸς ἔκταξιν, <ἔμενεν> ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, προτιθέμενος ἐπὶ τὴν ὀφρὺν
9 ἀεὶ τὰς ἐφεδρείας. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἐγγίσας προθύμως μὲν εἶχε πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεύειν, ἀπόρως δὲ διέκειτο, θεωρῶν τοὺς τόπους εὐφυεῖς ὄντας πρὸς τὴν τῶν
10 ἐναντίων ἀσφάλειαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ προσανασχὼν δύ' ἡμέρας καὶ διαγωνιάσας μὴ συνεπιγενομένων τῶν περὶ τὸν Μάγωνα καὶ τὸν τοῦ Γέσκωνος Ἀσδρούβαν πανταχόθεν αὐτὸν οἱ πολέμιοι περιστῶσιν, ἔκρινε παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ καταπειράζειν τῶν ὑπεναντίων.
39 Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἑτοιμάσας πρὸς μά-

those present applauded, and Scipio, who was much touched, exhorted them to be of good cheer, for they would meet with all kindness at the hands of the Romans. He at once handed over their daughters to them, and next day made a treaty with them, the essential part of the agreement being that they should follow the Roman commanders and obey their orders. After this they retired to their own camps, and taking their forces came back to Scipio, and now joining the Roman camp advanced against Hasdrubal.

The Carthaginian general was then quartered in the district of Castalon near the town of Baecula not far from the silver mines. On hearing of the arrival of the Romans, he shifted his camp to a position where he had in his rear the effective protection of a river and in his front a stretch of level ground defended by a ridge and of sufficient depth for safety and sufficient width for deploying his troops. Here he remained, stationing all the time his covering force on the ridge in front of him. Scipio on approaching was eager to risk a battle, but was somewhat at a loss, as he saw how advantageous and safe the enemy's position was. But after waiting for two days he became apprehensive lest Mago and Gesco should come up and he should find himself surrounded by the enemy on all sides, and he therefore decided to take his chance and make an attempt on the enemy.

39. Getting the rest of his forces ready for battle

χην συνεῖχεν ἐν τῷ χάρακι, τοὺς δὲ γροσφομάχους καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους ἐξαφιεὶς ἐκέλευε προσβάλλειν πρὸς τὴν ὀφρὺν καὶ καταπειράζειν
2 τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐφεδρείας. τῶν δὲ ποιούντων τὸ παραγγελθὲν εὐψύχως, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς ἐκαραδόκει τὸ συμβαῖνον· θεωρῶν δὲ διὰ τὴν τόλμαν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τοὺς παρ' αὐτῶν πιεζομένους καὶ κακῶς πάσχοντας, ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν καὶ παρενέβαλε παρὰ τὴν ὀφρύν,
3 πιστεύων τοῖς τόποις. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ὁ Πόπλιος τοὺς μὲν εὐζώνους ἅπαντας ἐπαφῆκε, συντάξας βοηθεῖν τοῖς προκινδυνεύουσι, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἑτοίμους ἔχων, τοὺς μὲν ἡμίσεις αὐτὸς ἔχων, περιελθὼν τὴν ὀφρὺν κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν τῶν
4 ὑπεναντίων, προσέβαλλε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, τοὺς δ' ἡμίσεις Λαιλίῳ δοὺς ὁμοίως παρήγγειλε τὴν
5 ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ μέρη τῶν πολεμίων. οὗ συμβαίνοντος ὁ μὲν Ἀσδρούβας ἀκμὴν ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν· τὸν γὰρ πρὸ τούτου χρόνον ἐπέμενε πιστεύων τοῖς τόποις καὶ πεπεισμένος μηδέποτε τολμήσειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐγχειρεῖν αὐτοῖς· διὸ παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν γεγενημένης τῆς ἐπιθέσεως καθυστέρει τῆς ἐκτάξεως.
6 οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ κέρας ποιούμενοι τὸν κίνδυνον, οὐδέπω τῶν πολεμίων κατειληφότων τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν κεράτων τόπους, οὐ μόνον ἐπέβησαν ἀσφαλῶς ἐπὶ τὴν ὀφρύν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσάγοντες ἔτι παρεμβαλλόντων καὶ κινουμένων τῶν ὑπεναντίων τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν προσπίπτοντας ἐκ πλαγίων ἐφόνευον, τοὺς δὲ παρεμβάλλοντας ἐξ ἐπιστροφῆς φεύγειν ἠνάγ-
7 καζον. Ἀσδρούβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλογισμούς, θεωρῶν κλινούσας καὶ διατετραμμένας

he kept them inside the camp, and sending off the velites and a picked force of foot he ordered them to throw themselves on the ridge and attack the enemy's covering force. They executed his order with great gallantry, and at first the Carthaginian commander remained waiting for the result. But when he saw that, owing to the dashing courage of the Romans, his men were hard pressed and in an evil plight, he led out his forces and drew them up near the ridge, relying on the strength of the position. Scipio at once dispatched the whole of his light-armed troops with orders to support the force which had commenced the attack, and having the rest of his army ready, he himself took one half of it and skirting the ridge to the left of the enemy fell upon the Carthaginians; the other half he gave to Laelius with orders to attack the enemy on their right in a similar manner. While this was happening Hasdrubal was still engaged in leading his forces out of the camp. For up to now he had waited there relying on the strength of the position and convinced that the enemy would never venture to attack him: thus, owing to the unexpectedness of the assault, he was too late in deploying his troops. The Romans fighting on the wings, since the enemy had not yet occupied the ground on their wings, not only succeeded in safely mounting the ridge, but as the enemy were still forming up and in motion when they attacked, slaughtered some of them by falling on their flank and compelled those who were getting into formation to turn and fly. Hasdrubal, as had been his original intention, when he saw his troops

τὰς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεις, τὸ μὲν ψυχομαχεῖν μέχρι
8 τῆς ἐσχάτης ἐλπίδος ἀπεδοκίμαζε, λαβὼν δὲ τά
τε χρήματα καὶ τὰ θηρία, καὶ τῶν φευγόντων
ὅσους ἠδύνατο πλείστους ἐπισπασάμενος, ἐποιεῖτο
τὴν ἀναχώρησιν παρὰ τὸν Τάγον ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ
τὰς Πυρήνης ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τοὺς ταύτῃ κατοι-
9 κοῦντας Γαλάτας. Πόπλιος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ ποδὸς
ἔπεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν οὐχ ἡγεῖτο
συμφέρειν τῷ δεδιέναι τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν
‹τὴν› ἔφοδον, τὸν δὲ χάρακα τῶν ὑπεναντίων
ἐφῆκε τοῖς αὐτοῦ στρατιώταις διαρπάζειν.

40 Εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον συναθροίσας τὸ τῶν αἰχμα-
λώτων πλῆθος, ὧν ἦσαν πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς μυρίους, ἵπ-
πεῖς δὲ πλείους δισχιλίων, ἐγίνετο περὶ τὴν τού-
2 των οἰκονομίαν. τῶν δ' Ἰβήρων ὅσοι κατὰ τοὺς
προειρημένους τόπους Καρχηδονίοις τότε συνεμά-
χουν, ἦκον ἐγχειρίζοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν
Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις βασιλέα
3 προσεφώνουν τὸν Πόπλιον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐποίη-
σε τοῦτο καὶ προσεκύνησε πρῶτος Ἐδεκών, μετὰ
δὲ τοῦτον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην. τότε μὲν οὖν
4 ἀνεπιστάτως αὐτὸν παρέδραμε τὸ ῥηθέν· μετὰ
δὲ τὴν μάχην ἁπάντων βασιλέα προσφωνούντων,
εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἤγαγε τὸν Πόπλιον τὸ γινόμενον.
5 διὸ καὶ συναθροίσας τοὺς Ἴβηρας βασιλικὸς μὲν
ἔφη βούλεσθαι καὶ λέγεσθαι παρὰ πᾶσι καὶ ταῖς
ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν, βασιλεύς γε μὴν οὔτ' ‹εἶναι›
θέλειν οὔτε λέγεσθαι παρ' οὐδενί. ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν
6 παρήγγειλε στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν προσφωνεῖν. ἴσως
μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε δικαίως ἄν τις ἐπεσημήνατο τὴν
μεγαλοψυχίαν τἀνδρός, ἢ κομιδῇ νέος ὢν καὶ τῆς
τύχης αὐτῷ συνεκδραμούσης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε

giving way and in disorder, declined to fight it out to the death, but taking his money and his elephants and drawing off after him as many of the fugitives as he could, retreated along the River Tagus in the direction of the pass over the Pyrenees and of the Gauls who inhabited that part of the country. Scipio did not think it advisable to follow Hasdrubal, as he was afraid of being attacked by the other generals, but gave the enemy's camp up to his soldiers to plunder.

40. Next day collecting the prisoners, of whom there were about ten thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, he occupied himself with their disposal. The Iberians in the districts I spoke of who were still allies of the Carthaginians now came in to submit to the Romans, and on meeting Scipio saluted him as king. Edeco was the first who had done this and made obeisance to him, and he had been followed by Andobales. On that occasion Scipio had paid no great attention and did not particularly notice the appellation, but when after the battle all addressed him as king, the matter gave him pause. He therefore assembled the Iberians and told them that he wished to be called kingly by them and actually to be kingly, but that he did not wish to be king or to be called so by any one. After saying this he ordered them to call him general. Perhaps even on this occasion one would be justified in noting with admiration Scipio's greatness of mind, in view of the fact that though he was still quite young and fortune had favoured him so

πάντας τοὺς ὑποταττομένους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπί τε ταύτην κατενεχθῆναι τὴν διάληψιν καὶ τὴν ὀνομασίαν, ὅμως ἐν ἑαυτῷ διέμεινε καὶ παρῃτεῖτο
7 τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμὴν καὶ φαντασίαν. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἄν τις θαυμάσειε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα μεγαλοψυχίας, βλέψας εἰς τοὺς ἐσχάτους τοῦ βίου καιρούς, ἡνίκα πρὸς τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἔργοις κατεστρέψατο μὲν Καρχηδονίους, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα μέρη τῆς Λιβύης ἀπὸ τῶν Φιλαίνου βωμῶν ἕως Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἐξουσίαν ἤγαγε, κατεστρέψατο δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ τοὺς τῆς Συρίας βασιλεῖς, καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ μέγιστον μέρος τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπήκοον ἐποίησε Ῥωμαίοις, ἔλαβε δὲ καιροὺς εἰς τὸ περιποιήσασθαι δυναστείαν βασιλικὴν ἐν οἷς ἐπιβάλοιτο καὶ βουληθείη τόποις τῆς οἰκουμένης.
8 ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θειοτέραν, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, ὑπερφρονεῖν ἂν ἐποίησεν.
9 Πόπλιος ⟨δὲ⟩ τοσοῦτον ὑπερέθετο μεγαλοψυχίᾳ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὡς οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εὔξασθαί τις τοῖς θεοῖς ⟨οὐ⟩ τολμήσειε, λέγω δὲ βασιλείας, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης αὐτῷ δεδομένον ἀπηξίωσε, καὶ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ταύτης πίστιν τῆς
10 περιβλέπτου καὶ μακαριστῆς ⟨βασιλείας⟩. πλὴν τότε γε διαλέξας ἐκ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων τοὺς Ἴβηρας, τούτους μὲν ἀπέλυσε χωρὶς λύτρων πάντας εἰς τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδας, τῶν δ' ἵππων τριακοσίους κελεύσας ἐκλέξαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην τοὺς
11 λοιποὺς διέδωκε τοῖς ἀνίπποις. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη μεταλαβὼν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατοπεδείαν διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυΐαν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἔμενε

highly that all who were subject to him were prompted to form this estimate of him and bestow on him the name of king of their own accord, he still kept his head and declined to profit by their enthusiasm and accept this splendid title. But much more must we admire this exceptional greatness of mind when we look at the close of his life, at the period when in addition to his exploits in Spain he had destroyed the power of Carthage and subjected to the dominion of his country the largest and finest part of Libya from the altars of Philaenus to the pillars of Heracles, when he had reduced Asia and overthrown the kings of Syria and had made the greatest and richest part of the world subject to Rome, and had the opportunity of attaining royal power in whatever part of the world he chose to attempt it. Such success indeed might have made not only a man, but if it is permitted to say so, even a god overweening. And yet Scipio so far excelled all other men in greatness of mind, that when kingship, the greatest blessing for which any man would dare to pray to the gods, was often offered to him by fortune, he refused it, and valued more highly his country and his own loyalty to her than the thing which is the object of universal admiration and envy. To resume my narrative, on the present occasion he picked out the Iberians from the prisoners and left them all free to return to their own countries without ransom, and ordering Andobales to choose for himself three hundred of the horses, he distributed the rest among those who had none. After this he transferred his army to the Carthaginian camp owing to its favourable

καραδοκῶν τοὺς καταλειπομένους τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγούς, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν Πυρηναίων ὀρέων ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς τηρήσοντας
12 τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, τῆς ὥρας ἤδη συναπτούσης, ἀνεχώρησε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς Ταρράκων', ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραχειμασίαν.

VII. Res Graeciae

41 Οἱ μὲν Αἰτωλοί, προσφάτως ἐπηρμένοι ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐπὶ τῇ Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀττάλου παρουσίᾳ, πάντας ἐξέπληττον καὶ πᾶσιν
2 ἐπέκειντο κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἄτταλον καὶ Πόπλιον κατὰ θάλατταν. διόπερ ἦκον Ἀχαιοὶ μὲν παρακαλοῦντες τὸν Φίλιππον βοηθεῖν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἠγωνίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Μαχανίδαν διὰ τὸ προκαθῆσθαι μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως
3 ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀργείων ὅροις. Βοιωτοὶ <δὲ> δεδιότες τὸν στόλον τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἡγεμόνα καὶ βοήθειαν ἤτουν. φιλοπονώτατά γε μὴν οἱ τὴν Εὔβοιαν κατοικοῦντες ἠξίουν <ἔχειν> τινὰ πρόνοιαν τῶν πολεμίων. παραπλήσια δ' Ἀκαρνᾶνες παρ-
4 εκάλουν. ἦν δὲ καὶ παρ' Ἠπειρωτῶν πρεσβεία. προσήγγελτο δὲ καὶ Σκερδιλαΐδαν καὶ Πλευρᾶτον ἐξάγειν τὰς δυνάμεις· ἔτι δὲ τοὺς προσοροῦντας τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ Θρᾷκας, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς Μαιδούς, ἐπιβολὰς ἔχειν ὡς ἐμβαλοῦντας ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν,
5 ἐὰν βραχύ τι μόνον ὁ βασιλεὺς τῆς οἰκείας ἀποσπασθῇ. προκατελάμβανον δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ Θερμοπύλας στενὰ τάφροις καὶ χάρακι καὶ φυλακαῖς βαρείαις Αἰτωλοί, πεπεισμένοι συγκλείειν τὸν Φίλιππον καὶ

position, and dispatched a force to the pass over the Pyrenees to observe the movements of Hasdrubal. Subsequently, as the season was now advanced, he retired with his army to Tarraco to pass the winter in that district.

VII. Affairs of Greece

Action of Philip

41. The Aetolians, whose hopes had recently risen high owing to the arrival of the Romans and King Attalus, were terrorizing and threatening everyone by land while the Romans and Attalus were doing the same by sea. The Achaeans therefore came to Philip to beg for his help, for they were not only in dread of the Aetolians but of Machanidas, as he was hovering with his army on the Argive frontier. The Boeotians, who were afraid of the enemy's fleet, begged for a commander and for succour, but the inhabitants of Euboea were the most energetic of all in their instances to Philip to take precautions against the enemy. The Acarnanians made the same request, and there was also an embassy from Epirus. Information had been received that Scerdilaïdas and Pleuratus were setting their forces in motion, and also that the Thracians on the Macedonian frontier, and especially the Maedi, intended to invade Macedonia if the king were drawn away however so little from his native country. The Aetolians also had occupied the pass of Thermopylae, fortifying it with a palisade and trench and strongly garrisoning it, feeling sure that they thus shut out 209-210 B.C.

καθόλου κωλύειν παραβοηθεῖν τοῖς ἐντὸς Πυλῶν
6 συμμάχοις. δοκεῖ δέ μοι τὰς τοιαύτας περιστάσεις
εὐλόγως ἄν τις ἐπισημήνασθαι καὶ συνεφιστάνειν
τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας, ἐν αἷς πεῖρα καὶ βάσανος
ἀληθινὴ γίνεται κατὰ τάς ‹τε ψυχικὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ
7 τὰς› σωματικὰς δυνάμεις τῶν ἡγεμόνων. καθάπερ
‹γὰρ› ἐν ταῖς κυνηγεσίαις τὰ ζῷα τότε διάδηλα
γίνεται κατὰ τὴν ἀλκὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ὅταν τὸ
δεινὸν αὐτὰ περιστῇ πανταχόθεν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων. ὃ δὴ τότε
μάλιστα συνιδεῖν ἦν γινόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου·
8 τὰς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβείας ἀπέλυσε πάσας, ἑκάστοις
τὰ δυνατὰ ποιήσειν ἐπαγγειλάμενος, τῷ ‹δὲ›
πολέμῳ πανταχόθεν ἐπεῖχε, καραδοκῶν πῇ καὶ
πρὸς τίνα πρῶτον δεήσει ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὁρμήν.
42 προσπεσόντος δ' αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον
τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄτταλον διάραντας καὶ προσορμή-
σαντας τῇ Πεπαρήθῳ κατεσχηκέναι τὴν χώραν,
τούτοις μὲν ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς παραφυλάξοντας
2 τὴν πόλιν, εἰς δὲ Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Βοιω-
τίαν τόπους Πολυφάνταν ἐξέπεμψε μετὰ συμ-
μέτρου δυνάμεως, εἰς δὲ Χαλκίδα καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
Εὔβοιαν Μένιππον, ἔχοντα πελταστὰς χιλίους,
3 Ἀγριᾶνας πεντακοσίους. αὐτὸς δὲ προῆγε ποιού-
μενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς Σκοτοῦσαν, παραπλησίως
δὲ καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν εἰς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν παρ-
4 ἤγγειλεν ἀπαντᾶν. πυθόμενος δὲ τοὺς περὶ τὸν
Ἄτταλον εἰς Νίκαιαν καταπεπλευκέναι, τῶν δ'
Αἰτωλῶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀθροίζεσθαι
χάριν τοῦ κοινολογηθῆναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ
τῶν ἐνεστώτων, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς
Σκοτούσης ὥρμησε σπεύδων καταταχῆσαι καὶ

Philip and prevented him from coming to help his allies beyond the pass. It seems to me that it is only reasonable to bring into relief and prominently before the eyes of my readers those occasions on which the mental and physical capacities of commanders are really tried and put to the test. For just as in the chase the courage and power of wild beasts is then fully revealed, when they are exposed to danger on all sides, so is it with commanders, as was manifest then from Philip's action. He dismissed all the embassies after promising each to do what was in his power and devoted his whole attention to the war, waiting to see in what direction and against whom in the first place he should act. 42. Upon news reaching him at this time that Attalus had crossed and anchored off Peparethus and occupied its country districts, he dispatched a force to protect the town against them; to Phocis and Boeotia and that neighbourhood he sent Polyphantus with an adequate number of troops, and to Calchis and the rest of Euboea Menippus with a thousand peltasts and five hundred Agrianians; he himself marched upon Scotusa, and ordered the Macedonians also to meet him at that town. Hearing now that Attalus had sailed back to Nicaea and that the Aetolian magistrates were about to meet at Heraclea to discuss the situation, he took the force he had with him from Scotusa and made for Heraclea with the object of arriving in time to frighten and disperse

πτοήσας διασῦραι τὴν σύνοδον αὐτῶν. τοῦ μὲν οὖν συλλόγου καθυστέρει, τὸν δὲ σῖτον φθείρας καὶ παρελόμενος τῶν περὶ τὸν Αἰνιᾶνα κόλπον κατοικούντων ἐπανῆλθε. καὶ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐν τῇ Σκοτούσῃ πάλιν ἀπέλειπε, μετὰ δὲ τῶν εὐζώνων καὶ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἴλης εἰς Δημητριάδα καταλύσας ἔμενε, καραδοκῶν ‹τὰς› τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιβολάς. ἵνα δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸν λανθάνῃ τῶν πραττομένων, διεπέμψατο πρὸς Πεπαρηθίους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς Φωκίδος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς Εὐβοίας, καὶ παρήγγειλε διασαφεῖν αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα διὰ τῶν πυρσῶν ἐπὶ τὸ Τίσαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῆς Θετταλίας ὄρος, εὐφυῶς κείμενον πρὸς τὰς τῶν προειρημένων τόπων περιφάσεις.

43 Τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὰς πυρσείας γένους, μεγίστας δὴ παρεχομένου χρείας ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἀνεργάστου πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος, χρήσιμον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ μὴ παραδραμεῖν, ἀλλὰ ποιήσασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν μνήμην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ καιρὸς ἐν πᾶσι μεγάλην ἔχει μερίδα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολάς, μεγίστην δ' ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, παντὶ δῆλον· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο συναγωνισμάτων πλείστην ἔχουσι δύναμιν οἱ πυρσοί. ‹δηλοῦσι γὰρ› τίνα μὲν ἄρτι γέγονε, τινὰ δ' ἀκμὴν ἐνεργεῖται, καὶ δυνατόν ἐστι γινώσκειν, ᾧ μέλει, ποτὲ μὲν ἡμερῶν τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ὁδὸν ἀπέχοντι, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλειόνων. ὥστ' ἀεὶ τοῖς δεομένοις πράγμασιν ἐπικουρίας παράδοξον γίνεσθαι τὴν βοήθειαν διὰ τῆς τῶν πυρσῶν ἀπαγγελίας. τὸν μὲν ‹οὖν› πρὸ τούτου χρόνον ἁπλῆς γινομένης τῆς πυρσείας κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτὴν ἀνωφελῆ

their meeting. He arrived too late for the meeting, but after destroying or carrying off the crops of the inhabitants round the Gulf of Aenus, he returned. Leaving his main force again in Scotusa he halted and remained at Demetrias with the royal troop of horse and his light-armed troops, waiting for the enemy to reveal their plans. So that nothing that was going on should escape his notice he sent to the Peparethians, and to his commanders in Phocis and Boeotia, ordering them to inform him of everything by fire-signals direct to Mount Tisaeus, a mountain in Thessaly favourably situated for commanding a view of the above places.

Fire-Signalling

43. I think that as regards the system of signalling by fire, which is now of the greatest possible service in war but was formerly undeveloped, it will be of use not to pass it over but to give it a proper discussion. It is evident to all that in every matter, and especially in warfare, the power of acting at the right time contributes very much to the success of enterprises, and fire-signals are the most efficient of all the devices which aid us to do this. For they show what has recently occurred and what is still in the course of being done, and by means of them anyone who cares to do so even if he is at a distance of three, four, or even more days' journey can be informed. So that it is always surprising how help can be brought by means of fire messages when the situation requires it. Now in former times, as fire-signals were simple beacons, they were for the most part of little use

6 συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τοῖς χρωμένοις. διὰ γὰρ συνθημάτων ὡρισμένων ἔδει τὴν χρείαν συντελεῖν· τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων ἀορίστων ὑπαρχόντων τὰ πλεῖστα διέφυγε τὴν τῶν πυρσῶν χρείαν, οἷον ἐπ' αὐτῶν
7 τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰς Ὠρεὸν καὶ Πεπάρηθον ἢ Χαλκίδα πάρεστι στόλος, δυνατὸν
8 ἦν διασαφεῖν τοῖς περὶ τούτου συνθεμένοις· ὅτι δὲ μεταβάλλονταί τινες τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ προδιδόασιν, ἢ φόνος ἐν τῇ πόλει γέγονεν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ δὴ συμβαίνει μὲν πολλάκις, πρόληψιν δ' ἔχειν
9 πάντων ἀδύνατον—μάλιστα δὲ τὰ παραδόξως γινόμενα τῆς ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ συμβουλίας καὶ ἐπικουρίας προσδεῖται—τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα διέφυγε τὴν τῶν
10 πυρσῶν χρείαν. περὶ ὧν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνεδέχετο προνοηθῆναι, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲ σύνθημα ποιήσασθαι δυνατόν.

44 Αἰνείας δὲ βουληθεὶς διορθώσασθαι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν, ὁ τὰ περὶ τῶν Στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα συντεταγμένος, βραχὺ μέν τι προεβίβασε, τοῦ γε μὴν δέοντος ἀκμὴν πάμπολυ τὸ κατὰ τὴν
2 ἐπίνοιαν ἀπελείφθη. γνοίη δ' ἄν τις ἐκ τούτων. φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀλλήλοις διὰ τῶν πυρσῶν δηλοῦν τὸ κατεπεῖγον ἀγγεῖα κατασκευάσαι κεραμεᾶ, κατά τε τὸ πλάτος καὶ κατὰ τὸ βάθος ἰσομεγέθη πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν· εἶναι δὲ μάλιστα τὸ μὲν
3 βάθος τριῶν πηχῶν, τὸ δὲ πλάτος πήχεος. εἶτα παρασκευάσαι φελλοὺς βραχὺ κατὰ πλάτος ἐνδεεῖς τῶν στομάτων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις μέσοις ἐμπεπηγέναι ‹βακτηρίας διηρημένας εἰς› ἴσα μέρη τριδάκτυλα, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ μέρος εἶναι περιγραφὴν εὔσημον.
4 ἐν ἑκάστῳ δὲ μέρει γεγράφθαι τὰ προφανέστατα καὶ καθολικώτατα τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς συμ-

to those who used them. For the service should have been performed by signals previously determined upon, and as facts are indefinite, most of them defied communication by fire-signals. To take the case I just mentioned, it was possible for those who had agreed on this to convey information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus, Peparethus, or Chalcis, but when it came to some of the citizens having changed sides or having been guilty of treachery or a massacre having taken place in the town, or anything of the kind, things that often happen, but cannot all be foreseen—and it is chiefly unexpected occurrences which require instant consideration and help—all such matters defied communication by fire-signal. For it was quite impossible to have a preconcerted code for things which there was no means of foretelling.

44. Aeneas, the author of the work on strategy, wishing to find a remedy for the difficulty, advanced matters a little, but his device still fell far short of our requirements, as can be seen from this description of it. He says that those who are about to communicate urgent news to each other by fire-signal should procure two earthenware vessels of exactly the same width and depth, the depth being some three cubits and the width one. Then they should have corks made a little narrower than the mouths of the vessels and through the middle of each cork should pass a rod graduated in equal sections of three fingerbreadths, each clearly marked off from the next. In each section should be written the most evident and ordinary events that occur in war,

5 βαινόντων, οἷον εὐθέως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, διότι "πάρ-
εισιν ἱππεῖς εἰς τὴν χώραν," ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ δι-
6 ότι "πεζοὶ βαρεῖς," ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ "ψιλοί," τού-
των δ' ἑξῆς "πεζοὶ μεθ' ἱππέων," εἶτα "πλοῖα,"
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα "σῖτος," ‹καὶ› κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς
οὕτω, μέχρις ἂν ἐν πάσαις γραφῇ ταῖς χώραις
τὰ μάλιστ' ἂν ἐκ τῶν εὐλόγων προνοίας τυγχά-
νοντα καὶ συμβαίνοντα κατὰ τοὺς ἐνεστῶτας καιρούς
7 ἐκ τῶν πολεμικῶν. τούτων δὲ γενομένων
ἀμφότερα κελεύει τρῆσαι τὰ ἀγγεῖα πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν,
ὥστε τοὺς αὐλίσκους ἴσους εἶναι καὶ κατ' ἴσον
ἀπορρεῖν· εἶτα πληρώσαντας ὕδατος ἐπιθεῖναι
τοὺς φελλοὺς ἔχοντας ‹τὰς› βακτηρίας, κἄπειτα
8 τοὺς αὐλίσκους ἀφεῖναι ῥεῖν ἅμα. τούτου δὲ
συμβαίνοντος δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη πάντων ἴσων
καὶ ὁμοίων ὄντων, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἀπορρέῃ τὸ ὑγρόν,
κατὰ τοσοῦτον τοὺς φελλοὺς καταβαίνειν καὶ τὰς
9 βακτηρίας κρύπτεσθαι κατὰ τῶν ἀγγείων. ὅταν
δὲ τὰ προειρημένα γένηται κατὰ τὸν χειρισμὸν
ἰσοταχῆ καὶ σύμφωνα, τότε κομίσαντας ἐπὶ τοὺς
τόπους, ἐν οἷς ἑκάτεροι μέλλουσι συντηρεῖν τὰς
10 πυρσείας, ἑκάτερον θεῖναι τῶν ἀγγείων. εἶτ'
ἐπὰν ἐμπέσῃ τι τῶν ἐν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ γεγραμμένων,
πυρσὸν ἆραι κελεύει, καὶ μένειν, ἕως ἂν ἀνταίρωσιν
οἱ συντεταγμένοι· γενομένων δὲ φανερῶν ἀμφο-
τέρων ἅμα τῶν πυρσῶν καθελεῖν. εἶτ' εὐθέως
11 ἀφεῖναι τοὺς αὐλίσκους ῥεῖν. ὅταν δὲ κατα-
βαίνοντος τοῦ φελλοῦ καὶ τῆς βακτηρίας ἔλθῃ τῶν
γεγραμμένων ὃ βούλει δηλοῦν κατὰ τὸ χεῖλος τοῦ
12 τεύχους, ἆραι κελεύει τὸν πυρσόν· τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους
ἐπιλαβεῖν εὐθέως τὸν αὐλίσκον, καὶ σκοπεῖν τί
κατὰ τὸ χεῖλός ἐστι τῶν ἐν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ γεγραμ-

e.g. on the first "Cavalry arrived in the country," on the second "Heavy infantry," on the third "Light-armed infantry," next "Infantry and cavalry," next "Ships," next "Corn," and so on until we have entered in all the sections the chief contingencies of which, at the present time, there is a reasonable probability in war time. Next he tells us to bore holes in both vessels of exactly the same size, so that they allow exactly the same escape. Then we are to fill the vessels with water and put on the corks with the rods in them and allow the water to flow through the two apertures. When this is done it is evident that, the conditions being precisely similar, in proportion as the water escapes the two corks will sink and the rods will disappear into the vessels. When by experiment it is seen that the rapidity of escape is in both cases exactly the same, the vessels are to be conveyed to the places in which both parties are to look after the signals and deposited there. Now whenever any of the contingencies written on the rods occurs he tells us to raise a torch and to wait until the corresponding party raise another. When both the torches are clearly visible the signaller is to lower his torch and at once allow the water to escape through the aperture. Whenever, as the corks sink, the contingency you wish to communicate reaches the mouth of the vessel he tells the signaller to raise his torch and the receivers of the signal are to stop the aperture at once and to note which of the messages written on the rods is at the mouth of the vessel. This will be

13 μένων· ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο τὸ δηλούμενον πάντων ἰσοταχῶς παρ' ἀμφοτέροις κινουμένων.

45 Ταῦτα δὲ βραχὺ μέν τι τῆς διὰ τῶν συνθημάτων πυρσείας ἐξήλλαχεν, ἀκμὴν δ' ἐστὶν ἀόριστα. 2 δῆλον γὰρ [ἔσται] ὡς οὔτε προϊδέσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα πάντα δυνατὸν οὔτε προϊδόμενον εἰς τὴν βακτηρίαν γράψαι· λοιπὸν ὁπόταν ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ἀνυπονόητά τινα συμβαίνῃ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐ δύναται δηλοῦσθαι 3 κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπίνοιαν. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ γεγραμμένων οὐδέν ἐστιν ὡρισμένον. πόσοι γὰρ ἥκουσιν ἱππεῖς ἢ πόσοι πεζοὶ καὶ ποῦ τῆς χώρας καὶ πόσαι νῆες καὶ πόσος 4 σῖτος, οὐχ οἷόν τε διασαφῆσαι· περὶ γὰρ ὧν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ τούτων 5 οὐδὲ συνθέσθαι πρὸ τοῦ δυνατόν. τὸ δὲ συνέχον ἐστὶ τοῦτο· πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις βουλεύσαιτο περὶ τοῦ βοηθεῖν μὴ γινώσκων πόσοι πάρεισι τῶν πολεμίων ἢ ποῦ; πῶς δὲ θαρρήσαι πάλιν ἢ τοὐναντίον ἢ καθόλου διανοηθείη τι μὴ συνεὶς πόσαι νῆες ἢ πόσος σῖτος ἥκει παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων;

6 Ὁ δὲ τελευταῖος ‹τρόπος›, ἐπινοηθεὶς διὰ Κλεοξένου καὶ Δημοκλείτου, τυχὼν δὲ τῆς ἐξεργασίας δι' ἡμῶν, ‹πάντη πάντως› μέν ἐστιν ὡρισμένος καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατεπεῖγον δυνάμενος ἀκριβῶς διασαφεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν χειρισμὸν ἐπιμελείας δεῖ καὶ παρα- 7 τηρήσεως ἀκριβεστέρας. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος. τὸ τῶν στοιχείων πλῆθος ἑξῆς δεῖ λαμβάνοντας διελεῖν εἰς πέντε μέρη κατὰ πέντε γράμματα. λείψει δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον ἑνὶ στοιχείῳ· τοῦτο δ' οὐ 8 βλάπτει πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πλατεῖα παρεσκευάσθαι πέντε τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πυρσείαν ἀλλήλοις ἑκατέρους καὶ γράψαι τῶν

the message delivered, if the apparatus works at the same pace in both cases.

45. This is a slight advance on beacons with a preconcerted code, but it is still quite indefinite. For it is evident that it is neither possible to foresee all contingencies, or even if one did to write them on the rod. So that when circumstances produce some unexpected event, it is evident that it cannot be conveyed by this plan. Again none of the things written on the rod are defined statements, for it is impossible to indicate how many infantry are coming and to what part of the country, or how many ships or how much corn. For it is impossible to agree beforehand about things of which one cannot be aware before they happen. And this is the vital matter ; for how can anyone consider how to render assistance if he does not know how many of the enemy have arrived, or where ? And how can anyone be of good cheer or the reverse, or in fact think of anything at all, if he does not understand how many ships or how much corn has arrived from the allies ?

The most recent method, devised by Cleoxenus and Democleitus and perfected by myself, is quite definite and capable of dispatching with accuracy every kind of urgent messages, but in practice it requires care and exact attention. It is as follows : We take the alphabet and divide it into five parts, each consisting of five letters. There is one letter less in the last division, but this makes no practical difference. Each of the two parties who are about to signal to each other must now get ready five

μερῶν ἐξῆς εἰς ἕκαστον πλατεῖον, κἄπειτα συν-
θέσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς διότι τοὺς μὲν πρώτους ἀρεῖ
πυρσοὺς ὁ μέλλων σημαίνειν ἅμα καὶ δύο καὶ
μενεῖ μέχρις ἂν ὁ ἕτερος ἀνταίρῃ. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται
χάριν τοῦ διὰ ταύτης τῆς πυρσείας ἑαυτοῖς ἀνθ-
ομολογήσασθαι διότι προσέχουσι. καθαιρεθέντων
δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν ‹ὁ› σημαίνων ἀρεῖ μὲν τοὺς
πρώτους ἐκ τῶν εὐωνύμων, διασαφῶν τὸ πλατεῖον
ποῖον δεήσει σκοπεῖν, οἷον ἐὰν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον,
ἕν', ἂν δὲ τὸ δεύτερον, δύο, καὶ κατὰ λόγον οὕτω·
τοὺς δὲ δευτέρους ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον, ποῖον δεήσει γράμμα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πλατείου
γράφειν αὖ τὸν ἀποδεχόμενον τὴν πυρσείαν.

46 Ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα συνθέμενοι χωρισθῶσιν, ἑκάτερον
ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου δεήσει πρῶτον μὲν διόπτραν ἔχειν
δύ' αὐλίσκους ἔχουσαν, ὥστε τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀντιπυρ-
σεύειν τῷ μὲν τὸν δεξιὸν τόπον, τῷ δὲ τὸν εὐώνυ-
μον δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν. παρὰ δὲ τὴν διόπτραν
ἐξῆς ὀρθὰ δεῖ τὰ πλατεῖα πεπηγέναι, παραπεφρά-
χθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν δεξιὸν καὶ τὸν εὐώνυμον τόπον
ἐπὶ δέκα πόδας, τὸ δὲ βάθος ὡς ἀνδρόμηκες,
‹εἰς› τὸ τοὺς πυρσοὺς αἰρομένους μὲν παρὰ ταῦτα
τὴν φάσιν ἀκριβῆ ποιεῖν, καθαιρουμένους δὲ τὴν
κρύψιν. τούτων δ' ἑτοιμασθέντων παρ' ἀμφοτέ-
ροις, ὅταν βούλῃ δηλῶσαι λόγου χάριν διότι "τῶν
στρατιωτῶν τινες εἰς ἑκατὸν ἀποκεχωρήκασι πρὸς
τοὺς ὑπεναντίους," πρῶτον δεῖ διαλέξαι τῶν
λέξεων, ὅσαι δι' ἐλαχίστων γραμμάτων δύνανται
ταὐτὸ δηλοῦν, οἷον ἀντὶ τοῦ προειρημένου "Κρῆτες
ἑκατὸν ἀφ' ἡμῶν ηὐτομόλησαν." νῦν γὰρ τὰ μὲν

tablets and write one division of the alphabet on each tablet, and then come to an agreement that the man who is going to signal is in the first place to raise two torches and wait until the other replies by doing the same. This is for the purpose of conveying to each other that they are both at attention. These torches having been lowered the dispatcher of the message will now raise the first set of torches on the left side indicating which tablet is to be consulted, *i.e.* one torch if it is the first, two if it is the second, and so on. Next he will raise the second set on the right on the same principle to indicate what letter of the tablet the receiver should write down.

46. Upon their separating after coming to this understanding each of them must first have on the spot a telescope [a] with two tubes, so that with the one he can observe the space on the right of the man who is going to signal back and with the other that on the left. The tablets must be set straight up in order next the telescope, and there must be a screen before both spaces, as well the right as the left, ten feet in length and of the height of a man so that by this means the torches may be seen distinctly when raised and disappear when lowered. When all has been thus got ready on both sides, if the signaller wants to convey, for instance, that about a hundred of the soldiers have deserted to the enemy, he must first of all choose words which will convey what he means in the smallest number of letters, *e.g.* instead of the above "Cretans a hundred deserted us," for thus

[a] The instrument did not, of course, magnify but merely limited the area of vision.

γράμματ' ἐστὶν ἐλάττω τῶν ἡμίσεων, διασαφεῖται
6 δὲ ταὐτόν. τούτου δὲ γραφέντος εἰς πινάκιον,
οὕτω δηλωθήσεται τοῖς πυρσοῖς. πρῶτον δ' ἐστὶ
7 γράμμα τὸ κάππα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ
μερίδι καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ πλατείῳ. δεήσει δὲ καὶ
πυρσοὺς ἐκ τῶν εὐωνύμων δύ' αἴρειν, ὥστε τὸν
ἀποδεχόμενον γινώσκειν ὅτι δεῖ τὸ δεύτερον πλα-
8 τεῖον ἐπισκοπεῖν. εἶτ' ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν ἀρεῖ πέντε,
διασαφῶν ὅτι κάππα· τοῦτο γὰρ πέμπτον ἐστὶ
τῆς δευτέρας μερίδος, ὃ δεήσει γράφειν εἰς τὸ
9 πινάκιον τὸν ἀποδεχόμενον τοὺς πυρσούς. ‹εἶτα
τέτταρας ἐκ τῶν εὐωνύμων, ἐπεὶ› τὸ ῥῶ τῆς
τετάρτης ἐστὶ μερίδος. εἶτα δύο πάλιν ἐκ τῶν
δεξιῶν· δεύτερον ‹γάρ› ἐστι τῆς τετάρτης. ἐξ
οὗ τὸ ῥῶ γράφει [ὁ δεχόμενος τοὺς πυρσούς]·
10 καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. προδηλοῦται μὲν
οὖν πᾶν τὸ προσπῖπτον ὡρισμένως κατὰ ταύτην
47 τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, πολλοὶ δὲ γίνονθ' οἱ πυρσοὶ διὰ τὸ
δεῖν ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου γράμματος διττὰς ποιεῖσθαι
2 τὰς πυρσείας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐάν τις εὐτρεπῆ ποιήσῃ
τὰ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, δύναται γίνεσθαι τὸ δέον.
3 καθ' ἑκατέραν δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν προμελετᾶν δεῖ
τοὺς χειρίζοντας, ἵνα τῆς χρείας γινομένης ἀδια-
4 πτώτως δύνωνται διασαφεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πηλίκην
δὲ συμβαίνει φαίνεσθαι τὴν διαφορὰν ἐπὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν πραγμάτων πρῶτον λεγομένων καὶ πάλιν
κατὰ συνήθειαν γινομένων, ἐκ πολλῶν εὐχερὲς
5 τῷ βουλομένῳ καταμαθεῖν. πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ μόνον
τῶν δυσχερῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι
δοκούντων κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς, μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνου
καὶ συνηθείας τυχόντα ῥᾷστα πάντων ἐπιτελεῖται.
6 τοῦ δὲ τοιούτου λόγου παραδείγματα μὲν πολλὰ

the letters are less than one half in number, but the same sense is conveyed. Having jotted this down on a writing-tablet he will communicate it by the torches as follows : The first letter is *kappa*. This being in the second division is on tablet number two, and, therefore, he must raise two torches on the left, so that the receiver may know that he has to consult the second tablet. He will now raise five torches on the right, to indicate that it is *kappa*, this being the fifth letter in the second division, and the receiver of the signal will note this down on his writing tablet. The dispatcher will then raise four torches on the left as *rho* belongs to the fourth division, and then two on the right, *rho* being the second letter in this division. The receiver writes down *rho* and so forth. This device enables any news to be definitely conveyed. 47. Many torches, of course, are required, as the signal for each letter is a double one. But if all is properly prepared for the purpose, what is required can be done whichever system we follow. Those engaged in the work must have had proper practice, so that when it comes to putting it in action they may communicate with each other without the possibility of a mistake. From many instances it is easy for all who wish it to learn how great the difference is between the same thing when it is first heard of and when it has become a matter of habit. For many things which appear at the beginning to be not only difficult but impossible are performed quite easily after time and practice. There are many other examples which

καὶ ἕτερα πρὸς πίστιν, ἐναργέστατον δὲ τὸ γινό-
7 μενον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως. ἐπὶ γὰρ ἐκείνης, εἴ
τις παραστησάμενος ἄνθρωπον ἄπειρον μὲν καὶ
ἀσυνήθη γραμματικῆς, τἄλλα δ' ἀγχίνουν, κἄπειτα
παιδάριον ἔξιν ἔχον παραστήσας καὶ δοὺς βυβλίον
8 κελεύοι λέγειν τὰ γεγραμμένα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν
δύναιτο πιστεῦσαι διότι ‹δεῖ› πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὰς
ὄψεις τὰς ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν γραμμάτων ἐπιστῆσαι
τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα, δεύτερον ἐπὶ τὰς δυνάμεις,
τρίτον ἐπὶ τὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλοκάς, ὧν ἕκαστον
9 ποσοῦ χρόνου τινὸς δεῖται. διόπερ ὅταν ἀνεπιστά-
τως θεωρῇ τὸ παιδάριον ὑπὸ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν ἑπτὰ
καὶ πέντε στίχους συνεῖρον, οὐκ ἂν εὐχερῶς δύναιτο
πιστεῦσαι διότι πρότερον οὗτος οὐκ ἀνέγνωκε τὸ
10 βυβλίον· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν καὶ τὰς διαιρέσεις,
ἔτι δὲ δασύτητας καὶ ψιλότητας δύναιτο συσσώζειν,
11 οὐδὲ τελέως. διόπερ οὐκ ἀποστατέον οὐδενὸς
τῶν χρησίμων διὰ τὰς προφαινομένας δυσχερείας,
προσακτέον δὲ τὴν ἕξιν, ᾗ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίνεται
θηρατὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ τῶν
τοιούτων, ἐν οἷς πολλάκις κεῖται τὸ συνέχον τῆς
σωτηρίας.
12 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαγγελίαν
προήχθημεν εἰπεῖν. ἔφαμεν γὰρ πάντα τὰ θεωρή-
ματα καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰληφέναι τὰς προ-
κοπάς, ὥστε τῶν πλείστων τρόπον τινὰ μεθοδικὰς
13 εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο γίνεται τῆς
δεόντως ἱστορίας συντεταγμένης ὠφελιμώτατον.

confirm this, but the clearest of all is the case of reading. Here if we put side by side a man who is ignorant and unpractised in letters, but generally intelligent, and a boy who is accustomed to read, give the boy a book and order him to read it, the man will plainly not be able to believe that a reader must first of all pay attention to the form of each letter, then to its sound-value, next to the combinations of the different letters, each of which things requires a considerable amount of time. So when he sees that the boy without hesitation reels off five or seven lines in a breath he will not find it easy to believe that he never read the book before, and he will absolutely refuse to believe this if the reader should be able to observe the action, the pauses, and the rough and smooth breathings. We should not, therefore, abandon anything useful owing to the difficulties which show themselves at the outset, but we must call in the aid of habit, through which all good things fall into the hands of men, and more especially when the matter is one on which our preservation mainly depends.

In offering these observations I am acting up to the promise I originally made at the outset of this work. For I stated that in our time all arts and sciences have so much advanced that knowledge of most of them may be said to have been reduced to a system. This is, then, one of the most useful parts of a history properly written.

VIII. Res Asiae

48 Οἱ δ' Ἀπασιάκαι κατοικοῦσι μὲν ἀνὰ μέσον
Ὄξου καὶ Τανάιδος, ὧν ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν Ὑρκανίαν
ἐμβάλλει θάλατταν, ὁ δὲ Τάναϊς ἐξίησιν εἰς τὴν
Μαιῶτιν λίμνην· εἰσὶ δ' ἑκάτεροι κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος
2 πλωτοί. καὶ δοκεῖ θαυμαστὸν εἶναι πῶς οἱ
Νομάδες περαιούμενοι τὸν Ὄξον εἰς τὴν Ὑρκανίαν
3 ἔρχονται πεζῇ μετὰ τῶν ἵππων. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο
λόγοι περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ μὲν ἐπιεικής,
4 ὁ δ' ἕτερος παράδοξος, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατος. ὁ γὰρ
Ὄξος ἔχει μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Καυκάσου τὰς πηγάς, ἐπὶ
πολὺ δ' αὐξηθεὶς ἐν τῇ Βακτριανῇ, συρρεόντων
εἰς αὐτὸν ὑδάτων, φέρεται διὰ πεδιάδος χώρας
5 πολλῷ καὶ θολερῷ ῥεύματι. παραγενόμενος δ'
εἰς τὴν ἔρημον ἐπί τινας πέτρας ἀπορρῶγας
ἐξωθεῖ τὸ ῥεῦμα τῇ βίᾳ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν
καταφορὰν τῶν ὑπερκειμένων τόπων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
ὥστε τῆς πέτρας ἐν τοῖς κάτω μέρεσι πλεῖον ἢ
6 στάδιον ἀφάλλεσθαι τὴν καταφορὰν αὐτοῦ. διὰ
δὴ τούτου τοῦ τόπου φασὶ τοὺς Ἀπασιάκας παρ'
αὐτὴν τὴν πέτραν ὑπὸ τὴν καταφορὰν τοῦ ποτα-
μοῦ πεζεύειν μετὰ τῶν ἵππων εἰς τὴν Ὑρκανίαν.
7 ὁ δ' ἕτερος λόγος ἐπιεικεστέραν ἔχει τοῦ πρόσθεν
τὴν ἀπόφασιν. τοῦ γὰρ ὑποκειμένου τόπου με-
γάλους ἔχοντος πλαταμῶνας, εἰς οὓς καταρράττει,
τούτους φασὶ τῇ βίᾳ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκκοιλαίνοντα
καὶ διαρρηγνύντα κατὰ βάθος ὑπὸ γῆν φέρεσθαι
8 τόπον οὐ πολύν, εἶτ' ἀναφαίνεσθαι πάλιν. τοὺς
δὲ βαρβάρους διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν κατὰ τὸν δια-

VIII. Affairs of Asia

The River Oxus

48. The Apasiacae inhabit the district between the Oxus and Tanaïs, the former of which rivers falls into the Hyrcanian Sea, while the Tanaïs falls into the Palus Maeotis. Both are large enough to be navigable, and it is considered marvellous how the nomads passing the Oxus on foot with their horses reach Hyrcania. There are two stories regarding this, one reasonably probable and the other very surprising, but yet not impossible. The Oxus, I should say, rises in the Caucasus, but in traversing Bactria greatly increases in volume owing to the number of tributaries it receives, and henceforth runs through the plain with a strong and turbid current. Reaching in the desert a certain precipice it projects its stream, owing to the volume of the current and the height of the fall, so far from the crest of the cataract that in falling it leaps to a distance of more than a stade from the bottom of the precipice. It is in this place that they say the Apasiacae pass dry-shod with their horses to Hyrcania, skirting the precipice under the waterfall. There is more reasonable probability in the second account than in the first. They say there are at the foot of the cataract large slabs of rock on which the river falls, and by the force of the current hollows out and pierces these rocks for some depth and flows underground for a short distance, after which it comes to the surface again. The barbarians are acquainted with this and cross to Hyrcania with

λείποντα τόπον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν δίοδον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων εἰς τὴν Ὑρκανίαν. . . .

49 Γενομένης δὲ τῆς προσαγγελίας διότι συμβαίνει τὸν μὲν Εὐθύδημον μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἶναι περὶ Ταπουρίαν, μυρίους δ' ἱππεῖς προκαθίζεσθαι φυλάττοντας ‹τὰς› περὶ τὸν Ἄριον ποταμὸν διαβάσεις, ἔκρινε τὴν πολιορκίαν ἀπογνοὺς ἔχεσθαι τῶν
2 προκειμένων. ἀπέχοντος δὲ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, ἐπὶ μὲν ἡμέρας δύο σύμμετρον ἐποιήσατο τὴν πορείαν, τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ μετὰ τὸ δειπνῆσαι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ ποιεῖσθαι
3 παρήγγειλε τὴν ἀναζυγήν, αὐτὸς δ' ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, ἅμα δὲ πελταστὰς μυρίους, προῆγε νυκτός, πορείᾳ χρώμενος ἐνεργῷ.
4 τοὺς γὰρ ἱππεῖς ἐπυνθάνετο τῶν ὑπεναντίων τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐφεδρεύειν παρὰ τὸ χεῖλος τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὰς δὲ νύκτας ὑποχωρεῖν πρός τινα πόλιν οὐκ ἔλαττον εἴκοσι σταδίων ‹διέχουσαν›. διανύσας δὲ νύκτωρ τὴν καταλειπομένην ὁδόν,
5 ἅτε τῶν πεδίων ἱππασίμων ὑπαρχόντων, ἔφθασε περαιώσας τὸν ποταμὸν ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τὸ πλεῖστον
6 μέρος τῆς μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βακτριανῶν ἱππεῖς, σημηνάντων αὐτοῖς τῶν σκοπῶν τὸ γεγονός, ἐξεβοήθουν, καὶ κατὰ πορείαν
7 συνέμισγον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς, θεωρῶν ὅτι δεῖ δέξασθαι τὴν πρώτην ἐπιφορὰν τῶν πολεμίων, παρακαλέσας τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν εἰθισμένους κινδυνεύειν τῶν ἱππέων δισχιλίους, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις παρήγγειλε κατὰ σημαίας καὶ κατ' οὐλαμοὺς αὐτοῦ παρεμβαλεῖν καὶ λαμβάνειν ἑκά-
8 στους τὰς εἰθισμένας τάξεις, αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἱππέων ἀπαντήσας συνέβαλε τοῖς

their horses at the place where the river thus interrupts its course.

Campaign of Antiochus in Bactria

49. When the news came that Euthydemus with his army was before Tapuria, and that ten thousand cavalry were in his front guarding the ford of the river Arius, Antiochus decided to abandon the siege and deal with the situation. The river being at a distance of three days' march, he marched at a moderate pace for two days, but on the third day he ordered the rest of his army to break up their camp at daylight while he himself with his cavalry, his light-armed infantry, and ten thousand peltasts advanced during the night marching quickly. For he had heard that the enemy's horse kept guard during the day on the river bank, but retired at night to a town as much as twenty stades away. Having completed the remainder of the distance during the night, as the plain is easy to ride over, he succeeded in getting the greater part of his forces across the river by daylight. The Bactrian cavalry, when their scouts had reported this, came up to attack and engaged the enemy while still on the march. The king, seeing that it was necessary to stand the first charge of the enemy, called on two thousand of his cavalry who were accustomed to fight round him and ordered the rest to form up on the spot in squadrons and troops and all place themselves in their usual order, while he himself with the force I spoke of met and engaged the 208 B.C.

9 πρώτοις ἐπιφερομένοις τῶν Βάκτρων. δοκεῖ δὲ
κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον Ἀντίοχος ἀγωνίσασθαι
10 διαπρεπέστατα τῶν μεθ' αὑτοῦ. πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν
ἀμφοτέρων διεφθάρησαν, ἐπεκράτησαν δὲ τῆς
πρώτης ἱππαρχίας οἱ μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως· τῆς
δὲ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτης ἐπιφερομένης ἐπιέζοντο
11 καὶ κακῶς ἀπήλλαττον. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν
τοῦτον, τῶν πλείστων ἱππέων ἐκτεταγμένων ἤδη,
Παναίτωλος ἐπαγαγεῖν παραγγείλας τὸν μὲν
βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ κινδυνεύοντας ἐδέξατο,
τοὺς δὲ τῶν Βακτριανῶν ἐπιφερομένους ἀτάκτως ἐκ
12 μεταβολῆς προτροπάδην ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι
μὲν οὖν, τῶν περὶ τὸν Παναίτωλον αὐτοῖς ἐπι-
κειμένων, οὐ πρότερον ἔστησαν ἕως οὗ συνέμιξαν
τοῖς περὶ τὸν Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς πλείστους ἀπ-
13 ολωλεκότες αὐτῶν· οἱ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ἱππεῖς,
πολλοὺς μὲν φονεύσαντες, πολλοὺς ‹δὲ› ζωγρίᾳ
λαβόντες, ἀνεχώρουν. καὶ τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ παρὰ
14 τὸν ποταμὸν ηὐλίσθησαν· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ κινδύνῳ
τὸν μὲν ἵππον συμβαίνει . . . ἀποθανεῖν τραυ-
ματισθέντα . . . , αὐτὸν δὲ πληγέντα διὰ τοῦ
στόματος ἀποβαλεῖν τινας τῶν ὀδόντων, καθόλου
δὲ φήμην ἐπ' ἀνδρείᾳ περιποιήσασθαι τότε μάλιστα.
15 γενομένης δὲ τῆς μάχης ταύτης ὁ μὲν Εὐθύδημος
καταπλαγεὶς ἀνεχώρησε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς
πόλιν Ζαριάσπαν τῆς Βακτριανῆς.

Bactrians who were the first to charge. In this affair it seems that Antiochus himself fought more brilliantly than any of those with him. There were severe losses on both sides, but the king's cavalry repulsed the first Bactrian regiment. When, however, the second and third came up they were in difficulties and had the worst of it. It was now that Panaetolus ordered his men to advance, and joining the king and those who were fighting round him, compelled those Bactrians who were pursuing in disorder to turn rein and take to headlong flight. The Bactrians, now hard pressed by Panaetolus, never stopped until they joined Euthydemus after losing most of their men. The royal cavalry, after killing many of the enemy and making many prisoners, withdrew, and at first encamped on the spot near the river. In this battle Antiochus's horse was transfixed and killed, and he himself received a wound in the mouth and lost several of his teeth, having in general gained a greater reputation for courage on this occasion than on any other. After the battle Euthydemus was terror-stricken and retired with his army to a city in Bactria called Zariaspa.

FRAGMENTA LIBRI XI

I. Ex Prooemio

1[a] Ἴσως δέ τινες ἐπιζητοῦσι πῶς ἡμεῖς οὐ προγραφὰς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ βίβλῳ, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προεκθέσεις καθ' ἑκάστην ὀλυμπιάδα
2 πεποιήκαμεν τῶν πράξεων. ἐγὼ δὲ κρίνω χρήσιμον μὲν εἶναι καὶ τὸ τῶν προγραφῶν γένος· καὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἄγει τοὺς ἀναγινώσκειν θέλοντας καὶ συνεκκαλεῖται καὶ παρορμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πᾶν τὸ ζητούμενον ἑτοίμως ἔνεστιν εὑρεῖν διὰ τούτου·
3 θεωρῶν δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας καὶ τὰς τυχούσας ὀλιγωρούμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον τὸ τῶν προγραφῶν γένος, οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος
4 κατηνέχθην· τῆς γὰρ προεκθέσεως οὐ μόνον ἰσοδυναμούσης <πρὸς> τὴν προγραφήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεῖόν τι δυναμένης, ἅμα δὲ καὶ χώραν ἐχούσης
5 ἀσφαλεστέραν διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι τῇ πραγματείᾳ, τούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐδοκιμάσαμεν χρῆσθαι τῷ μέρει παρ' ὅλην τὴν σύνταξιν πλὴν ἓξ τῶν πρώτων βυβλίων· ἐν ἐκείνοις <δὲ> προγραφὰς ἐποιησάμεθα διὰ τὸ μὴ λίαν ἐναρμόζειν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῶν προεκθέσεων γένος.

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XI

I. From the Preface

1[a]. Some will perhaps inquire why in this work I do not, like former authors, write prologues but give a summary of the events in each Olympiad. I indeed regard a prologue as a useful kind of thing, since it fixes the attention of those who wish to read the work and stimulates and encourages readers in their task, besides which by this means any matter that we are in search of can be easily found. But as I saw that for various fortuitous reasons prologues were now neglected and had degenerated in style, I was led to adopt the other alternative. For an introductory summary is not only of equal value to a prologue but even of somewhat greater, while at the same time it occupies a surer position, as it forms an integral part of the work. I, therefore, decided to employ this method throughout except in the first six books to which I wrote prologues, because in their case previous summaries are not very suitable.

II. Res Italiae

1 Ἀλλὰ πολὺ ῥᾳδιεστέραν καὶ συντομωτέραν συνέβη γενέσθαι τὴν Ἀσδρούβου παρουσίαν εἰς Ἰταλίαν.

Διόπερ ὡς οὐδέποτε μᾶλλον ὀρθὴ καὶ περίφοβος ἡ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πόλις ἐγεγόνει, καραδοκοῦσα τὸ συμβησόμενον. . . .

2 Ἀσδρούβᾳ δὲ τούτων μὲν ἤρεσκεν οὐδέν, τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων οὐκέτι διδόντων ἀναστροφὴν διὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐκτεταγμένους καὶ προσάγοντας, ἠναγκάζετο παρατάττειν τοὺς Ἴβηρας
3 καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότας Γαλάτας. προθέμενος δὲ τὰ θηρία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα δέκα, καὶ τὸ βάθος αὐξήσας τῶν τάξεων, καὶ ποιήσας ἐν βραχεῖ χώρῳ τὴν ὅλην δύναμιν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μέσον αὐτὸν θεὶς τῆς παρατάξεως κατὰ τὴν τῶν θηρίων προστασίαν, ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὰ λαιὰ τῶν πολεμίων, προδιειληφὼς ὅτι δεῖ κατὰ
4 τὸν παρόντα κίνδυνον νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λίβιος ἀντεπῆγε τοῖς πολεμίοις σοβαρῶς καὶ συμβαλὼν ταῖς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεσιν ἐμάχετο γενναίως·
5 ὁ δὲ Κλαύδιος ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος τεταγμένος προάγειν μὲν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν καὶ περικερᾶν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους οὐκ ἐδύνατο διὰ τὰς προκειμένας δυσχωρίας, αἷς πεπιστευκὼς Ἀσδρούβας ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ λαιὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἔφοδον.
6 ἀπόρως δὲ διακείμενος ἐπὶ τῷ μηδὲν πράττειν, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ <τοῦ> συμβαίνοντος ἔμαθεν ὃ δέον ἦν
7 πράττειν. διὸ καὶ παραδεξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν τοὺς αὐτοῦ στρατιώτας κατὰ τὸν ὄπισθεν τόπον

II. Affairs of Italy

Hasdrubal's Expedition

1. Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy was much easier 207 B.C.
and more rapid than Hannibal's had been.

Rome had never been in such a state of excitement and dismay, awaiting the result. . . .

None of these things were agreeable to Hasdrubal, but as circumstances did not admit of delay, for he saw the Romans already in battle order and advancing, he was obliged to draw up his Iberians and the Gauls who were with him. Stationing his elephants, ten in number, in front, he increased the depth of his line, making the front of his whole army very narrow, and then taking up his position in the centre behind the elephants fell upon the enemy's left, having determined either to conquer or die in this battle. Livius advanced to meet the enemy's attack in an imposing fashion, and on encountering them with his army fought gallantly. Marcellus, who was stationed on the right wing, could not advance and outflank the enemy owing to the difficult character of the ground in front of him, relying on which Hasdrubal had attacked the Roman left, but when he found himself thus at a loss owing to his forced inaction, circumstances suggested to him what ought to be done. Having therefore collected his men from the right wing in

τῆς μάχης, καὶ τὸ λαιὸν ὑπεράρας τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς, προσέβαλε κατὰ κέρας τοῖς Καρ-
8 χηδονίοις ἐπὶ τὰ θηρία. καὶ μέχρι μὲν [οὖν] τούτων ἀμφίδοξος ἦν ἡ νίκη. οἵ τε γὰρ ἄνδρες ἐφαμίλλως ἐκινδύνευον ἀμφότεροι διὰ τὸ μήτε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐλπίδα καταλείπεσθαι σωτηρίας, εἰ σφαλεῖεν, μήτε τοῖς Ἴβηρσι καὶ Καρχηδονίοις· τά τε θηρία κοινὴν ἀμφοῖν παρείχοντο τὴν χρείαν
9 ἐν τῇ μάχῃ· μέσα γὰρ ἀπειλημμένα καὶ συνακοντιζόμενα διετάραττε καὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων
10 καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἰβήρων τάξεις. ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Κλαύδιον προσπεσεῖν κατ' οὐρὰν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄνισος ἦν ἡ μάχη, τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νώτου τοῖς Ἴβηρσι προσ-
11 κειμένων. ἐξ οὗ καὶ συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους τῶν Ἰβήρων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς μάχης καιρῷ κατα-
12 κοπῆναι. τῶν δὲ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἓξ ἅμα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔπεσε, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα διωσάμενα τὰς τάξεις ὕστερον ἐάλω μεμονωμένα καὶ ψιλὰ τῶν Ἰνδῶν.

2 Ἀσδρούβας δὲ καὶ τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον καιρὸν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος, ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον· ‹ὃν› οὐκ
2 ἄξιον ἀνεπισήμαντον παραλιπεῖν. ὅτι μὲν ἀδελφὸς ἦν Ἀννίβου κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ διότι χωριζόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν τούτῳ ‹τὰς› κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράξεις ἐνεχείρισε, ταῦτα μὲν ἐν ‹τοῖς πρὸ τούτων›
3 ἡμῖν ‹δεδήλωται›. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ διότι πολλοῖς μὲν χρησάμενος ἀγῶσι πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ποικίλαις περιστάσεσι παλαίσας διὰ τὸ . . . τοὺς ἐπαποστελλομένους ἐκ Καρχηδόνος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν στρατηγούς, ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς

the rear of the field he passed round the left of the Roman camp and attacked the Carthaginians in flank where the elephants were. Up to now the victory had been disputed, for the men fought on both sides with equal bravery, as there was no hope of safety either for the Romans if defeated or for the Spaniards and Carthaginians. The elephants too had been of equal service to both sides in the battle; for as they were shut in between the two armies and tormented by missiles, they threw both the Roman and the Spanish ranks into confusion. But as soon as Marcellus fell on the enemy from behind, the battle became unequal, as the Spaniards were now attacked both in front and rear. In consequence they were most of them cut to pieces on the battle-field. Of the elephants six were killed with their drivers and the other four having forced their way through the ranks were captured afterwards alone and abandoned by their Indians.

2. Hasdrubal, who was always a brave man both in former times and at this his last hour, fell in the thick of the fight, and it would not be just to take leave of this commander without a word of praise. I have already stated that he was Hannibal's own brother, and that Hannibal on quitting Spain entrusted him with the management of affairs there, and I also told in a previous Book how in his many encounters with the Romans and in his frequent struggles with adverse circumstances, owing to the character of the commanders who were sent to co-operate with him in Spain from Carthage, he

εἰρημένοις καιροῖς ἀξίως μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς Βάρκα,
καλῶς δὲ καὶ γενναίως τὰς περιπετείας καὶ τὰς
ἐλαττώσεις διετέλει φέρων, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν
4 πρὸ τοῦ συντάξεων δεδηλώκαμεν. περὶ δὲ τῶν
τελευταίων ἀγώνων νῦν ἐροῦμεν, καθὸ μάλιστα
πέφηνεν ἡμῖν ἄξιος ἐπιστάσεως εἶναι καὶ ζήλου.
5 τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν στρατηγῶν
καὶ τῶν βασιλέων, ἐπειδὰν συνιστῶνται τοὺς
ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἀγῶνας, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν κατορθω-
μάτων ἔνδοξα καὶ λυσιτελῆ συνεχῶς λαμβάνοντας
ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ πολλάκις ἐφιστάνοντας καὶ
διαλογιζομένους πῶς ἑκάστοις χρήσονται, κατὰ
6 λόγον σφίσι χωρησάντων τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ
δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀποπτωμάτων οὐκέτι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν
τιθεμένους, οὐδ' ἐν νῷ λαμβάνοντας πῇ καὶ τί
πρακτέον ἑκάστοις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὰς περιπετείας.
καίτοι τὸ μὲν ἕτοιμόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ πολλῆς δεῖται
7 προνοίας. τοιγαροῦν οἱ πλεῖστοι διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν
ἀγεννίαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἀβουλίαν αἰσχρὰς
μὲν ἐποίησαν τὰς ἥττας, εὐγενῶς πολλάκις ἡγωνι-
σμένων τῶν στρατιωτῶν, κατῄσχυναν δὲ τὰς
πρὸ τούτου πράξεις, ἐπονείδιστον δὲ σφίσι τὸν
8 καταλειπόμενον ἐποίησαν βίον. διότι <δὲ> πολλοὶ
τῶν ἡγουμένων περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος σφάλλονται,
καὶ διότι μεγίστην ἐν τούτοις ἔχει διαφορὰν ἀνὴρ
ἀνδρός, εὐχερὲς τῷ βουλομένῳ καταμαθεῖν· πολλὰ
γὰρ ὑποδείγματα τῶν τοιούτων πεποίηκεν ὁ
9 προγεγονὼς χρόνος. Ἀσδρούβας δ', ἕως μὲν ἦν
ἐλπὶς ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον τοῦ δύνασθαι πράττειν
ἄξιόν τι τῶν προβεβιωμένων, οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον
προενοεῖτο κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ὡς τῆς αὑτοῦ
10 σωτηρίας· ἐπεὶ δὲ πάσας ἀφελομένη τὰς εἰς τὸ

constantly bore disaster and defeat with spirit and courage and in a manner worthy of his father Barcas. I will now say for what reason in this his final struggle he seems to me to have been worthy of our respect and emulation. For we see that most generals and kings, when they undertake a critical struggle, constantly keep before their eyes the glory and profit that will accrue from success, and while they devote their attention and consideration to the manner in which they will manage everything if all goes in their favour, do not envisage the consequences of mischance or consider at all how they should behave and what they should do in the event of disaster, although the one thing is simple enough and the other requires the greatest foresight. Consequently most of them, owing to their lack of spirit and their helplessness in such a case, make defeat shameful, and although their soldiers have often fought bravely, cast disgrace on their former exploits and make the rest of their life a reproach to them. Anyone who wishes can easily see that many commanders err in this respect and that there is here the greatest difference between one man and another, as past history affords so many examples of the fact. But Hasdrubal, as long as there was a reasonable hope of his being able to accomplish something worthy of his past, was more careful of nothing in action than of his own safety, but when fortune

μέλλον ἐλπίδας ἡ τύχη συνέκλεισε πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον καιρόν, οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν οὔτε περὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν οὔτε κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, οὐχ ἧττον πρόνοιαν εἶχε καὶ τοῦ σφαλεὶς τοῖς ὅλοις ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομεῖναι τῶν προβεβιωμένων ἀνάξιον.

11 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ τῶν ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένων, ἵνα μήτε προπετῶς κινδυνεύοντες σφάλλωσι τὰς τῶν πιστευσάντων ἐλπίδας μήτε φιλοζωοῦντες παρὰ τὸ δέον αἰσχρὰς καὶ ἐπονειδίστους ποιῶσι τὰς αὐτῶν περιπετείας·

3 Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τῇ μάχῃ κατορθώσαντες παραυτίκα μὲν τὸν χάρακα διήρπαζον τῶν ὑπεναντίων, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν Κελτῶν ἐν ταῖς στιβάσι κοιμωμένους διὰ τὴν μέθην κατέκοπτον ἱερείων τρόπον·

2 συνῆγον δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων λείαν, ἀφ' ἧς εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἀνήχθη πλείω τῶν τριακο-

3 σίων ταλάντων. ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν μὲν Καρχηδονίων κατὰ τὴν μάχην σὺν τοῖς Κελτοῖς οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων περὶ δισχιλίους. ἑάλωσαν δὲ καὶ ζωγρίᾳ τινὲς τῶν ἐνδόξων Καρ-

4 χηδονίων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατεφθάρησαν. τῆς δὲ φήμης ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἠπίστουν τῷ λίαν βούλεσθαι τοῦτο γενόμενον

5 ἰδεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἦκον, οὐ μόνον τὸ γεγονός, ἀλλὰ καὶ <τὰ> κατὰ μέρος διασαφοῦντες, τότε δὴ χαρᾶς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἦν ἡ πόλις πλήρης, καὶ πᾶν μὲν τέμενος ἐκοσμεῖτο, πᾶς δὲ ναὸς ἔγεμε

6 πελάνων καὶ θυμάτων, καθόλου δ' εἰς τοιαύτην εὐελπιστίαν παρεγένοντο καὶ θάρσος ὥστε πάντας τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ὃν μάλιστα πρότερον ἐφοβήθησαν, τότε μηδ' ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ νομίζειν παρεῖναι.

had robbed him of the last shred of hope and forced him to face the last extremity, though he neglected nothing in his preparations for the struggle or in the battle itself that might contribute to victory, nevertheless he took thought how if he met with total defeat he might confront that contingency and suffer nothing unworthy of his past. What I have said here may serve to warn all who direct public affairs neither by rashly exposing themselves to cheat the hopes of those who trust in them nor by clinging to life when duty forbids it to add to their own disasters disgrace and reproach.

3. The Romans now, having won the battle, at once pillaged the enemy's camp, and butchered many of the Gauls whom they found drunk and asleep on their litter beds. They then collected the rest of the prisoners and from this part of the booty more than three hundred talents were realized for the treasury. Not fewer than ten thousand Carthaginians and Gauls fell in the battle, while the Roman loss amounted to two thousand. Some of the Carthaginians of distinction were captured and the rest were slain. When the news arrived in Rome they at first refused to believe it, just because they had been so very eager to see this happen, but when more messengers arrived not only announcing the fact, but adding details, then indeed the city was full of exceeding great joy, every holy place was decorated, and every temple was filled with offerings and victims. In a word they became so sanguine and confident that it seemed to everyone that Hannibal whom they had formerly so much dreaded was not now even in Italy.

III. Res Graeciae

Ὁ δὲ φαντασίαν μὲν ἔχειν ἔφη τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους, τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν οὐ τοιαύτην εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον. . . .

4 (5) "Ὅτι μὲν οὔτε Πτολεμαῖος ὁ βασιλεὺς οὔθ' ἡ τῶν Ῥοδίων πόλις οὔθ' ἡ τῶν Βυζαντίων καὶ Χίων καὶ Μυτιληναίων ἐν παρέργῳ τίθενται τὰς ὑμετέρας, ὦ ἄνδρες Αἰτωλοί, διαλύσεις, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπολαμβάνω τοῦτ' εἶναι συμ-
2 φανές. οὐ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον οὐδὲ δεύτερον ποιούμεθα πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης λόγους, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅτου τὸν πόλεμον ἐνεστήσασθε, προσεδρεύοντες καὶ πάντα καιρὸν θεραπεύοντες οὐ διαλείπομεν ὑπὲρ τούτων ποιούμενοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς
3 μνήμην, κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν τῆς ὑμετέρας καὶ Μακεδόνων στοχαζόμενοι καταφθορᾶς, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον καὶ περὶ τῶν σφετέρων πατρίδων καὶ
4 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων προνοούμενοι. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός, ὅταν ὑφάψῃ τις ἅπαξ τὴν ὕλην, οὐκέτι τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τῇ τούτου προαιρέσει γίνεται τὸ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλ' ἤ ποτ' ἂν τύχῃ λαμβάνει τὴν νομήν, τὸ πλεῖον τοῖς ἀνέμοις κυβερνώμενον καὶ τῇ τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὕλης διαφθορᾷ, καὶ πολλάκις ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν ἐμπρήσαντα πρῶτον
5 ὥρμησε παραλόγως, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον [καὶ] ὁ πόλεμος ὑπό τινων ὅταν ἅπαξ ἐκκαυθῇ, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτοὺς τούτους πρώτους ἀπόλλυσι, ποτὲ δὲ φέρεται φθείρων ἀδίκως πᾶν τὸ παραπεσόν, αἰεὶ καινοποιούμενος καὶ προσφυσώμενος, ὥσπερ ὑπ' ἀνέμων, ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν πλησιαζόντων ἀγνοίας.

III. Affairs of Greece

He said that the speech was full of imagination, 207 B.C.
but that the truth was not this but rather the reverse. . . .

Speech of an Ambassador

4. "I consider, men of Aetolia, that the facts themselves demonstrate that neither King Ptolemy nor Rhodes nor Byzantium nor Chios nor Mytilene make light of coming to terms with you. For this is not the first or the second time that we make proposals to you for peace, but from the date at which you opened hostilities we have never ceased to mention the matter to you, entreating you to entertain it and availing ourselves gladly of every occasion, having before our eyes the ruin brought by the war on yourselves and the Macedonians, and taking thought for the future safety of our own countries and the rest of Greece. For, as with fire, once we have set the fuel alight the consequences are not at our discretion, but it spreads wherever chance directs it, guided chiefly by the wind and by the rapidity with which the fuel it feeds on is consumed, often strangely enough turning on the very man who lit it, so it is with war. Once it has been kindled by anyone, at times it destroys in the first place its authors and at times advances blindly, bringing unmerited destruction on everything it meets with, ever revived and ever blown anew into a blaze, as if by winds, by the folly of those who

6 διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες Αἰτωλοί, νομίσαντες καὶ τοὺς νησιώτας πανδημεὶ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας παρόντας ὑμῶν δεῖσθαι τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἆραι, τὴν δ' εἰρήνην ἑλέσθαι, διὰ τὸ καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς ἀνήκειν τὰ γινόμενα, σωφρονήσαντες ἐντράπητε καὶ πείσθητε τοῖς παρακαλου-
7 μένοις. καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατά τινα τύχην ἐπολεμεῖτε πόλεμον ἀλυσιτελῆ μέν, ἐπειδὴ παντὶ πολέμῳ τοῦτο παρέπεται κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἔνδοξον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν
8 ἀποβαινόντων ἐπιγραφήν, ἴσως ἄν τις ὑμῖν ἔσχε συγγνώμην, φιλοτίμως διακειμένοις. εἰ δὲ πάντων αἴσχιστον καὶ πολλῆς ἀδοξίας πλήρη καὶ βλασφημίας, ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλης προσδεῖται τὰ πράγματ'
9 ἐπιστάσεως; ῥηθήσεται γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν μετὰ παρρησίας· ὑμεῖς δ', ἂν εὖ φρονῆτε, μεθ' ἡσυχίας
10 ἀνέξεσθε. πολλῷ γάρ ἐστιν ἄμεινον ὀνειδισθέντας ἐν καιρῷ σωθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς χάριν ἀκούσαντας μετ' ὀλίγον ἀπολέσθαι μὲν αὐτούς, ἀπολέσαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς Ἕλληνας.

5 6 Λάβετε τοίνυν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὴν αὑτῶν ἄγνοιαν. φατὲ μὲν γὰρ πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Φίλιππον, ἵνα σῳζόμενοι μὴ ποιῶσι τούτῳ τὸ προσταττόμενον, πολεμεῖτε δ' ἐπ' ἐξανδρα-
2 ποδισμῷ καὶ καταφθορᾷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος. ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ συνθῆκαι λέγουσιν ὑμῶν αἱ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, αἳ πρότερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασιν ὑπῆρχον, νῦν δ' ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι θεωροῦνται γινόμεναι.
3 καὶ τότε μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γράμματα τὴν αἰσχύνην ὑμῖν ἐπέφερε, νῦν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ὑπὸ τὴν
4 ὄψιν τοῦτο γίνεται πᾶσι καταφανές. λοιπὸν ὁ μὲν Φίλιππος ὄνομα γίνεται καὶ πρόσχημα τοῦ πολέμου·

come near it. Therefore, men of Aetolia, we beg you, as if the whole of the islanders and all the Greeks who inhabit Asia Minor were present here and were entreating you to put a stop to the war and decide for peace—for the matter concerns them as much as ourselves—to come to your senses and relent and agree to our request. Now if it so chanced that you were engaged in a war, unprofitable indeed, as every war for the most part is, but glorious in the motive of its inception and in the splendour of its results, you might perhaps be pardoned for acting from ambitious motives. But if it is a war most shameful and full of dishonour and reproach, does not the situation call for much hesitation? We will state our opinion frankly, and you, if you are wise, will listen to it calmly. For it is far better to be reproached and saved in time, than to listen to pleasant words and a little after to be ruined yourselves and to ruin the rest of the Greeks.

5. "Consider, then, the errors you have committed. You say that you are fighting with Philip for the sake of the Greeks, that they may be delivered and may refuse to obey his commands; but as a fact you are fighting for the enslavement and ruin of Greece. This is the story your treaty with the Romans tells, a treaty formerly existing merely in writing, but now seen to be carried out in actual fact. Previously the words of the treaty alone involved you in disgrace, but now when it is put in action this becomes evident to the eyes of all. Philip, then, is but the nominal pretext of the war;

πάσχει γὰρ οὐδὲν δεινόν· τούτῳ δὲ συμμάχων
ὑπαρχόντων Πελοποννησίων τῶν πλείστων, Βοιω-
τῶν, Εὐβοέων, Φωκέων, Λοκρῶν, Θετταλῶν,
Ἠπειρωτῶν, κατὰ τούτων πεποίησθε τὰς συν-
5 θήκας ἐφ' ᾧ τὰ μὲν σώματα καὶ τἄπιπλα Ῥωμαίων
ὑπάρχειν, τὰς δὲ πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν Αἰτωλῶν.
6 καὶ κυριεύσαντες μὲν αὐτοὶ πόλεως οὔτ' ἂν ὑβρίζειν
ὑπομείναιτε τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὔτ' ἐμπιπράναι τὰς
πόλεις, νομίζοντες ὠμὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ
7 βαρβαρικόν· συνθήκας δὲ πεποίησθε τοιαύτας,
δι' ὧν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐκδότους
δεδώκατε τοῖς βαρβάροις εἰς τὰς αἰσχίστας ὕβρεις
8 καὶ παρανομίας. καὶ ταῦτα πρότερον μὲν ἠγνοεῖτο·
νυνὶ δὲ διὰ τῆς Ὠρειτῶν καὶ τῶν ταλαιπώρων
Αἰγινητῶν ἅπασι γεγόνατε καταφανεῖς, τῆς τύχης
ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξώστραν ἀναβιβαζούσης
9 τὴν ὑμετέραν ἄγνοιαν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ
πολέμου καὶ τὰ νῦν ἤδη συμβαίνοντα τοιαῦτ'
ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τέλος, ἂν ὅλως πάντα κατὰ νοῦν
ὑμῖν χωρήσῃ, ποῖόν τι δεῖ προσδοκᾶν; ἆρ' οὐ
κακῶν ἀρχὴν μεγάλων ἅπασι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν;
6 (1) ὅτι γάρ, ἂν Ῥωμαῖοι τὸν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ πόλεμον
ἀποτρίψωνται—τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ, συγ-
κεκλειμένου τῆς Βρεττίας εἰς πάνυ βραχεῖς τόπους
2 Ἀννίβου—λοιπὸν ὅτι πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει τὴν ὁρμὴν
ἐπὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους ποιήσονται,
λόγῳ μὲν Αἰτωλοῖς βοηθήσοντες κατὰ Φιλίππου,
τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ πᾶσαν ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιησόμενοι,
καὶ λίαν ‹ὑπολαμβάνω› τοῦτ' εἶναι καταφανές.
3 ἐάν τε καλῶς προθῶνται ποιεῖν Ῥωμαῖοι κυριεύ-
σαντες, ἐκείνων ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὴν χάριν καὶ τὴν
ἐπιγραφήν, ἐάν τε κακῶς, τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπάρξειν

he is in no kind of danger; but as he has for allies most of the Peloponnesians, the Boeotians, the Euboeans, the Phocians, the Locrians, the Thessalians, and Epirots, you made the treaty against them all, the terms being that their persons and personal property should belong to the Romans and their cities and lands to the Aetolians. Did you capture a city yourselves you would not allow yourselves to outrage freemen or to burn their towns, which you regard as a cruel proceeding and barbarous; but you have made a treaty by which you have given up to the barbarians the rest of the Greeks to be exposed to atrocious outrage and violence. This was not formerly understood, but now the case of the people of Oreum and that of the unhappy Aeginetans have exposed you to all, Fortune having of set purpose as it were mounted your infatuation on the stage. Such was the beginning of this war, such are already its consequences, and what must we expect its end to be, if all falls out entirely as you wish? Surely the beginning of terrible disaster to all the Greeks. 6. For it is only too evident, I think, that the Romans if they get the war in Italy off their hands—and this will be very shortly, as Hannibal is now confined in quite a small district of Bruttium—will next throw themselves with their whole strength on Grecian lands on the pretext that they are helping the Aetolians against Philip, but really with the intention of conquering the whole country. Should the Romans, when they have subjected us, determine to treat us kindly, the credit and thanks will be theirs; but if they treat us ill it is they who will acquire

καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας ἐκ τῶν ἀπολλυμένων καὶ τὴν
4 ἐξουσίαν ‹τῶν› σῳζομένων. ὑμεῖς δὲ τότε τοὺς
θεοὺς ἐπικαλέσεσθε μάρτυρας, ὅταν μήτε τῶν
θεῶν βούληται μήτε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔτι δύνηται
βοηθεῖν ὑμῖν μηδείς.
5 Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔδει πάντα προορᾶσθαι·
6 τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὑμῖν πρέπον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλὰ δια-
φεύγει τῶν μελλόντων τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην πρόνοιαν,
νῦν γε δέον ἂν εἴη, διὰ τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων
συνεωρακότας τὸ συμβαῖνον, βέλτιον βουλεύεσθαι
7 περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε κατὰ τὸ
παρὸν οὐδὲν ἀπολελοίπαμεν τῶν ἁρμοζόντων ἢ
λέγειν ἢ πράττειν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς φίλοις, καὶ περὶ
τοῦ μέλλοντος τὸ δοκοῦν μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρή-
8 καμεν· ὑμᾶς δ' ἀξιοῦμεν καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν μήθ'
αὑτοῖς φθονῆσαι μήτε τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι τῆς
ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας."
9 Τούτου δὲ ποιήσαντος διατροπήν τινα τοῖς
πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐδόκει, μετὰ τοῦτον εἰσῆλθον οἱ παρὰ
τοῦ Φιλίππου πρέσβεις, οἳ τοὺς μὲν κατὰ μέρος
λόγους ὑπερέθεντο, δύο δ' ἔφασαν ἥκειν ἔχοντες
10 ἐντολάς, αἱρουμένων μὲν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν εἰρήνην
ἑτοίμως δέχεσθαι . . . τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς πρεσ-
βευτὰς τοὺς παρόντας ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπι-
μαρτυραμένους χωρίζεσθαι διότι τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα
συμβησομένων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν Αἰτωλούς, ἀλλ'
οὐ Φίλιππον αἴτιον δεήσει νομίζειν. . . .

7 (4) Καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸν κατοιμώξας ὅτι παρὰ μι-
κρὸν ἔλθοι τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸν Ἄτταλον ὑποχείριον. . . .
2 Ὅτι Φίλιππος πορευθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν Τριχωνίδα
λίμνην καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὸν Θέρμον, ἔνθ'

the spoil of those they destroy and sovereignty over the survivors, and you will then call the gods to witness when neither any god will be still willing, nor any man still able to help you.

"Possibly you should have foreseen all the consequences from the beginning, but as much of the future escapes human foresight, it should be your duty now at last, when these occurrences have opened your eyes to facts, to take better counsel for the future. As for ourselves we protest that on the present occasion we have neglected nothing which it is proper for true friends to say or do, and we have frankly stated our opinion about the future. To conclude we beg and entreat you not to grudge to yourselves and to the rest of the Greeks the blessings of liberty and security."

This speech appears to have made a considerable impression on the people, and after the speaker the ambassadors from Philip entered. Leaving the discussion of details over for the present they said they had come with two imperative messages. If the Aetolians elected for peace the king readily consented, but if not, the ambassadors were bidden to take their leave after calling to witness the gods and the embassies from the rest of Greece that the Aetolians and not Philip must be considered responsible for what might happen afterwards to the Greeks. . . .

7. He bewailed his ill-luck in having narrowly missed taking Attalus prisoner. . . .

Philip at Thermus

Philip, after marching on Lake Trichonis, reached Thermus where there was a temple of Apollo and

ἦν ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος, ὅσα πρότερον ἀπέλιπε τῶν ἀναθημάτων, τότε πάλιν ἅπαντα διελωβήσατο, κακῶς μὲν πρὸ τοῦ, κακῶς δὲ τότε χρώμενος τῷ
3 θυμῷ· τὸ γὰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀργιζόμενον εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβεῖν τῆς πάσης ἀλογιστίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον. . . .

8 Ὅτι τριῶν ὄντων τρόπων, καθ' οὓς ἐφίενται πάντες στρατηγίας οἱ κατὰ λόγον αὐτῇ προσιόντες, πρώτου μὲν διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκ
2 τούτων κατασκευῆς, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ μεθοδικοῦ καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἐμπείρων ἀνδρῶν παραδόσεως, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ διὰ τῆς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων
3 ἕξεως καὶ τριβῆς, πάντων ἦσαν τούτων ἀνεννόητοι οἱ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγοὶ ἁπλῶς. . . .

4 Τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις ὑπεγεγόνει τις ζῆλος οὐκ εὐτυχὴς ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀλαζονείας καὶ τῆς
5 ἀκαιρίας· ἐσπούδαζον γὰρ τὰς ἀκολουθίας καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας διαφερόντως, καί τις ἦν περὶ τοὺς πλείστους καλλωπισμός, ὑπερέχων τὴν ἐκ τοῦ
6 βίου χορηγίαν. ὅπλων δ' οὐδὲ τὸν ἐλάχιστον ἐποιοῦντο λόγον. . . .

7 Οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ τὰ μὲν ἔργα τῶν εὐτυχούντων οὐδὲ πειρῶνται μιμεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ πάρεργα ζηλοῦντες μετὰ βλάβης ἐκθεατρίζουσι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀκρισίαν. . . .

9 Μεγάλα μὲν γὰρ ἔφη τὴν λαμπρότητα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, πολλὰ δὲ
2 συνεργεῖν τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἐπισκευῆς ἁρμογὴν τῶν ὅπλων εἰς τὴν χρείαν. γίνεσθαι δ' ἂν μάλιστα

now mutilated all the statues which he had spared on the former occasion, acting wrongly both then and now in giving way to his passion. For it is the height of unreasonableness to be guilty of impiety to the gods because one is angry with men. . . .

The Achaean Strategi and Philopoemen

8. There are three ways in which those who aim at acquiring the art of generalship may reasonably hope to do so, first by studying military memoirs and availing themselves of the lessons contained in them, secondly by following the systematic instruction of experienced men, and thirdly by the habit and experience acquired in actual practice, and in all three the present Achaean strategi were absolutely unversed. . . .

Most of them displayed an unhappy emulation of the inopportune pretentiousness of others. They were particularly careful about their retinues and their dress, generally exhibiting a dandyism much in excess of what their fortunes permitted, while as to their arms they paid not the least attention to them. . . .

Most men do not even attempt to imitate the essential characteristics of those who are favoured by fortune, but by striving to copy them in unessentials make a display of their own want of judgement. . . .

9. Philopoemen told them that the brightness of their arms and armour would contribute much to intimidate the enemy, and that it was also of great importance that arms should be so constructed as to be adapted to the purpose they were to serve.

τὸ δέον, εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν νῦν ποιοῦνται περὶ τὸν ἱματισμόν, ταύτην ποιήσαιντο περὶ τῶν ὅπλων, τὴν δὲ πρότερον ὀλιγωρίαν περὶ τῶν ὅπλων παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχουσαν, ταύτην μετενέγ-
3 καιεν ἐπὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας· οὕτως γὰρ ἅμα τούς τε κατ' ἰδίαν βίους ὠφελήσεσθαι καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράγματ' ὁμολογουμένως αὐτοὺς δυνήσεσθαι σῴζειν.
4 διόπερ ἔφη δεῖν τὸν εἰς ἐξοπλισίαν ἢ στρατείαν ἐκπορευόμενον, ὅτε μὲν τὰς κνημῖδας περιτίθεται, σκοπεῖν ὅπως ἀραρυῖαί τε καὶ στίλβουσαι τῶν ὑποδεσμῶν καὶ κρηπίδων ὑπάρχωσιν αὗται μᾶλλον,
5 ὅταν δὲ τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ ‹τὸν› θώρακα καὶ τὸ κράνος διαλαμβάνῃ, περιβλέπειν ἵνα τῆς χλαμύδος καὶ τοῦ χιτῶνος καθαρειότερα ταῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ καὶ
6 πολυτελέστερα· παρ' οἷς γὰρ τὰ πρὸς ἐπιφάνειαν αἱρετώτερά [ἐστι] τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, παρὰ τούτοις αὐτόθεν εὐθέως προφανὲς εἶναι τὸ συμ-
7 βησόμενον ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. καθόλου δ' ἠξίου διαλαμβάνειν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἱματίοις καλλωπισμὸς γυναικός ἐστι, καὶ ταύτης οὐ λίαν σώφρονος, ἡ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις πολυτέλεια καὶ σεμνότης ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, προαιρουμένων ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς
8 πατρίδας ἐνδόξως σῴζειν. πάντες δ' οἱ παρόντες οὕτως ἀπεδέξαντο τὰ ῥηθέντα καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῆς παρακλήσεως ἐθαύμασαν, ὡς καὶ παραχρῆμα μὲν ἐκπορευόμενοι τὸ βουλευτήριον εὐθέως ἐνεδείκνυντο ‹τοὺς› κεκαλλωπισμένους καὶ διακλίνειν
9 ἐνίους ἠνάγκαζον τῆς ἀγορᾶς, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐξοπλισίαις καὶ στρατείαις παρετήρουν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις.

10 Οὕτως εἷς λόγος εὐκαίρως ῥηθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἀποτρέπει τῶν

What was required could be best done by bestowing on their arms the care they now devote to their dress, and transferring to the latter the lack of attention they formerly exhibited to their arms. For by this means they would both benefit their private fortunes, and as all would acknowledge, enable themselves to save the state. Therefore he said that a man on starting for a review or a campaign should in putting on his greaves take more care to see that they fit well and look shiny than he does about his shoes and boots, and again, when he handles his shield, breastplate, and helmet, see to it that they are cleaner and smarter than his chlamys and chiton. For when a man gives the preference over serviceable things to superficial things it is on the face of it evident what will happen to him in a battle. He begged them to regard general daintiness in dress as being fit for a woman and not for a very modest woman, while the richness and distinction of armour is suited to brave men who are determined to save gloriously both themselves and their country. All present applauded his speech so much and so admired the spirit of his advice, that at once on issuing from the senate-house they pointed to such as were dressed like dandies, and compelled some of them to retire from the market-place, and henceforth in their military exercises and campaigns they paid much more attention to these matters.

10. So true is it that a single word spoken in season by a man of authority not only deters his

χειρίστων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρορμᾷ πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα
2 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἴδιον βίον
ἀκόλουθον εἰσφέρηται τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὁ παρακαλῶν,
ἀνάγκη λαμβάνειν τὴν πρώτην πίστιν τὴν παραί-
νεσιν. ὃ δὴ περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἄνδρα μάλιστ' ἄν τις
3 ἴδοι γινόμενον. κατά τε γὰρ τὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὴν
σίτησιν ἀφελὴς καὶ λιτὸς ἦν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς
τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις,
4 εὐπερίκοπτος καὶ ἀνεπίφθονος· περί γε μὴν τοῦ παρ'
ὅλον τὸν βίον ἀληθεύειν μεγίστην ἐποιήσατο σπουδήν.
τοιγάρτοι βραχέα καὶ τὰ τυχόντ' ἀποφαινόμενος
μεγάλην ἐγκατέλειπε πίστιν τοῖς ἀκούουσι· παρά-
5 δειγμα γὰρ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἴδιον βίον εἰσφερόμενος οὐ
πολλῶν ἐποίει προσδεῖσθαι λόγων τοὺς ἀκούοντας.
6 διὸ καὶ πολλάκις λόγους μακροὺς καὶ δοκοῦντας
ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων δεόντως εἰρῆσθαι δι'
ὀλίγων ῥημάτων τῇ πίστει καὶ ταῖς ἐννοίαις τῶν
πραγμάτων ὁλοσχερῶς ἐξέβαλε.
7 Πλὴν τότε συντελεσθέντος τοῦ διαβουλίου πάν-
τες ἐπανῆγον ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις, τά τε ῥηθέντα καὶ
τὸν ἄνδρα διαφερόντως ἀποδεδεγμένοι, καὶ νομί-
ζοντες οὐδ' ἂν παθεῖν οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἐκείνου προ-
8 εστῶτος. ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην εὐθέως ἐπεπορεύετο
τὰς πόλεις, ἐνεργῶς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ποιούμενος
9 τὴν ἔφοδον. κἄπειτα συναγαγὼν τοὺς ὄχλους
ἅμα μὲν ‹ἐγύμναζεν ἅμα δὲ› συνέταττε καὶ τέλος
οὐδ' ὅλους ὀκτὼ μῆνας χρησάμενος τῇ τοιαύτῃ
παρασκευῇ καὶ μελέτῃ συνῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς
Μαντίνειαν, διαγωνιούμενος πρὸς τὸν τύραννον
ὑπὲρ τῆς ἁπάντων Πελοποννησίων ἐλευθερίας.
11 Ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας κατατεθαρρηκώς, καὶ νομίζων
ὡς ἂν εἰ κατ' εὐχὴν αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν

hearers from what is worst, but urges them on to what is best. And when the speaker can reinforce his advice by the example of a life which follows it, it is impossible not to give the fullest credit to his words. And this, we see, was especially true of Philopoemen. For in his dress and living he was plain and simple, and alike in the care he bestowed on his person and in his conversation he was marked by fine restraint and quite unassuming. Through his whole life he was most scrupulous in always speaking the truth, and therefore a few ordinary words from his lips inspired complete trust in the hearers; for since in everything the example of his own life supported his advice, they did not require many words from him. Consequently on many occasions by his credit and his insight into affairs he completely overthrew in a few sentences long speeches of his adversaries which had appeared to be very plausible.

To resume—after the close of the council all returned to their cities completely approving of the speech and the speaker, and convinced that with him as a leader no calamity could overtake them. Philopoemen now at once went the round of the cities, visiting and inspecting each with the greatest diligence and care. Afterwards collecting their forces he trained and drilled them, and finally after spending less than eight months on these preparations he collected his army at Mantinea, to enter on the struggle against the tyrant for the liberty of the whole Peloponnese.

The Defeat and Death of Machanidas

11. Machanidas, filled with confidence and regarding the attack of the Achaeans almost as a godsend,

ὁρμήν, ἅμα τῷ γνῶναι διότι συνηθροισμένοι
2 τυγχάνουσιν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν, παρακαλέσας
ἐν Τεγέᾳ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς
καιροῖς, εὐθέως εἰς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν, ἄρτι τῆς ἡμέρας
ἐπιφαινούσης, προῆγεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Μαντίνειαν,
τῆς μὲν φάλαγγος καθηγούμενος τῷ δεξιῷ κέρατι,
3 τοὺς δὲ μισθοφόρους ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς
πρωτοπορείας παραλλήλους ἄγων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις
ζεύγη πλῆθος ὀργάνων καὶ βελῶν κομίζοντα
4 καταπελτικῶν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν Φιλο-
ποίμην εἰς τρία μέρη διῃρηκὼς τὴν δύναμιν ἐξῆγεν
ἐκ τῆς Μαντινείας, κατὰ μὲν <τὴν> ἐκ τοῦ Ποσει-
δῶνος ἱεροῦ φέρουσαν τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρα-
κίτας, ἅμα δὲ τὸ ξενικὸν ἅπαν καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους,
κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἑξῆς ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις τοὺς φαλαγ-
γίτας, ἔτι δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐχομένην τοὺς πολιτικοὺς
5 ἱππεῖς. τοῖς μὲν οὖν εὐζώνοις κατελάβετο πρώτοις
τὸν λόφον τὸν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἀνατείνων
ἱκανὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν ὁδὸν κεῖται τὴν Ξενίδα καὶ τὸ
προειρημένον ἱερόν· τοὺς δὲ θωρακίτας συνάπτων
ἐπὶ τὴν μεσημβρίαν κατέστησε. τούτοις δὲ συν-
6 εχεῖς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς παρενέβαλε. μετὰ δὲ τού-
τους ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν τὴν φάλαγγα κατὰ
τέλη σπειρηδὸν ἐν διαστήμασιν ἐπέστησε παρὰ
τὴν τάφρον τὴν φέρουσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ποσειδίου
διὰ μέσου τοῦ τῶν Μαντινέων πεδίου καὶ συνάπ-
τουσαν τοῖς ὄρεσι τοῖς συντερμονοῦσι τῇ τῶν
7 Ἐλισφασίων χώρᾳ. πρὸς μὲν τούτοις ἐπὶ τὸ
δεξιὸν κέρας ἐπέστησε τοὺς Ἀχαϊκοὺς ἱππεῖς,
ὧν Ἀρισταίνετος ἡγεῖτο Δυμαῖος· κατὰ δὲ τὸ
λαιὸν αὐτὸς εἶχε τὸ ξενικὸν ἅπαν ἐν ἐπαλλήλοις
τάξεσιν.

as soon as he heard that they were concentrated at Mantinea, addressed the Lacedaemonians at Tegea in terms suitable to the occasion, and at once on the next day shortly after daybreak began to advance on Mantinea. He himself led the right wing of the phalanx, and placed the mercenaries in parallel columns on each side of the van with wagons behind them charged with a quantity of engines and missiles for catapults. At the same time Philopoemen, dividing his army into three parts, led it out of Mantinea, taking by the road that starts from the temple of Poseidon the Illyrians and heavy-armed cavalry, together with all his mercenaries and light-armed troops, by the next road to the west the phalanx, and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He first of all occupied with his light-armed troops the hill in front of the city which rises at a considerable height above the road called Xenis and the above temple, and next to them on the south he placed the heavy-armed cavalry, with the Illyrians adjacent to them. Next to these on the same straight line he stationed the phalanx in several divisions at a certain distance from each other along the ditch that runs from the temple of Poseidon through the plain of Mantinea and terminates at a range of hills forming the boundary of the territory of Elisphasia. Then next the phalanx on his right wing he posted the Achaean cavalry under the command of Aristaenetus of Dyme. On the left wing under his own command was the mercenary cavalry in close order.

12 Ἅμα δὲ τῷ σύνοπτον ἤδη καλῶς εἶναι παραγενομένην τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων δύναμιν ἐπιπορευόμενος τὰ συστήματα τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν παρεκάλει βραχέως μέν, ἐμφαντικῶς δὲ τοῦ παρόντος κινδύνου.
2 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα τῶν λεγομένων ἀσαφῆ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν τῶν ὄχλων εἰς τοιαύτην ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν παρέστη τὸ πλῆθος ὥστε παραπλησίαν ἐνθουσιασμῷ τὴν ἀντιπαράκλησιν γίνεσθαι τῶν δυνάμεων, ἄγειν καὶ θαρρεῖν αὐτὸν παρακελευο-
3 μένων· τοῦτο μέντοι παράπαν ἐπιμελῶς ἐπειρᾶτο διασαφεῖν, ὅτε λάβοι καιρόν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὑπὲρ αἰσχρᾶς καὶ ἐπονειδίστου δουλείας, τοῖς δ' ὑπὲρ ἀειμνήστου καὶ λαμπρᾶς ἐλευθερίας συνέστηκεν ὁ παρὼν κίνδυνος.
4 Ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπέδειξεν ὡς ὀρθίᾳ τῇ φάλαγγι προσμίξων πρὸς τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν πολεμίων· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασε, λαβὼν σύμμετρον ἀπόστημα περιέκλα τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ δόρυ, καὶ παρεκτείνας ἴσον ἐποίησε τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ δεξιὸν τῷ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εὐωνύμῳ, τοὺς δὲ καταπέλτας πρὸ πάσης ἐπέστησε τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν διαστήμασιν.
5 ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην θεασάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ὅτι τοῖς καταπέλταις ἐπενόει βαλὼν εἰς τὰς σπείρας τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν τραυματίζειν τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ
6 θόρυβον ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ὅλοις, οὐκέτι χρόνον ἔδωκεν οὐδ' ἀναστροφήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν Ταραντίνων ἐνεργῶς ἐχρῆτο τῇ καταρχῇ τοῦ κινδύνου κατὰ τοὺς
7 περὶ τὸ Ποσείδιον τόπους, ὄντας ἐπιπέδους καὶ πρὸς ἱππικὴν εὐφυεῖς χρείαν. ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας ὁρῶν τὸ γινόμενον ἠναγκάζετο ποιεῖν τὸ παραπλήσιον καὶ συναφεῖναι τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ Ταραντίνους.

12. As soon as the enemy were well in view he rode along the divisions of the phalanx and addressed them in a few brief words, pointing out the importance of the coming battle. Most of what he said was not distinctly heard, because, owing to the soldiers' affection for him and reliance on him, such was their ardour and zeal that they responded to his address by what was almost a transport of enthusiasm, exhorting him to lead them on and be of good heart. The general tenor, however, of what he attempted to point out to them whenever he got the chance, was that in the present battle the enemy were fighting for shameful and ignominious slavery and they themselves for imperishable and glorious liberty.

Machanidas at first looked as if he were about to charge the enemy's right with his phalanx in column, but on approaching, when he found himself at the proper distance he wheeled to the right, and deploying into line made his own right wing equal in extent to the Acheaan left, placing his catapults at certain intervals in front of his whole army. Philopoemen, seeing that Machanidas' plan was by shooting at the divisions of the phalanx to wound the men and throw the whole force into disorder, gave him not a moment's leisure, but vigorously opened the attack with his Tarentines in the neighbourhood of the temple of Poseidon where the ground was flat and suitable for cavalry. Machanidas, when he saw this, was obliged to do likewise and order his own Tarentines to charge at the same time.

13 Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνδρώδης ἦν ἡ σύμπτωσις· κατὰ βραχὺ δὲ προσγινομένων τοῖς πιεζομένοις τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ συνέβη ‹τὸ› παρ' ἑκατέρων ξενικὸν ἀναμὶξ
2 γενέσθαι, πάντῃ δὲ τούτων συμπλοκῆς ἁθρόως καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα γινομένης ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον πάρισος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος οὕτως ὥστε τὰς λοιπὰς δυνάμεις, καραδοκούσας καθ' ὁποτέρων ὁ κονιορτὸς τραπήσεται, μὴ δύνασθαι συμβαλεῖν διὰ ‹τὸ› μένειν ἀμφοτέρους ἐπὶ πολὺ διακατέχοντας ἐν τῇ μάχῃ
3 τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τόπον. χρόνου δὲ γινομένου κατίσχυον καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ ταῖς εὐχειρίαις διὰ τὴν ἕξιν
4 οἱ παρὰ τοῦ τυράννου μισθοφόροι. τοῦτο δ'
5 εἰκότως καὶ τὸ παράπαν εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. ὅσῳ γὰρ συμβαίνει τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ὄχλους προθυμοτέρους ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀγῶσι τῶν τοῖς τυράννοις πολιτικῶν ὑποταττομένων, τοσούτῳ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις ξενικὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μισθοφορούντων εἰκὸς ὑπεράγειν
6 καὶ διαφέρειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων οἷς μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας ἐστίν, οἷς δ' ὑπὲρ δουλείας ὁ κίνδυνος, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων οἷς μὲν ὑπὲρ ὁμολογουμένης ἐπανορθώσεως, ‹οἷς δ'› ὑπὲρ
7 προδήλου βλάβης γίνεται φιλοτιμία. δημοκρατία μὲν γάρ, ἐπανελομένη τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύσαντας, οὐκέτι μισθοφόροις τηρεῖ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐλευθερίαν· τυραννὶς δ' ὅσῳ μειζόνων ἐφίεται, τοσούτῳ πλειό-
8 νων προσδεῖται μισθοφόρων. πλείονας γὰρ ἀδικοῦσα πλείονας ἔχει καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας. ἡ δὲ τῶν μονάρχων ἀσφάλεια τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῇ τῶν ξένων εὐνοίᾳ κεῖται καὶ δυνάμει.

14 Διὸ δὴ καὶ τότε συνέβαινε τὸ παρὰ τῷ Μαχα-

13. At first the Tarentines alone were engaged, fighting gallantly, but as the light-armed infantry gradually came up to the support of those who were hard pressed, in quite a short time the mercenaries on both sides were mixed up. They were fighting all over the field, in a confused crowd and man to man. For long the struggle was so equally balanced that the rest of the army, who were waiting to see to which side the cloud of dust was carried, could not make this out, since both long remained occupying their original positions. But after some time the tyrant's mercenaries prevailed by their superior numbers and skill, for they were well trained. This is generally what is liable to happen, since by as much as the civic force of a democracy is more courageous in action than the subjects of a tyrant, by so much will a despot's mercenaries in all probability excel those who serve for hire in a democracy. For as in the former case one side is fighting for freedom and the other for slavery, so in the case of the mercenaries the one force is fighting for manifest improvement in their situation and the other for evident damage to their own; since a democracy when it has destroyed those who conspire against it no longer requires mercenaries to protect its freedom, but a tyranny, the more ambitious its aims, requires all the more mercenaries. For since it injures more people it has the more conspiring against it, and in general it may be said that the safety of despots depends on the affection and strength of their foreign soldiers.

14. So it was at present also. The mercenaries of

νίδα ξενικὸν οὕτως ἐκθύμως ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ βιαίως ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς ἐφεδρεύοντας τοῖς ξένοις Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρακίτας δύνασθαι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν ὑπομεῖναι, πάντας δ' ἐκπιεσθέντας φεύγειν προτροπάδην ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Μαντινείας, ἀπεχούσης
2 τῆς πόλεως ἑπτὰ σταδίους. ἐν ᾧ δὴ καιρῷ τὸ παρ' ἐνίοις ἀπορούμενον τότε παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογούμενον ἐγένετο καὶ συμφανές, ὅτι πλεῖστα τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον συντελουμένων ‹παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων› ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀπειρίαν ἐπι-
3 τελεῖται. μέγα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τὸ προτερήματος ἀρχὴν λαβόντα προσθεῖναι τἀκόλουθον, πολὺ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ σφαλέντα ταῖς πρώταις ἐπιβολαῖς μεῖναι παρ' αὑτὸν καὶ συνιδεῖν τὴν τῶν εὐτυχούντων ἀκρισίαν καὶ συνεπιθέσθαι τοῖς τούτων
4 ἁμαρτήμασιν. ἰδεῖν γοῦν ἔστι πολλάκις τοὺς μὲν ἤδη δοκοῦντας πεπροτερηκέναι μετ' ὀλίγον τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφαλμένους, τοὺς δ' ἐν ἀρχαῖς δόξαντας ἑπταικέναι πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν
5 ἀγχίνοιαν τὰ ὅλα παραδόξως κατωρθωκότας. ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε προφανῶς ἐδόκει περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας
6 ἀμφοτέρους γεγονέναι. τοῦ γὰρ ξενικοῦ παντὸς ἐγκεκλικότος τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ παραλελυμένου τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως, ὁ μὲν Μαχανίδας ἀφέμενος τοῦ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατὰ κέρας ὑπεραίρειν τοῖς δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀπαντᾶν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι τῶν ὅλων, τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἔπραξεν,
7 ἀκρατῶς δὲ καὶ μειρακιωδῶς συνεκχυθεὶς τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μισθοφόροις ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτὸν τὸν φόβον ἱκανὸν ὄντα τοὺς ἅπαξ ἐγκλίναντας ἄχρι τῶν πυλῶν συνδιώκειν.

15 Ὁ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἕως μὲν τοῦ δυ-

Machanidas fought with such desperate courage and force that the Illyrians and cuirassed troops who supported the mercenaries could not resist the attack, but all gave way and fled in disorder towards Mantinea, which was seven stades distant. This occasion afforded evidence sufficient to convince all of what some have doubted, the fact that most results in war are due to the skill or the reverse of the commanders. It is perhaps a great feat to follow up initial success, but it is a much greater one upon meeting with reverse at the outset to keep cool-headed, to be able to detect any lack of judgement on the part of the victors and take advantage of their errors. Indeed we often see those who already seem to have gained the day totally worsted very shortly afterwards, and those who at first seemed to have lost it unexpectedly turn the tables and restore the situation by their dexterity. This was very clearly illustrated by the conduct of both the two commanders on the present occasion. For when the whole Achaean mercenary force gave way and their left wing was broken, Machanidas, instead of remaining on the field to outflank the enemy on one side and by a direct attack on the other to strike a decisive blow, did neither, but with childish lack of self-control rushed forward to join his own mercenaries and fall upon the fugitives, as if terror alone were not sufficient to drive them as far as the gate once they had given way.

15. The Achaean commander did his best to rally

νατοῦ διακατεῖχε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐπ' ὀνόματος
2 καλῶν καὶ παροξύνων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας· ἐπεὶ δ' ἑώρα τούτους ἐκβιαζομένους, οὐ πτοηθεὶς ἔφευγεν οὐδ' ἀθυμήσας ἀπέστη . . ., ἀλλ' ὑποστείλας αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος κέρας, ἅμα τῷ παραπεσεῖν τοὺς διώκοντας καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔρημον, καθ' ὃν ὁ κίνδυνος ἦν, εὐθέως τοῖς πρώτοις τέλεσι τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν ἐπ' ἀσπίδα κλίνων, προῆγε
3 μετὰ δρόμου, τηρῶν τὰς τάξεις. καταλαβόμενος δὲ τὸν ἐκλειφθέντα τόπον ὀξέως, ἅμα μὲν ἀπ-
4 ετέτμητο τοὺς διώκοντας, ἅμα δ' ὑπερδέξιος ἐγεγόνει τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων κέρατος. καὶ τοὺς μὲν φαλαγγίτας αὐτοῦ παρεκάλει θαρρεῖν καὶ μένειν, ἕως ἂν παραγγείλῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν
5 ἀναμίξ· Πολυαίνῳ δ' ἐπέταξε τῷ Μεγαλοπολίτῃ τοὺς περιλειπομένους καὶ τοὺς διακεκλικότας τὴν φυγὴν Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ θωρακίτας καὶ μισθοφόρους συναθροίσαντι μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐφεδρεύειν τῷ κέρατι τῆς φάλαγγος καὶ τηρεῖν τὴν ἐπάνοδον τῶν ἐκ
6 διώγματος ἀναχωρούντων. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρὶς παραγγέλματος, ἐπαρθέντες ταῖς διανοίαις ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν εὐζώνων προτερήματι, καταβαλόντες
7 τὰς σαρίσας ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν προάγοντες ἦκον ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς τάφρου χεῖλος, τὰ μὲν οὐκέτι διδόντος τοῦ καιροῦ μεταμέλειαν ὥστ' ἐν χερσὶν ὄντας τῶν πολεμίων ἀναστρέφειν, τὰ δὲ καὶ τῆς τάφρου καταφρονήσαντες διὰ τὸ τὴν κατάβασιν ἔχειν ἐκ πολλοῦ καὶ μήθ' ὕδωρ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἐν αὐτῇ μήτε τιν' ἀγρίαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν, ὥρμησαν ἀν-
επιστάτως διὰ ταύτης.

16 Ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην ἅμα τῷ παραπεσεῖν κατὰ τῶν

the mercenaries, calling on their leaders by name and encouraging them, but when he saw that they were forced back he neither fled in dismay, nor lost heart and gave up hope, but posting himself on the wing of his phalanx, and waiting till the pursuers had passed by and left the ground on which the action had taken place clear, he at once wheeled the first section of the phalanx to the left and advanced at the double but without breaking his ranks, and rapidly occupying the ground which the enemy had abandoned, both cut off the pursuers and at the same time outflanked the Spartan wing. He exhorted the men of his phalanx to be of good heart and wait until he gave the order for a general charge. He commanded Polyaenus of Megalopolis to collect rapidly all those of the Illyrians, cuirassed infantry, and mercenaries who were left behind or had evaded the pursuit, and to support the wing of the phalanx and wait for the return of the pursuers. The Lacedaemonian phalanx now, without orders but elated by the success of the light-armed troops, levelled their spears and charged the enemy. When in charging they reached the edge of the ditch, partly because they had no longer time to change their minds and retrace their steps as they were at close quarters with the enemy, and partly since they made light of the ditch as its descent was gentle and it had neither water nor bushes at the bottom, they dashed through it without hesitating.

16. When he saw that the chance of smiting the

ὑπεναντίων τὸν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ἑωραμένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καιρόν, τότε πᾶσιν ἐπάγειν τοῖς φαλαγγίταις
2 καταβαλοῦσι τὰς σαρίσας παρήγγειλε. τῶν δ' Ἀχαιῶν ὁμοθυμαδὸν καὶ μετὰ καταπληκτικῆς κραυγῆς ποιησαμένων τὴν ἔφοδον, οἱ μὲν προδιαλελυκότες τὰς τάξεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῇ τῆς τάφρου κατα‹βάσει πάλιν ἀνα›βαίνοντες πρὸς ὑπερδεξίους τοὺς πολεμίους ἀποδειλιάσαντες
3 ἐτρέποντο· τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τάφρῳ διεφθείρετο, τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ
4 τῶν ἰδίων. συνέβαινε δὲ τὸ προειρημένον οὐκ αὐτομάτως οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀγχίνοιαν τοῦ προεστῶτος, ‹ὃς› εὐθέως προεβάλετο τὴν
5 τάφρον. ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην οὐ φυγομαχῶν, ὥς τινες ὑπελάμβανον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἀκριβῶς καὶ στρατηγικῶς ἕκαστα συλλογισάμενος, ὅτι παραγενόμενος ὁ Μαχανίδας, εἰ μὲν προσάξει τὴν δύναμιν οὐ προϊδόμενος τὴν τάφρον, οὕτω συμβήσεται παθεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν φάλαγγα ‹τὸ› προειρημένον
6 νῦν, γινόμενον δὲ τότ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· εἰ δὲ συλλογισάμενος τὴν δυσχρηστίαν τῆς τάφρου, κἄπειτα μεταμεληθεὶς καὶ δόξας ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἐκ παρατεταγμένων ἀπολύσει καὶ μακρὰν αὐτὸν ἐν πορείᾳ διδόναι μέλλει, διότι χωρὶς ὁλοσχεροῦς ἀγῶνος αὐτῷ μὲν τὸ νικᾶν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ τἀναντία
7 περιέσται. πολλοῖς γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν, οἵτινες παραταξάμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως ‹δὲ νομίσαντες› σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις
8 ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τινὲς μὲν διὰ τόπους, οἱ δὲ διὰ πλῆθος, οἱ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, μακρὰν ἑαυτοὺς δόντες ἐν πορείᾳ, κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν δι' αὐτῶν τῶν οὐραγούντων ἤλπισαν οἱ μὲν προτερήσειν,

enemy that had so long been present to his mind had at length arrived, Philopoemen ordered the whole phalanx to level their spears and charge. When the Achaeans, like one man and with a loud cheer that cast terror into their foes, rushed on them, those of the Lacedaemonians who had broken their ranks and descended into the ditch, lost courage as they mounted the bank to meet the enemy above their heads and took to flight. The greater number of them perished in the ditch itself, killed either by the Achaeans or by each other. And this result was not due to chance or to momentary luck, but to the sagacity of the commander in at once protecting his men by the ditch. This he did not with the desire to avoid an encounter as was supposed by some, but calculating everything accurately like the expert general he was and foreseeing that if Machanidas, when he came up, led his force forward without reckoning on the ditch, the phalanx would suffer what I have just described as actually happening to it, whereas if the tyrant took into consideration the difficulty presented by the ditch, and changing his mind, seemed to shirk an encounter, breaking up his formation and exposing himself in long marching order, he would then without a general engagement himself secure victory while Machanidas would suffer defeat. This has already happened to many, who after drawing up in order of battle, being under the impression that they were not equal to engaging the enemy, either owing to their position or owing to their inferiority in numbers or for any other reason, have exposed themselves in a long marching column, hoping as they retired to succeed, by the sole aid of their rearguard, either in getting the better of

9 οἱ δ' ἀσφαλῶς ἀπολυθήσεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων. ἐν
οἷς δὴ καὶ μέγιστα συμβαίνει τοὺς ἡγουμένους.
17 Πλὴν ὅ γε Φιλοποίμην οὐ διεψεύσθη τῇ
προνοίᾳ τοῦ συντελεσθησομένου· τροπὴν ⟨γὰρ⟩
ἰσχυρὰν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.
2 συνορῶν δὲ τὴν φάλαγγα νικῶσαν καὶ τὰ ὅλα
καλῶς αὐτῷ προχωροῦντα καὶ λαμπρῶς, ἐπὶ τὸ
καταλειπόμενον ὥρμησε τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς· τοῦτο
3 δ' ἦν τὸ μὴ διαφυγεῖν τὸν Μαχανίδαν. εἰδὼς
οὖν αὐτὸν κατὰ ⟨τὴν⟩ τοῦ διώγματος παράπτωσιν
ἀποτετμημένον ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν μέρεσι
τῆς τάφρου μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων μισθοφόρων, ἐκαρα-
4 δόκει τὴν τούτου παρουσίαν. ὁ δὲ Μαχανίδας,
συνθεωρήσας κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
διώγματος φεύγουσαν τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, καὶ
συλλογισάμενος διότι προπέπτωκε καὶ διέψευσται
τῆς ὅλης ἐλπίδος, εὐθέως ἐπειρᾶτο συστραφεὶς
μεθ' ὧν εἶχε περὶ αὐτὸν ξένων, ἄθρους διαπεσεῖν
5 διὰ τῶν ἐσκεδασμένων καὶ διωκόντων. εἰς ἃ καὶ
συνορῶντες ἔνιοι συνέμενον αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρχάς,
6 ταύτην ἔχοντες τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας. ὡς
δὲ παραγενόμενοι συνεῖδον τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τηροῦντας
τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τάφρου γέφυραν, τότε δὴ πάντες
ἐξαθυμήσαντες ἀπέρρεον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ καθ'
7 ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος ἐπορίζετο τὴν σωτηρίαν. καθ'
ὃν δὴ καιρὸν ὁ τύραννος ἀπογνοὺς τὴν διὰ τῆς
γεφύρας ὁδὸν παρήλαυνε παρὰ τὴν τάφρον, ἐνεργῶς
διάβασιν ζητῶν.
18 Ὁ δὲ Φιλοποίμην, ἐπιγνοὺς τὸν Μαχανίδαν ἀπό
τε τῆς πορφυρίδος καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὸν ἵππον κόσμου,
τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀναξίδαμον ἀπολείπει, παρα-
καλέσας τηρεῖν ἐπιμελῶς τὴν δίοδον καὶ μηδενὸς

the enemy or in making good their escape. This is a most frequent cause of error on the part of commanders.

17. But Philopoemen was by no means deceived in his anticipation of what the result would be ; for the Lacedaemonians were completely routed. When he saw his phalanx victorious and everything going on splendidly for himself he turned his mind to the remainder of his project, which was to prevent the escape of Machanidas. Knowing that in his unwise pursuit he had been cut off together with his mercenaries on the side of the ditch lying nearest the town, he was waiting for his reappearance. Machanidas on observing when he had desisted from the pursuit that his troops were in flight, and on realizing that he had blundered and thereby lost the day, at once attempted to make the mercenaries he had round him close up and force their way in a compact body through the scattered ranks of the pursuers. Some of them with this end in view remained with him at first, hoping thus to get off safe, but when they got up to the ditch and saw that the Achaeans were holding the bridge over it, they all lost heart and dropped off from him, each attempting to save himself as best he could. Meanwhile the tyrant, despairing of making his way across the bridge, rode along the ditch trying with all his might to find a crossing.

18. Recognizing Machanidas by his purple cloak and the trappings of his horse, Philopoemen left Alexidamus with orders to guard the passage care-

φείδεσθαι τῶν μισθοφόρων διὰ τὸ τούτους εἶναι
τοὺς συναύξοντας αἰεὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ τυραννίδας·
2 αὐτὸς δὲ παραλαβὼν Πολύαινον τὸν Κυπαρισσέα
καὶ Σιμίαν, οἷς ἐχρῆτο τότε παρασπισταῖς, ἐκ
τοῦ πέραν τῆς τάφρου τὴν ἀντιπαραγωγὴν ἐποιεῖτο
3 τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ· δύο γὰρ ἦσαν
οἱ τότε τῷ Μαχανίδᾳ συμμίξαντες, Ἀρηξίδαμος
4 καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων εἷς. ἅμα δὲ τῷ τὸν Μα-
χανίδαν κατά τινα τόπον εὔβατον τῆς τάφρου,
προσθέντα τοὺς μύωπας, βίᾳ τὸν ἵππον ἐπάγειν
καὶ διαπεραῖν, συναγαγὼν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὁ Φιλο-
ποίμην αὐτῷ καὶ πατάξας τῷ δόρατι καιρίως,
καὶ προσενεγκὼν τῷ σαυρωτῆρι πληγὴν ἄλλην
ἐκ διαλήψεως, ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ διέφθειρε τὸν
5 τύραννον. τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον ἐγίνετο καὶ περὶ
τὸν Ἀρηξίδαμον ὑπὸ τῶν παρίππων. ὁ δὲ τρίτος
ἀπογνοὺς τὴν διάβασιν διέφυγε τὸν κίνδυνον
6 κατὰ τὸν τῶν προειρημένων φόνον. πεσόντων δ'
ἀμφοτέρων, εὐθέως οἱ περὶ τὸν Σιμίαν, σκυλεύ-
σαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ συναφελόντες ἅμα τοῖς
ὅπλοις τὴν τοῦ τυράννου κεφαλήν, ἠπείγοντο
7 πρὸς τοὺς διώκοντας, σπεύδοντες ἐπιδεῖξαι τοῖς
ὄχλοις τὴν ἀπώλειαν τοῦ τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνος
χάριν τοῦ πιστεύσαντας ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀνυπόπτως
καὶ τεθαρρηκότως ποιήσασθαι τὸν ἐπιδιωγμὸν
8 τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἕως τῆς Τεγεατῶν πόλεως. ὃ
καὶ μεγάλα συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν
ὄχλων· οὐ γὰρ ἥκιστα διὰ τούτων τῆς μὲν Τεγέας
ἐξ ἐφόδου κύριοι κατέστησαν, ταῖς δ' ἐχομέναις
παρὰ τὸν Εὐρώταν ἐστρατοπέδευον, κρατοῦντες
9 ἤδη τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀναμφισβητήτως. καὶ πολλῶν
χρόνων οὐ δυνάμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας

fully and spare none of the mercenaries, as they were the men who had always maintained the power of the Spartan tyrants. Taking with him Polyaenus of Cyparissia and Simias, who acted at the time as his aides-de-camp, he followed the tyrant and those with him—there were two who had joined him, Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries—along the opposite side of the ditch. When Machanidas, on reaching a place where the ditch was easily passable, set spurs to his horse and forced it across, Philopoemen turned to meet him. Giving him a mortal wound with his spear and adding yet another thrust with the lower end of it, he slew the tyrant hand to hand. Arexidamus suffered the same fate at the hands of the two officers who rode with Philopoemen, and after the death of the two the third man, despairing of crossing, sought safety in flight. When both had fallen Simias and his companion stripped the bodies and taking the armour and the head of the tyrant hastened back to the pursuers, eager to show to their men those proofs of the death of the enemy's commander, so that believing the evidence of their eyes they might with increased confidence and fearlessness continue the pursuit of the enemy as far as Tegea. And the sight did as a fact much contribute to the spirit of the soldiers ; for it was chiefly owing to this that they captured Tegea by storm, and a few days after were encamped on the banks of the Eurotas, already in undisputed command of the country. For many years they had been unable to repulse the enemy from their own land,

ἀπώσασθαι, τότε πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθουν αὐτοὶ τὴν
10 Λακωνικήν, τῶν μὲν ἰδίων οὐ πολλοὺς ἀπολωλεκότες ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπεκτακότες μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τετρακισχιλίων, ζωγρίᾳ δ' εἰληφότες ἔτι πλείους τούτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς κεκυριευκότες ἁπάσης καὶ τῶν ὅπλων.

IV. Res Italiae

19[a] (18[a]) Ὅτι φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος, τί γὰρ ὄφελός ἐστι τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι διεξιέναι πολέμους καὶ μάχας καὶ πόλεων ἐξανδραποδισμοὺς καὶ πολιορκίας, εἰ μὴ τὰς αἰτίας ἐπιγνώσονται, παρ' ἃς ἐν ἑκάστοις οἱ
2 μὲν κατώρθωσαν, οἱ δ' ἐσφάλησαν; τὰ γὰρ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ψυγαγωγεῖ μόνον τοὺς ἀκούοντας, αἱ δὲ πρόσθεν διαλήψεις τῶν ἐπιβαλλομένων ἐξεταζόμεναι δεόντως ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦν-
3 τας. μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ὁ κατὰ μέρος χειρισμὸς ἑκάστων ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἐπανορθοῖ τοὺς συνεφιστάνοντας. . . .

19 Τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις τἀνδρός,
2 βλέψας εἰς τὸ μῆκος τούτου τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ συνεπιστήσας αὐτὸν ἐπί τε τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μάχας καὶ πολιορκίας καὶ πόλεων μεταβολὰς καὶ περιστάσεις καιρῶν, ἐπί τε τὴν
3 περιοχὴν τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πράξεως, ἐν ᾗ συνεχῶς Ἀννίβας ἑκκαίδεκα πολεμήσας ἔτη Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οὐδέποτε διέλυσε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τῶν ὑπαίθρων, ἀλλὰ συνέχων ὑφ' αὑτόν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς κυβερνήτης, ἀστασίαστα

and now they themselves fearlessly pillaged Laconia, having suffered little loss in the battle, but having not only slain as many as four thousand Lacedaemonians but captured a still greater number and made themselves masters of all the baggage and arms.

IV. Affairs of Italy

19[a]. What is the use of recounting to our readers wars and battles and the sieges and captures of cities, if they are not likewise informed of the causes to which in each case success or failure was due? For the results of actions merely interest readers, but anticipation of what is to follow, when the inquiry is properly conducted, is of benefit to students. Most salutary of all to those who give due attention to it is an exposition of the detailed management of each particular question.

Hannibal

19. No one can withhold admiration for Hannibal's generalship, courage, and power in the field, who considers the length of this period, and carefully reflects on the major and minor battles, on the sieges he undertook, on his movements from city to city, on the difficulties that at times faced him, and in a word on the whole scope of his design and its execution, a design in the pursuit of which, having constantly fought the Romans for sixteen years, he never broke up his forces and dismissed them from the field, but holding them together under his personal command, like a good ship's captain, kept such

διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοεθνέσιν, ἀλλ' 4 οὐδ' ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις. εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυας, Ἴβηρας, Λιγυστίνους, Κελτούς, Φοίνικας, Ἰταλούς, Ἕλληνας, οἷς οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος, οὐχ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν ἐκ 5 φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀγχίνοια τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ἑνὸς ἐποίει προστάγματος ἀκούειν καὶ μιᾷ πείθεσθαι γνώμῃ, καίπερ οὐχ ἁπλῆς οὔσης τῆς περιστάσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποικίλης, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν αὐτοῖς λαμπρᾶς ἐπιπνεούσης τῆς τύχης, ποτὲ 6 δὲ τοὐναντίον. ἐξ ὧν εἰκότως ἄν τις θαυμάσειε τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος δύναμιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει, καὶ θαρρῶν εἴπειεν ὡς εἴπερ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπ' ἄλλα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπὶ τελευταίους ἦλθε Ῥωμαίους, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν προτεθέντων 7 αὐτὸν διέφυγε. νῦν δ', ἐφ' οὓς ἔδει τελευταίους ἐλθεῖν, ἀπὸ τούτων ἀρξάμενος, ἐν τούτοις ἐποιήσατο καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ τέλος.

V. Res Hispaniae

20 Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, ἀθροίσαντες τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐν αἷς ἐποιοῦντο τὴν παραχειμασίαν, προῆλθον, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως τῆς προσαγορευομένης Ἰλίπας, βαλόμενοι τὸν χάρακα πρὸς ταῖς ὑπωρείαις, καὶ προθέμενοι πεδία πρὸς 2 ἀγῶνα καὶ μάχην εὐφυῆ. πλῆθος δὲ πεζῶν μὲν εἶχον εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριάδας, ἱππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχιλίους,

a large army free from sedition towards him or among themselves, and this although his regiments were not only of different nationalities but of different races. For he had with him Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, peoples who neither in their laws, customs, or language, nor in any other respect had anything naturally in common. But, nevertheless, the ability of their commander forced men so radically different to give ear to a single word of command and yield obedience to a single will. And this he did not under simple conditions but under very complicated ones, the gale of fortune blowing often strongly in their favour and at other times against them. Therefore we cannot but justly admire Hannibal in these respects and pronounce with confidence that had he begun with the other parts of the world and finished with the Romans none of his plans would have failed to succeed. But as it was, commencing with those whom he should have left to the last, his career began and finished in this field.

V. Affairs of Spain

The Defeat of Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, by Publius Scipio

20. Hasdrubal, collecting his forces from the towns in which they had passed the winter, advanced and encamped not far from the town called Ilipa, entrenching himself just under the hills with a level space in front favourably situated for giving battle. He had about seventy thousand infantry, four thou- 206 B.C.

3 θηρία δὲ δυσὶ πλείω τῶν τριάκοντα· Πόπλιος δὲ Μάρκον μὲν Ἰούνιον ἐξαπέστειλε πρὸς Κολίχαντα, παραληψόμενον τὰς ἑτοιμασθείσας αὐτῷ παρὰ τούτου δυνάμεις· αὗται δ' ἦσαν πεζοὶ μὲν
4 τρισχίλιοι, ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντακόσιοι· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς συμμάχους αὐτὸς παρελάμβανε, προάγων καὶ ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον.
5 ἐγγίσας δὲ τῷ Κασταλῶνι καὶ τοῖς περὶ Βαίκυλα τόποις, καὶ συμμίξας ἐνθάδε τῷ Μάρκῳ καὶ ταῖς παρὰ τοῦ Κολίχαντος δυνάμεσιν, εἰς πολλὴν
6 ἀπορίαν ἐνέπιπτε περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἀξιόχρεοι <παρ>ῆσαν αἱ Ῥωμαϊκαὶ δυνάμεις αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεύειν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἔχοντας τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων κινδυνεύειν ἐπισφαλὲς ἐδόκει καὶ
7 λίαν εἶναι παράβολον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διαπορήσας, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων συγκλειόμενος, ἐπὶ τὸ συγχρῆσθαι κατηνέχθη τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν οὕτως ὥστε φαντασίαν μὲν παρασκευάζειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις,
8 τὸν δ' ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν ἰδίων στρατοπέδων. ταῦτα δὲ προθέμενος ἀνέζευξε μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως, ἔχων πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς τετρακισμυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ τρισχιλίους.
9 ἐγγίσας δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις καὶ γενόμενος σύνοπτος ἐστρατοπέδευσε περί τινας γεωλόφους καταντικρὺ τῶν πολεμίων.

21 Μάγων δὲ νομίσας εὐφυῆ καιρὸν ἐπιθέσθαι καταστρατοπεδεύουσι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀναλαβὼν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων καὶ Μασανάσαν μετὰ τῶν Νομάδων, ἤλαυνε πρὸς τὴν
2 παρεμβολήν, πεπεισμένος ἀφυλακτοῦντα λήψεσθαι τὸν Πόπλιον. ὁ δὲ πάλαι προορώμενος τὸ μέλλον,

sand horse, and thirty-two elephants. Scipio sent off Marcus Junius to Colichas to take over the forces that the latter had got ready for him, which consisted of three thousand foot and five hundred horse. The rest of the allies he took with himself and advanced marching to encounter the enemy. When he drew near Castalon and the neighbourhood of Baecula and there joined Marcus and the troops sent by Colichas, he found the situation a very embarrassing one. For without the allies the Roman troops at his disposal were not sufficient for him to risk a battle, while it seemed to him dangerous, and far too risky, to rely on the support of the allies in what promised to be a decisive engagement. However, though he hesitated, he found himself forced by circumstances and was reduced to employing the Spaniards, using them for the purpose of impressing the enemy by an imposing show but leaving the actual fighting to his own legions. With this purpose he left with his whole army, consisting of about forty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse. When he got near the Carthaginians and was in full sight of them he encamped on certain low hills opposite to the enemy.

21. Mago, thinking it a favourable occasion to attack the Romans as they were forming their camp, took most of his own cavalry and Massanissa with his Numidians and charged the camp, being convinced that he would find Scipio off his guard. Scipio, however, had long foreseen what would happen,

ὑπό τινα βουνὸν ὑπεστάλκει τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἴσους
3 ‹τοῖς› τῶν Καρχηδονίων· ὧν ἀνυπονοήτως ἐμπεσόντων πολλοὶ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀναστρέφοντες διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ἐπιφανείας ‹τῆς› ἄφνω τῶν ἱππέων ἀπέπεσον, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ συμβάλλοντες
4 τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐμάχοντο γενναίως. τῇ δὲ παρὰ τῶν καταβαινόντων ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εὐχειρίᾳ δυσχρηστούμενοι καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπολλύντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, βραχὺ προσαντισχόντες ἐνέκλιναν.
5 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τάξει τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ἐποιοῦντο, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἐγκειμένων αὐτοῖς λύσαντες τὰς ἴλας κατέφυγον ὑπὸ τὴν αὑτῶν
6 παρεμβολήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαῖοι τούτου γενομένου θαρραλεώτερον διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, οἱ
7 δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τοὐναντίον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἑξῆς ἐπί τινας ἡμέρας τάς τε δυνάμεις ἐκτάξαντες ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ πεδίῳ ‹καὶ› διὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων ἀκροβολισμοὺς ποιησάμενοι καὶ καταπειράσαντες ἀλλήλων, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν τὰ ὅλα.

22 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον δυσὶ δοκεῖ κεχρῆσθαι
2 στρατηγήμασιν ὁ Πόπλιος. θεωρῶν γὰρ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ὀψὲ ποιούμενον τὰς ἐξαγωγάς, καὶ μέσους Λίβυας, τὰ δὲ θηρία προτιθέμενον ἑκατέρων τῶν κεράτων, αὐτὸς εἰωθὼς τῇ μὲν ὥρᾳ προσ-
3 ανατείνειν, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους μέσους ἀντιτάττειν τοῖς Λίβυσι, τοὺς δ' Ἴβηρας ἐπὶ τῶν κεράτων παρεμβάλλειν, ᾗ προέθετο κρίνειν ἡμέρᾳ, τἀναντία τοῖς προειρημένοις ποιήσας μεγάλα συνήργησε ταῖς σφετέραις δυνάμεσι πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, οὐκ ὀλίγα
4 δ' ἠλάττωσε τοὺς πολεμίους. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ φωτὶ διαπεμψάμενος τοὺς ὑπηρέτας παρήγγειλε πᾶσι τοῖς χιλιάρχοις καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀριστο-

and had stationed his cavalry, who were equal in number to those of the Carthaginians, under a hill. Surprised by this unexpected attack many of the Carthaginians as they wheeled sharply round at the unexpected sight, lost their seats, but the rest met the enemy and fought bravely. Thrown, however, into difficulties by the dexterity with which the Roman horsemen dismounted, and losing many of their numbers, the Carthaginians gave way after a short resistance. At first they retired in good order, but when the Romans pressed them hard, the squadrons broke up and they took refuge under their own camp. After this the Romans displayed greater eagerness to engage and the Carthaginians less. However, for several days following they drew up their forces on the level ground between them, and after trying their strength by skirmishing with their cavalry and light infantry, finally resolved on a decisive action.

22. On this occasion we see Scipio employing two different stratagems. Observing that Hasdrubal always brought his troops out of camp at a late hour and drew them up with the Libyans in the centre and the elephants in front of the two wings, and having himself been in the habit of delaying until a still later hour and of opposing his Romans to the Libyans in the centre and stationing the Spaniards on his wings, he acted on the day on which he had decided to deliver the decisive battle in a precisely opposite manner, and thus much contributed to the victory of his own army and the discomfiture of the enemy. For as soon as it was light he sent a message by his aides-de-camp to all the tribunes

ποιησαμένους καὶ καθοπλισαμένους ἐξάγειν πρὸ
5 τοῦ χάρακος. γενομένου δὲ τούτου καὶ προθύμως
πειθαρχησάντων διὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν τοῦ μέλλοντος,
τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους προαπέστειλε,
συντάξας ἐγγίζειν τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν ὑπεναντίων
6 καὶ προσακροβολίζεσθαι θρασέως, αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς
πεζοὺς ἔχων ἅρτι τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατολῆς
ἐπιφαινομένης προῆγε, καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς
μέσον τὸ πεδίον παρενέβαλε, τάττων ἐναντίως ἢ
πρόσθεν· μέσους μὲν γὰρ ἐτίθει τοὺς Ἴβηρας, ἐπὶ
7 δὲ τῶν κεράτων τὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων. τοῖς δὲ
Καρχηδονίοις, ἄφνω συνεγγιζόντων πρὸς τὸν
χάρακα τῶν ἱππέων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης δυνάμεως
ἐκταττομένης ἐν ὄψει, μόλις ἐδόθη καιρὸς εἰς τὸ
8 καθοπλίσασθαι. διόπερ ἠναγκάσθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν
Ἀσδρούβαν ἔτι νήστεις ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας
ἀπαρασκεύως ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς
καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους ἐπαφιέναι τοῖς ἱππεῦσι τῶν
ὑπεναντίων εἰς τὰ πεδία, τὰς δὲ πεζικὰς δυνάμεις
παρατάττειν, οὐ πολὺ τῆς παρωρείας ἐν τοῖς
ἐπιπέδοις ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔκταξιν, καθάπερ ἦν
9 ἔθος αὐτοῖς. ἕως μὲν οὖν τινος ἔμενον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι
τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔχοντες· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἡμέρας
προύβαινε, τῶν δ' εὐζώνων ἄκριτος ἦν καὶ πάρισος
ἡ συμπλοκὴ διὰ τὸ τοὺς πιεζομένους καταφεύ-
γοντας ὑπὸ τὰς ἰδίας φάλαγγας ἐκ μεταβολῆς
10 κινδυνεύειν, τὸ τηνικαῦτα δὲ διαδεξάμενος ὁ
Πόπλιος διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐν ταῖς σημαίαις
εἴσω τοὺς ἀκροβολιζομένους, καὶ μερίσας ἐφ'
ἑκάτερον κέρας ὀπίσω τῶν παρατεταγμένων,
πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς γροσφομάχους, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις
ἐπιβάλλει τοὺς ἱππεῖς, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς μετωπηδὸν

and soldiers to take their morning meal and arm themselves and march out of the camp. When this was done, all showing great zeal in carrying out the order, as they suspected what was in the wind, he sent on the cavalry and light infantry with orders to get close up to the enemy's camp and shoot at him boldly, while he himself with his infantry advanced just as the sun was rising, and when he reached the middle of the plain, formed in order of battle, disposing his troops in an order contrary to that which he had previously used, as he placed the Spaniards in the centre and the Romans on the wings. The Carthaginians, upon the enemy's cavalry coming suddenly up to their camp and the rest of his army forming up in full view, scarcely had time to arm themselves. So that Hasdrubal, with his men still fasting, was obliged on the spur of the moment and without any preparation to send off his own cavalry and light infantry to engage those of the enemy on the plain and to draw up his heavy infantry on the level ground at no great distance from the foot of the hill, as was his usual practice. For a certain time the Romans remained inactive, but when, as the day advanced, there was no decisive advantage on either side in the engagement of the light-armed troops, those who were hard pressed always retreating to the shelter of their respective phalanxes and then issuing forth again to resume the combat, Scipio receiving the skirmishers through the intervals between his cohorts distributed them on his wings behind his infantry, placing the velites in front with the horse behind them. At first

11 ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον· ἀποσχὼν δὲ περὶ ‹τετρα-›
στάδιον τῶν ὑπεναντίων, τοὺς μὲν Ἴβηρας τη-
ροῦντας τὰς τάξεις τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ποιεῖσθαι
τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν . . . παρήγγειλε, τῷ μὲν δεξιῷ
τὰς σημαίας καὶ τὰς ἴλας ἐπιστρέφειν ἐπὶ δόρυ,
23 τῷ δ' εὐωνύμῳ τἀναντία. καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὸς μὲν
ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ, Λεύκιος δὲ Μάρκιος καὶ Μάρκος
Ἰούνιος ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων τρεῖς ἴλας ἱππέων
τὰς ἡγουμένας, καὶ πρὸ τούτων γροσφομάχους
τοὺς εἰθισμένους καὶ τρεῖς σπείρας—τοῦτο δὲ
καλεῖται τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν πεζῶν παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις
2 κοόρτις—πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐπ' ἀσπίδα περικλάσαντες
τούτους, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δόρυ, προῆγον ὀρθίους ἐπὶ τοὺς
πολεμίους, ἐνεργῆ ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον, ἀεὶ τῶν
ἐξῆς ἐπιβαλλόντων καὶ κατὰ περίκλασιν ἑπομένων.
3 ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτους μὲν οὐ πολὺ συνέβαινε τῶν πολε-
μίων ἀπέχειν, τοὺς δ' Ἴβηρας ἐν τῇ κατὰ πρόσ-
ωπον πλευρᾷ τόπον ἱκανὸν ἔτι διεστάναι τῷ
βάδην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγήν, προσέβαλλον τοῖς
κέρασιν ἀμφοτέροις ἅμα τοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων
ὀρθίαις ταῖς Ῥωμαϊκαῖς δυνάμεσι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ
4 ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. αἱ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα κινήσεις, δι'
ὧν συνέβαινε τοὺς ἑπομένους, ἐπιπαρεμβάλλοντας
‹ἐπὶ› τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, συγ-
καθίστασθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς τὴν μάχην, τὴν
ἐναντίαν εἶχον διάθεσιν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ καθόλου
τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῷ λαιῷ ‹καὶ› κατὰ μέρος οἱ
5 πεζοὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ
κέρως ἱππεῖς μετὰ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐκ δόρατος
ἐπιπαρεμβάλλοντες, ὑπερκερᾶν ἐπειρῶντο τοὺς
πολεμίους, οἱ δὲ πεζοὶ τοὐναντίον ἐξ ἀσπίδος
6 παρενέβαλλον· τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν οἱ μὲν ἐν

he made a direct frontal advance, but when at a distance of four stades from the enemy he ordered the Spaniards to continue advancing in the same order but the infantry and cavalry on the right wing to wheel to the right and those of the left wing to wheel to the left. 23. Then taking, himself from the right wing and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Junius from the left, the leading three troops of horse and placing in front of them the usual number of velites and three maniples (this body of infantry the Romans call a cohort), he advanced straight on the enemy at a rapid pace, wheeling in the one case to the left and in the other to the right, the rear ranks always following the direction of the front ones. When they were not far away from the enemy, while the Spaniards, who continued their direct advance, were still at some distance, as they were marching slowly, he fell, as he had originally intended, directly on both wings of the enemy with the Roman forces. The subsequent movements, which enabled the rear ranks to get into the same line as the leading ones and place themselves in a position to attack the enemy, were in contrary directions both as regards the right and left wings and as regards the infantry and cavalry. For the cavalry and light infantry on the right wing wheeling to the right attempted to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry wheeled to the left. On the left

ταῖς σπείραις ἐκ δόρατος, οἱ δ' ἱππεῖς μετὰ τῶν
7 γροσφομάχων ἐξ ἡνίας. ἐγεγόνει μὲν οὖν ἐκ
τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν εὐζώνων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν
κεράτων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως τὸ δεξιὸν εὐώνυ-
8 μον. οὗ μικρὸν λόγον θέμενος ὁ στρατηγὸς τοῦ
μείζονος ἐποιήσατο πρόνοιαν, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπερ-
9 κέρασιν, ὀρθῶς λογιζόμενος· εἰδέναι μὲν γὰρ δεῖ
τὸ γινόμενον, χρῆσθαι δὲ ταῖς πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἁρμο-
ζούσαις κινήσεσιν.

24 Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων συμπλοκῆς τὰ μὲν θηρία διὰ
τῶν γροσφομάχων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων ἀκοντιζόμενα
καὶ διαταραττόμενα πανταχόθεν ἔπασχε μὲν κακῶς,
ἔβλαπτε δ' οὐδὲν ἧττον τοὺς φίλους ἢ τοὺς πολε-
μίους· φερόμενα γὰρ εἰκῇ τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας ἐξ
2 ἀμφοῖν αἰεὶ διέφθειρε. τῆς δὲ πεζικῆς δυνάμεως
τὰ μὲν κέρατα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐθραύετο, τὸ
δὲ μέσον τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Λίβυας, ὅπερ ἦν χρησιμώ-
3 τατον, εἰς τέλος ἄπρακτον ἦν· οὔτε γὰρ παρα-
βοηθεῖν ἠδύναντο τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν κεράτων, λιπόντες
τὸν ἴδιον τόπον διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰβήρων ἔφοδον,
οὔτε μένοντες ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐνεργεῖν τι
τῶν δεόντων οἷοί τ' ἦσαν διὰ τὸ μὴ συνιέναι τοὺς
κατὰ πρόσωπον πολεμίους αὐτοῖς εἰς τὰς χεῖρας.
4 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ χρόνον μέν τινα διηγωνίζοντο τὰ
κέρατα γενναίως διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἑκατέροις
5 συνεστάναι τὸν κίνδυνον. ἤδη δὲ τοῦ καύματος
ἐφεστῶτος κατὰ τὴν ἀκμήν, οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι
παρελύοντο διὰ τὸ μὴ πεποιῆσθαι τὴν ἔξοδον κατὰ
τὴν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν, κεκωλῦσθαι δὲ τῆς ἁρμο-
6 ζούσης παρασκευῆς, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει
καὶ ταῖς εὐψυχίαις καθυπερεῖχον, καὶ μάλιστα
τῷ τοῖς χρησιμωτάτοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀχρειοτάτους

wing the maniples wheeled to the right and the cavalry and velites to the left. The consequence of this was that the right of the cavalry and light-armed troops on both wings had become their left. But the general, regarding this as of small importance, devoted his intention to the really important object —outflanking the enemy—and he estimated rightly, for a general should, of course, know the actual course of events, but employ those movements which are suited to an emergency.

24. In consequence of this attack the elephants, assailed by the missiles of the cavalry and velites and harassed on every side, were suffering much, and doing as much damage to their own side as to the enemy. For in their wild rush they destroyed all, friend or foe, who came in their way. As for the infantry the wings of the Carthaginians were broken, and the centre, where stood the Libyans, the flower of the army, was of no service, as they could neither leave their original position to help those on the wings, for fear of attack by the Spaniards, nor, remaining where they were, could they operate effectively, as the enemy in front of them would not come to blows. The wings, however, kept up a gallant struggle for some time, as each side was aware that all depended on the result of this battle. But when the heat of the day was at its height, the Carthaginians grew faint, as they had not left their camp on their own initiative and had been prevented from preparing themselves properly, while the Romans began to exhibit superior strength and spirit, chiefly because, owing to the foresight of their

τῶν πολεμίων συμβεβληκέναι διὰ τὴν τοῦ στρα-
7 τηγοῦ πρόνοιαν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οἱ περὶ
τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν κατὰ πόδα πιεζούμενοι τὴν ἀνα-
χώρησιν ἐποιοῦντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κλίναντες
ἀθρόοι πρὸς τὴν παρώρειαν ἀπεχώρουν· ἐγκει-
μένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βιαιότερον ἔφευγον εἰς
8 τὸν χάρακα προτροπάδην. εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ θεὸς
αὐτοῖς τις συνεπελάβετο τῆς σωτηρίας, παραχρῆμ'
9 ἂν ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς. ἐπιγενομένης
δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα συστροφῆς ἐξαισίου, καὶ καταρ-
ραγέντος ὄμβρου λάβρου καὶ συνεχοῦς, μόλις
εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν στρατοπεδείαν ἀνεκομίσθησαν οἱ
Ῥωμαῖοι. . . .

11 Τὸ δὲ τετηκὸς καὶ συνερρυηκὸς ἀργύριον καὶ
χρυσίον ἀναζητοῦντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς πλεῖστοι
Ῥωμαίων διεφθάρησαν. . . .

24[1] Ὅτι πάντων εὐδαιμονιζόντων τὸν Πόπλιον μετὰ
τὸ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐξελάσαι τῆς Ἰβηρίας, καὶ
παρακαλούντων ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἐπεὶ
πέρας ἐπιτέθεικε τῷ πολέμῳ, μακαρίζειν αὐτοὺς
2 ἔφη διότι τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς ἐλπίδας, αὐτὸς δὲ
νῦν καὶ μάλιστα βουλεύεσθαι τίνα τρόπον ἄρξηται
3 τοῦ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πολέμου· τὸν μὲν γὰρ πρὸ
τούτου χρόνον Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις πεπολεμη-
κέναι, νυνὶ δὲ τὴν τύχην παραδεδωκέναι καιρὸν εἰς
τὸ Ῥωμαίους Καρχηδονίοις ἐξενεγκεῖν πόλεμον. . . .

4 Ὅτι ὁ Πόπλιος διαλεχθεὶς τῷ Σόφακι, ἅτε δὴ
πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυὴς ὑπάρχων, οὕτω φιλ-
ανθρώπως ὡμίλησε καὶ ἐπιδεξίως ὥστε τὸν Ἀ-
σδρούβαν εἰπεῖν ταῖς ὕστερον ἡμέραις πρὸς τὸν
Σόφακα διότι φοβερώτερος αὐτῷ Πόπλιος πέφηνε
κατὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν ἢπερ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις. . . .

commander, their choicest troops encountered here the least efficient of the enemy. At first Hasdrubal's men, yielding to the pressure, retired step by step, but later they gave way in a body and retreated to the foot of the hill, and when the Romans pushed their attack home with more violence they fled in rout to their camp. Had not some deity interposed to save them they would have been at once driven out of their entrenchments, but now arose an unprecedented disturbance in the heavens, and such heavy and continuous torrents of rain fell, that the Romans with difficulty made their way back to their own camp. . . .

Many of the Romans perished by fire in their search for the molten masses of silver and gold. . . .

24ª. When everyone congratulated Scipio on having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain and entreated him to rest and take his ease, as he had put an end to the war, he said he considered them happy in having such hopes, but that for his own part now especially the time had come when he had to consider how he should begin the war against Carthage; for up to now the Carthaginians had been making war on the Romans, but now chance had given the Romans the opportunity of making war on the Carthaginians. . . .

Scipio, who was highly gifted in this respect, spoke to Syphax with such urbanity and adroitness that Hasdrubal afterwards said to Syphax that Scipio had seemed to him to be more formidable in his conversation than on the field of battle. . . .

25 Ὅτι στάσεως γενομένης τινῶν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῷ Ῥωμαϊκῷ, ὁ Πόπλιος, καίπερ ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐφ' ἱκανόν, ὅμως οὐδέποτε μᾶλλον εἰς ἀπορίαν ἦκε καὶ δυσχρηστίαν. καὶ
2 τοῦτ' ἔπασχε κατὰ λόγον· καθάπερ <γὰρ> ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς μὲν ἐκτὸς αἰτίας τοῦ βλάπτειν, λέγω δ' οἷον ψύχους, καύματος, κόπου, τραυμάτων, καὶ πρὶν γίνεσθαι φυλάξασθαι δυνατὸν καὶ γενομέναις εὐμαρὲς βοηθῆσαι, τὰ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων γινόμενα φύματα καὶ νόσους δυσχερὲς
3 μὲν προϊδέσθαι, δυσχερὲς δὲ γενομένοις βοηθεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ περὶ πολιτείας καὶ περὶ
4 στρατοπέδων διαληπτέον. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἔξωθεν ἐπιβουλὰς καὶ πολέμους πρόχειρος ὁ τρόπος τῆς
5 παρασκευῆς καὶ βοηθείας τοῖς ἐφιστάνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς γενομένας ἀντιπολιτείας καὶ στάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς δύσχρηστος ἡ βοήθεια καὶ μεγάλης ἐπιδεξιότητος καὶ διαφερούσης ἀγχινοίας
6 δεομένη· πλὴν ἑνὸς παραγγέλματος, ὃ πᾶσιν ἁρμόσει, <δεῖ> καὶ στρατοπέδοις καὶ πόλεσι καὶ
7 σώμασιν, ὡς ἐμὴ δόξα. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἐᾶν ἐπὶ πολὺ ῥᾳθυμεῖν καὶ σχολάζειν περὶ μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων, ἥκιστα δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐροίαις τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἐν ταῖς δαψιλείαις
8 τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. πλὴν ὅ γε Πόπλιος, ἅτε διαφερόντως ἐπιμελὴς ὤν, καθάπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπον, ἔτι δ' ἀγχίνους καὶ πρακτικός, συναθροίσας τοὺς χιλιάρχους τοιάνδε τινὰ τῶν ἐνεστώτων εἰσηγεῖτο
9 λύσιν. ἔφη γὰρ δεῖν ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς στρατιώταις τὴν τῶν ὀψωνίων ἀπόδοσιν· χάριν δὲ τοῦ πιστεύεσθαι τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν, τὰς ἐπιτεταγμένας εἰσφορὰς ταῖς πόλεσι πρότερον εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς στρατο-

Mutiny in the Roman Army

25. When a sedition broke out among some of the soldiers in the Roman camp, Scipio, though he had by this time gained considerable practical experience, never found himself in such difficulty and perplexity. And this was only to be expected. For just as in the case of our bodies external causes of injury, such as cold, extreme heat, fatigue, and wounds, can be guarded against before they happen and easily remedied when they do happen, but growths and abscesses which originate in the body itself can with difficulty be foreseen and with difficulty be cured when they happen, we should assume the same to be true of a state or an army. As for plots and wars from outside, it is easy, if we are on the watch, to prepare to meet them and to find a remedy, but in the case of intestine opposition, sedition, and disturbance it is a difficult task to hit on a remedy, a task requiring great adroitness and exceptional sagacity. There is one rule, however, which in my opinion is equally applicable to armies, cities, and to the body, and that is never to allow any of them to remain long indolent and inactive and especially when they enjoy prosperity and plenty. Scipio, as I have said, was exceptionally painstaking and at the same time very sagacious and practical, and he now summoned the tribunes and laid before them the following plan for relieving the present situation. He said they should undertake to pay the men their arrears, and in order to secure credence for this promise, collect at once publicly and energetically

πέδου χορηγίαν ταύτας νῦν ἀθροίζειν ἐπιφανῶς
καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὡς πρὸς τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν
10 ὀψωνίων γινομένης τῆς παρασκευῆς· τοὺς δὲ
χιλιάρχους τοὺς αὐτοὺς πάλιν πορευθέντας ἀξιοῦν
καὶ παρακαλεῖν μετατίθεσθαι τὴν ἄγνοιαν καὶ
κομίζεσθαι τὰς σιταρχίας, παραγινομένους ὡς
αὐτόν, ἄν τε κατὰ μέρη βούλωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν
11 ἄν θ' ὁμοῦ πάντες. γενομένου δὲ τούτου τὸ
λοιπὸν ἤδη παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἔφη δεῖν βου-
λεύεσθαι τί δέον ἐστὶ πράττειν.

26 Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διανοηθέντες ἐγίνοντο
2 περὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐπιμέλειαν· . . . . . τῶν
δὲ χιλιάρχων διασαφούντων τὰ δεδογμένα, γνοὺς
ὁ Πόπλιος ἀνεκοινοῦτο τῷ συνεδρίῳ τί δέον ἐστὶ
3 ποιεῖν. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἡμέραν διασαφήσαντας
εἰς ἣν δεήσει παρεῖναι, πρὸς μὲν τὸ πλῆθος δια-
λύεσθαι, τοὺς δ' αἰτίους κολάζειν πικρῶς· οὗτοι
4 δ' ἦσαν εἰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμόν. τῆς
δ' ἡμέρας ἐπελθούσης, καὶ παραγενομένων τῶν
ἀποστατῶν ἐπί τε τὰς διαλύσεις καὶ τὴν κομιδὴν
5 τῶν ὀψωνίων, τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις τοῖς πρε-
σβεύσασι συνέταξε δι' ἀπορρήτων ὁ Πόπλιος
ἅπαντᾶν τοῖς ἀποστάταις καὶ διελομένους ἕκαστον
πέντε τῶν ἀρχηγῶν τῆς στάσεως εὐθέως κατὰ
τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπεῖν καὶ καλεῖν ὡς αὐτούς,
μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς κατασκήνωσιν· οἳ δ' ἂν μὴ
δύνωνται τοῦτο, πρός γε δεῖπνον καὶ τοιαύτην
6 συνουσίαν. τῷ δὲ μεθ' αὑτοῦ στρατοπέδῳ παρ-
ήγγειλε πρὸ ἡμερῶν τριῶν ἐφόδια παρεσκευάσθαι
κατὰ πλείω χρόνον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην αὐτῶν
7 μετὰ Μάρκου πορευομένων. ὃ καὶ θαρραλεω-
τέρους αὐτοὺς ἀκούσαντας ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀποστάτας·

the contributions formerly imposed on the cities for the maintenance of the whole army, making it evident that the measure was taken to adjust the irregularity of payment. He begged the same officers to return to their troops and urge them to retrieve their error and present themselves before him to receive their pay either singly or in a body. When this had been done he said it would be time to consult what further action the circumstances demanded.

26. The officers with this object in view applied themselves to collecting the money.[a] . . . When the tribunes communicated the decision to Scipio he, on hearing of it, laid before the council his views as to what should be done. It was decided to fix a day for the soldiers to present themselves and then come to terms with the rank and file, but to punish severely the authors of the mutiny, who numbered about five and thirty. When the day arrived and the mutineers came to make terms and receive their pay, Scipio gave secret instructions to the tribunes who had been deputed to him to meet the mutineers and each attaching to himself five of the ringleaders, at once upon meeting them make professions of friendship and invite them to their quarters, if possible to lodge there, but if that were impossible to take supper and carouse afterwards. Three days previously he had ordered the legion he had with him to furnish themselves with provisions for a considerable time on the pretext that they were marching under Marcus against Andobales. This, when it reached their ears, gave the mutineers increased confidence, as they thought that they

[a] It is evident from Livy xxviii. 25. 15 that a good deal is missing.

ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἔσεσθαι τὴν πλείστην ἐξουσίαν, ἐπειδὰν συμμίξωσι τῷ στρατηγῷ τῶν ἄλλων στρατοπέδων κεχωρισμένων.

27 Συνεγγιζόντων δ' αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις στρατιώταις εἰς τὴν ἐπαύριον ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ παρηγγέλλετο μετὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐξάγειν, 2 τοῖς δὲ χιλιάρχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐπάρχοις, ὅταν ἐκπορευομένοις . . . μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον τὰς μὲν ἀποσκευὰς ἀποτιθέναι, τοὺς δὲ στρατιώτας κατέχειν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐπὶ τῆς πύλης, κἄπειτα διελεῖν σφᾶς ἐφ' ἑκάστην τῶν πυλῶν καὶ φροντίζειν ἵνα 3 μηδεὶς ἐκπορεύηται τῶν ἀποστατῶν. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀπάντησιν ἀποτεταγμένοι, συμμίξαντες τοῖς παραγινομένοις πρὸς αὐτούς, ἀπῆγον μετὰ φιλανθρωπίας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις κατὰ τὸ συν- 4 τεταγμένον. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἐρρήθη συλλαβεῖν τοὺς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντ' ἄνδρας, ἐπειδὰν δειπνήσωσι, δήσαντάς ‹τε› τηρεῖν, μηδενὸς ἔτι τῶν ἔνδον ἐκπορευομένου πλὴν τοῦ διασαφήσοντος τῷ στρατηγῷ παρ' ἑκάστου τὸ γεγονός. 5 πραξάντων δὲ τῶν χιλιάρχων τὸ συνταχθέν, εἰς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ θεωρῶν τοὺς παραγινομένους ἠθροισμένους εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, 6 συνεκάλει τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. πάντων δὲ συντρεχόντων κατὰ τὸν ἐθισμὸν ἅμα τῷ σημῆναι, καὶ μετεώρων ὄντων ταῖς διανοίαις ‹οἷόν› ποτ' ὄψονται τὸν στρατηγὸν καὶ τί ποτ' ἀκούσονται περὶ τῶν 7 ἐνεστώτων, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶν χιλιάρχους ὁ Πόπλιος διεπέμψατο, κελεύων αὐτοὺς ἄγειν τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ περιστῆναι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ προπορευθεὶς ἐξέστησε ταῖς διανοίαις πάντας εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν

themselves would be masters of the situation when they met their general after the other legions had taken their departure.

27. When they were approaching the town he ordered the other soldiers to march out at day-break next day with all their baggage. The tribunes and prefects upon their issuing from the city were to make the soldiers deposit their baggage and halt them under arms at the gate, afterwards distributing them to guard all the gates and to see that none of the mutineers got out. Those tribunes who had been told off to meet the mutineers, when they encountered them as they advanced towards them, cordially received the most culpable of them, as had been arranged, and led them off. Orders had been given to them to arrest at once after supper the thirty-five and secure them bound, not allowing any of those inside to go out except the messenger sent by each to inform the general that the thing had been done. The tribunes acted on these orders, and next morning Scipio, seeing that the newly arrived soldiers were collected in the market-place, summoned an assembly. When they all, as they were in the habit of doing, ran to obey the summons with their curiosity fully aroused as to how the general would look, and what they would be told about the present situation, Scipio sent to the tribunes at the gates ordering them to bring their men under arms and surround the assembly. When he advanced and presented himself his appearance at once struck

8 πρώτην φαντασίαν· ἔτι γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὐτὸν ἀσθενῶς ἔχειν οἱ πολλοί, κἄπειτα παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν αἰφνιδίως ἐρρωμένον θεασάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἐπίφασιν κατεπλάγησαν.

28 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὕτω πως ἤρξατο τῶν λόγων. ἔφη γὰρ θαυμάζειν τίνι δυσαρεστήσαντες ἢ ποίαις ἐλπίσιν ἐπαρθέντες ἐπεβάλοντο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν
2 ἀπόστασιν. τρεῖς γὰρ αἰτίας εἶναι, δι' ἃς τολμῶσι στασιάζειν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς ἡγουμένους, ὅταν ‹τοῖς› προεστῶσι μέμφωνταί τι καὶ δυσχεραίνωσιν, ἢ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασι δυσαρεστῶσιν, ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία μειζόνων ὀρεχθῶσι
3 καὶ καλλιόνων ἐλπίδων. "ἐρωτῶ δὲ τί τούτων ὑμῖν ὑπῆρξεν; ἐμοὶ δῆλον ὅτι δυσηρεστήσασθε,
4 διότι τὰς σιταρχίας ὑμῖν οὐκ ἀπεδίδουν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐμὸν μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἔγκλημα· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν
5 ἐμὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν ὑμῖν ἐνέλειπε τῶν ὀψωνίων· εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἦν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης, διότι τὰ πάλαι προσ-
6 οφειλόμενα νῦν οὐ διωρθοῦτο—πότερον οὖν ἐχρῆν ἀποστάτας γενομένους τῆς πατρίδος καὶ πολεμίους τῆς θρεψάσης οὕτως ἐγκαλεῖν ἢ παρόντας λέγειν μὲν περὶ τούτων πρὸς ἐμέ, παρακαλεῖν δὲ τοὺς φίλους συνεπιλαβέσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν ὑμῖν; δοκῶ
7 γάρ, ἦν τοῦτο βέλτιον. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μισθοῦ παρά τισι στρατευομένοις ἔστιν ὅτε συγγνώμην δοτέον ἀφισταμένοις τῶν μισθοδοτῶν, τοῖς δ' ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν πολεμοῦσι καὶ γυναικῶν ἰδίων καὶ
8 τέκνων οὐδαμῶς συγχωρητέον· ἔστι γὰρ παραπλήσιον ὡς ἂν εἴ τις ὑπὸ γονέως ἰδίου φάσκων εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον ἀδικεῖσθαι παρείη μετὰ τῶν
9 ὅπλων, ἀποκτενῶν τοῦτον παρ' οὗ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸς ἔλαβε. νὴ Δί' ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τὰς μὲν κακοπαθείας

them all with amazement. For most of them still supposed him to be in feeble health, and now when contrary to their expectation they suddenly saw him looking well they were dumbfounded by the apparition.

28. He began to speak somewhat as follows. He said he wondered what grievance or what expectations had induced them to make this revolt. For there were three reasons which make men venture to revolt against their country and their officers. Either they find fault and are displeased with those in command, or they are dissatisfied with their actual situation, or indeed they entertain hopes of some improvement in their fortunes. "Which of these, I ask you," he said, "existed in your case? Evidently you were displeased with me because I did not pay what was due to you. But that was no fault of mine, for since I myself have been in command, you have been always paid in full. But if you have a grievance against Rome because your old arrears were not made good, was it the proper method of complaint to revolt against your country and take up arms against her who nourished you? Should you not rather have come and spoken to me about the matter, and begged your friends to take up your cause and help you? Yes, that, I think, would have been far better. Mercenary troops may indeed sometimes be pardoned for revolting against their employers, but no pardon can be extended to those who are fighting for themselves and their wives and children. For that is just as if a man who said he had been wronged by his own father in money matters were to take up arms to kill him who was the author of his life. Great Heavens! can you say that I imposed

ὑμῖν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους πλείους ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἐπέταττον, τὰ δὲ λυσιτελῆ καὶ τὰς ὠφελείας
10 ἑτέροις μᾶλλον ἐμέριζον· ἀλλ' οὔτε τολμᾶτε
τοῦτο λέγειν οὔτε τολμήσαντες δύναισθ' ἂν ἀπο-
11 δεῖξαι. τί οὖν ἐστιν, ἐφ' ᾧ δυσαρεστούμενοι
κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἡμῖν τὰς ἀποστάσεις ἐποιήσασθε;
τοῦτ' ἤδη βούλομαι πυθέσθαι· δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ
οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐρεῖν οὔτ' ἐπινοήσειν ὑμῶν οὐδένα.
29 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἀσχάλλοντες· πότε
γὰρ εὔροια πραγμάτων μείζων; πότε δὲ πλείω
προτερήματα γέγονε τῇ Ῥώμῃ; πότε δὲ τοῖς
2 στρατευομένοις μείζους ἐλπίδες ἢ νῦν; ἀλλ' ἴσως
<ἐρεῖ> τις τῶν ἀπηλπικότων ὅτι πλείω τὰ λυσιτελῆ
τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς προυφαίνετο καὶ μείζους
3 ἐλπίδες καὶ βεβαιότεραι· παρὰ τίσι δὴ τούτοις;
ἢ παρ' Ἀνδοβάλῃ καὶ Μανδονίῳ; καὶ τίς ὑμῶν
οὐκ οἶδε διότι πρότερον μὲν οὗτοι παρασπονδή-
σαντες Καρχηδονίους πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπέστησαν, νῦν
δὲ πάλιν ἀθετήσαντες τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ <τὴν>
πίστιν ἐχθροὺς ἡμῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναδεδείχασι;
4 καλόν γε τούτοις πιστεύσαντας πολεμίους γενέσθαι
5 τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτοῖς
εἴχετε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς κρατήσοντες τῆς Ἰβηρίας·
οὐδὲ γὰρ μετ' Ἀνδοβάλου ταχθέντες ἱκανοὶ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς ἦτε διακινδυνεύειν, μή τι καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς
6 ταττόμενοι. τί οὖν ἦν ᾧ προσείχετε; πυθέσθαι
γὰρ ἂν βουλοίμην ὑμῶν. εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία ταῖς
ἐμπειρίαις τῶν νῦν προχειρισθέντων ἡγεμόνων
καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς πιστεύοντες ἢ καὶ ταῖς ῥάβδοις
καὶ τοῖς πελέκεσι τοῖς προηγουμένοις αὐτῶν·
7 ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδὲ λέγειν πλείω καλόν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι
τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδέν· οὐδ' ἂν ἔχοιθ' ὑμεῖς

more hardship and danger on you than on others but bestowed on others a larger share of profit and booty? Neither will you dare to say so, nor could you prove it if you did. What is it then with which you are so dissatisfied at present as to revolt against me? I should very much like to know; for my opinion is that there is not one of you who will be able to tell me any grievance or think of any. 29. Nor is it that you are discontented with your present situation. When was everything so abundant, when had Rome enjoyed more success, when had her soldiers brighter hopes than now? But perhaps one of the more despondent among you will tell me that with the enemy there would be more profit for you and greater and more certain expectations! Who are these enemies? Are they Andobales and Mandonius? Who among you is not aware that, to begin with, they revolted to us after betraying Carthage and now again, breaking their oaths and pledges to us, have proclaimed themselves our enemies? A fine thing truly to rely on these men and become enemies of your own country! Again you could not hope to conquer Spain by your own arms, for you were not a match for me even if you joined Andobales' army, much less by yourselves. What then was in your minds? I should very much like to learn that from you. Unless indeed the fact was that you relied on the skill and valour of the leaders you have just appointed or on the fasces and axes that are carried before them, about which it is disgraceful even to speak further. No, my men, it was nothing of the sort, and you could not give the

δίκαιον οὐδὲ τοὐλάχιστον εἰπεῖν οὔτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς
8 οὔτε πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα. διόπερ ἐγὼ περὶ ὑμῶν
πρός τε τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπολογήσομαι,
τὰ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμολογούμενα δίκαια
9 προθέμενος. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ διότι πᾶς ὄχλος
εὐπαραλόγιστος ὑπάρχει καὶ πρὸς πᾶν εὐάγωγος.
ὅθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περί
10 τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν. καθάπερ γὰρ
κἀκείνης ἡ μὲν ἰδία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβὴς τοῖς
χρωμένοις καὶ στάσιμος, ὅταν δ' εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ
τὰ πνεύματα βία, τοιαύτη φαίνεται τοῖς χρωμένοις
οἷοί τινες ἂν ὦσιν οἱ κυκλοῦντες αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι,
11 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀεὶ καὶ φαίνεται
καὶ γίνεται πρὸς τοὺς χρωμένους οἵους ἂν ἔχῃ
12 προστάτας καὶ συμβούλους. διὸ κἀγὼ νῦν καὶ
πάντες οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ στρατοπέδου πρὸς μὲν
ὑμᾶς διαλυόμεθα καὶ πίστιν δίδομεν ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ
13 μνησικακήσειν. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους ἀκαταλ-
λάκτως διακείμεθα, κολάζειν αὐτοὺς ἀξίως καὶ
τῶν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἡμαρτη-
μένων."

30 Ἀκμὴν δὲ ταῦτ' ἔλεγε καὶ κύκλῳ μὲν οἱ στρα-
τιῶται περιεστῶτες ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀπὸ παρ-
αγγέλματος συνεψόφησαν ταῖς μαχαίραις τοὺς
θυρεούς, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις δεδεμένοι γυμνοὶ . . . οἱ
2 τῆς στάσεως αἴτιοι γεγονότες εἰσήγοντο. τῷ δὲ
πλήθει τοιοῦτον παρέστη δέος ὑπό τε τοῦ πέριξ
φόβου καὶ τῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον δεινῶν, ὥστε τῶν
μὲν μαστιγουμένων, τῶν δὲ πελεκιζομένων μήτε
τὴν ὄψιν ἀλλοιῶσαι μήτε φωνὴν προέσθαι μηδένα,
μένειν δὲ πάντας ἀχανεῖς, ἐκπεπληγμένους πρὸς
3 τὸ συμβαῖνον. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχηγοὶ τῶν κακῶν

slightest reason to justify yourselves in my eyes or in those of your country. I, therefore, will plead for you to Rome and to myself, using a plea universally acknowledged among men: and that is that all multitudes are easily misled and easily impelled to every excess, so that a multitude is ever liable to the same vicissitudes as the sea. For as the sea is by its own nature harmless to those who voyage on it and quiet, but when winds fall violently upon it seems to those who have dealings with it to be of the same character as the winds that happen to stir it, so a multitude ever appears to be and actually is to those who deal with it of the same character as the leaders and counsellors it happens to have. Therefore I, too, on the present occasion and all the superior officers of the army consent to be reconciled with you and engage to grant you amnesty. But with the guilty parties we refuse to be reconciled and have decided to punish them for their offences against their country and ourselves."

30. Hardly had he finished speaking when the men who stood round him in arms upon a signal given clashed their swords against their bucklers, and at the same time the authors of the mutiny were brought in bound and naked. The multitude of mutineers were so thoroughly cowed by fear of the surrounding force and the terror that looked them in the face, that while some of their leaders were being scourged and others beheaded none of them either changed his countenance or uttered a word, but all remained dumbfounded, smitten with astonishment and dread. After the authors of the

αἰκισθέντες εἴλκοντο διὰ μέσων, ἀπηλλαγμένοι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχόντων κατὰ κοινὸν ἔλαβον
4 τὰς πίστεις ἐφ' ᾧ μηδένα μηδενὶ μνησικακήσειν, αὐτοὶ δὲ καθ' ἕνα προϊόντες ὤμνυον τοῖς χιλιάρχοις ἢ μὴν πειθαρχήσειν τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον φρονήσειν τῇ Ῥώμῃ.
5 Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν, μεγάλων κινδύνων ἀρχὴν φυομένων καλῶς διορθωσάμενος, πάλιν ἀποκατέστησε τὰς οἰκείας δυνάμεις εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διάθεσιν. . . .

31 Ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος συναθροίσας εὐθέως ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ Καρχηδόνι τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἔλεγε περί
2 τε τῆς Ἀνδοβάλου τόλμης καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀθεσίας, καὶ πολλὰ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐνεγκάμενος παρώξυνε τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς τὴν ‹κατὰ› τῶν
3 προειρημένων δυναστῶν ὁρμήν. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐξηριθμήσατο τοὺς προγεγενημένους αὐτοῖς ἀγῶνας πρὸς Ἴβηρας ὁμοῦ καὶ πρὸς Καρχηδονίους,
4 στρατηγούντων Καρχηδονίων, ἐν οἷς ἀεὶ νικῶντας οὐ καθήκειν ἔφη νυνὶ διαπορεῖν, μήποτε πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἴβηρας Ἀνδοβάλου στρατηγοῦντος μα-
5 χόμενοι λειφθῶσι. διόπερ οὐδὲ προσδέξασθαι συναγωνιστὴν Ἰβήρων οὐδένα καθάπαξ ἔφη, δι' αὐτῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων συστήσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον,
6 ἵνα φανερὸν γένηται πᾶσιν ὡς οὐκ Ἴβηρσι Καρχηδονίους καταπολεμησάμενοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοί φασιν, ἐξεβάλομεν ἐξ Ἰβηρίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Κελτίβηρας ταῖς Ῥωμαίων ἀρεταῖς καὶ τῇ
7 σφετέρᾳ γενναιότητι νενικήκαμεν. ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ὁμονοεῖν παρῄνει καὶ θαρροῦντας, εἰ καὶ πρὸς

evil had thus been put to death with contumely, their bodies were dragged through the troops, and the rest of the mutineers received from the general and other officers a common assurance that no one would remember their past faults. Advancing singly, they took their oath to the tribunes that they would obey the orders of their officers and be guilty of no disloyalty to Rome.

Scipio then by successfully nipping in the bud what might have proved a great danger restored his forces to their original discipline.

The Revolt of Andobales and its Suppression

31. Scipio, calling a meeting of his troops in New Carthage itself, addressed them on the subject of the daring design of Andobales and his perfidy towards them. Dealing at length with this topic he thoroughly aroused the passions of the soldiers against that prince. Enumerating in the next place all the battles in which they had previously encountered the Spaniards and Carthaginians together under the command of the Carthaginians he told them that as they had in all cases won the day, they should not now have a shadow of apprehension lest they should be beaten by the Spaniards alone under Andobales. He had therefore not consented to call in the aid of a single Spaniard, but was going to give battle with his Romans alone, that it might be evident to all that it was not due to the help of the Spaniards that they had crushed the Carthaginians and driven them out of Spain, but that they had conquered both the Carthaginians and Celtiberians by Roman valour and their own brave effort. Having said this he exhorted them to be of one mind, and

ἄλλον τινά, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἰέναι τὸν κίνδυνον. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νικᾶν αὐτὸς ἔφη μετὰ τῶν θεῶν ποιή-
8 σασθαι τὴν καθήκουσαν πρόνοιαν. τῷ δὲ πλήθει τοιαύτη παρέστη προθυμία καὶ θάρσος ὥστε παραπλησίους εἶναι πάντας ἐκ τῆς ἀπόψεως τοῖς ὁρῶσι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μέλλουσιν ὅσον οὔπω πρὸς αὐτοὺς διακινδυνεύειν.

32 Τότε μὲν οὖν ταῦτ' εἰπὼν διαφῆκε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἀναξεύξας προῆγε, καὶ παραγενηθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν δεκαταῖος καὶ περαιωθεὶς τῇ τετάρτῃ μετὰ ταύτην προσεστρατοπέδευσε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, λαβὼν αὐλῶνά τινα μεταξὺ τῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν πολεμίων στρατο-
2 πεδείας. τῇ δ' ἑξῆς εἰς τὸν προειρημένον αὐλῶνα προσέβαλέ τινα θρέμματα τῶν παρεπομένων τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, συντάξας ἑτοίμους ἔχειν τοὺς ἱππεῖς τῷ Γαΐῳ, τοὺς ‹δὲ› γροσφομάχους ἐπέταξε τῶν
3 χιλιάρχων τισὶ παρασκευάζειν. ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ἰβήρων ἐπιπεσόντων ἐπὶ τὰ θρέμματ' ἐξαφῆκε τῶν γροσφομάχων τινάς. γινομένης δὲ διὰ τούτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ προσβοηθούντων ἑκατέροις πλειόνων, συνέστη μέγας ἀκροβολισμὸς τῶν πεζῶν
4 περὶ τὸν αὐλῶνα. τοῦ δὲ καιροῦ παραδιδόντος εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν, ἔχων ὁ Γάιος ἑτοίμους τοὺς ἱππεῖς κατὰ τὸ συνταχθὲν ἐπεβάλετο τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις, ἀποτεμόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς παρωρείας, ὥστε τοὺς πλείους αὐτῶν κατὰ
5 τὸν αὐλῶνα σκεδασθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων διαφθαρῆναι. γενομένου δὲ τούτου, παροξυνθέντες οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ διαγωνιάσαντες μὴ διὰ τὸ προηττῆσθαι δόξωσι καταπεπλῆχθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἐξῆγον ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ καὶ παρέταττον εἰς μάχην ἅπασαν

if ever they marched to a battle in a spirit of confidence, to do so now. As for victory he himself with the aid of the gods would take the proper steps to secure it. His words produced such zeal and confidence in the troops, that in appearance they grew all of them like men who had the enemy before their eyes and were about to do battle with them at that instant.

32. After making this speech he dismissed the meeting. Next day he set out on the march. He reached the Ebro on the tenth day and crossing it took up on the fourth day after this a position in front of the enemy, leaving a valley between his own camp and theirs. On the following day he drove into this valley some of the cattle that followed the army, ordering Laelius to hold his cavalry in readiness and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites for action. Very soon, upon the Spaniards throwing themselves on the cattle, he sent some of the velites against them, and the engagement which ensued developed, as reinforcements came up from each side, into a sharp infantry skirmish round the valley. The opportunity was now an excellent one for attacking, and Laelius, who, as he had been ordered, was holding his cavalry in readiness, charged the enemy's skirmishers, cutting them off from the hillside, so that most of them scattered about the valley and were cut down by the horsemen. Upon this the barbarians were irritated, and being in extreme anxiety lest it should be thought that this reverse at the outset had created general terror among them, they marched out in full force as soon as day dawned and drew up in order of battle.

6 τὴν δύναμιν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἕτοιμος μὲν ἦν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς Ἴβηρας ἀλογίστως συγκαταβαίνοντας εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα καὶ τάττοντας οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις, ἐπέμενε, βουλόμενος ὡς πλείστους ταύτῃ
7 χρήσασθαι τῇ παρεμβολῇ, πιστεύων μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι τοῖς ἰδίοις, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς πεζοῖς, διὰ ‹τὸ κατὰ› τὰς ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ συστάδην μάχας τόν τε καθοπλισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν Ἰβήρων.

33 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔδοξε τὸ δέον αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν τῇ παρωρείᾳ τεταγμένους τῶν πολεμίων ἀντέταττε . . . πρὸς δὲ τοὺς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα καταβεβηκότας ἄθρους ἄγων ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τέτταρας κοόρτις προσέβαλε τοῖς πεζοῖς τῶν
2 ὑπεναντίων. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον καὶ Γάιος Λαίλιος, ἔχων τοὺς ἱππεῖς, προῆγε διὰ τῶν λόφων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τὸν αὐλῶνα κατατεινόντων, καὶ προσέβαλλε τοῖς τῶν Ἰβήρων ἱππεῦσι κατὰ νώτου, καὶ συνεῖχε τούτους ἐν τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν μάχῃ. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν πεζοὶ τῶν
3 ὑπεναντίων, ἐρημωθέντες τῆς τῶν ἱππέων χρείας, οἷς πιστεύσαντες εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα κατέβησαν, ἐπιεζοῦντο καὶ κατεβαροῦντο τῇ μάχῃ, οἱ δ'
4 ἱππεῖς τὸ παραπλήσιον ἔπασχον· ἀπειλημμένοι γὰρ ἐν στενῷ καὶ δυσχρηστούμενοι πλείους ὑφ' αὑτῶν ἢ τῶν πολεμίων διεφθείροντο, τῶν μὲν ἰδίων πεζῶν ἐκ πλαγίου προσκειμένων αὐτοῖς, τῶν δὲ πολεμίων τῶν πεζῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῶν
5 δ' ἱππέων κατὰ νώτου περιεστώτων. τοιαύτης δὲ γενομένης τῆς μάχης οἱ μὲν εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα καταβάντες σχεδὸν ἅπαντες διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ

Scipio was ready for the emergency, but noticing that the Spaniards had the imprudence to descend *en masse* into the valley and to draw up not only their cavalry but their infantry on the level ground, he bided his time wishing that as many as possible of them should take up this position. He had great confidence in his own horse and still greater in his infantry, because in a pitched battle hand-to-hand they were much superior to the Spaniards both as regards their armament and as regards the quality of the men.

33. When he thought that conditions were as he desired he opposed his velites to the enemy who were drawn up at the foot of the hill, and himself advancing from his camp with four cohorts in close order against those who had come down into the valley fell upon the enemy's infantry. Simultaneously Gaius Laelius with the cavalry advanced along the ridges which descended from the camp to the valley and took the Spanish cavalry in the rear, keeping them confined to defending themselves from him. In the long run the enemy's infantry, thus deprived of the services of the cavalry, relying on whose support they had come down into the valley, found themselves hard pressed and in difficulties. The cavalry suffered no less ; for confined as they were in a narrow space and incapacitated from action, more of them destroyed each other than were destroyed by the enemy, their own infantry pressing on their flank, the enemy's infantry on their front and his cavalry hovering round their rear. Such being the conditions of the battle nearly all those who had come down into the valley were cut to

παρωρείᾳ διέφυγον. οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν εὔζωνοι, τρίτον δὲ μέρος τῆς ἁπάσης δυνάμεως, μεθ' ὧν καὶ τὸν Ἀνδοβάλην συνέβη διασωθέντα φυγεῖν εἴς τι χωρίον ὀχυρόν.

7 Πόπλιος δέ, συντέλειαν ἐπιτεθεικὼς τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἔργοις, παρῆν εἰς τὸν Ταρράκωνα ‹μετὰ› μεγίστης χαρᾶς, κάλλιστον θρίαμβον καὶ
8 καλλίστην νίκην τῇ πατρίδι κατάγων. σπεύδων δὲ μὴ καθυστερεῖν τῆς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ καταστάσεως τῶν ὑπάτων, πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν διατάξας καὶ παραδοὺς τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἰούνιον καὶ Μάρκιον, αὐτὸς ἀπέπλευσε μετὰ Γαΐου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην.

VI. Res Asiae

39 Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος Μάγνης, πρὸς ὃν ἀπελογίζετο φάσκων ὡς οὐ δικαίως αὐτὸν Ἀντίοχος ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας ἐκβαλεῖν σπουδάζει·
2 γεγονέναι γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποστάτης τοῦ βασιλέως, ἀλλ' ἑτέρων ἀποστάντων ἐπανελόμενος τοὺς ἐκείνων ἐκγόνους, οὕτως κρατῆσαι τῆς Βακτριανῶν
3 ἀρχῆς. καὶ πλείω δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν διαλεχθεὶς ἠξίου τὸν Τηλέαν μεσιτεῦσαι τὴν διάλυσιν εὐνοϊκῶς, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν Ἀντίοχον μὴ φθονῆσαι τῆς ὀνομασίας αὐτῷ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως
4 ‹καὶ› προστασίας, ὥς γ' ἐὰν μὴ συγχωρῇ τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις, οὐδετέρῳ τῆς ἀσφαλείας ὑπαρχούσης·
5 πλήθη γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγα παρεῖναι τῶν Νομάδων, δι' ὧν κινδυνεύειν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, ἐκβαρβαρωθήσεσθαι δὲ τὴν χώραν ὁμολογουμένως, ἐὰν ἐκείνους

pieces, those on the hill escaping. The latter were light-armed infantry forming the third part of the whole army, and Andobales in their company succeeded in saving his life and escaping to a strong place.

Having thus completely executed his task in Spain Scipio reached Tarraco full of joy, taking home as a gift to his country a splendid triumph and a glorious victory. He was anxious not to arrive in Rome too late for the consular elections, and after regulating everything in Spain and handing over his army to Junius Silanus and Marcius he sailed to Rome with Laelius and his other friends.

VI. Affairs of Asia

The Situation in Bactria

39. For Euthydemus himself was a native of Magnesia, and he now, in defending himself to Teleas, said that Antiochus was not justified in attempting to deprive him of his kingdom, as he himself had never revolted against the king, but after others had revolted he had possessed himself of the throne of Bactria by destroying their descendants. After speaking at some length in the same sense he begged Teleas to mediate between them in a friendly manner and bring about a reconciliation, entreating Antiochus not to grudge him the name and state of king, as if he did not yield to this request, neither of them would be safe; for considerable hordes of Nomads were approaching, and this was not only a grave danger to both of them, but if they consented to admit them, the country would certainly relapse into 206–205 B.C.

προσδέχωνται. ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ἐξαπέστειλε τὸν
Τηλέαν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον. ὁ δὲ βασιλεύς,
πάλαι περιβλεπόμενος λύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων,
πυθόμενος ταῦτα παρὰ τοῦ Τηλέου, προθύμως
ὑπήκουσε πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις διὰ τὰς προειρη-
μένας αἰτίας. τοῦ δὲ Τηλέου προσανακάμψαντος
καὶ πολλάκις πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, τέλος Εὐθύδημος
ἐξέπεμψε Δημήτριον τὸν υἱὸν βεβαιώσοντα τὰς
ὁμολογίας· ὃν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀποδεξάμενος, καὶ
νομίσας ἄξιον εἶναι τὸν νεανίσκον βασιλείας καὶ
κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔντευξιν ‹καὶ›
προστασίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπηγγείλατο δώσειν αὐτῷ
μίαν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρων· δεύτερον δὲ συν-
εχώρησε τῷ πατρὶ τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὄνομα. περὶ
δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐγγράπτους ποιησάμενος ὁμολογίας
καὶ συμμαχίαν ἔνορκον, ἀνέζευξε σιτομετρήσας
δαψιλῶς τὴν δύναμιν, προσλαβὼν καὶ τοὺς ὑπ-
άρχοντας ἐλέφαντας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Εὐθύδημον.
ὑπερβαλὼν δὲ τὸν Καύκασον καὶ κατάρας εἰς τὴν
Ἰνδικήν, τήν τε φιλίαν ἀνενεώσατο τὴν πρὸς τὸν
Σοφαγασῆνον τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Ἰνδῶν, καὶ λαβὼν
ἐλέφαντας, ὥστε γενέσθαι τοὺς ἅπαντας εἰς ἑκατὸν
καὶ πεντήκοντ', ἔτι δὲ σιτομετρήσας πάλιν ἐνταῦθα
τὴν δύναμιν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς,
Ἀνδροσθένην δὲ τὸν Κυζικηνὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνακομιδῆς
ἀπέλιπε τῆς γάζης τῆς ὁμολογηθείσης αὐτῷ παρὰ
τοῦ βασιλέως. διελθὼν δὲ τὴν Ἀραχωσίαν καὶ
περαιωθεὶς τὸν Ἐρύμανθον ποταμόν, ἦκε διὰ τῆς
Δραγγηνῆς εἰς τὴν Καρμανίαν, οὗ καὶ συν-
άπτοντος ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐποιήσατο τὴν παρα-
χειμασίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πέρας τῆς εἰς τοὺς ἄνω
τόπους στρατείας Ἀντιόχου τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν

barbarism. After speaking thus he dispatched Teleas to Antiochus. The king, who had long been on the look-out for a solution of the question when he received Teleas' report, gladly consented to an accommodation owing to the reasons above stated. Teleas went backwards and forwards more than once to both kings, and finally Euthydemus sent off his son Demetrius to ratify the agreement. Antiochus, on receiving the young man and judging him from his appearance, conversation, and dignity of bearing to be worthy of royal rank, in the first place promised to give him one of his daughters in marriage and next gave permission to his father to style himself king. After making a written treaty concerning other points and entering into a sworn alliance, Antiochus took his departure, serving out generous rations of corn to his troops and adding to his own the elephants belonging to Euthydemus. Crossing the Caucasus he descended into India and renewed his alliance with Sophagasenus the Indian king. Here he procured more elephants, so that his total force of them amounted now to a hundred and fifty, and after a further distribution of corn to his troops, set out himself with his army, leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus to collect the treasure which the king had agreed to pay. Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Erymanthus he reached Carmania through Drangene, where, as winter was now at hand, he took up his quarters. Such was the final result of Antiochus's expedition into the interior, an

συντέλειαν, δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἄνω σατράπας
ὑπηκόους ἐποιήσατο τῆς ἰδίας ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὰς ἐπιθαλαττίους πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ
15 Ταύρου δυνάστας, καὶ συλλήβδην ἠσφαλίσατο
τὴν βασιλείαν, καταπληξάμενος τῇ τόλμῃ καὶ
16 φιλοπονίᾳ πάντας τοὺς ὑποταττομένους· διὰ γὰρ
ταύτης τῆς στρατείας ἄξιος ἐφάνη τῆς βασιλείας
οὐ μόνον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς
κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην.

expedition by which he not only brought the upper satraps under his rule, but also the maritime cities and the princes this side of Taurus. In a word he put his kingdom in a position of safety, overawing all subject to him by his courage and industry. It was this expedition, in fact, which made him appear worthy of his throne not only to the inhabitants of Asia, but to those of Europe likewise.

FRAGMENTA LIBRI XII

I. Res Africae

2 Τὰ παραπλήσια τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἡρόδοτον ἱστορεῖ
περὶ τοῦ ἐν Λιβύῃ καλουμένου λωτοῦ αὐτόπτης
γενόμενος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης Πολύβιος ἐν τῇ ιβ′
2 τῶν ἱστοριῶν λέγων οὕτως· "Ἔστι δὲ τὸ δένδρον
ὁ λωτὸς οὐ μέγα, τραχὺ δὲ καὶ ἀκανθῶδες, ἔχει
δὲ φύλλον χλωρὸν παραπλήσιον τῇ ῥάμνῳ, μικρὸν
3 βαθύτερον καὶ πλατύτερον. ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τὰς
μὲν ἀρχὰς ὅμοιός ἐστι καὶ τῇ χρόᾳ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει
4 ταῖς λευκαῖς μυρτίσι ταῖς τετελειωμέναις, αὐξανό-
μενος δὲ τῷ μὲν χρώματι γίνεται φοινικοῦς, τῷ δὲ
μεγέθει ταῖς γογγύλαις ἐλαίαις παραπλήσιος,
5 πυρῆνα δὲ ἔχει τελέως μικρόν. ἐπὰν δὲ πεπανθῇ,
συνάγουσι, καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις μετὰ χόνδρου
κόψαντες σάττουσιν εἰς ἀγγεῖα, τὸν δὲ τοῖς
ἐλευθέροις ἐξελόντες τὸν πυρῆνα συντιθέασιν
6 ὡσαύτως, καὶ σιτεύονται τοῦτον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ
βρῶμα παραπλήσιον σύκῳ καὶ φοινικοβαλάνῳ,
7 τῇ δὲ εὐωδίᾳ βέλτιον. γίνεται δὲ καὶ οἶνος ἐξ
αὐτοῦ βρεχομένου καὶ τριβομένου δι' ὕδατος,
κατὰ μὲν τὴν γεῦσιν ἡδὺς καὶ ἀπολαυστικός,
οἰνομέλιτι χρηστῷ παραπλήσιος, ᾧ χρῶνται χωρὶς
8 ὕδατος. οὐ δύναται δὲ πλέον δέκα μένειν ἡμερῶν·

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XII

I. The Lotus [a]

2. Polybius in the twelfth book of his histories gives from personal observation the same account as Herodotus of the so-called lotus of Africa. He says : " The lotus is not a large tree, but it is rough and thorny. Its leaf resembles that of the black-thorn, but is rather wider and flatter. The fruit at first both in colour and size resembles the white myrtle berry when fully grown, but as it grows it becomes purple in colour and about the size of a round olive. The stone is quite small. They gather it when ripe, and after pounding what is meant for the slaves pack it with salt in jars. They remove the stones from the portion meant for freemen and store it in the same way and on this they feed. The food rather resembles figs or dates, but has a better aroma. Wine is also made from it by moistening it and crushing it in water. This wine is sweet and of an agreeable flavour, resembling very good metheglin, and they drink it unwatered. It does not, however, keep for more than ten days, so that they make it

[a] From Athenaeus xiv. 651 D.

διὸ καὶ ποιοῦσι κατὰ βραχὺ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. ποιοῦσι δὲ καὶ ὄξος ἐξ αὐτῶν.''

II. Timaei de Africa et Corsica errores

3 Τὴν μὲν τῆς χώρας ἀρετὴν πᾶς ἄν τις θαυμά-
2 σειε, τὸν δὲ Τίμαιον εἴποι τις ἂν οὐ μόνον ἀνιστό-
ρητον γεγονέναι περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, ἀλλὰ
καὶ παιδαριώδη καὶ τελέως ἀσυλλόγιστον καὶ
ταῖς ἀρχαίαις φήμαις ἀκμὴν ἐνδεδεμένον, ἃς
παρειλήφαμεν, ὡς ἀμμώδους πάσης καὶ ξηρᾶς
3 καὶ ἀκάρπου καθυπαρχούσης τῆς Λιβύης. ὁ δ'
αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ζώων. τό τε γὰρ τῶν
ἵππων καὶ τῶν βοῶν καὶ προβάτων, ἅμα δὲ
τούτοις αἰγῶν πλῆθος τοσοῦτόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν
χώραν ὅσον οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ δύναιτ' ἂν εὑρεθῆναι κατὰ
4 τὴν λοιπὴν οἰκουμένην, διὰ τὸ πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ
Λιβύην ἐθνῶν τοῖς μὲν ἡμέροις μὴ χρῆσθαι καρ-
ποῖς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν θρεμμάτων καὶ σὺν τοῖς θρέμμασιν
5 ἔχειν τὸν βίον. καὶ μὴν τὸ τῶν ἐλεφάντων καὶ
λεόντων καὶ παρδάλεων πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἀλκήν,
ἔτι δὲ βουβάλων κάλλος καὶ στρουθῶν μεγέθη,
τίς οὐχ ἱστόρησεν; ὧν κατὰ μὲν τὴν Εὐρώπην τὸ
παράπαν οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ Λιβύη πλήρης ἐστὶ
6 τῶν προειρημένων. περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν ἱστορήσας
Τίμαιος ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες τἀναντία τοῖς κατ'
ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχουσιν ἐξηγεῖται.
7 Καθάπερ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ Λιβύην ἀπ-
εσχεδίακεν, οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον τὴν
8 προσαγορευομένην Κύρνον. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνης
μνημονεύων ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βύβλῳ φησὶν αἶγας ἀγρίας
καὶ πρόβατα καὶ βοῦς ἀγρίους ὑπάρχειν ἐν αὐτῇ

in small quantities when required. They also make vinegar from it."

II. Mistakes of Timaeus concerning Africa and Corsica

3. No one can help admiring the richness of the country, and one is inclined to say that Timaeus was not only unacquainted with Africa but that he was childish and entirely deficient in judgement, and was still fettered by the ancient report handed down to us that the whole of Africa is sandy, dry, and unproductive. The same holds good regarding the animals. For the number of horses, oxen, sheep, and goats in the country is so large that I doubt if so many could be found in the rest of the world, because many of the African tribes make no use of cereals but live on the flesh of their cattle and among their cattle. Again, all are aware of the numbers and strength of the elephants, lions, and panthers in Africa, of the beauty of its buffaloes, and the size of its ostriches, creatures that do not exist at all in Europe while Africa is full of them. Timaeus has no information on this subject and seems of set purpose to tell the exact opposite of the actual facts.

Regarding Corsica, too, he makes the same kind of random statements as in the case of Africa. In the account he gives of it in his second Book he tells us that there are many wild goats, sheep, and cattle

πολλούς, ἔτι δ' ἐλάφους καὶ λαγὼς καὶ λύκους καί τινα τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους περὶ ταῦτα διατρίβειν κυνηγετοῦντας καὶ τὴν ὅλην τοῦ
9 βίου διαγωγὴν ἐν τούτοις ἔχειν. κατὰ δὲ τὴν προειρημένην νῆσον οὐχ οἷον αἴξ ἄγριος ἢ βοῦς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λαγὼς οὐδὲ λύκος οὐδ' ἔλαφος οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ζῴων οὐδέν ἐστι, πλὴν ἀλωπέκων
10 καὶ κυνίκλων καὶ προβάτων ἀγρίων. ὁ δὲ κύνικλος πόρρωθεν μὲν ὁρώμενος εἶναι δοκεῖ λαγὼς μικρός, ὅταν δ' εἰς τὰς χεῖρας λάβῃ τις, μεγάλην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν βρῶσιν· γίνεται δὲ τὸ πλεῖον μέρος κατὰ γῆς.
4 δοκεῖ γε μὴν πάντ' εἶναι τὰ ζῷα κατὰ τὴν νῆσον
2 ἄγρια διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν. οὐ δύνανται κατὰ τὰς νομὰς συνακολουθεῖν οἱ ποιμαίνοντες τοῖς θρέμμασι διὰ τὸ σύνδενδρον καὶ κρημνώδη καὶ τραχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν νῆσον· ἀλλ' ὅταν βούλωνται συναθροῖσαι, κατὰ τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους ἐφιστάμενοι τῇ σάλπιγγι συγκαλοῦσι τὰ ζῷα, καὶ πάντα πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἰδιαπτώτως συντρέχει σάλπιγγα.
3 λοιπὸν ὅταν τινὲς προσπλεύσαντες πρὸς τὴν νῆσον αἶγας ἢ βοῦς θεάσωνται νεμομένας ἐρήμους, κἄπειτα βουληθῶσι καταλαβεῖν, οὐ προσίεται
4 τὰ ζῷα διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν, ἀλλὰ φεύγει. ὅταν δὲ καὶ συνιδὼν ὁ ποιμὴν τοὺς ἀποβαίνοντας σαλπίσῃ, προτροπάδην ἅμα φέρεται καὶ συντρέχει πρὸς τὴν σάλπιγγα. διὸ φαντασίαν ἀγρίων ποιεῖ· ὑπὲρ ὧν Τίμαιος κακῶς καὶ παρέργως ἱστορήσας
5 ἐσχεδίασε. τὸ δὲ τῇ σάλπιγγι πειθαρχεῖν οὐκ ἔστι θαυμάσιον· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἱ τὰς ὗς τρέφοντες οὕτω χειρίζουσι τὰ κατὰ τὰς
6 νομάς. οὐ γὰρ ἔπονται κατὰ πόδας οἱ συοφορβοὶ

in it, as well as deer, hares, wolves, and certain other animals, and that the inhabitants spend their time in hunting those animals, this being their sole occupation. The fact is that in this island not only is there not a single wild goat or wild ox, but there are not even any hares, wolves, deer, or similar animals, with the exception of foxes, rabbits, and wild sheep. The rabbit when seen from a distance looks like a small hare, but when captured it differs much from a hare both in appearance and taste. It lives for the most part under the ground. 4. All the animals in the island, however, seem to be wild for the following reason. The shepherds are not able to follow their cattle as they graze, owing to the island being thickly wooded, rough, and precipitous, but when they want to collect the herds they take up their position on suitable spots and call them in by trumpet, all the animals without fail responding to their own trumpet. So that when people touching at the island see goats and oxen grazing by themselves and then attempt to catch them, the animals will not approach them, being unused to them, but take to flight. When the shepherd sees the strangers disembarking and sounds his trumpet the herd starts off at full speed to respond to the call. For this reason the animals give one the impression of being wild, and Timaeus, after inadequate and casual inquiry, made this random statement. It is by no means surprising that the animals should obey the call of the trumpet; for in Italy those in care of swine manage matters in the same way in pasturing them. The swineherd

τοῖς θρέμμασιν, ὥσπερ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλὰ προηγοῦνται φωνοῦντες τῇ βυκάνῃ κατὰ διάστημα, τὰ δὲ θρέμματα κατόπιν ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ συντρέχει
7 πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, καὶ τηλικαύτη γίνεται συνήθεια τοῖς ζῴοις πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν βυκάνην ὥστε θαυμάζειν καὶ δυσπαραδέκτως ἔχειν τοὺς πρώτους ἀκού-
8 σαντας. διὰ γὰρ τὴν πολυχειρίαν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν χορηγίαν μεγάλα συμβαίνει τὰ συβόσια κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μάλιστα [τὴν παλαίαν,] παρά τε τοῖς Τυρρηνικοῖς καὶ Γαλάταις, ὥστε τὴν μίαν τοκάδα χιλίους ἐκτρέφειν ὗς, ποτὲ δὲ
9 καὶ πλείους. διὸ καὶ κατὰ γένη ποιοῦνται καὶ καθ' ἡλικίαν τὰς ἐκ τῶν νυκτερευμάτων ἐξαγωγάς.
10 ὅθεν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον προαγομένων καὶ πλειόνων συστημάτων οὐ δύνανται ταῦτα κατὰ γένη τηρεῖν, ἀλλά γε συμπίπτει κατά τε τὰς ἐξελασίας καὶ νομὰς ἀλλήλοις, ὁμοίως δὲ κατὰ τὰς προσαγωγάς.
11 ἐξ ὧν αὐτοῖς ἐπινενόηται πρὸς τὸ διακρίνειν, ὅταν συμπέσῃ, χωρὶς κόπου καὶ πραγματείας τὸ κατὰ
12 βυκάνην. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ τῶν νεμόντων ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος προάγῃ φωνῶν, ὁ δ' ἐφ' ἕτερον ἀποκλίνας, αὐτὰ δι' αὑτῶν χωρίζεται τὰ θρέμματα καὶ κατακολουθεῖ ταῖς ἰδίαις βυκάναις μετὰ τοιαύτης προθυμίας ὥστε μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι βιάσασθαι μηδὲ κωλῦσαι μηδενὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ὁρμὴν
13 αὐτῶν. παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατὰ τοὺς δρυμούς, ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλοις συμπέσῃ διώκοντα τὸν καρπόν, ὁ πλείονας ἔχων χεῖρας καὶ κατευκαιρήσας περιλαβὼν τοῖς ἰδίοις θρέμμασιν ἀπάγει τὰ τοῦ πλησίον.
14 ποτὲ δὲ κλέπτης ὑποκαθίσας ἀπήλασεν, οὐδ' ἐπιγινώσκοντος τοῦ περιάγοντος πῶς ἀπέβαλε, διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀποσπᾶσθαι τὰ κτήνη τῶν περι-

does not follow behind the animals as in Greece but goes in front and sounds a horn at intervals, the animals following him and responding to the call. They have learnt so well to answer to their own horn that those who hear of this for the first time are astonished and loth to believe it. For owing to the large labouring population and the general abundance of food the herds of swine in Italy are very large, especially among the Etruscans and Gauls, so that a thousand pigs and sometimes even more are reared from one sow. They, therefore, drive them out from their night quarters in different troops according to their breed and age. Thus when several troops are driven on to the same place they cannot keep the different classes apart, but they get mixed either when they are being driven out, or when they are feeding, or when they are on the way home. They, therefore, invented the horn-call to separate them when they get mixed without trouble or fuss. For when one of the swineherds advances in one direction sounding the horn and another turns off in another direction, the animals separate of their own accord and follow the sound of their own horn with such alacrity that it is impossible by any means to force them back or arrest their course. In Greece, on the contrary, when different herds meet each other in the thickets in their search for acorns, whoever has more hands with him and has the opportunity includes his neighbour's swine with his own and carries them off, or at times a robber will lie in wait and drive some off without the man in charge of them knowing how he has lost them, as the swine become widely

ἀγόντων, ἀμιλλώμενα περὶ τὸν καρπόν, ὅταν ἀκμὴν ἄρχηται ῥεῖν. πλὴν ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον.

III. De aliis Timaei erroribus

4[a] Ὅτι διασύρας ὁ Πολύβιος τὸν Τίμαιον ἐν πολλοῖς αὖθίς φησι· Τίς ἂν ἔτι δοίη συγγνώμην ‹ἐπὶ› τοῖς τοιούτοις ἁμαρτήμασιν ἄλλως τε καὶ Τιμαίῳ τῷ προσφυομένῳ τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας
2 παρωνυχίας; ἐν αἷς Θεοπόμπου μὲν κατηγορεῖ διότι Διονυσίου ποιησαμένου τὴν ἀνακομιδὴν ἐκ Σικελίας εἰς Κόρινθον ἐν μακρᾷ νηί, Θεόπομπός φησιν ἐν στρογγύλῃ παραγενέσθαι τὸν Διονύσιον,
3 Ἐφόρου δὲ πάλιν ἄγνοιαν καταψεύδεται, φάσκων λέγειν αὐτὸν ὅτι Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος παρελάμβανε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐτῶν εἴκοσι τριῶν ὑπάρχων, δυναστεύσαι δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ δύο, μεταλλάξαι
4 δὲ τὸν βίον προσλαβὼν τοῖς ἑξήκοντα τρία· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειε δήπου τοῦ συγγραφέως εἶναι τὸ διάπτωμα, τοῦ δὲ γραφέως ὁμολογουμένως·
5 ἢ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν Ἔφορον ὑπερβεβηκέναι τῇ μωρίᾳ καὶ τὸν Κόροιβον καὶ τὸν Μαργίτην, εἰ μὴ δυνατὸς ἦν συλλογίζεσθαι διότι τὰ τετταράκοντα καὶ δύο προστεθέντα τοῖς εἴκοσι καὶ τρισὶν ἑξήκοντα
6 γίνεται καὶ πέντε· ἢ τούτου μηδαμῶς ἂν πιστευθέντος ὑπὲρ Ἐφόρου φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἁμάρτημα . . . ἐστι τοῦ γραφέως, τὸ δὲ Τιμαίου φιλεπίτιμον καὶ φιλέγκλημον οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀποδέξαιτο.

4[b] Καὶ μὴν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Πύρρου πάλιν φησὶ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἔτι νῦν ὑπόμνημα ποιουμένους τῆς κατὰ τὸ Ἴλιον ἀπωλείας ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τινὶ κατακοντίζειν ἵππον πολεμιστὴν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐν

separated from their conductors in their race for the acorn when the fruit just begins to fall. But this is enough on this subject.

III. Other Errors made by Timaeus

4ᵃ. Who could continue to pardon such faults, especially when committed by Timaeus who is so fond of cavilling at similar blemishes in others? For instance, he accuses Theopompus of stating that Dionysius was conveyed from Sicily to Corinth in a merchant ship, whereas he really travelled in a warship, and again he falsely accuses Ephorus of making a blunder because he tells us that the elder Dionysius began to reign at the age of twenty-three, reigned for forty-two years, and died at the age of sixty-three. For surely no one could say that the mistake here was the author's, but it is obviously the scribe's. Either Ephorus must have surpassed Coroebus and Margites[a] in stupidity if he could not reckon that forty-two added to twenty-three make sixty-five, or as nobody would believe this of Ephorus, the mistake is evidently due to the scribe. No one, however, could approve of Timaeus' love of cavilling and fault-finding.

4ᵇ. Again in his account of Pyrrhus he tells us that the Romans still commemorate their disaster at Troy by shooting on a certain day a war-horse

[a] The foolish and ignorant hero of the comic epic poem so entitled.

τῷ Κάμπῳ καλουμένῳ διὰ τὸ τῆς Τροίας τὴν ἅλωσιν διὰ τὸν ἵππον γενέσθαι τὸν δούριον προσαγορευόμενον, πρᾶγμα πάντων παιδαριωδέστατον·
2 οὕτω μὲν γὰρ δεήσει πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους
3 λέγειν Τρώων ἀπογόνους ὑπάρχειν· σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντες, εἰ δὲ μή γ', οἱ πλείους, ὅταν ἢ πολεμεῖν μέλλωσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἢ διακινδυνεύειν πρός τινας ὁλοσχερῶς, ἵππον προθύονται καὶ σφαγιάζονται, σημειούμενοι τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ζῴου πτώσεως.
4[c] ὁ δὲ Τίμαιος περὶ τούτου τὸ μέρος τῆς ἀλογίας οὐ μόνον ἀπειρίαν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὀψιμαθίαν δοκεῖ μοι πολλὴν ἐπιφαίνειν, ὅς γε, διότι θύουσιν ἵππον, εὐθέως ὑπέλαβε τοῦτο ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ τὴν Τροίαν ἀφ' ἵππου δοκεῖν ἑαλωκέναι.
2 Πλὴν ὅτι γε κακῶς ἱστόρηκε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Λιβύην καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Σαρδόνα, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ
3 τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἐκ τούτων ἐστὶ συμφανές, καὶ καθόλου διότι τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις μέρος ἐπισέσυρται παρ' αὐτῷ τελέως· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κυριώτατον τῆς
4 ἱστορίας. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ μὲν πράξεις ἅμα πολλαχῇ συντελοῦνται, παρεῖναι δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν πλείοσι τόποις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἀδύνατον, ὁμοίως γε μὴν οὐδ' αὐτόπτην γενέσθαι πάντων τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην τόπων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τόποις ἰδιωμάτων
5 τὸν ἕνα δυνατόν, καταλείπεται πυνθάνεσθαι μὲν ὡς παρὰ πλείστων, πιστεύειν δὲ τοῖς ἀξίοις πίστεως, κριτὴν δ' εἶναι τῶν προσπιπτόντων μὴ κακόν.
4[d] Ἐν ᾧ γένει μεγίστην ἐπίφασιν ἕλκων Τίμαιος πλεῖστον ἀπολείπεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἀληθείας·
2 τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀπέχει τοῦ δι' ἑτέρων ἀκριβῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξετάζειν ὡς οὐδὲ τούτων ὢν αὐτόπτης γέγονε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς αὐτὸς ἥκει τόπους, οὐδὲ περὶ

before the city in the Campus Martius, because the capture of Troy was due to the wooden horse—a most childish statement. For at that rate we should have to say that all barbarian tribes were descendants of the Trojans, since nearly all of them, or at least the majority, when they are entering on a war or on the eve of a decisive battle sacrifice a horse, divining the issue from the manner in which it falls. 4[c]. Timaeus in dealing with the foolish practice seems to me to exhibit not only ignorance but pedantry in supposing that in sacrificing a horse they do so because Troy was said to have been taken by means of a horse.

But from all this it is evident that the account he gives of Africa, of Sardinia, and especially of Italy, is inaccurate, and we see that generally the task of investigation has been entirely scamped by him, and this is the most important part of history. For since many events occur at the same time in different places, and one man cannot be in several places at one time, nor is it possible for a single man to have seen with his own eyes every place in the world and all the peculiar features of different places, the only thing left for an historian is to inquire from as many people as possible, to believe those worthy of belief and to be an adequate critic of the reports that reach him.

4[d]. In this respect Timaeus, while making a great parade of accuracy, is, in my opinion, wont to be very short of the truth. So far is he from accurate investigation of the truth by questioning others that not even about matters he has seen with his own eyes and places he has actually visited does he tell

3 τούτων οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἡμῖν ἐξηγεῖται. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται δῆλον, ἐὰν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν δείξωμεν
4 αὐτὸν ἀγνοοῦντα περὶ ὧν ἀποφαίνεται· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐ πολλῶν ἔτι προσδεήσει λόγων ὑπέρ γε τῆς ψευδολογίας, ἐὰν ἐν οἷς ἔφυ καὶ ἐτράφη τόποις, καὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις [ἐν τούτοις] ἀγνοῶν εὑρεθῇ καὶ παραπαίων τῆς ἀληθείας.
5 φησὶ τοιγαροῦν τὴν Ἀρέθουσαν κρήνην τὴν ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ἔχειν τὰς πηγὰς ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον διά τε τῆς Ἀρκαδίας καὶ διὰ τῆς
6 Ὀλυμπίας ῥέοντος [ποταμοῦ] Ἀλφειοῦ· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ δύντα κατὰ γῆς <καὶ> τετρακισχιλίους σταδίους ὑπὸ τὸ Σικελικὸν ἐνεχθέντα πέλαγος ἀναδύνειν
7 ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις, γενέσθαι δὲ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ κατά τινα χρόνον οὐρανίων ὄμβρων ῥαγέντων κατὰ τὸν τῶν Ὀλυμπίων καιρὸν καὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ
8 τοὺς κατὰ τὸ τέμενος ἐπικλύσαντος τόπους, ὅνθου τε πλῆθος ἀναβλύζειν τὴν Ἀρέθουσαν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν πανήγυριν θυομένων βοῶν καὶ φιάλην χρυσῆν ἀναβαλεῖν, ἣν ἐπιγνόντες εἶναι τῆς ἑορτῆς ἀνείλοντο.

IV. De Timaei erroribus commissis de rebus Locrensium

5 Ἐμοὶ δὴ συμβαίνει καὶ παραβεβληκέναι πλεονάκις εἰς τὴν τῶν Λοκρῶν πόλιν καὶ παρεσχῆσθαι
2 χρείας αὐτοῖς ἀναγκαίας· καὶ γὰρ τῆς εἰς Ἰβηρίαν στρατείας αὐτοὺς παραλυθῆναι συνέβη δι' ἐμὲ καὶ τῆς εἰς Δαλματεῖς, ἣν ὤφειλον κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκ-
3 πέμπειν Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας. ἐξ ὧν καὶ κακοπαθείας καὶ κινδύνου καὶ δαπάνης ἱκανῆς τινος ἀπολυθέντες πᾶσιν ἡμᾶς ἠμείψαντο τοῖς

us anything trustworthy. This will become evident if we can show that in talking of Sicily he makes mistaken statements. For we may almost say that no further evidence of his inaccuracy is required, if as regards the country where he was born and bred and the most celebrated spots in it we find him mistaken and widely diverging from the truth. He tells us, then, that the fountain of Arethusa in Syracuse derives its source from the river Alpheius in the Peloponnese which runs through Arcadia and past Olympia. This river, he says, diving into the earth and travelling four thousand stades under the Sicilian Sea reappears in Syracuse. This, he adds, is proved by the fact that once upon a time after heavy rains at the season of the Olympian festival, when the river had flooded the sanctuary, Arethusa threw up a quantity of dung from the beasts sacrificed at the festival and even a gold bowl which they recognized as coming from the festival and made away with.

IV. Errors of Timaeus about Locri

5. I happen to have paid several visits to Locri and to have rendered the Locrians important services. It was indeed through me that they were excused from serving in the Spanish and Dalmatian campaigns, in both of which they were required by the terms of their treaty to send aid to the Romans by sea. In consequence they were relieved from considerable hardship, danger, and expense, and in return conferred on me all kinds of honours and

τιμίοις καὶ φιλανθρώποις· διόπερ ὀφείλω μᾶλλον
4 εὐλογεῖν Λοκροὺς ἢ τοὐναντίον. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ
ὤκνησα καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν ὅτι τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρι-
στοτέλους παραδιδομένην ἱστορίαν περὶ τῆς ἀποι-
κίας ἀληθινωτέραν εἶναι συμβαίνει τῆς ὑπὸ Τιμαίου
5 λεγομένης. σύνοιδα γὰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁμολο-
γοῦσιν ὅτι παραδόσιμος αὐτοῖς ἐστιν αὕτη περὶ
τῆς ἀποικίας ἡ φήμη παρὰ πατέρων, ἣν Ἀρι-
στοτέλης εἴρηκεν, οὐ Τίμαιος. καὶ τούτων γε
6 τοιαύτας ἔφερον ἀποδείξεις. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι
πάντα τὰ διὰ προγόνων ἔνδοξα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ
τῶν γυναικῶν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐστιν, οἷον
εὐθέως εὐγενεῖς παρὰ σφίσι νομίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀπὸ
7 τῶν ἑκατὸν οἰκιῶν λεγομένους· ταύτας δ' εἶναι
τὰς ἑκατὸν οἰκίας τὰς προκριθείσας ὑπὸ τῶν
Λοκρῶν πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐξελθεῖν, ἐξ ὧν
ἔμελλον οἱ Λοκροὶ κατὰ τὸν χρησμὸν κληροῦν
8 τὰς ἀποσταλησομένας παρθένους εἰς Ἴλιον. τού-
των δή τινας τῶν γυναικῶν συνεξᾶραι μετὰ τῆς
ἀποικίας, ὧν τοὺς ἀπογόνους ἔτι νῦν εὐγενεῖς
νομίζεσθαι καὶ καλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἑκατὸν
9 οἰκιῶν. πάλιν ὑπὲρ τῆς φιαληφόρου παρ' αὐτοῖς
10 λεγομένης τοιαύτη τις ἱστορία παραδέδοτο, διότι
καθ' ὃν καιρὸν τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἐκβάλοιεν τοὺς
κατασχόντας τὸν τόπον τοῦτον τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὧν
καὶ ταῖς θυσίαις προηγεῖτο τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων καὶ
τῶν εὐγενεστάτων ὑπάρχων παῖς, αὐτοὶ καὶ πλείω
τῶν Σικελικῶν ἐθῶν παραλαβόντες διὰ τὸ μηδὲν
αὐτοῖς πάτριον ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοῦτο διαφυλάττοιεν
11 ἀπ' ἐκείνων, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο διορθώσαιντο, τὸ μὴ
παῖδα ποιεῖν ἐξ αὑτῶν τὸν φιαληφόρον, ἀλλὰ
παρθένον, διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν εὐγένειαν.

favours; so that I ought rather to speak well of the Locrians than the reverse. But nevertheless I have not hesitated to affirm both in speech and writing that the account we have received from Aristotle about the foundation of the colony is truer than that given by Timaeus. For I know that the Locrians themselves confess that the tradition handed down to them by their fathers concerning the colony is that given by Aristotle and not that of Timaeus. And of this they adduce the following proofs. First of all that at Locri all ancestral nobility is derived from women, not from men, as, for example, those are considered noble among them who are said to be of the "hundred houses." These "hundred houses" were those distinguished by the Locrians as the leading families before the colony was sent out, the families from which the Locrians, as the oracle ordered, were to select by lot the virgins they had to send to Troy. Some women belonging to these families left with the colony, and it is their descendants who are still considered noble and called "of the hundred houses." Again, as regards the virgin ministrant they call the Phialephorus the tradition is much as follows. At the time they expelled the Sicels who had occupied this site in Italy, at whose sacrifices the procession was led by a boy of one of the most celebrated and noble families, the Locrians adopted several of the Sicelian rites, as they had no inherited ritual, retaining among others this particular one, but making merely this change in it that they did not appoint one of their boys to be Phialephorus, but one of their virgins, because nobility among them was derived from women.

6 Συνθῆκαι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Λοκροὺς οὔτ' ἦσαν οὔτ' ἐλέγοντο παρ' αὐτοῖς γεγονέναι, πρὸς μέντοι Σικελοὺς πάντες εἶχον ἐν
2 παραδόσει. περὶ ὧν ἔλεγον διότι, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης παρουσίας καταλάβοιεν Σικελοὺς κατέχοντας ταύτην τὴν χώραν, ἐν ᾗ νῦν κατοικοῦσι, καταπλαγέντων αὐτοὺς ἐκείνων καὶ προσδεξα-
3 μένων διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁμολογίας ποιήσαιντο τοιαύτας, ἣ μὴν εὐνοήσειν αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινῇ τὴν χώραν ἕξειν, ἕως ἂν ἐπιβαίνωσι τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ καὶ
4 τὰς κεφαλὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς ὤμοις φορῶσι. τοιούτων δὲ τῶν ὅρκων γινομένων φασὶ τοὺς Λοκροὺς εἰς μὲν τὰ πέλματα τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἐμβαλόντας γῆν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ὤμους σκόρδων κεφαλὰς ἀφανεῖς ὑποθεμένους
5 οὕτως ποιήσασθαι τοὺς ὅρκους, κἄπειτα τὴν μὲν γῆν ἐκβαλόντας ἐκ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, τὰς δὲ κεφαλὰς τῶν σκόρδων ἀπορρίψαντας μετ' οὐ πολὺ καιροῦ παραπεσόντος ἐκβαλεῖν τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἐκ τῆς
6 χώρας. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν λέγεται παρὰ Λοκροῖς. . . .

7 Τίμαιος δ' ὁ Ταυρομενίτης ἐν τῇ ἑνάτῃ τῶν ἱστοριῶν, "οὐκ ἦν" φησί "πάτριον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὑπὸ ἀργυρωνήτων τὸ παλαιὸν διακονεῖσθαι," γράφων οὕτως· "Καθό-
8 λου δὲ ᾠήθησαν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη διημαρτηκέναι τῶν Λοκρικῶν ἐθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κεκτῆσθαι νόμον εἶναι τοῖς Λοκροῖς."

Τίμαιος δ' ὁ Ταυρομενίτης ἐκλαθόμενος αὐτοῦ—ἐλέγχει δ' αὐτὸν εἰς τοῦτο Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης διὰ τῆς δωδεκάτης τῶν ἱστοριῶν—οὐκ εἶναι ἔφη σύνηθες τοῖς Ἕλλησι δούλους κτᾶσθαι.

6. As for treaties with the Locrians of Greece proper there were none, and none were ever said to have existed, but all knew of the tradition of one with the Sicels. About this they said that when on their first arrival they found the Sicels in occupation of the place they now dwell in, and the Sicels being terror-struck at their arrival received them out of fear, they made a solemn compact to the effect that they would be their friends and share the country with them as long as they trod on this earth and wore heads on their shoulders. When they were taking the oath they say that the Locrians had put some earth into the soles of their shoes and had concealed on their shoulders under their dress some heads of garlic: in this state they took the oath, but subsequently emptying their shoes of the earth and throwing away the heads of garlic, they very shortly afterwards, when the occasion presented itself, expelled the Sicels from the country. Such is the account given by the Locrians.[a] . . .

(1) Timaeus of Tauromenium in the ninth Book of his *Histories*, says: "It was not the Greek custom to be served by purchased slaves," adding "They accused Aristotle in general of having misunderstood the Locrian customs, for (they said) the law did not permit the Locrians even to possess them."

(2) Timaeus of Tauromenium forgetting himself—he is confuted by Polybius in the twelfth Book of his *Histories*—says it was once not even the custom for the Greeks to possess slaves.

[a] From Athenaeus vi. 272 A.

6[a] Ἐκ τούτων ἄν τις συλλογιζόμενος Ἀριστοτέλει
πρόσσχοι μᾶλλον ἢ Τιμαίῳ· καὶ μὴν τὸ συνεχὲς
2 τούτῳ τελέως ἄτοπον· τὸ γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνειν,
καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος ὑποδείκνυσιν, ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς ἦν
τοὺς οἰκέτας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίοις συμμαχησάντων
τὴν τῶν κυρίων εὔνοιαν ἀναφέρειν πρὸς τοὺς
3 ἐκείνων φίλους εὔηθες· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰς εὐνοίας,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ξενίας καὶ τὰς συγγενείας τῶν
δεσποτῶν οἱ δουλεύσαντες, ὅταν εὐτυχήσωσι παρα-
δόξως καὶ χρόνος ἐπιγένηται, πειρῶνται προσ-
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ συνανανεοῦσθαι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν
4 ἀναγκαίων μᾶλλον, αὐτῷ τούτῳ σπουδάζοντες
τὴν προγεγενημένην περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐλάττωσιν καὶ
τὴν ἀδοξίαν ἐξαλείφειν, τῷ βούλεσθαι τῶν δε-
σποτῶν ἀπόγονοι μᾶλλον ἐπιφαίνειν ἥπερ ἀπελεύ-
6[b] θεροι. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα περὶ τοὺς Λοκροὺς εἰκός
ἐστι γεγονέναι· πολὺ γὰρ ἐκτοπίσαντες ἐκ τῶν
συνειδότων καὶ προσλαβόντες συνεργὸν τὸν χρόνον,
οὐχ οὕτως ἄφρονες ‹ἦσαν› ὥστε ταῦτ' ἐπιτηδεύειν,
δι' ὧν ἔμελλον ἀνανέωσιν ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἰδίων
ἐλαττωμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὐναντίον δι' ὧν ἐπι-
2 καλύψειν ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὴν ὀνομασίαν τῇ πόλει
τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν εἰκότως ἐπέθεσαν καὶ
τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν κατὰ τὰς γυναῖκας προσ-
εποιήθησαν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς φιλίας καὶ τὰς συμ-
μαχίας τὰς προγονικὰς τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀν-
3 ενεοῦντο. ᾗ καὶ τὸ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πορθῆσαι
τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν οὐδέν ἐστι σημεῖον ψευδῆ λέγειν
4 τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην· εὐλόγου γὰρ ὄντος ἐκ τῶν
προειρημένων, εἰ καὶ δεκάκις ἦσαν οἰκέται, τοῦ
προσπεποιῆσθαι τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φιλίαν
τοὺς ἐξάραντας ἐκ τῶν Λοκρῶν καὶ κατασχόντας

6ª. The inference from all this is that we should rely on Aristotle rather than on Timaeus. And what follows in the latter is quite peculiar. For it is foolish to suppose, as he hints, that it was improbable that the slaves of those who had been the allies of the Lacedaemonians should adopt the friendly feelings of their masters for the friends of those masters. Men, indeed, who have once been slaves when they meet with unexpected good fortune attempt to affect and reproduce not only the likings but the friendships and relationships of their masters, taking more pains to do so than those actually connected by blood, and hope to wipe out their former inferiority and disrepute by this very effort to appear rather as descendants than as freedmen of their late masters. 6ᵇ. And in the case of the Locrians this is especially likely to have happened. For as they had removed to a great distance from those acquainted with their past and had lapse of time on their side, they would not have been so foolish as to behave in a manner likely to revive the memory of their defects, but would have so conducted themselves as to cover these defects. They, therefore, naturally named their city after the women and pretended to be related to other Locrians on the female side, renewing also those ancestral friendships and alliances which were derived from the women. For this reason too the fact that the Athenians ravaged their country is no proof that Aristotle's statements are not correct. For, as it was to be expected from what I have said, that even had they been slaves ten times over these men who set sail from Locri and landed in Italy would have affected to be friends of the Lacedae-

εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, εὔλογος γίνεται καὶ [ἡ] τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀλλοτριότης ἢ πρὸς ⟨πάντας⟩ τοὺς προειρημένους, οὐχ ⟨οὕτως⟩ ἐξεταζόντων τὸ γένος ὡς τὴν προαίρεσιν. νὴ Δί' ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐξαπέστελλον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς ἀκμάζοντας εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τεκνοποιίας χάριν, τοὺς δὲ Λοκροὺς τὸ παραπλήσιον οὐκ εἴων ποιεῖν; ἕκαστα δὲ τούτων οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μεγάλην ἔχει διαφοράν. οὔτε γὰρ κωλύειν τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἔμελλον, αὐτοὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ποιοῦντες—ἄτοπον γάρ—οὐδὲ μὴν κελευόντων αὐτῶν οἱ Λοκροὶ πάντως ποιήσειν ἐκείνοις τὸ παραπλήσιον. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ πάτριον ἦν καὶ σύνηθες τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔχειν τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τέτταρας, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀδελφοὺς ὄντας, καὶ τὰ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινά, καὶ γεννήσαντα παῖδας ἱκανοὺς ἐκδόσθαι γυναῖκά τινι τῶν φίλων καλὸν καὶ σύνηθες. διόπερ οἱ Λοκροὶ μήτε ταῖς ἀραῖς ὄντες ἔνοχοι μήτε τοῖς ὅρκοις, ⟨οἷς⟩ ὤμοσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ πρότερον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπανήξειν πρὶν ἢ τὴν Μεσσήνην κατὰ κράτος ἑλεῖν, τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν ἐξαποστολῆς εὐλόγως οὐ μετέσχον, κατὰ δὲ μέρος τὰς ἐπανόδους ποιούμενοι καὶ σπανίως ἔδοσαν ἀναστροφὴν ταῖς γυναιξὶ πρὸς οἰκέτας γενέσθαι συνηθεστέραν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄνδρας, ταῖς δὲ παρθένοις καὶ μᾶλλον· ὃ καὶ τῆς ἐξαναστάσεως αἴτιον γέγονεν.

7 (8) Ὅτι πολλὰ ἱστορεῖ ψευδῆ ὁ Τίμαιος, καὶ δοκεῖ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἄπειρος ὢν οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων,

monians, it was only to be expected also that the Athenians would be hostile to the whole pack of these Locrians, not so much from consideration of their ancestry as in view of their sympathies. How again, I ask, could the Spartans who had once sent home those in the prime of life to beget children have refused permission to the Locrians to do the same thing? Not only the probabilities, however, in each case but the facts differ considerably. For neither were the Spartans likely to prevent the Locrians from acting as they had acted themselves —this would have been strange indeed—nor were the Locrians likely at the bidding of the Spartans to act in precisely the same manner as the latter had acted. For among the Lacedaemonians it was a hereditary custom and quite usual for three or four men to have one wife or even more if they were brothers, the offspring being the common property of all, and when a man had begotten enough children, it was honourable and quite usual for him to give his wife to one of his friends. Therefore the Locrians, who were not subject to the same curse as the Spartans, nor bound by an oath such as the Spartans had taken that they would not return home before storming Messene, did not, as readily can be explained, imitate the Spartans in a general dispatch of men to their wives, but returning home singly and at rare intervals allowed their wives to become more familiar with their slaves than with their original husbands, and allowed their maidens still greater latitude, which was the cause of the emigration.

7. Timaeus frequently makes false statements. He appears to me not to be in general uninformed

ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς φιλονεικίας ἐπισκοτούμενος, ὅταν ἅπαξ ἢ ψέγειν ἢ τοὐναντίον ἐγκωμιάζειν τινὰ πρόθηται, πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεται καὶ πολύ τι τοῦ
2 καθήκοντος παρεκβαίνει. πλὴν ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ Ἀριστοτέλους εἰρήσθω πῶς καὶ τίσι προσέχων τοιαύτην ἐποιήσατο τὴν περὶ τῶν Λοκρῶν ἐξήγησιν·
3 τὰ δὲ λέγεσθαι μέλλοντα περὶ Τιμαίου καὶ τῆς ὅλης συντάξεως αὐτοῦ καὶ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τοῖς πραγματευομένοις ἱστορίαν
4 τοιάνδε τινὰ λήψεται τὴν ἀπάντησιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον πεποίηνται τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, καὶ διότι πλείους εἰσὶ πιθανότητες ἐν τῇ κατ' Ἀριστοτέλην ἱστορίᾳ, δοκῶ, πᾶς ἄν τις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὁμολογήσειεν· ἀληθὲς μέντοι γε καὶ καθάπαξ διαστεῖλαι περί τινος οὐδὲν
5 ἔστιν ἐν τούτοις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔστω τὸν Τίμαιον εἰκότα λέγειν μᾶλλον. διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν δεήσει πᾶν ῥῆμα καὶ πᾶσαν φωνὴν ἀκούειν καὶ μόνον οὐ θανάτου κρίσιν ὑπέχειν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς
6 ἱστορίαις ἧττον εἰκότα λέγοντας; οὐ δήπου. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κατ' ἄγνοιαν ψευδογραφοῦσιν ἔφαμεν δεῖν διόρθωσιν εὐμενικὴν καὶ συγγνώμην ἐξακολουθεῖν, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀπαραίτητον κατηγορίαν.

8 (9) Ἢ δεικτέον οὖν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον τὰ περὶ Λοκρῶν εἰρηκότα χάριτος ἢ κέρδους ἢ διαφορᾶς ἕνεκεν ἢ μηδὲ τολμῶντας τοῦτο λέγειν ὁμολογητέον ἀγνοεῖν καὶ παραπαίειν τοὺς τοιαύτῃ χρωμένους ἀπεχθείᾳ καὶ πικρίᾳ
2 κατὰ τῶν πέλας οἵᾳ κέχρηται Τίμαιος κατ' Ἀριστοτέλους. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν εἶναι θρασύν,

about such matters, but his judgement to be darkened by prejudice; and when he once sets himself to blame or praise anyone he forgets everything and departs very widely from his duty as a historian. Let it suffice, however, on behalf of Aristotle that I have shown how and relying on what authority he composed his account of Locri. But what I am now about to say concerning Timaeus and his work as a whole, and in general about the duty incumbent on those who occupy themselves with history, will meet objections more or less as follows. That both authors have aimed at reaching probability, but that there is more probability in Aristotle's account, I think everyone will avow after what I have said. It is not however, I shall be told, possible to pronounce absolutely about the truth of anything in this matter. Well! I am even ready to concede that Timaeus's account is more probable. But is this a reason why a historical writer whose statements seem lacking in probability must submit to listen to every term of contumely and almost to be put on trial for his life? Surely not. For those, as I said, who make false statements owing to error should meet with kind correction and forgiveness, but those who lie deliberately deserve an implacable accuser.

8. We have, then, either to show that Aristotle, in making the statements I have just reproduced about Locri, did so for the sake of currying favour or for gain or from some self-interested motive, or if we do not venture to maintain this we must confess that those are wrong and at fault who exhibit to others such animosity and bitterness as Timaeus does to Aristotle. He calls him arrogant, reckless, and

εὐχερῆ, προπετῆ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατατετολμηκέναι τῆς τῶν Λοκρῶν πόλεως, εἰπόντα τὴν ἀποικίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι δραπετῶν, οἰκετῶν, μοιχῶν,
3 ἀνδραποδιστῶν. καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτόν φησιν οὕτως ἀξιοπίστως ὥστε δοκεῖν ἕνα τῶν ἐστρατηγηκότων ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐν ταῖς Κιλικίαις πύλαις ἄρτι παρατάξει νενικηκότα διὰ
4 τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀλλ' οὐ σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα καὶ τὸ πολυτίμητον ἰατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰς πᾶσαν αὐλὴν καὶ σκηνὴν ἐμπεπηδηκότα, πρὸς δὲ γαστρίμαργον, ὀψαρτυτήν, ἐπὶ στόμα φερόμενον ἐν πᾶσι.
5 δοκεῖ δή μοι τὰ τοιαῦτα μόλις ‹ἂν› ἄνθρωπος ἀγύρτης καὶ προπετὴς ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου ῥιψολογῶν ἀνεκτὸς φανῆναι· μέτριος μὲν γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ.
6 συγγραφεὺς δὲ κοινῶν πράξεων καὶ προστάτης ἱστορίας ἀληθινὸς οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἐν αὑτῷ διανοηθῆναι μή τι δὴ καὶ γράφειν τολμήσαι τοιοῦτον.
9 (10) Σκεψώμεθα δὴ καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ Τιμαίου προαίρεσιν, καὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις συγκρίνωμεν ἐκ παραθέσεως, ἃς πεποίηται περὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀποικίας, ἵνα γνῶμεν πότερος ἄξιος ἔσται τῆς τοιαύτης
2 κατηγορίας. φησὶ τοιγαροῦν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν βύβλον, οὐκέτι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν εἰκότα λόγον χρώμενος τοῖς ἐλέγχοις, ἀλλ' ἀληθινῶς αὐτὸς ἐπιβαλὼν εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Λοκρούς,
3 ἐξετάζειν τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀποικίας. τοὺς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιδεικνύειν αὐτῷ συνθήκας ἐγγράπτους, ἔτι καὶ νῦν διαμενούσας, πρὸς τοὺς ἐξαπεσταλμένους, αἷς ὑπογεγράφθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην "ὡς
4 γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα." πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἶναι δόγματα, καθ' ἃ πολιτείαν ὑπάρχειν ἑκατέροις

headstrong, and adds that he had the effrontery to attack the city of Locri by stating that the colony consisted of runaway slaves, lackeys, adulterers, and kidnappers. And all this, he says, is told with such an assumption of trustworthiness that one would take him for one of those back from the campaign who had just by his own power defeated the Persians in a pitched battle at the Cilician gates, and not for a pedantic and detestable sophist who had just locked up his precious surgeon's shop. Besides this he says he had forced his way into every court and on to every stage and was a glutton and epicure catering for his mouth in everything. I think that surely such language could scarcely be tolerated even from the lips of some unscrupulous knave making random accusations in a law court; for we must avow that he goes beyond all bounds. But no chronicler of public affairs, no really leading historian, would ever dare to entertain such thoughts, much less to put them in writing.

9. Let us now look at Timaeus's own deliberate statement, and compare with Aristotle's the account he himself gives of this identical colony, so that we may discover which of the two deserves such an accusation. He tells us, then, in the same Book, that he investigated the history of the colony, no longer applying the test of mere probability, but personally visiting the Locrians in Greece proper. He states that in the first place they showed him a written treaty, still preserved between them and the emigrants, with the following phrase at the outset, "As parents to children." In addition there were decrees that citizens of either town were citizens of

παρ' ἑκατέροις. καθόλου διακούοντας τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξήγησιν περὶ τῆς ἀποικίας θαυμάζειν
5 τὴν ἰταμότητα τοῦ συγγραφέως. μεταβὰς δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Λοκροὺς εὑρίσκειν ἀκολούθους καὶ τοὺς νόμους φησὶ τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς οὐ τῇ τῶν οἰκετῶν
6 ῥᾳδιουργίᾳ, τῇ δὲ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀποικίᾳ· πάντως γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδραποδισταῖς ἐπιτίμια τετάχθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὁμοίως τοῖς μοιχοῖς, τοῖς δραπέταις· ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ συνήδεισαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοιούτων πεφυκόσι.

10 Πρῶτον δὴ διαπορήσαι τις ἂν πρὸς τίνας τῶν
(11) Λοκρῶν παραγενόμενος ἐπυνθάνετο περὶ τούτων.
2 εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνέβαινε, καθάπερ τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Λοκρούς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα μίαν πόλιν ἔχειν, τάχ' ἂν οὐκ ἔδει διαπορεῖν, ἀλλ' ἦν
3 ἂν εὐθεώρητον· ἐπεὶ δὲ δύ' ἔθνη Λοκρῶν ἐστι, πρὸς ποτέρους ἦλθε καὶ πρὸς ποίας πόλεις τῶν ἑτέρων, καὶ παρὰ τίσιν εὗρε τὰς συνθήκας ἀναγεγραμμένας; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν διασαφεῖται τούτων.
4 καίτοι διότι τοῦτ' ἴδιόν ἐστι Τιμαίου καὶ ταύτῃ παρημίλληται τοὺς ἄλλους συγγραφέας καὶ καθόλου τῇδέ πῃ τῆς ἀποδοχῆς . . .—λέγω δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγραφαῖς ἐπίφασιν τῆς ἀκριβείας καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐπιμέλειαν
5 —δοκῶ, πάντες γινώσκομεν. διὸ καὶ θαυμάζειν ἐστὶν ἄξιον πῶς οὔτε τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὄνομα, παρ' οἷς εὗρεν, οὔτε ‹τὸν› τόπον, ἐν ᾧ συμβαίνει τὴν συνθήκην ἀναγεγράφθαι, διεσάφησεν ἡμῖν, οὔτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς δείξαντας αὐτῷ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἐποιεῖτο τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μηδενὶ διαπορεῖν ἐξῇ ‹μηδέν›, ἀλλ' ὡρισμένου τοῦ τόπου

the other. When they heard Aristotle's account of the colony they expressed astonishment at that author's recklessness. Proceeding afterwards to the Italian Locri he says he found their laws and customs also were such as beseemed not a pack of rascally slaves but a colony of freemen. For certainly there were penalties fixed in their code for kidnappers as well as for adulterers and runaway slaves, which would not have been the case had they been aware that they themselves sprang from such men.

10. In the first place we are in doubt as to which of the Greek Locrians he visited for the purpose of inquiry. For if the Greek Locrians, like the Italian, were confined to one city we should perhaps not entertain any doubt, but the matter would be perspicuous. But since there are two sets of Locrians in Greece proper, we ask to which he went and to which of their cities and in whose possession he found the inscribed treaty; for he gives us no information on the subject. And yet Timaeus's special boast, the thing in which he outvies other authors and which is the main cause of the reputation he enjoys, is, as I suppose we all know, his display of accuracy in the matter of dates and public records, and the care he devotes to such matters. So it is most surprising that he has not informed us of the name of the city where he found the treaty or the exact spot in which it is inscribed, or who were the magistrates who showed him this document and with whom he spoke, so that no cause of perplexity would be left, but the place and the city being identified, those in doubt would

καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐνῆ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν εὑρεῖν τὴν
6 ἀκρίβειαν. ὁ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα παραλελοιπὼς δῆλός
ἐστι συνειδὼς αὑτῷ κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἐψευσμένῳ.
διότι γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιλαβόμενος οὐδὲν ἂν
παρέλειπε Τίμαιος, ἀλλ' ἀπρίξ, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον,
ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν ἐπέφυ, προφανὲς ἐκ τούτων.
7 ὁ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν Ἐχεκράτους πίστιν ἀπερεισάμενος
ἐπ' ὀνόματος, πρὸς ὃν φησι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ
Λοκρῶν ποιήσασθαι τοὺς λόγους καὶ παρ' οὗ
8 πυθέσθαι περὶ τούτων, καὶ προσεξειργασμένος,
ἵνα μὴ φανῇ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀκηκοώς, ὅτι συνέβαινε
τὸν τούτου πατέρα πρεσβείας κατηξιῶσθαι πρό-
9 τερον ὑπὸ Διονυσίου, ἢ πού γ' ἂν οὗτος δημοσίας
ἀναγραφῆς ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ παραδοσίμου στήλης
11 παρεσιώπησεν; ὁ γὰρ τὰς συγκρίσεις ποιούμενος
ἀνέκαθεν τῶν ἐφόρων πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοὺς ἐν
Λακεδαίμονι καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς Ἀθήνησι
καὶ τὰς ἱερείας τὰς ἐν Ἄργει παραβάλλων πρὸς
τοὺς ὀλυμπιονίκας, καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τῶν πόλεων
περὶ τὰς ἀναγραφὰς τὰς τούτων ἐξελέγχων, παρὰ
2 τρίμηνον ἐχούσας τὸ διαφέρον, οὗτός ἐστι. καὶ
μὴν ὁ τὰς ὀπισθοδόμους στήλας καὶ τὰς ἐν ταῖς
φλιαῖς τῶν νεῶν προξενίας ἐξευρηκὼς Τίμαιός
3 ἐστιν. ὃν οὔθ' ὑπάρχον τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀγνοεῖν
οὔθ' εὑρόντα παραλιπεῖν πιστευτέον οὔτε ψευ-
4 σαμένῳ συγγνώμην δοτέον οὐδαμῶς· πικρὸς γὰρ
γεγονὼς καὶ ἀπαραίτητος ἐπιτιμητὴς τῶν πέλας
εἰκότως ἂν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πλησίον αὐτὸς ἀπαραιτήτου
5 τυγχάνοι κατηγορίας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ προφανῶς
ἐν τούτοις ἐψευσμένος, μεταβὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ

have the means of discovering the exact truth. The fact that he neglects to inform us on all these points is a clear proof that he knew he was deliberately lying. For that, had Timaeus got hold of such information, he would not have let a word of it escape, but, as the phrase is, would have held on to it tight with both hands, is evident from the following consideration. Would the writer who mentions Echecrates by name as the man on whom he depends, having consulted him about the Italian Locrians and obtained this information, the writer who, not to appear to have heard all this from a person of no importance, takes the pains to tell us that the father of this Echecrates had formerly been deemed worthy of employment as envoy by Dionysius—would such a writer, I ask, if he had got hold of a public record or a commemorative inscription, have held his tongue about it? 11. For this is the author who compares the dates of the ephors with those of the kings in Lacedaemon from the earliest times, and the lists of Athenian archons and priestesses of Hera at Argos with those of the victors at Olympia, and who convicts cities of inaccuracy in these records, there being a difference of three months. Yes, and it is Timaeus who discovered the inscriptions at the back of buildings and lists of proxeni on the jambs of temples. We cannot then believe that he would have missed any such thing had it existed, or omitted to mention it had he found it, nor can we in any way excuse his mendacity. Himself a most bitter and implacable critic of others he can but expect to meet with implacable criticism at the hands of others. Next, having been obviously guilty of untruth in regard to this matter, he passes

Λοκροὺς πρῶτον μέν φησι τήν τε πολιτείαν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ φιλάνθρωπα τοῖς Λοκροῖς ἀμφοτέροις . . . Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Θεόφραστον κατεψεῦσθαι τῆς
6 πόλεως. ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν ὅτι καὶ ταύτῃ τῆς πραγματείας ἀναγκασθήσομαι παρεκβαίνειν, διοριζόμενος καὶ διαβεβαιούμενος περὶ τούτων·
7 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν εἰς ἕνα τόπον ὑπερεθέμην τὸν περὶ Τιμαίου λόγον, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις ἀναγκάζωμαι τοῦ καθήκοντος ὀλιγωρεῖν. . . .

(11[1]) Ὅτι Τίμαιός φησι μέγιστον ἁμάρτημα περὶ τὴν
8 ἱστορίαν εἶναι τὸ ψεῦδος· διὸ καὶ παραινεῖ τούτοις, οὓς ἂν ἐξελέγξῃ διεψευσμένους ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν, ἕτερόν τι ζητεῖν ὄνομα τοῖς βυβλίοις, πάντα δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ καλεῖν ἱστορίαν. . . .

12 (7) Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κανόνων, κἂν ἐλάττων ᾖ τῷ μήκει κἂν τῷ πλάτει ταπεινότερος, μετέχῃ δὲ τῆς τοῦ κανόνος ἰδιότητος, κανόνα φησὶ δεῖν προσαγορεύειν ὅμως, ὅταν ‹δὲ› τῆς εὐθείας καὶ τῆς πρὸς ταύτην οἰκειότητος ἐκπέσῃ, πάντα
2 μᾶλλον δεῖν ἢ κανόνα καλεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ὅσα μὲν ἂν ᾖ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ κατὰ τὸν χειρισμὸν ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι διαμαρτάνηται τῶν ἰδίων μερῶν, ἀντέχηται δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας, προσίεσθαί φησι τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ὄνομα τὰς βύβλους, ὅταν δὲ ταύτης παραπέσῃ, μηκέτι
3 καλεῖσθαι δεῖν ἱστορίαν. ἐγὼ δὲ διότι μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων συγγραμμάτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁμολογῶ, καὶ κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν αὐτός που κέχρημαι λέγων οὕτως, ὅτι, καθάπερ ἐμψύχου σώματος τῶν ὄψεων ἐξαιρεθεισῶν ἀχρειοῦται τὸ ὅλον, οὕτως ἐξ ἱστορίας ἐὰν ἄρῃς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται διήγημα.

to the Italian Locrians and tells us in the first place that he found the constitution and general culture of both these Locrians and those in Greece to be the same, but that Aristotle and Theophrastus had falsely accused the Italian town. I am quite aware that here too I shall be compelled to digress from my main subject, in order to put my case more clearly and further fortify it, but as a fact I deferred to one place my discussion of Timaeus just because I do not wish to be obliged frequently to neglect my main task. . . .

Timaeus says that the worst vice of history is falsehood. So he advises those whom he convicts of falsehood in their works to find another name for their book and call it anything but history. . . .

12. Timaeus says, that as a rule which is defective in length and breadth but possesses the essential quality of a rule must still be called a rule, but when it has no approach to straightness or any quality akin to straightness, must be called anything rather than a rule, so in the case of historical works, when they are defective in style, treatment, or any other particular quality but still strive to ascertain the truth they may claim to be styled histories, but when they fall away from the truth have no longer any claim to this name. I quite agree with him that truth is the leading quality in such books, and somewhere in the course of this work I made the same statement, writing as follows, that as in the case of a living body if the eyes are put out the whole becomes useless, so if you take away truth from history what remains is but an unprofitable fable.

4 Δύο μέντοι τρόπους ἔφαμεν εἶναι ψεύδους, ἕνα
μὲν τὸν κατ' ἄγνοιαν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν κατὰ προαίρε-
5 σιν, καὶ τούτων δεῖν τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἄγνοιαν παρα-
παίουσι τῆς ἀληθείας διδόναι συγγνώμην, τοῖς δὲ
κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀκαταλλάκτως ἔχειν.

(12ᵃ¹) Τούτων δ' ἡμῖν ὁμολογουμένων, αὐτοῦ τούτου
6 τοῦ ψεύδους μεγάλην ὑπολαμβάνω διαφορὰν εἶναι
τοῦ κατ' ἄγνοιαν γινομένου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ προ-
αίρεσιν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδέχεσθαι συγγνώμην καὶ
διόρθωσιν εὐμενικήν, τὸ δ' ἀπαραιτήτου δικαίως
7 ἂν τυγχάνειν κατηγορίας· ᾧ γένει μάλιστ' ἂν
εὕροι τις ἔνοχον αὐτὸν ὄντα τὸν Τίμαιον· διότι δ'
ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος σκοπεῖν ἤδη πάρεστιν.

12ᵃ 'Επὶ τῶν ἀθετούντων τὰς ὁμολογίας προφερό-
(12ᵇ) μεθα ταύτην τὴν παροιμίαν "Λοκροὶ τὰς συνθή-
κας." τοῦτο δέ τις ἐξεύρηκεν ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς
συγγραφεῦσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις
2 ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι, διότι κατὰ τὴν τῶν 'Ηρα-
κλειδῶν ἔφοδον συνθεμένων τῶν Λοκρῶν τοῖς
Πελοποννησίοις πολεμίους πυρσοὺς αἴρειν, ἐὰν
συμβῇ τοὺς 'Ηρακλείδας μὴ κατὰ τὸν 'Ισθμόν,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ 'Ρίον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν διάβασιν, χάριν
τοῦ προαισθομένους φυλάξασθαι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν,
3 οὐ ποιησάντων δὲ τῶν Λοκρῶν, πᾶν δὲ τοὐναντίον
φιλίους ἀράντων πυρσούς, ὅτε παρῆσαν, τοὺς μὲν
'Ηρακλείδας συνέβη μετ' ἀσφαλείας χρῆσθαι τῇ
διαβάσει, τοὺς δὲ Πελοποννησίους κατολιγωρήσαν-
τας λαθεῖν παραδεξαμένους εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοὺς
ὑπεναντίους παρασπονδηθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν Λοκρῶν.

12ᵇ . . . κατηγορεῖν καὶ θειασ<μὸν δια>σύρειν τῶν
(12ᶜ) ὀνειρωττόντων καὶ δαιμονώντων ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνή-
μασιν· ὅσοι γε μὴν αὐτοὶ πολλὴν τῆς τοιαύτης

I said, however, that there are two kinds of falsehood, one the consequence of ignorance and the other deliberate, and that we should accord pardon to those who fall away from the truth owing to ignorance, but should refuse to forgive deliberate lying.

This point being settled I affirm that the difference is very wide between such falsehood as is the result of ignorance and such as is deliberate, the one admitting of pardon and kindly correction but the other deserving implacable condemnation. And one finds that Timaeus himself is a chief sinner in this respect, as I will now prove.

12ᵃ. We use this proverb about those who violate treaties, "The Locrians and the pact,"[a] and the origin of this is that, as both authors and other people agree, on the occasion of the invasion of the Heracleidae the Locrians had promised the Peloponnesians to raise war signals in case it happened that the Heracleidae tried to cross by Rhion and not to pass the Isthmus, so that due warning might be given and measures taken to prevent their invasion. The Locrians, however, did not do this, but on the contrary raised friendly signals when the Heracleidae arrived, so that they made the crossing in safety, and the Peloponnesians, thus betrayed by the Locrians and neglecting to take any precautions, before they were aware of it had permitted their foes to enter their country.

12ᵇ. We should indeed reprove and ridicule the frenzy of those authors who dream dreams and write like men possessed. But those who indulge freely

[a] That is, παρέβησαν "violated," the verb being omitted as often in proverbs. See *Corp. Paroemiogr.*

ἐμπεποίηνται φλυαρίας, τοὺς τοιούτους ἀγαπᾶν
ἂν δέοι μὴ τυγχάνοντας κατηγορίας, μηδ' ὅτι
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοὺς κατατρέχειν· ὃ συμβέβηκε
2 περὶ Τίμαιον. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ κόλακα μὲν εἶναί
φησι τὸν Καλλισθένην τοιαῦτα γράφοντα καὶ
πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν φιλοσοφίας, κόρδαξί τε προσ-
έχοντα καὶ κορυβαντιώσαις γυναιξί· δικαίως δ'
αὐτὸν ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου τετευχέναι τιμωρίας δι-
εφθαρκότα τὴν ἐκείνου ψυχὴν καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ'
3 ἦν· καὶ Δημοσθένην μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ῥήτορας
τοὺς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ἀκμάσαντας ἐπαινεῖ
καί φησι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀξίους γεγονέναι, διότι
ταῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου τιμαῖς ταῖς ἰσοθέοις ἀντέλεγον,
τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον αἰγίδα καὶ κεραυνὸν περιθέντα
θνητῇ φύσει δικαίως αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου
τετευχέναι τούτων ὧν ἔτυχεν.

13 Ὅτι Τίμαιός φησι Δημοχάρην ἡταιρηκέναι
μὲν τοῖς ἄνω μέρεσι τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ εἶναι δ'
ἄξιον τὸ ἱερὸν πῦρ φυσᾶν, ὑπερβεβηκέναι δὲ τοῖς
ἐπιτηδεύμασι τὰ Βότρυος ὑπομνήματα καὶ τὰ
Φιλαινίδος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναισχυντογράφων·
2 ταύτην δὲ τὴν λοιδορίαν καὶ τὰς ἐμφάσεις οὐχ
οἷον ἄν τις διέθετο πεπαιδευμένος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ'
οὐδὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τέγους ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰργα-
3 σμένων οὐδείς. ὁ δ' ἵνα πιστὸς φανῇ κατὰ τὴν
αἰσχρολογίαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἀναισχυντίαν, καὶ
προσκατέψευσται τἀνδρός, κωμικόν τινα μάρτυρα
4 προσεπισπασάμενος ἀνώνυμον. πόθεν δ' ἐγὼ κατα-
στοχάζομαι τοῦτο; πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ καὶ
πεφυκέναι καὶ τεθράφθαι καλῶς Δημοχάρην, ἀδελ-
5 φιδοῦν ὄντα Δημοσθένους, δεύτερον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
μόνον στρατηγίας αὐτὸν ἠξιῶσθαι παρ' Ἀθηναίοις,

themselves in this kind of foolery should, far from accusing others, be only too glad if they escape blame themselves. Such is the case with Timaeus. He calls Callisthenes a flatterer for writing in the manner he does, and says he is very far from being a philosopher, paying attention as he does to crows and frenzied women. He adds that Alexander was very right in punishing him, as he had corrupted his mind as far as he could. He praises Demosthenes and the other orators who flourished at the time and says they were worthy of Greece because they opposed the conferment of divine honours on Alexander, while the philosopher who invested a mortal with aegis and thunderbolt was justly visited by heaven with the fate that befel him.

13. Timaeus tells us that Democharès had been guilty of such impurity that he was not a fit person to blow the sacrificial flame, and that in his practices he had been more shameless than the works of Botrys, Philaenis, and other obscene writers. Scurrilous assertions of this kind are such as not only no man of culture, but not even any of the inmates of a brothel would make. But Timaeus, in order that he may gain credit for his filthy accusations and his utter lack of decency, has made a further false charge against Democharès, dragging in the evidence of a comic poet of no repute. You will ask on what grounds I infer that Timaeus is guilty of falsehood? First and foremost because Democharès was of good birth and breeding, being the nephew of Demosthenes, and secondly because the Athenians deemed him worthy not only of the office of strategus, but

ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τιμῶν, ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῷ
6 συνεξέδραμε τοιαύταις ἀτυχίαις παλαίοντι. διὸ
καὶ δοκεῖ μοι Τίμαιος οὐχ οὕτως Δημοχάρους
κατηγορεῖν ὡς Ἀθηναίων, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα
προῆγον καὶ τοιούτῳ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς ἰδίους
7 βίους ἐνεχείριζον. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐδέν.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν Ἀρχέδικος ὁ κωμῳδιογράφος ἔλεγε
8 ταῦτα μόνος περὶ Δημοχάρους, ὡς Τίμαιός φησιν,
ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ μὲν ἂν τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων, καθ'
οὓς πεπαρρησίασται πολλὰ καὶ δυνάμενα λυπεῖν
οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν Ἀντίπατρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
ἐκείνου διαδόχους καὶ φίλους γεγονότας, πολλοὶ
δὲ τῶν ἀντιπεπολιτευμένων, ὧν ἦν καὶ Δημήτριος
9 ὁ Φαληρεύς. οὗ 'κεῖνος οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πεποίηται
κατηγορίαν ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις, φάσκων αὐτὸν
γεγονέναι τοιοῦτον προστάτην τῆς πατρίδος καὶ
ἐπὶ τούτοις σεμνύνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν,
ἐφ' οἷς ἂν καὶ τελώνης σεμνυνθείη βάναυσος.
10 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῷ πολλὰ καὶ λυσιτελῶς πωλεῖσθαι κατὰ
τὴν πόλιν καὶ δαψιλῆ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ὑπάρχειν
πᾶσιν, ἐπὶ τούτοις φησὶ μεγαλαυχεῖν αὐτόν·
11 καὶ διότι κοχλίας αὐτομάτως βαδίζων προηγεῖτο
τῆς πομπῆς αὐτῷ, σίαλον ἀναπτύων, σὺν δὲ τού-
τοις ὄνοι διεπέμποντο διὰ τοῦ θεάτρου, διότι δὴ
πάντων τῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος καλῶν ἡ πατρὶς παρα-
κεχωρηκυῖα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐποίει Κασσάνδρῳ τὸ
προσταττόμενον, ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὸν οὐκ αἰσχύ-
12 νεσθαί φησιν. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτε Δημήτριος οὔτ'
ἄλλος οὐδεὶς εἰρήκει περὶ Δημοχάρους τοιοῦτον
14 οὐδέν. ἐξ ὧν ἐγώ, βεβαιοτέραν τὴν τῆς πατρίδος
ἡγούμενος μαρτυρίαν ἢ τὴν Τιμαίου πικρίαν,
θαρρῶν ἀποφαίνομαι μηδενὶ τὸν Δημοχάρους βίον

of other distinctions, to none of which could he have successfully aspired had he had such disadvantages to combat. Timaeus, therefore, seems to me to accuse not so much Democharès as the Athenians for advancing such a man and entrusting their country and their lives and properties to him. But not a word of all this can be true. For in that case not only Archedicus, the comic poet, would, as Timaeus asserts, have said this about Democharès, but many of the friends of Antipater also, against whom Democharès had ventured to say much calculated to vex not only Antipater himself but his successors and former friends. The same accusations would have been brought also by many of Democharès' political adversaries, among whom was Demetrius of Phaleron. Democharès in his history brings accusations by no means trivial against Demetrius, telling us that the statesmanship on which he prided himself was such as a vulgar farmer of taxes would pride himself on, his boast having been that the market in the town was plentifully supplied and cheap, and that there was abundance of all the necessities of life for everybody. He tells us that a snail moved by machinery went in front of his procession, spitting out saliva, and that donkeys were marched through the theatre, to show, forsooth, that the country had yielded up to others all the glory of Greece and obeyed the behests of Cassander. Of all this he says he was in no wise ashamed. But yet neither Demetrius nor anyone else said anything of the sort about Democharès. 14. From which, regarding the testimony of his country as more trustworthy than Timaeus's spite, I pronounce with confidence that the life of Democharès was guiltless of all such

2 ἔνοχον εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων κατηγορημάτων. καίπερ εἰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπῆρχέ τι τοιοῦτον ἀτύχημα περὶ Δημοχάρην, ποῖος καιρὸς ἢ ποία πρᾶξις ἠνάγκασε Τίμαιον ταῦτα κατατάττειν εἰς τὴν
3 ἱστορίαν; καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες, ἐπὰν ἀμύνασθαι κρίνωσι τοὺς ἐχθρούς, οὐ τοῦτο πρῶτον σκοποῦνται τί παθεῖν ἄξιός ἐστιν ὁ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ
4 τί ποιεῖν αὐτοῖς πρέπει, τοῦτο μᾶλλον . . . οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῶν λοιδοριῶν, οὐ τί τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀκούειν ἁρμόζει, τοῦτο πρῶτον ἡγητέον, ἀλλὰ τί λέγειν
5 ἡμῖν πρέπει, τοῦτ' ἀναγκαιότατον λογιστέον. περὶ δὲ τῶν πάντα μετρούντων ταῖς ἰδίαις ὀργαῖς καὶ φιλοτιμίαις ἀνάγκη πάνθ' ὑποπτεύειν ἐστὶ καὶ πᾶσι διαπιστεῖν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος λεγομένοις.
6 διὸ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς μὲν εἰκότως ἂν δόξαιμεν ἀθετεῖν τοῖς ὑπὸ Τιμαίου κατὰ Δημοχάρους
7 εἰρημένοις· ἐκεῖνος δ' ἂν οὐκ εἰκότως τυγχάνοι συγγνώμης οὐδὲ πίστεως ὑπ' οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἐκπίπτειν τοῦ καθήκοντος διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον πικρίαν.

15 Καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ταῖς κατ' Ἀγαθοκλέους ἔγωγε λοιδορίαις, εἰ καὶ πάντων γέγονεν ἀσεβέστατος,
2 εὐδοκῶ. λέγω δ' ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς ἐπὶ καταστροφῇ τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας φησὶ γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν κοινὸν πόρνον, ἕτοιμον τοῖς ἀκρατεστάτοις, κολοιόν,
3 τριόρχην, πάντων τῶν βουλομένων τοῖς ὄπισθεν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτ' ἀπέθανε, τὴν γυναῖκά φησι κατακλαιομένην αὐτὸν οὕτως θρηνεῖν· "Τί δ' οὐκ ἐγὼ σέ; τί δ' οὐκ
4 ἐμὲ σύ;" ἐν γὰρ τούτοις πάλιν οὐ μόνον ἄν τις

offences. And even if, as a fact, Democharès had the misfortune to be guilty of any such thing, what circumstance or what event compelled Timaeus to record it in his history? For just as men of sense when they meditate revenge on their enemies do not examine in the first place what others deserve to suffer, but rather how it becomes themselves to act, so when we bring reproaches we must not in the first place consider what is fitting for our enemies to hear, but regard it as of the greatest importance to determine what is proper for ourselves to speak. In the case, therefore, of writers who measure everything by the standard of their own passions and jealousies, we must suspect all their statements and refuse credit to them when extravagant. So that in the present case I may claim to be justified in rejecting the slanders of Timaeus concerning Democharès, whereas this author can claim neither pardon nor credit from anyone, as he has in his reproaches so obviously let himself be carried beyond the bounds of decency by the spitefulness which was engrained in him.

15. Nor can I approve the terms in which he speaks of Agathocles, even if that prince were the most impious of men. I allude to the passage at the end of his history in which he says that Agathocles in his early youth was a common prostitute, ready to yield himself to the most debauched, a jackdaw, a buzzard,[a] who would right about face to anyone who wished it. And in addition to this he says that on his death his wife lamenting him called out in her wail, "What did I not do to you? What did you not do to me?" In this instance we are not only inclined to repeat the protest we made in the case of

[a] τριόρχης lit. = "very lecherous."

ἐπιφθέγξαιτο τὰ καὶ περὶ Δημοχάρους, ἀλλὰ καὶ
5 τὴν ὑπερβολὴν θαυμάσειε τῆς πικρίας. ὅτι γὰρ
ἐκ φύσεως ἀνάγκη μεγάλα προτερήματα γεγονέναι
περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα, τοῦτο δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ αὐτῶν
6 ὧν ὁ Τίμαιος ἀποφαίνεται. εἰ γὰρ εἰς τὰς Συ-
ρακούσας παρεγενήθη φεύγων τὸν τροχόν, τὸν
καπνόν, τὸν πηλόν, περὶ ἔτη τὴν ἡλικίαν ὀκτω-
7 καίδεκα γεγονώς, καὶ μετά τινα χρόνον ὁρμηθεὶς
ἀπὸ τοιαύτης ὑποθέσεως κύριος μὲν ἐγενήθη
πάσης Σικελίας, μεγίστους δὲ κινδύνους περιέστησε
Καρχηδονίοις, τέλος ἐγγηράσας τῇ δυναστείᾳ
κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον βασιλεὺς προσαγορευόμενος,
8 ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη μέγα τι γεγονέναι χρῆμα καὶ
θαυμάσιον τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ πολλὰς ἐσχηκέναι
ῥοπὰς καὶ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον;
9 ὑπὲρ ὧν δεῖ τὸν συγγραφέα μὴ μόνον τὰ πρὸς
διαβολὴν κυροῦντα καὶ κατηγορίαν ἐξηγεῖσθαι
τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἔπαινον
ἥκοντα περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιόν ἐστι
10 τῆς ἱστορίας. ὁ δ' ἐπεσκοτημένος ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας
πικρίας τὰ μὲν ἐλαττώματα δυσμενικῶς καὶ μετ'
αὐξήσεως ἡμῖν ἐξήγγελκε, τὰ δὲ κατορθώματα
11 συλλήβδην παραλέλοιπεν, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὸ ψεῦδος
οὐχ ἧττόν ἐστι περὶ τοὺς τὰ γεγονότα . . . γράφον-
12 τας ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις. ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιμετρεῖν
τῆς ἀπεχθείας αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀφήκαμεν, τὰ δ' οἰκεῖα
τῆς προθέσεως αὐτῶν οὐ παρελείψαμεν. . . .

16 Νεανίσκων δυεῖν περί τινος οἰκέτου διαφερο-
μένων συνέβαινε παρὰ μὲν τὸν ἕτερον καὶ πλείω

Democharès, but we are positively astonished by the excess of rancour displayed. For that Agathocles had great natural advantages is evident from Timaeus's own account of him. For if at the age of eighteen he reached Syracuse, escaping from the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, and in a short time, starting from such small beginnings, became master of the whole of Sicily, exposed the Carthaginians to extreme peril, and having grown old in his sovereign position, died with the title of king, must not Agathocles have had something great and wonderful in him, and must he not have been qualified for the conduct of affairs by peculiar mental force and power? Regarding all this a historian should lay before posterity not only such matters as tend to confirm slanderous accusations, but also what redounds to the credit of this prince; for such is the proper function of history. But Timaeus, blinded by his own malice, has chronicled with hostility and exaggeration the defects of Agathocles and has entirely omitted to mention his shining qualities, being unaware that it is just as mendacious for a writer to conceal what did occur as to report what did not occur. I myself, while refraining in order to spare him from giving full expression to my hostility to Timaeus, have omitted nothing essential to the object I had in view.[a] . . .

16. There was a dispute at Locri between two young men about a slave. The slave had been with one of them for a considerable time, and the other,

[a] The last sentence seems to be defective. Shuckburgh translates: "The part of the history therefore which was added by him for the gratification of his personal spite I have passed over, but not what was really germane to his subject." Neither version corresponds exactly to the Greek. —Ed.

χρόνον γεγονέναι τὸν παῖδα, τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἡμέραις
δυσὶ πρότερον εἰς τὸν ἀγρὸν ἐλθόντα μὴ παρόντος
τοῦ δεσπότου μετὰ βίας εἰς οἶκον ἀπηχέναι τὸν
δοῦλον, κἄπειτα τὸν ἕτερον αἰσθόμενον ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ
τὴν οἰκίαν, καὶ λαβόντ' ἀπάγειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν,
καὶ φάναι δεῖν κύριον αὐτὸν εἶναι διδόντα τοὺς
ἐγγυητάς· κελεύειν γὰρ τὸν Ζαλεύκου νόμον
τοῦτον δεῖν κρατεῖν τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἕως
τῆς κρίσεως παρ' οὗ τὴν ἀγωγὴν συμβαίνει γίνε-
σθαι. τοῦ δ' ἑτέρου κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον παρ'
αὐτοῦ φάσκοντος γεγονέναι τὴν ἀγωγήν—ἐκ γὰρ
τῆς οἰκίας τῆς ἐκείνου τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
ἥκειν ἀπαγόμενον—τοὺς προκαθημένους ἄρχοντας
διαποροῦντας ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπισπάσασθαι
καὶ συμμεταδοῦναι τῷ κοσμοπόλιδι. τὸν δὲ δια-
στείλασθαι τὸν νόμον, φήσαντα παρὰ τούτων τὴν
ἀγωγὴν αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι, παρ' οἷς ἂν ἔσχατον ἀδήριτον
ᾖ χρόνον τινὰ γεγονὸς τὸ διαμφισβητούμενον·
ἐὰν δὲ τις ἀφελόμενος βίᾳ παρά τινος ἀπαγάγῃ
πρὸς αὑτόν, κἄπειτα παρὰ τούτου τὴν ἀγωγὴν
ὁ προϋπάρχων ποιῆται δεσπότης, οὐκ εἶναι ταύτην
κυρίαν. τοῦ δὲ νεανίσκου δεινοπαθοῦντος καὶ
μὴ φάσκοντος εἶναι τοῦ νομοθέτου ταύτην τὴν
προαίρεσιν, προκαλέσασθία φασι τὸν κοσμόπολιν,
εἴ τι βούλεται λέγειν ὑπὲρ τῆς γνώμης κατὰ τὸν
Ζαλεύκου νόμον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθισάντων τῶν
χιλίων καὶ βρόχων κρεμασθέντων λέγειν ὑπὲρ
τῆς τοῦ νομοθέτου γνώμης· ὁπότερος δ' ἂν
αὐτῶν φανῇ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκδεχό-
μενος, τὸν τοιοῦτον διὰ τῆς ἀγχόνης ἀπόλυσθαι
βλεπόντων τῶν χιλίων. ταῦτα προτείναντος τοῦ
κοσμοπόλιδος, τὸν νεανίσκον εἰπεῖν φασιν ἄνισον

two days before, had come in the absence of the master to the latter's country place and had forcibly carried off the slave to his own house. The other young man, when he heard of it, came to the house, seized on the slave, and led him before the magistrates, to whom he maintained that upon his giving proper sureties, the boy ought to remain in his possession. For he said the law of Zaleucus enjoins that in cases of disputed ownership the party from whom the property had been taken away or abducted should remain in possession until the trial. The other claimant contended that according to the same law the abduction had been from him; for it was from his house that the slave had been taken and carried before the court. The presiding magistrates were in doubt about the point and calling in the cosmopolis submitted it to him. The cosmopolis defined the law as meaning that the abduction always was from the party who had last been in undisputed possession of the property for a certain time. If anyone forcibly deprives another of property and carries it off to his own house, and if then the former owner comes and takes it away from him, this is not abduction within the meaning of the law. When the young man upon this felt aggrieved and asserted that such was not the intention of the law-giver, they say that the cosmopolis invited him to state his case according to the law of Zaleucus. This is that the two disputants should speak before the "thousand" on the subject of the law-giver's meaning, each with a halter round his neck, and whichever of them appeared to interpret the law worst, should be hanged in the presence of the thousand. Upon the cosmopolis making this offer, the young

εἶναι τὴν συνθήκην· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἔτη δύ' ἢ τρία
13 καταλείπεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν· συνέβαινε γὰρ εἶναι τὸν
κοσμόπολιν οὐ πολὺ λεῖπον τῶν ἐνενήκοντ' ἐτῶν·
αὐτῷ δὲ τοῦ βίου τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ τῶν εὐλόγων ἔτι
14 μένειν. ὁ μὲν οὖν νεανίσκος οὕτως εὐτραπελευ-
σάμενος ἐξέλυσε τὴν σπουδήν, οἱ δ' ἄρχοντες
ἔκριναν τὴν ἀγωγὴν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κοσμοπόλιδος
γνώμην.

V. De Callisthenis imperitia in narrandis rebus militaribus

17 Ἵνα δὲ μὴ δόξωμεν τῶν τηλικούτων ἀνδρῶν
καταξιοπιστεῖσθαι, μνησθησόμεθα μιᾶς παρα-
τάξεως, ἣν ἅμα μὲν οἵαν ἐπιφανεστάτην εἶναι
συμβέβηκεν, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς καιροῖς οὐ μακρὰν
ἀπηρτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, παρατετευχέναι τὸν
2 Καλλισθένη. λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐν Κιλικίᾳ γενο-
μένης Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πρὸς Δαρεῖον, ἐν ᾗ φησὶ μὲν
Ἀλέξανδρον ἤδη διαπεπορεῦσθαι τὰ στενὰ καὶ
τὰς λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ Πύλας, Δαρεῖον δὲ
χρησάμενον τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἀμανίδων λεγομένων
Πυλῶν πορείᾳ κατᾶραι μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς
3 Κιλικίαν· πυθόμενον δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων
προάγειν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὡς ἐπὶ Συρίαν, ἀκολου-
θεῖν, καὶ συνεγγίσαντα τοῖς στενοῖς στρατοπεδεῦ-
4 σαι παρὰ τὸν Πίναρον ποταμόν. εἶναι δὲ τοῦ
μὲν τόπου τὸ διάστημ' οὐ πλείω τῶν τεττάρων
καὶ δέκα σταδίων ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἕως πρὸς τὴν
5 παρώρειαν· διὰ δὲ τούτου φέρεσθαι τὸν προ-
ειρημένον ποταμὸν ἐπικάρσιον, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ὀρῶν
εὐθέως ἐκρήγματα τῶν πλευρῶν, διὰ δὲ τῶν

man said that the bargain was not a fair one. For the one of them had only two or three years left to live, the cosmopolis being very nearly ninety years of age, whereas he himself in all likelihood had the most of his life still before him. Thus the young man's ready wit relaxed the gravity of the court, but the magistrates followed the opinion of the cosmopolis in defining abduction.

V. Incapacity of Callisthenes in writing of Military Matters

17. In order that I may not seem to insist arbitrarily on the acceptance of my criticism of such famous writers, I will take one battle and a very celebrated one, a battle which took place at no very distant date and, what is most important, one at which Callisthenes himself was present. I mean Alexander's battle with Darius in Cilicia. Callisthenes tells us that Alexander had already passed the narrows and the so-called Cilician gates, while Darius had marched through the pass known as the Gates of Amanus and had descended with his army into Cilicia. On learning from the natives that Alexander was advancing in the direction of Syria he followed him up, and when he approached the pass, encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus. The distance, he says, from the sea to the foot of the hills is not more than fourteen stades, the river running obliquely across this space, with gaps in its banks just where it issues from the mountains, but in its whole course

ἐπιπέδων ἕως εἰς θάλατταν ἀποτόμους ἔχοντα
6 καὶ δυσβάτους λόφους. ταῦτα δ' ὑποθέμενος,
ἐπεὶ συνεγγίζοιεν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐξ
ὑποστροφῆς ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἀναχωροῦντες, κρῖναί
φησι Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὴν μὲν φάλαγγα
τάξαι πᾶσαν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ στρατοπεδείᾳ, καθάπερ
ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶχε, χρήσασθαι δὲ τῷ ποταμῷ προ-
βλήματι διὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτὴν ῥεῖν τὴν στρατοπεδείαν.
7 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φησι τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς τάξαι παρὰ
θάλατταν, τοὺς δὲ μισθοφόρους ἐξῆς τούτοις
παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμόν, ἐχομένους τούτων τοὺς
18 πελταστὰς συνάπτοντας τοῖς ὄρεσι. πῶς δὲ προ-
έταξε τούτους πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος, τοῦ ποταμοῦ
ῥέοντος παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, δυσχερὲς
2 κατανοῆσαι, καὶ ταῦτα τῷ πλήθει τοσούτων
ὑπαρχόντων. τρισμύριοι μὲν γὰρ ἱππεῖς ὑπ-
ῆρχον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Καλλισθένης φησί, τρισμύριοι
δὲ μισθοφόροι· πόσου δ' εἶχον οὗτοι τόπου χρείαν,
3 εὐχερὲς καταμαθεῖν. πλεῖστον μὲν γὰρ ἱππέων
τάττεται βάθος ἐπ' ὀκτὼ πρὸς ἀληθινὴν χρείαν,
καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν ἰλῶν ἑκάστης ἴσον ὑπάρχειν δεῖ
διάστημα τοῖς μετώποις πρὸς τὸ ταῖς ἐπιστροφαῖς
4 δύνασθαι καὶ τοῖς περισπασμοῖς εὐχρηστεῖν. ἐξ
ὧν τὸ στάδιον ὀκτακοσίους λαμβάνει, τὰ δὲ δέκα
τοὺς ὀκτακισχιλίους, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα τρισχιλίους
διακοσίους, ὥστ' ἀπὸ τῶν μυρίων χιλίων διακοσίων
πεπληρῶσθαι τὸν τῶν τετταρεσκαίδεκα σταδίων
5 τόπον. ἐὰν δὲ πάντας ἐκτάττῃ τοὺς τρισμυρίους,
βραχὺ λείπει τοῦ τριφαλαγγίαν ἐπάλληλον εἶναι
6 τῶν ἱππέων αὐτῶν. εἰς ποῖον οὖν τόπον ἐτάττετο
τὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος; εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία κατόπιν
τῶν ἱππέων. ἀλλ' οὔ φησιν, ἀλλὰ συμπεπτωκέναι

through the plain as far as the sea passing between steep hills difficult to climb. Having given this sketch of the country, he tells us that Darius and his generals, when Alexander turned and marched back to meet them, decided to draw up the whole phalanx in the camp itself in its original position, the river affording protection, as it ran close past the camp. After this he says they drew up the cavalry along the sea-shore, the mercenaries next them at the brink of the river, and the peltasts next the mercenaries in a line reaching as far as the mountains. 18. It is difficult to understand how they posted all these troops in front of the phalanx, considering that the river ran close past the camp, especially in view of their numbers, for, as Callisthenes himself says, there were thirty thousand cavalry and thirty thousand mercenaries, and it is easy to calculate how much space was required to hold them. For to be really useful cavalry should not be drawn up more than eight deep, and between each troop there must be a space equal in length to the front of a troop so that there may be no difficulty in wheeling and facing round. Thus a stade will hold eight hundred horse, ten stades eight thousand, and four stades three thousand two hundred, so that eleven thousand two hundred horse would fill a space of fourteen stades. If the whole force of thirty thousand were drawn up the cavalry alone would very nearly suffice to form three such bodies, one placed close behind the other. Where, then, were the mercenaries posted, unless indeed they were drawn up behind the cavalry? This he tells us was not so, as they were the first to meet the

τούτους τοῖς Μακεδόσι κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγήν. ἐξ
ὧν ἀνάγκη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκδοχὴν διότι τὸ μὲν
ἥμισυ τοῦ τόπου τὸ παρὰ θάλατταν ἡ τῶν ἱππέων
ἐπεῖχε τάξις, τὸ δ' ἥμισυ τὸ πρὸς τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἡ
τῶν μισθοφόρων. ἐκ δὲ τούτων εὐσυλλόγιστον
πόσον ὑπῆρχε τὸ βάθος τῶν ἱππέων καὶ ποῖον
ἔδει τόπον ἀπέχειν τὸν ποταμὸν ἀπὸ τῆς στρα-
τοπεδείας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνεγγιζόντων τῶν
πολεμίων φησὶ τὸν Δαρεῖον, αὐτὸν κατὰ μέσην
ὑπάρχοντα τὴν τάξιν, καλεῖν τοὺς μισθοφόρους
ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρατος πρὸς αὑτόν. πῶς δὲ λέγεται
τοῦτο, διαπορεῖν ἔστι· τῶν γὰρ μισθοφόρων
ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν ἱππέων τὴν συναφὴν κατὰ μέσον
ὑπάρχειν τὸν τόπον, ὥστ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ὢν τοῖς
μισθοφόροις ὁ Δαρεῖος ποῦ καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῶς
ἐκάλει τοὺς μισθοφόρους; τὸ δὲ τελευταῖόν φησι
τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος ἱππεῖς ἐπαγαγόντας
ἐμβαλεῖν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, τοὺς δὲ
γενναίως δεξαμένους ἀντεπάγειν καὶ ποιεῖν μάχην
ἰσχυράν. ὅτι δὲ ποταμὸς ἦν ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ποταμὸς
οἷον ἀρτίως εἶπεν, ἐπελάθετο.

19 Τούτοις δ' ἐστὶ παραπλήσια τὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἀλέ-
ξανδρον. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς
τὴν Ἀσίαν διάβασιν, πεζῶν μὲν ἔχοντα τέτταρας
μυριάδας, ἱππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχιλίους καὶ πεν-
τακοσίους, μέλλοντι δ' εἰς Κιλικίαν ἐμβάλλειν
ἄλλους ἐλθεῖν ἐκ Μακεδονίας πεζοὺς μὲν πεν-
τακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δ' ὀκτακοσίους. ἀφ' ὧν εἴ
τις ἀφέλοι τρισχιλίους μὲν πεζούς, τριακοσίους
δ' ἱππεῖς, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον ποιῶν τὴν ἀπουσίαν
πρὸς τὰς γεγενημένας χρείας, ὅμως πεζοὶ μὲν
ἀπολειφθήσονται τετρακισμύριοι δισχίλιοι, ‹πεντα-

Macedonian attack. We must, then, of necessity, understand that the cavalry occupied that half of the space which was nearest to the sea and the mercenaries the half nearest the hills, and from this it is easy to reckon what was the depth of the cavalry and how far away from the camp the river must have been. After this he tells us that on the approach of the enemy, Darius, who was half way down the line, called the mercenaries himself from the wing to come to him. It is difficult to see what he means by this. For the mercenaries and cavalry must have been in touch just in the middle of the field, so that how, why, and where could Darius, who was actually among the mercenaries, call them to come to him? Lastly, he says that the cavalry from the right wing advanced and attacked Alexander's cavalry, who received their charge bravely and delivering a counter charge fought stubbornly. He forgets that there was a river between them and such a river as he has just described.

19. Very similar are his statements about Alexander. He says that when he crossed to Asia he had forty thousand foot and four thousand five hundred horse, and that when he was on the point of invading Cilicia he was joined by a further force of five thousand foot and eight hundred horse. Suppose we deduct from this total three thousand foot and three hundred horse, a liberal allowance for those absent on special service, there still remain

κισχίλιοι δ' ἱππεῖς>. τούτων οὖν ὑποκειμένων, φησὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον πυθέσθαι τὴν Δαρείου παρουσίαν εἰς Κιλικίαν ἑκατὸν ἀπέχοντα σταδίους ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, διαπεπορευμένον ἤδη τὰ στενά· διόπερ ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς πάλιν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῶν στενῶν, ἄγοντα πρῶτον μὲν τὴν φάλαγγα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸ σκευοφόρον. ἅμα δὲ τῷ πρῶτον εἰς τὰς εὐρυχωρίας ἐκπεσεῖν, διασκευάζεσθαι παραγγείλαντα πᾶσιν ἐπιπαρεμβαλεῖν τὴν φάλαγγα, καὶ ποιῆσαι τὸ βάθος αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τριάκοντα καὶ δύο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν εἰς ἑκκαίδεκα, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, ἐγγίζοντα τοῖς πολεμίοις, εἰς ὀκτώ. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τῶν προειρημένων ἀλογήματα. τοῦ γὰρ σταδίου λαμβάνοντος ἄνδρας ἐν τοῖς πορευτικοῖς διαστήμασιν, ὅταν εἰς ἑκκαίδεκα τὸ βάθος ὦσι, χιλίους ἑξακοσίους, ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἓξ πόδας ἐπέχοντος, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δέκα στάδια λήψεται μυρίους ἑξακισχιλίους, τὰ δ' εἴκοσι τοὺς διπλασίους. ἐκ δὲ τούτων εὐθεώρητον ὅτι καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἐποίησε τὴν δύναμιν Ἀλέξανδρος ἑκκαίδεκα τὸ βάθος, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν εἴκοσι σταδίων ὑπάρχειν τὸ τοῦ τόπου διάστημα καὶ περιττεύειν ἔτι τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς πάντας, τῶν δὲ πεζῶν μυρίους.

20 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φησι μετωπηδὸν ἄγειν τὴν δύναμιν, ἀπέχοντα τῶν πολεμίων περὶ τετταράκοντα σταδίους. τούτου δὲ μεῖζον ἀλόγημα δυσχερὲς ἐπινοῆσαι· ποῦ γὰρ ἂν εὕροι τις τοιούτους τόπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ κατὰ Κιλικίαν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ σταδίους εἴκοσι μὲν τὸ πλάτος τετταράκοντα δὲ τὸ μῆκος μετωπηδὸν ἄγειν φάλαγγα σαρισοφόρον; τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἐμπόδια πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν καὶ

forty-two thousand foot and five thousand horse. Assuming these numbers, he tells us that when Alexander heard the news of Darius's arrival in Cilicia he was a hundred stades away and had already traversed the pass. In consequence he turned and marched back through the pass with the phalanx in front, followed by the cavalry, and last of all the baggage-train. Immediately on issuing into the open country he re-formed his order, passing to all the word of command to form into phalanx, making it at first thirty-two deep, changing this subsequently to sixteen deep, and finally as he approached the enemy to eight deep. These statements are even more absurd than his former ones. For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next. It is evident, then, that ten stades will hold sixteen thousand men and twenty stades twice as many. From all this it is quite plain that when Alexander made his army sixteen deep the line necessarily extended for twenty stades, and this left all the cavalry and ten thousand of the infantry over.

20. After this he says that Alexander led on his army in an extended line, being then at a distance of about forty stades from the enemy. It is difficult to conceive anything more absurd than this. Where, especially in Cilicia, could one find an extent of ground where a phalanx with its long spears could advance for forty stades in a line twenty stades long? The obstacles indeed to such a formation and such a movement are so many that it would

χρείαν, ἃ τις οὐδ' ἂν ἐξαριθμήσαιτο ῥᾳδίως. ἐν δὲ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Καλλισθένους λεγομένων ἱκανὸν
4 ὑπάρχει πρὸς πίστιν· τοὺς γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρῶν χειμάρρους καταφερομένους τοσαῦτά φησι ποιεῖν ἐκρήγματα κατὰ τὸ πεδίον ὥστε καὶ τῶν Περσῶν κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν διαφθαρῆναι λέγουσι τοὺς πλεί-
5 στους ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις κοιλώμασι. νὴ Δί', ἀλλ' ἕτοιμος ἐβούλετ' εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων
6 ἐπιφάνειαν. τί δ' ἀνετοιμότερον φάλαγγος ἐν μετώπῳ διαλελυμένης καὶ διεσταμένης; πόσῳ γὰρ ἐκ πορευτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἁρμοζούσης παρατάξαι ῥᾷον ἢ διαλελυμένην ἐν μετώπῳ καὶ διεσπασμένην δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθεῖαν ἀγαγεῖν καὶ συστῆσαι πρὸς μάχην ἐν τόποις ὑλώδεσι καὶ
7 περικεκλασμένοις; διόπερ οὐδὲ παρὰ μικρὸν ἦν κρεῖττον ἄγειν διφαλαγγίαν ἢ τετραφαλαγγίαν ἁρμόζουσαν, ᾗ καὶ τόπον πορείας εὑρεῖν οὐκ ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὸ παρατάξαι ταχέως ῥᾴδιόν γε, δυνάμενον διὰ τῶν προδρόμων ἐκ πολλοῦ γινώσκειν
8 τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρουσίαν. ὁ δὲ χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τοὺς ἱππεῖς προέθετο, μετωπηδὸν ἄγων τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τόποις ἐπιπέδοις, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ποιεῖ τοῖς πεζοῖς.

21 Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντων μέγιστον· ἤδη γὰρ σύνεγγυς ὄντα τοῖς πολεμίοις αὐτὸν εἰς ὀκτὼ ποιῆσαί φησι
2 τὸ βάθος. ἐξ οὗ δῆλον ὅτι κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐπὶ τετταράκοντα σταδίους ἔδει γενέσθαι τὸ μῆκος
3 τῆς φάλαγγος. εἰ δ' ὅλως συνήσπισαν κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν οὕτως ὥστε συνερεῖσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅμως εἴκοσι σταδίων ἔδει τὸν τόπον ὑπάρχειν.
4 αὐτὸς δέ φησι λείπειν τῶν δεκατεττάρων σταδίων

be difficult to enumerate them all, a single one mentioned by Callisthenes himself being sufficient to convince us of its impossibility. For he tells us that the torrents descending from the mountains have formed so many clefts in the plain that most of the Persians in their flight perished in such fissures. But, it may be said, Alexander wished to be prepared for the appearance of the enemy. And what can be less prepared than a phalanx advancing in line but broken and disunited? How much easier indeed it would have been to develop from proper marching-order into order of battle than to straighten out and prepare for action on thickly wooded and fissured ground a broken line with numerous gaps in it? It would, therefore, have been considerably better to form a proper double or quadruple phalanx, for which it was not impossible to find marching room and which it would have been quite easy to get into order of battle expeditiously enough, as he was enabled through his scouts to receive in good time warning of the approach of the enemy. But, other things apart, Alexander did not even, according to Callisthenes, send his cavalry on in front when advancing in line over flat ground, but apparently placed them alongside the infantry.

21. But here is the greatest of all his mistakes. He tells us that Alexander, on approaching the enemy, made his line eight deep. It is evident then that now the total length of the line must have been forty stades. And even if they closed up so that, as described by Homer, they actually jostled each other, still the front must have extended over twenty stades. But he tells us that there was only a space of less than fourteen stades, and as half of

5 . . . καὶ τούτου μέρος μέν τι πρὸς θαλάττῃ τοὺς
ἡμίσεας ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ· . . . ἔτι δὲ τὴν ὅλην τάξιν
ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρῶν ἱκανὸν τόπον ἀφεστάναι πρὸς τὸ
μὴ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑποπεπτωκέναι τοῖς κατέχουσι
6 τὰς παρωρείας. ἴσμεν γὰρ ὃ ποιεῖ πρὸς τούτους
ἐπικάμπιον.

Ὑπολειπόμεθα καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς τοὺς μυρίους πε-
7 ζούς, πλείους ὄντας τῆς ἐκείνου προθέσεως. ὥστ'
ἐκ τούτων ἕνδεκα σταδίους ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον ἀπολεί-
πεσθαι τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος μῆκος κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν
Καλλισθένην, ἐν οἷς ἀνάγκη τοὺς τρισμυρίους καὶ
δισχιλίους ἐπὶ τριάκοντα τὸ βάθος ὑπάρχειν συν-
8 ησπικότας. ὁ δέ φησιν εἰς ὀκτὼ τεταγμένων
9 γενέσθαι τὴν μάχην. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἁμαρ-
τημάτων οὐδ' ἀπολογίαν ἐπιδέχεται· τὸ γὰρ
ἀδύνατον ἐν πράγμασιν αὐτόθεν ἔχει τὴν πίστιν.
10 διόπερ ὅταν καὶ τὰ κατ' ἄνδρα διαστήματα καὶ
τὸ πᾶν τοῦ τόπου μέγεθος ὡρισμένον ὑποθῶσι
καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἀναπολόγητον γίνεται
τὸ ψεῦδος.

22 Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἅμα τούτοις ἀλογήματα μακρὸν ἂν
2 εἴη λέγειν πάντα πλὴν τελέως ὀλίγων. φησὶ γὰρ
τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον σπουδάζειν κατὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἵνα
κατὰ τὸν Δαρεῖον αὐτὸν ποιήσηται τὴν μάχην·
ὁμοίως δὲ κατὰ μὲν ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸν Δαρεῖον αὐτὸν
βούλεσθαι κατὰ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, ὕστερον δὲ
3 μετανοῆσαι. πῶς δ' ἐπέγνωσαν ἀλλήλους οὗτοι
ποῦ τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως ἔχουσι τὴν τάξιν, ἢ ποῦ

the cavalry were on the left near the sea and half on the right, the room available for the infantry is still further reduced. Add to this that the whole line must have kept at a considerable distance from the mountains so as not to be exposed to attack by those of the enemy who held the foot-hills. We know that he did as a fact draw up part of his force in a crescent formation to oppose these latter.

I omit to reckon here also[a] the ten thousand infantry more than his purpose required. So the consequence is that the length of the line must have been, according to Callisthenes himself, eleven stades at the most, and in this space thirty-two thousand men must have stood closely packed and thirty deep, whereas he tells us that in the battle they were eight deep. Now for such mistakes we can admit no excuse. For when the actual facts show a thing to be impossible we are instantly convinced that it is so. Thus when a writer gives definitely, as in this case, the distance from man to man, the total area of the ground, and the number of men, he is perfectly inexcusable in making false statements.

22. It would be too long a story to mention all the other absurdities of his narrative, and it will suffice to point out a few. He tells us that Alexander in drawing up his army was most anxious to be opposed to Darius in person, and that Darius also at first entertained the same wish, but afterwards changed his mind. But he tells us absolutely nothing as to how they intimated to each other at what point in their own line they were stationed,

[a] The reference is to p. 357, but either the omissions by the epitomator or faults in the text make the passage very obscure.

μετέβη πάλιν ὁ Δαρεῖος, ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν λέγεται.
4 πῶς δὲ προσανέβη πρὸς τὴν ὀφρὺν τοῦ ποταμοῦ
φαλαγγιτῶν τάξις, ἀπότομον οὖσαν καὶ βατώδη;
5 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο παρὰ λόγον. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ μὲν οὖν
οὐκ ἐποιστέον τὴν τοιαύτην ἀτοπίαν ‹διὰ τὸ πᾶσιν›
ὁμολογουμένην παραλαμβάνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τριβὴν ἐκ παιδός,
6 τῷ δὲ συγγραφεῖ μᾶλλον, ὃς διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν
οὐδὲ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
7 δύναται διευκρινεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν Ἐφόρου καὶ
Καλλισθένους ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω.

VI. De Timaeo historico

23 Ὅτι κατὰ τοῦ Ἐφόρου Τίμαιος πλείστην πεποίη-
ται καταδρομήν, αὐτὸς ὢν δυσὶν ἁμαρτήμασιν
2 ἔνοχος, τῷ μὲν ὅτι πικρῶς κατηγορεῖ τῶν πέλας
ἐπὶ τούτοις οἷς αὐτὸς ἔνοχός ἐστι, τῷ δὲ διότι
καθόλου διέφθαρται τῇ ψυχῇ, τοιαύτας ἀποφάσεις
3 ἐκτιθέμενος ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι καὶ τοιαύτας
ἐντίκτων δόξας τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι. πλὴν εἰ τὸν
Καλλισθένην θετέον εἰκότως κολασθέντα μεταλ-
λάξαι τὸν βίον, τί χρὴ πάσχειν Τίμαιον; πολὺ
γὰρ ἂν δικαιότερον τούτῳ νεμεσήσαι τὸ δαιμόνιον
4 ἢ Καλλισθένει. ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν ἀποθεοῦν Ἀλέ-
ξανδρον ἐβουλήθη, Τίμαιος δὲ μείζω ποιεῖ Τιμο-
5 λέοντα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων θεῶν, καὶ Καλλι-
σθένης μὲν ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον, ὃν πάντες μεγαλο-
φυέστερον ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον γεγονέναι τῇ ψυχῇ
6 συγχωροῦσιν, οὗτος δὲ Τιμολέοντα τὸν οὐχ οἷον
δόξαντά τι πεπραχέναι μεγαλεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐδ'

or where Darius finally went on changing his position. And how, we ask, did a phalanx of heavy-armed men manage to mount the bank of the river which was steep and overgrown with brambles? This, too, is inexplicable. Such an absurdity cannot be attributed to Alexander, as it is universally acknowledged that from his childhood he was well versed and trained in the art of war. We should rather attribute it to the writer, who is so ignorant as to be unable to distinguish the possible from the impossible in such matters. Let this suffice for Ephorus and Callisthenes.

VI. The Faults of Timaeus

23. Timaeus, while vehemently attacking Ephorus, is himself guilty of two grave faults, the first being that he thus bitterly accuses others of the sins he himself is guilty of, and the second that he shows an utterly depraved mind in publishing such statements in his works and engendering such notions in his readers. If, indeed, we must admit that Callisthenes deserved to perish as he did under torture, what fate did Timaeus merit? For the wrath of the gods would have fallen on him with much more justice than on Callisthenes. Callisthenes wished to deify Alexander, but Timaeus makes Timoleon greater than the most illustrious gods; Callisthenes spoke of a man whose soul, as all admit, had something in it greater than human, Timaeus of Timoleon who not only never seems to have achieved anything great,

ἐπιβαλόμενον, μίαν δ' ἐν τῷ βίῳ γραμμὴν διανύσαντα, καὶ ταύτην οὐδὲ σπουδαίαν τρόπον τινὰ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς οἰκουμένης, λέγω δὲ τὴν
7 ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος εἰς Συρακούσας. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ πεισθῆναι Τίμαιος ὡς, ἂν Τιμολέων, πεφιλοδοξηκὼς ἐν αὐτῇ Σικελίᾳ, καθάπερ ἐν ὀξυβάφῳ, σύγκριτος φανῇ τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τῶν ἡρώων, κἂν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ Ἰταλίας μόνον καὶ Σικελίας πραγματευόμενος εἰκότως παραβολῆς ἀξιωθῆναι τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς οἰκουμένης καὶ τῶν καθόλου πράξεων
8 πεποιημένοις τὰς συντάξεις. περὶ μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Καλλισθένους, ἔτι δ' Ἐφόρου καὶ Δημοχάρους, ἱκανὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν ἐστι πρὸς τὴν Τιμαίου καταδρομήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀφιλοτίμως πεπεισμένους ἀληθεύειν τὸν συγγραφέα τοῦτον.

24 Ὅτι διαπορεῖ ἔστι περὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως Τιμαίου. φησὶ γὰρ τοὺς ποιητὰς καὶ συγγραφέας διὰ τῶν ὑπεράνω πλεονασμῶν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διαφαί-
2 νειν τὰς ἑαυτῶν φύσεις. λέγων τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν ἐκ τοῦ δαιτρεύειν πολλαχοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως ὡς ἂν εἰ γαστρίμαργον παρεμφαίνειν, τὸν δ' Ἀριστοτέλην, ὀψαρτύοντα πλεονάκις ἐν τοῖς συγγράμ-
3 μασιν, ὀψοφάγον εἶναι καὶ λίχνον. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ . . . τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου, κλινοκοσμοῦντος καὶ τὰς τῶν ὑφασμάτων ἰδιότητας
4 καὶ ποικιλίας ἐξεργαζομένου συνεχῶς . . . ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀκόλουθον ποιεῖσθαι διάληψιν . . . καὶ δυσ-
5 αρεστεῖσθαι . . . κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὗτος γὰρ ἐν μὲν ταῖς τῶν πέλας κατηγορίαις πολλὴν ἐπιφαίνει δεινότητα καὶ τόλμαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀποφάσεσιν ἐνυπνίων καὶ τεράτων καὶ μύθων

but never even to have attempted to do so, and in his whole life accomplished but one move and that by no means important considering the greatness of the world, the move from his country to Syracuse. The fact, in my opinion, is that Timaeus was sure that if Timoleon, who had sought fame in a mere tea-cup, as it were, Sicily, could be shown to be worthy of comparison with the most illustrious heroes, he himself, who treated only of Italy and Sicily, could claim comparison with writers whose works dealt with the whole world and with universal history. I have now said enough to defend Aristotle, Theophrastus, Callisthenes, Ephorus, and Democharcs from the attacks of Timaeus, and to convince those who not having the spirit to challenge the statements of this author place implicit reliance on all he says.

24. We must entertain considerable doubt about the proclivities of Timaeus. For he tells us that poets and authors reveal their real natures in their works by dwelling excessively on certain matters. Homer, he says, is constantly feasting his heroes, and this indicates that he was more or less of a glutton. Aristotle frequently gives recipes for cookery in his works, so he must have been an epicure and a lover of dainties. In the same way Dionysius the tyrant revealed his effeminate tastes by his interest in bed-hangings and the constant study he devoted to varieties and peculiarities of different woven work. We are driven then to form our opinion of Timaeus on the same principle and to take an unfavourable view of his own tendencies. For while he exhibits great severity and audacity in accusing others, his own pronouncements are full of dreams, prodigies, incredible tales, and to put it

ἀπιθάνων καὶ συλλήβδην δεισιδαιμονίας ἀγεννοῦς
6 καὶ τερατείας γυναικώδους ἐστὶ πλήρης. οὐ μὴν
ἀλλὰ διότι γε συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ
κακοκρισίαν πολλοὺς ἐνίοτε καθάπερ εἰ παρόν-
τας τρόπον τινὰ μὴ παρεῖναι καὶ βλέποντας μὴ
βλέπειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τε νῦν καὶ τῶν Τιμαίῳ
συμβεβηκότων γέγονε φανερόν.

25 Ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ταύρου τοῦ χαλκοῦ τοῦ παρὰ
Φαλάριδος κατασκευασθέντος ἐν Ἀκράγαντι, εἰς
ὃν ἐνεβίβαζεν ἀνθρώπους, κἄπειτα πῦρ ὑποκαίων
ἐλάμβανε τιμωρίαν παρὰ τῶν ὑποταττομένων
2 τοιαύτην ὥστ' ἐκπυρουμένου τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸν μὲν
ἄνθρωπον πανταχόθεν παροπτώμενον καὶ περι-
φλεγόμενον διαφθείρεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, ὁπότ' ἀναβοήσειε, μυκηθμῷ παρα-
πλήσιον τὸν ἦχον ἐκ τοῦ κατασκευάσματος προσ-
3 πίπτειν τοῖς ἀκούουσι. τούτου δὲ τοῦ ταύρου
κατὰ τὴν ἐπικράτειαν Καρχηδονίων μετενεχθέντος
ἐξ Ἀκράγαντος εἰς Καρχηδόνα, καὶ τῆς θυρίδος
διαμενούσης περὶ τὰς συνωμίας, δι' ἧς συνέβαινε
καθίεσθαι τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν, καὶ ἑτέρας
αἰτίας, δι' ἣν ἐν Καρχηδόνι κατεσκευάσθη τοιοῦτος
ταῦρος, οὐδαμῶς δυναμένης εὑρεθῆναι τὸ παράπαν,
4 ὅμως Τίμαιος ἐπεβάλετο καὶ τὴν κοινὴν φήμην
ἀνασκευάζειν καὶ τὰς ἀποφάσεις τῶν ποιητῶν
καὶ συγγραφέων ψευδοποιεῖν, φάσκων μήτ' εἶναι
τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι ταῦρον ἐξ Ἀκράγαντος μήτε
5 γεγονέναι τοιοῦτον ἐν τῇ προειρημένῃ πόλει· καὶ
πολλοὺς δή τινας εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διατέθειται
λόγους.

Κατὰ τῆς Τιμαίου τί ποτε δεῖ λέγειν ὄνομα καὶ
ῥῆμα; πάντα γὰρ ἐπιδέχεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ τὰ

shortly, craven superstition and womanish love of the marvellous. Be this as it may, it is made evident from what I have just said and from this case of Timaeus that owing to ignorance and a defect of judgement many men are at times as it were absent when present and blind with their eyes open.

25. There was a brazen bull which Phalaris made in Agrigentum, and in it he shut up men and afterwards lighting fire beneath it used to take such dreadful revenge on his subjects that as the brass grew red and the man inside perished roasted and scorched, when he screamed in the extremity of his agony, the sound when it reached the ears of those present resembled, owing to the way the thing was constructed, the lowing of a bull. This bull during the Carthaginian domination was taken from Agrigentum to Carthage, and though the door at the joint of its shoulder-blades through which the victims were lowered into it, was still preserved, and though no reason at all can be found why such a bull should have been made in Carthage, yet Timaeus attempts to demolish the common story and to give the lie to the statements of poets and authors, asserting that neither the bull that was in Carthage came from Agrigentum, nor had there ever been one in Agrigentum, and entering into quite a long disquisition on this subject.

What terms are we to use in speaking of Timaeus? For to me it seems that all the most bitter phrases

πικρότατα τὸ γένος, οἷς ἐκεῖνος κέχρηται κατὰ
6 τῶν πλησίον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστι φιλαπεχθὴς καὶ
ψεύστης καὶ τολμηρός, σχεδὸν ἱκανῶς ἐκ τῶν
προειρημένων ὑπεδείχθη· διότι δ' ἀφιλόσοφός ἐστι
καὶ συλλήβδην ἀνάγωγος συγγραφεύς, ἐκ τῶν
7 λέγεσθαι μελλόντων ἔσται συμφανές. ἐν γὰρ τῇ
μιᾷ καὶ εἰκοστῇ βύβλῳ, καὶ ταύτης ἐπὶ τελευτῇ,
λέγει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Τιμολέοντος παράκλησιν
ταῦτα, διότι τῆς γῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης
εἰς τρία μέρη διηρημένης, καὶ τῆς μὲν Ἀσίας,
τῆς δὲ Λιβύης, τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης προσαγορευο-
8 μένης. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐχ οἷον Τίμαιον εἰρηκέναι
τίς ἂν πιστεύσειεν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸν λεγόμενον Μαρ-
9 γίτην ἐκεῖνον. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀδαής, οὐ
λέγω τῶν πρὸς ὑπομνήμασι γεγονότων . . .

25[a] Ὅτι περὶ Τιμαίου φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλο-
πολίτης· Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν παροιμιῶν ἱκανὸν
εἶναί φασι σταλαγμὸν ἕνα τοῦ μεγίστου τεύχους
εἰς τὸ γνῶναι τὸ πᾶν ἔγχυμα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων χρὴ διαλαμβάνειν·
2 ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἓν ᾖ δεύτερον εὑρεθῇ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς
συγγράμμασι, καὶ τοῦτο γεγονὸς ᾖ κατὰ προαίρεσιν,
δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι βέβαιον οὐδ' ἀσφαλὲς
γένοιτο τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου συγγραφέως λεγο-
3 μένων. ἵνα δὲ καὶ τοὺς φιλοτιμότερον διακει-
μένους μεταπείσωμεν, ῥητέον ἂν εἴη περὶ τῆς
αἱρέσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ μελέτης τῆς κατὰ τὰς δημη-
γορίας καὶ τὰς παρακλήσεις, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς πρε-
σβευτικοὺς λόγους, καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν ‹τὸ› τοιοῦτο
γένος, ἃ σχεδὸν ὡς κεφάλαια τῶν πράξεών ἐστι
4 καὶ συνέχει τὴν ὅλην ἱστορίαν· διότι γὰρ ταῦτα
παρ' ἀλήθειαν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι κατατέταχε

of the kind he applies to others are appropriate to himself. That he was quarrelsome, mendacious, and headstrong has been, I trust, sufficiently proved by what I have already said, but what I am about to add will make it evident that he was no philosopher and in general a man of no education. For in his twenty-first book, near the end, he says, in the course of Timoleon's address to his troops, "The earth lying under the universe being divided into three parts named Asia, Africa, and Europe." [a] No one would credit that, I will not say Timaeus but, even the celebrated Margites had said such a thing. For who is such an ignoramus, I do not speak of those who undertake to write history but . . .

25ª. As the proverb tells us that a single drop from the largest vessel suffices to tell us the nature of the whole contents, so we should regard the subject now under discussion. When we find one or two false statements in a book and they prove to be deliberate ones, it is evident that not a word written by such an author is any longer certain and reliable. But to convince those also who are disposed to champion him I must speak of the principle on which he composes public speeches, harangues to soldiers, the discourses of ambassadors, and, in a word, all utterances of the kind, which, as it were, sum up events and hold the whole history together. Can anyone who reads these help noticing that Timaeus has untruthfully reported them

[a] Exception seems to be taken to the phrase "lying under the universe."

Τίμαιος, καὶ τοῦτο πεποίηκε κατὰ πρόθεσιν, τίς
5 οὐ παρακολουθεῖ τῶν ἀνεγνωκότων; οὐ γὰρ τὰ
ῥηθέντα γέγραφεν, οὐδ' ὡς ἐρρήθη κατ' ἀλήθειαν,
ἀλλὰ προθέμενος ὡς δεῖ ῥηθῆναι, πάντας ἐξαριθμεῖ-
ται τοὺς ῥηθέντας λόγους καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς
πράγμασιν οὕτως ὡς ἂν εἴ τις ἐν διατριβῇ πρὸς
ὑπόθεσιν ἐπιχειροίη . . . ὥσπερ ἀπόδειξιν τῆς
ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως ποιούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξήγησιν
τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένων.

25[b] Ὅτι τῆς ἱστορίας ἰδίωμα τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον
μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένους, οἷοί
ποτ' ἂν ὦσι, γνῶναι λόγους, δεύτερον τὴν αἰτίαν
πυνθάνεσθαι, παρ' ἣν ἢ διέπεσεν ἢ κατωρθώθη
2 τὸ πραχθὲν ἢ ῥηθέν· ἐπεὶ ψιλῶς λεγόμενον αὐτὸ
τὸ γεγονὸς ψυχαγωγεῖ μέν, ὠφελεῖ δ' οὐδέν· προσ-
τεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας ἔγκαρπος ἡ τῆς ἱστορίας
3 γίνεται χρῆσις. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπὶ τοὺς
οἰκείους μεταφερομένων καιροὺς ἀφορμαὶ γίνονται
καὶ προλήψεις εἰς τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον, καὶ
ποτὲ μὲν εὐλαβηθῆναι, ποτὲ δὲ μιμούμενον τὰ
προγεγονότα θαρραλεώτερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς ἐπι-
4 φερομένοις· ὁ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ῥηθέντας λόγους καὶ
τὴν αἰτίαν παρασιωπῶν, ψευδῆ δ' ἀντὶ τούτων
ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ διεξοδικοὺς λέγων λόγους,
ἀναιρεῖ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἴδιον· ὃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ
Τίμαιος· καὶ διότι τούτου τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ πλήρη
τὰ βυβλία παρ' αὐτῷ, πάντες γινώσκομεν.

25[c] Ἴσως δ' οὖν ἄν τις ἐναπορήσειε πῶς τοιοῦτος
ὢν οἷον ἡμεῖς ὑποδείκνυμεν τοιαύτης παρ' ἐνίοις
2 ἀποδοχῆς τέτευχε καὶ πίστεως. τούτου δ' ἐστὶν
αἴτιον διότι πλεοναζούσης αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν πραγμα-
τείαν τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτιμήσεως καὶ λοιδο-

in his work, and has done so of set purpose? For he has not set down the words spoken nor the sense of what was really said, but having made up his mind as to what ought to have been said, he recounts all these speeches and all else that follows upon events like a man in a school of rhetoric attempting to speak on a given subject, and shows off his oratorical power, but gives no report of what was actually spoken.

25ᵇ. The peculiar function of history is to discover, in the first place, the words actually spoken, whatever they were, and next to ascertain the reason why what was done or spoken led to failure or success. For the mere statement of a fact may interest us but is of no benefit to us: but when we add the cause of it, study of history becomes fruitful. For it is the mental transference of similar circumstances to our own times that gives us the means of forming presentiments of what is about to happen, and enables us at certain times to take precautions and at others by reproducing former conditions to face with more confidence the difficulties that menace us. But a writer who passes over in silence the speeches made and the causes of events and in their place introduces false rhetorical exercises and discursive speeches, destroys the peculiar virtue of history. And of this Timaeus especially is guilty, and we all know that his work is full of blemishes of the kind.

25ᶜ. Perhaps, therefore, some might wonder how, being such as I have proved him to be, he meets with such acceptance and credit from certain people. The reason of this is that, as throughout his whole work he is so lavish of fault-finding and abuse, they

ρίας οὐκ ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ θεωρεῖται πραγματείας οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἀποφάσεων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν πέλας κατηγορίας, πρὸς ὃ γένος καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην δοκεῖ μοι καὶ φύσιν προσενέγκασθαι
3 διαφέρουσαν· παραπλήσιον γὰρ δή τι τοιοῦτο συμβέβηκε καὶ Στράτωνι τῷ φυσικῷ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὅταν ἐγχειρήσῃ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας διαστέλλεσθαι καὶ ψευδοποιεῖν, θαυμάσιός ἐστιν· ὅταν δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ τι προφέρηται καί ‹τι› τῶν ἰδίων ἐπινοημάτων ἐξηγῆται, παρὰ πολὺ φαίνεται τοῖς ἐπιστήμοσιν εὐηθέστερος αὐτοῦ καὶ νωθρότερος.
4 καί μοι δοκεῖ παντάπασιν ὅμοιόν τι γίνεσθαι περὶ τοὺς γράφοντας τῷ περὶ τὸν ὅλον ἡμῶν βίον
5 συμβαίνοντι· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτιμῆσαι τοῖς πέλας ἐστὶ ῥᾴδιον, τὸ δ' αὐτὸν ἀναμάρτητον παρέχεσθαι χαλεπόν, καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἴδοι τις ἂν τοὺς προχειρότατα τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτιμῶντας πλεῖστα περὶ τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἁμαρτάνοντας.

25[1] Τῷ δὲ Τιμαίῳ καὶ ἕτερόν τι χωρὶς τῶν προγεγραμμένων συμβέβηκεν· ἀποκαθίσας γὰρ Ἀθήνησι σχεδὸν ἔτη πεντήκοντα καὶ πρὸς τοῖς τῶν προγεγονότων ὑπομνήμασι γενόμενος ὑπέλαβε τὰς μεγίστας ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν ἱστορίαν, ἀγνοῶν,
2 ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐχούσης γάρ τι παραπλήσιον τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαφορὰς ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τριμερῆ, παραπλησίους εἶναι συμβαίνει καὶ τὰς
3 τῶν ἐπιβαλλομένων ἐπ' αὐτὰς διαθέσεις· οἷον εὐθέως τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ἑνὸς μὲν μέρους αὐτῆς ὑπάρχοντος λογικοῦ, τοῦ δ' ἑξῆς διαιτητικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου χειρουργικοῦ καὶ φαρμακευτικοῦ, γένους . . . ὁλοσχερῶς. ε ..... μαι τῶι καταψεύδεσθαι

do not form their estimate of him from his own treatment of history and his own statements, but from the accusations he brings against others, for which kind of thing he seems to me to have possessed remarkable industry and a peculiar talent. It was much the same with Strato, the writer on physical science. He also, when he undertakes to set forth and refute the views of others, is admirable, but when he produces anything original and explains his own notions, he seems to men of science much more simple-minded and dull than they took him to be. I think that the same is the case with literature as with our life in general; for here too it is very easy to find fault with others, but it is difficult to behave faultlessly oneself, and one notices as a rule that those who are readiest to blame others err most in the conduct of their own life.

25ᵈ. Besides the above-mentioned faults another thing remains to be noticed about Timaeus. Having lived for nearly fifty years in Athens with access to the works of previous writers, he considered himself peculiarly qualified to write history, making herein, I think, a great mistake. For as medicine and history have this point of resemblance, that each of them may be roughly said to consist of three parts, so there is the same difference in the dispositions of those who enter on these callings. To begin with, as there are three parts of medicine, first the theory of disease, next dietetics, and thirdly surgery and pharmaceutics [*a sentence only partially legible in the* MS.], the study of the theory of

4 τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος . . . τὸ δὲ λογικόν, ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας ἄρχεται παρὰ τῶν Ἡροφιλείων καὶ Καλλιμαχείων ἐκεῖ προσαγορευομένων, τοῦτο μέρος μέν τι κατέχει τῆς ἰατρικῆς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπίφασιν καὶ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοιαύτην ἐφέλκεται φαντασίαν ὥστε δοκεῖν μηδένα τῶν ἄλλων κρατεῖν
5 τοῦ πράγματος· οὓς ὅταν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπαγαγὼν ἄρρωστον ἐγχειρίσῃς, τοσοῦτον ἀπέχοντες εὑρίσκονται τῆς χρείας ὅσον [καὶ] οἱ μηδὲν ἀνεγνωκότες ἁπλῶς ἰατρικὸν ὑπόμνημα· οἷς ἤδη τινὲς τῶν ἀρρώστων ἐπιτρέψαντες αὑτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἐν λόγῳ δύναμιν οὐδὲν ἔχοντες δεινὸν τοῖς ὅλοις
6 πολλάκις ἐκινδύνευσαν. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς ὅμοιοι τοῖς ἐκ βυβλίου κυβερνῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὗτοι μετὰ φαντασίας ἐπιπορευόμενοι τὰς πόλεις, ἐπειδὰν ἀθροίσωσι τοὺς ὄχλους . . . ἐπ' ὀνόματος, τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἀληθινὴν πεῖραν δεδωκότας αὑτῶν εἰς τὴν ἐσχάτην ἄγουσιν ἀπορίαν καὶ καταφρόνησιν παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσι, τῆς τοῦ λόγου πιθανότητος καταγωνιζομένης πολλάκις τὴν ἐπ'
7 αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων δοκιμασίαν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον, τὸ τὴν ἀληθινὴν προσφερόμενον ἕξιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οὐ μόνον ὑπάρχει σπάνιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς στωμυλίας καὶ τόλμης
25 ἐπισκοτεῖται διὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀκρισίαν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας ὑπαρχούσης τριμεροῦς, τῶν δὲ μερῶν αὐτῆς ἑνὸς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν παράθεσιν τῆς ἐκ τούτων ὕλης, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν θέαν τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν τόπων περί τε ποταμῶν καὶ λιμένων καὶ καθόλου τῶν κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἰδιω-

disease, which is derived chiefly from the schools of Herophilus and Callimachus at Alexandria, is indeed an integral part of medicine, but as regards the ostentation and pretensions of its professors they give themselves such an air of superiority that one would think no one else was master of the subject. Yet when you make them confront reality by entrusting a patient to them you find them just as incapable of being of any service as those who have never read a single medical treatise. Not a few invalids indeed who had nothing serious the matter with them have before now come very near losing their lives by entrusting themselves to these physicians, impressed by their rhetorical powers. For really they are just like pilots who steer by book. But nevertheless these men visit different towns with great parade, and when they manage to collect a crowd, throw into the greatest confusion and expose to the contempt of their audience men who in actual practice have given real proof of their skill, the persuasiveness of their eloquence often prevailing against the testimony of practical experience. The third quality,[a] which in every profession gives the true habit of mind, is not only rare but is often cast into the shade by gabble and audacity owing to people's general lack of judgement. 25ᵉ. In the same fashion systematic history too consists of three parts, the first being the industrious study of memoirs and other documents and a comparison of their contents, the second the survey of cities, places, rivers, lakes, and in general all the peculiar features of land and sea and the

[a] Something has obviously been omitted by the epitomator.

μάτων καὶ διαστημάτων, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὰς
2 πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς, παραπλησίως ἐφίενται
μὲν ταύτης πολλοὶ διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην περὶ
αὐτῆς δόξαν, προσφέρονται δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν
οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι τῶν γραφόντων ἁπλῶς δίκαιον
οὐδὲν πλὴν εὐχέρειαν καὶ τόλμαν καὶ ῥᾳδιουργίαν,
3 παραπλήσιον τοῖς φαρμακοπώλαις δοξοκοποῦντες
καὶ πρὸς χάριν λέγοντες ἀεὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς
ἕνεκα τοῦ πορίζειν τὸν βίον διὰ τούτων· περὶ ὧν
4 οὐκ ἄξιον πλείω ποιεῖσθαι λόγον. ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν
δοκούντων εὐλόγως προσάγειν πρὸς τὴν ἱστορίαν,
καθάπερ οἱ λογικοὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἐνδιατρίψαντες
ταῖς βυβλιοθήκαις καὶ καθόλου τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑπο-
μνημάτων περιποιησάμενοι πολυπειρίαν πείθουσιν
αὑτοὺς ὡς ὄντες ἱκανοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν, καὶ
τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀρκούντως δοκοῦσι προσφέρεσθαι, . . .
μέρος, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, πρὸς τὴν ‹πραγματικὴν›
5 ἱστορίαν· τὸ γὰρ ἐποπτεῦσαι τὰ πρότε‹ρον ὑπο-
μνήματα› πρὸς ‹μὲν τὸ γνῶναι› τὰς τῶν ἀρχαίων
διαλήψεις καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας ‹ἃς πρὶν› εἶχον ὑπὲρ
‹διαθ›έσεων, τόπων, ἐθνῶν, πολιτειῶν, πράξεων,
‹ἔτι δὲ› πρὸς τὸ ‹συνεῖναι› τὰς ἑκάστων περι-
στάσεις καὶ τύχας, αἷς κέχρηνται κατὰ τοὺς
6 ἀνωτέρω χρόνους, εὔχρηστόν ἐστι· συνεφίστησι
γὰρ τὰ προγεγονότα πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἡμᾶς οἰκείως,
ἐάν τις ὑπὲρ ἑκάστων ἀληθινῶς ἱστορῇ τὰ παρελήλυ-
7 θότα· τό γε μὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ταύτης ‹τῆς› δυνάμεως
ὁρμηθέντα πεπεῖσθαι γράφειν τὰς ἐπιγινομένας
πράξεις καλῶς, ὃ πέπεισται Τίμαιος, τελέως
εὖηθες καὶ παραπλήσιον ὡς ἂν εἴ τις τὰ τῶν
ἀρχαίων ζωγράφων ἔργα θεασάμενος ἱκανὸς οἴοιτο
ζωγράφος εἶναι καὶ προστάτης τῆς τέχνης.

distances of one place from another, and the third being the review of political events; and just as in the case of medicine, many aspire to write history owing to the high opinion in which the science is held, but most of them bring to the task absolutely no proper qualification except recklessness, audacity, and roguery, courting popularity like apothecaries, and always saying whatever they regard as opportune in order to curry favour for the sake of getting a living by this means. Some of those again who appear to be justified in undertaking the composition of history, just like the theoretical doctors, after spending a long time in libraries and becoming deeply learned in memoirs and records, persuade themselves that they are adequately qualified for the task, seeming indeed to outsiders to contribute sufficient for the requirements of systematic history, but, in my own opinion, contributing only a part. For it is true that looking through old memoirs is of service for knowledge of the views of the ancients and the notions people formerly had about conditions, places, nations, states, and events, and also for understanding the circumstances and chances which beset each nation in former times. For past events make us pay particular attention to the future, that is to say if we really make thorough inquiry in each case into the past. But to believe, as Timaeus did, that relying upon the mastery of material alone one can write well the history of subsequent events is absolutely foolish, and is much as if a man who had seen the works of ancient painters fancied himself to be a capable painter and a master of that art.

25[f] Δῆλον <δ'> ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερομένων, οἷον εὐθέως ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων Ἐφόρῳ κατὰ τόπους τινὰς τῆς ἱστορίας. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τῶν μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν ἔργων ἐπὶ ποσὸν ὑπόνοιαν ἐσχηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ, τῶν δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἀγώνων ἄπειρος εἶναι
2 τελέως. τοιγαροῦν ὅταν μὲν πρὸς τὰς περὶ Κύπρον ναυμαχίας καὶ τὰς περὶ Κνίδον ἀτενίσῃ τις, αἷς ἐχρήσανθ' οἱ βασιλέως στρατηγοὶ πρὸς Εὐαγόραν τὸν Σαλαμίνιον καὶ πάλιν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους θαυμάζειν τὸν συγγραφέα καὶ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν <εἰκὸς> καὶ πολλὰ τῶν χρησίμων ἀπενέγκασθαι πρὸς τὰς ὁμοίας περι-
3 στάσεις· ὅταν δὲ τὴν περὶ Λεῦκτρα μάχην ἐξηγῆται Θηβαίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαντινείᾳ πάλιν τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων, ἐν ᾗ καὶ μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον Ἐπαμινώνδας, ἐν τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήσας τις θεωρῇ τὰς ἐκτάξεις καὶ μετατάξεις τὰς κατ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς κινδύνους, γελοῖος φαίνεται καὶ παντελῶς ἄπειρος καὶ ἀόρατος τῶν
4 τοιούτων ὤν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς Λεύκτροις κίνδυνος ἁπλοῦς γεγονὼς καὶ καθ' ἕν τι μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως οὐ λίαν ἐκφανῆ ποιεῖ τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως ἀπειρίαν· ὁ δὲ περὶ τὴν Μαντίνειαν τὴν μὲν ἔμφασιν ἔχει ποικίλην καὶ στρατηγικήν, ἔστι δ' ἀνυπόστατος
5 καὶ τελέως ἀδιανόητος τῷ συγγραφεῖ. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται δῆλον, ἐάν τις τοὺς τόπους ὑποθέμενος ἀληθινῶς ἐπιμετρῇ τὰς κινήσεις τὰς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ
6 δηλουμένας. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ Θεοπόμπῳ
7 καὶ μάλιστα Τιμαίῳ, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος· οὗ μὲν

25f. What I say will be made plainer by the instances I am about to adduce, as, for example, in the first place, from what happened to Ephorus in certain parts of his history. Ephorus seems to me in dealing with war to have a certain notion of naval warfare, but he is entirely in the dark about battles on land. When, therefore, we study attentively his accounts of the naval battles near Cyprus and Cnidus in which the Persian king's commanders were engaged with Euagoras of Salamis, and on the second occasion with the Lacedaemonians, we are compelled to admire this writer for his descriptive power and knowledge of tactics, and we carry away much information useful for similar circumstances. But when he describes the battle of Leuctra between the Thebans and Lacedaemonians, or that at Mantinea between the same peoples, the battle in which Epaminondas lost his life, if we pay attention to every detail and look at the formation and reformation of the armies during the actual battle, he provokes our laughter and seems perfectly inexperienced in such things and never to have seen a battle. It is true that the battle of Leuctra, a simple affair in which only one part of the army was engaged, does not make the writer's ignorance very conspicuous, but while the battle of Mantinea has the appearance of being described with much detail and military science, the description is quite imaginary, and the battle was not in the least understood by the writer. This becomes evident if we get a correct idea of the ground and then number the movements he describes as being carried out on it. The same is the case with Theopompus, and more especially with Timaeus of whom we are now speaking.

γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων κεφαλαιώδη ποιήσωνται τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, διαλανθάνουσιν, οὗ δ' ἂν βουληθῶσι διαθέσθαι καὶ συνυποδεῖξαί τι τῶν κατὰ μέρος, τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται καὶ πάντως οἷος Ἔφορος.

25[g] Ὅτι οὔτε περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον συμβαινόντων δυνατόν ἐστι γράψαι καλῶς τὸν μηδεμίαν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντα τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔργων οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις τὸν μὴ πεπειραμένον τῶν τοιούτων
2 πράξεων καὶ περιστάσεων. λοιπὸν οὔτ' ἐμπείρως ὑπὸ τῶν βυβλιακῶν οὔτ' ἐμφαντικῶς οὐδενὸς γραφομένου συμβαίνει τὴν πραγματείαν ἄπρακτον γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας ἐξέλοι τις τὸ δυνάμενον ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς, τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτῆς ἄζηλον καὶ ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται παντελῶς.
3 ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τόπων ὅταν ἐπιβάλωνται γράφειν τὰ κατὰ μέρος, ὄντες ἀτριβεῖς τῆς τοιαύτης ἐμπειρίας, δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν τὸ παραπλήσιον, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν ἀξιόλογα παραλείπειν, περὶ πολλῶν δὲ ποιεῖσθαι πολὺν λόγον οὐκ ἀξίων
4 ὄντων· ὃ δὴ συμβαίνει μάλιστα Τιμαίῳ διὰ τὴν ἀορασίαν.

25[h] Ὅτι Τίμαιός φησιν ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ καὶ τετάρτῃ βύβλῳ "πεντήκοντα συνεχῶς ἔτη διατρίψας Ἀθήνησι ξενιτεύων καὶ πάσης ὁμολογουμένως ἄπειρος [ἐγένετο] πολεμικῆς χρείας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν
2 τόπων θέας." λοιπὸν ὅταν εἴς τι τῶν μερῶν τούτων ἐμπέσῃ κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν, πολλὰ μὲν ἀγνοεῖ καὶ ψεύδεται· κἂν ποτε δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπιψαύσῃ, παραπλήσιός ἐστι τοῖς ζωγράφοις τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ‹ἀνασεσ›αγμένων θυλάκων ποιουμένοις
3 τὰς ὑπογραφάς· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ἡ μὲν ἐκτὸς

For where they give a summary account of such matters, their errors escape notice, but when they wish to describe and point out the nature of any detailed movement they are both seen to be exactly like Ephorus.

25g. It is neither possible for a man with no experience of warlike operations to write well about what happens in war, nor for one unversed in the practice and circumstances of politics to write well on that subject. So that as nothing written by mere students of books is written with experience or vividness, their works are of no practical utility to readers. For if we take from history all that can benefit us, what is left is quite contemptible and useless. Again, when they attempt to write in detail about cities and places the result must be very similar, many things worthy of mention being omitted and many things not worth speaking of being treated at great length. This is often the case with Timaeus owing to the fact that he does not write from the evidence of his eyes.

25h. In his thirty-fourth book Timaeus says, "Living away from home at Athens for fifty years continuously, and having, as I confess, no experience of active service in war or any personal acquaintance with places." So that, when he meets with such matters in his history, he is guilty of many errors and misstatements, and if he ever comes near the truth he resembles those painters who make their sketches from stuffed bags. For in their case the

ἐνίοτε γραμμὴ σῴζεται, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐμφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῶν ἀληθινῶν ζῴων ἄπεστιν, ὅπερ ἴδιον ὑπάρχει τῆς ζωγραφικῆς τέχνης. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ Τίμαιον καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς βυβλιακῆς ἕξεως ὁρμωμένους· 4 ἡ γὰρ ἔμφασις τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῖς ἄπεστι διὰ τὸ μόνον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοπαθείας τοῦτο γίνεσθαι τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων· ὅθεν οὐκ ἐντίκτουσιν ἀληθινοὺς ζήλους τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οἱ μὴ δι' αὐτῶν 5 πεπορευμένοι τῶν πραγμάτων. ἦ καὶ τοιαύτας ᾠοντο δεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ὑπάρχειν ἐμφάσεις οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν ὥσθ', ὅτε μὲν ὑπὲρ πολιτικῶν ὁ λόγος εἴη πραγμάτων, ἐπιφθέγγεσθαι διότι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὁ γράφων πεπολίτευται καὶ πεῖραν ἔσχηκε τῶν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει συμβαινόντων, ὅτε δὲ περὶ πολεμικῶν, ὅτι πάλιν ἐστράτευκε καὶ κεκινδύνευκε, καὶ μὴν ὅτε περὶ βιωτικῶν, ὅτι τέτραφε τέκνα καὶ μετὰ γυναικὸς ἔζηκε. τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον 6 καὶ ‹περὶ› τῶν ἄλλων τοῦ βίου μερῶν· ὃ παρὰ μόνοις εἰκὸς εὑρίσκεσθαι τῶν συγγραφέων τοῖς δι' αὐτῶν πεπορευμένοις τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος περιπεποιημένοις τῆς ἱστορίας. πάντων μὲν οὖν οἷον αὐτουργὸν γενέσθαι καὶ δράστην δυσχερὲς ἴσως, τῶν μέντοι μεγίστων καὶ κοινοτάτων ἀναγκαῖον. ὅτι δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον
25 1 οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἱκανὸν ὑπόδειγμα πρὸς πίστιν ὁ ποιητής, παρ' ᾧ πολὺ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐμφάσεως ἴδοι τις ἂν ὑπάρχον. ἐξ ὧν πᾶς ἂν εἰκότως 2 συγκατάθοιτο τρίτον εἶναι μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ τρίτην ἔχειν τάξιν τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων 3 πολυπραγμοσύνην. ὡς δ' ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ νυνὶ λεγόμενον καὶ ἐκφανέστατον γένοιτ' ἂν ἐπί τε

outlines are sometimes preserved but we miss that vividness and animation of the real figures which the graphic art is especially capable of rendering. The same is the case with Timaeus and in general with all who approach the work in this bookish mood. We miss in them the vividness of facts, as this impression can only be produced by the personal experience of the author. Those, therefore, who have not been through the events themselves do not succeed in arousing the interest of their readers. Hence our predecessors considered that historical memoirs should possess such vividness as to make one exclaim when the author deals with political affairs that he necessarily had taken part in politics and had experience of what is wont to happen in the political world, when he deals with war that he had been in the field and risked his life, and when he deals with private life that he had reared children and lived with a wife, and so regarding the other parts of life. This quality can naturally only be found in those who have been through affairs themselves and have acquired this sort of historical knowledge It is difficult, perhaps, to have taken a personal part and been one of the performers in every kind of event, but it is necessary to have had experience of the most important and those of commonest occurrence. 25i. That what I say is not unattainable is sufficiently evidenced by Homer, in whose works we find much of this kind of vividness. From these considerations I suppose everyone would now agree that industry in the study of documents is only a third part of history and only stands in the third place. How true what I have just said is will be most clear from the

τῶν συμβουλευτικῶν καὶ παρακλητικῶν, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτικῶν λόγων, οἷς κέχρηται Τίμαιος. ὀλίγοι
4 μὲν γὰρ καιροὶ πάντας ἐπιδέχονται διαθέσθαι τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι βραχεῖς [καί] τινας τῶν ὑπόντων, καὶ τούτων τινὰς μὲν οἱ νῦν, ἄλλους δ' οἱ προγεγονότες, καὶ τινὰς μὲν Αἰτωλοὶ προσίενται, τινὰς δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, τινὰς δ' Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ματαίως καὶ ἀκαίρως
5 [καὶ] πρὸς πάντα πάντας διεξιέναι τοὺς ἐνόντας λόγους, ὃ ποιεῖ Τίμαιος πρὸς πᾶσαν ὑπόθεσιν εὑρεσιλογῶν, τελέως ἀνάληθες καὶ μειρακιῶδες καὶ διατριβικόν—ἅμα καὶ πολλοῖς ἀποτυχίας αἴτιον ἤδη τοῦτο γέγονε καὶ καταφρονήσεως—τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἁρμόζοντας καὶ καιρίους ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν, τοῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον. ἀστάτου δὲ τῆς χρείας οὔσης
6 καὶ πόσοις καὶ ποίοις τῶν ἐνόντων χρηστέον, ἀλλοιοτέρου τινὸς δεῖ ζήλου καὶ παραγγέλματος, εἰ μέλλομεν μὴ βλάπτειν, ἀλλ' ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὁ καιρὸς ἐν πᾶσι
7 δυσπαράγγελτος, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατος εἰς ὑπόνοιαν ἀχθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοπαθείας καὶ τριβῆς θεωρημάτων· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος μάλιστ' ἂν
8 ὑπονοηθείη τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τούτων. εἰ γὰρ οἱ συγγραφεῖς ὑποδείξαντες τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν βουλευομένων, κἄπειτα τοὺς κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντας λόγους ἐκθέντες διασαφήσαιεν ἡμῖν τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς ἢ κατευστοχῆσαι συνέβη τοὺς εἰπόντας ἢ διαπεσεῖν, γένοιτ' ἄν τις ἔννοια τοῦ πράγματος ἀληθινή, καὶ δυναίμεθ' ἂν ἅμα μὲν διακρίνοντες, ἅμα δὲ μετα-

speeches, political, exhortatory, and ambassadorial, introduced by Timaeus. There are few occasions which admit of setting forth all possible arguments, most admitting only of those few brief arguments which occur to one, and even of these there are certain which are appropriate to contemporaries, others to men of former times, others again to Aetolians, others to Peloponnesians and others to Athenians. But, without point or occasion, to recite all possible arguments for everything, as Timaeus, with his talent for invention, does on every subject, is perfectly untrue to facts, and a mere childish sport—to do it has even in many cases been the cause of actual failure and exposed many to contempt—the necessary thing being to choose on every occasion suitable and opportune arguments. But since the needs of the case vary, we have need of special practice and principle in judging how many and which of the possible arguments we should employ, that is to say if we mean to do good rather than harm to our readers. Now it is difficult to convey by precept what is opportune or not in all instances, but it is not impossible to be led to a notion of it by reasoning from our personal experience in the past. For the present the best way of conveying my meaning is as follows. If writers, after indicating to us the situation and the motives and inclinations of the people who are discussing it report in the next place what was actually said and then make clear to us the reasons why the speakers either succeeded or failed, we shall arrive at some true notion of the actual facts, and we shall be able, both by distinguishing what was successful from what was not and by transferring our impression to similar

φέροντες ἐπὶ τὰ παραπλήσια κατευστοχεῖν ἀεὶ
9 τῶν προκειμένων. ἀλλ' ἔστιν, οἶμαι, τὸ μὲν αἰτιολογεῖν δυσχερές, τὸ δὲ ῥησικοπεῖν ⟨ἐν⟩ τοῖς βυβλίοις ῥᾴδιον καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀλίγα καιρίως εἰπεῖν καὶ τούτου παραγγελίαν εὑρεῖν ὀλίγοις ἐφικτόν, τὸ δὲ πολλὰ διαθέσθαι καὶ ματαίως τῶν ἐν μέσῳ κειμένων καὶ κοινόν.

25[k] Ἵνα δὲ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα βεβαιωσώμεθα τὴν ἀπόφασιν τὴν ὑπὲρ Τιμαίου, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀγνοίας, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἑκουσίου ψευδογραφίας, βραχέα προοισόμεθα τῶν ὁμολογου-
2 μένων αὐτοῦ λόγων ἐπ' ὀνόματος.—ὅτι τῶν δεδυναστευκότων ἐν Σικελίᾳ μετὰ Γέλωνα τὸν ἀρχαῖον πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας παρειλήφαμεν Ἑρμοκράτην, Τιμολέοντα, Πύρρον τὸν Ἠπειρώτην, οἷς ἥκιστ' ἂν δέοι περιάπτειν μειρακιώδεις καὶ
3 διατριβικοὺς λόγους. ὁ δέ φησιν ἐν τῇ μιᾷ καὶ εἰκοστῇ βύβλῳ, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν Εὐρυμέδων παραγενόμενος εἰς Σικελίαν παρεκάλει τὰς πόλεις εἰς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων πόλεμον, τότε τοὺς Γελῴους κάμνοντας τῷ πολέμῳ διαπέμψασθαι
4 πρὸς τοὺς Καμαριναίους ὑπὲρ ἀνοχῶν· τῶν δὲ προθύμως δεξαμένων, μετὰ ταῦτα πρεσβεύειν ἑκατέρους πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν συμμάχους καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἄνδρας ἐκπέμψαι πιστούς, οἵτινες εἰσελθόντες εἰς Γέλαν βουλεύσονται περὶ διαλύσεως
5 καὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων. παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν συνέδρων, καὶ διαβουλίου προτεθέντος τοιούτοις τισὶ χρώμενον εἰσάγει λόγοις τὸν Ἑρμοκράτην.
6 ἐπαινέσας γὰρ ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ τοὺς Γελῴους καὶ τοὺς Καμαριναίους, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς αὐτῶν ποιησάντων τὰς ἀνοχάς, δεύτερον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ

circumstances, to treat any situation that faces us with hope of success. But, I fear, it is difficult to assign causes, and very easy to invent phrases by the aid of books, and while it is given only to a few to say a few words at the right time it is a common accomplishment and open to anyone to compose long speeches to no purpose.

25[k]. In confirmation of my charge against Timaeus on this count also, besides that of his mistakes and his deliberate falsification of the truth, I shall give some short extracts from speeches acknowledged to be his, giving names and dates. Of those who were in power in Sicily after the elder Gelo, we have always accepted as a fact that the most capable rulers were Hermocrates, Timoleon, and Pyrrhus of Epirus, and these are the last to whom one should attribute childish and idle speeches. But Timaeus in his twenty-first book says that at the time when Eurymedon came to Sicily and was urging the towns to pursue the war against Syracuse, the Geleans, who were suffering by the war, sent to Camarina begging for a truce. The people of Camarina gladly consented, and upon this both cities sent embassies to their allies begging them to dispatch trustworthy commissioners to Gela to discuss terms of peace and the general interests of all concerned. When, on the arrival of these commissioners, a resolution was proposed in council he represents Hermocrates as speaking somewhat as follows. This statesman, after praising the people of Gela and Camarina first of all for having themselves made the truce, secondly for

διαλύσεως γενέσθαι λόγους αἴτιοι καθεστήκασι, τρίτον ὅτι προνοηθεῖεν τοῦ μὴ βουλεύεσθαι τὰ ‹πλήθη περὶ τῶν δι›αλύσεων, ἀλλὰ ‹τοὺς προεστῶ›τας τῶν πολιτῶν ‹τοὺς› σαφῶς εἰδότας
7 τίνα διαφορὰν ὁ πόλεμος ἔχει τῆς εἰρήνης, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δύ' ἢ τρία λαβὼν ἐπιχειρήματα πραγματικά, λοιπόν ‹φησιν› αὐτοὺς ἐπιστήσαντας μαθεῖν ἡλίκην ὁ πόλεμος διαφορὰν ἔχει τῆς εἰρήνης, μικρῷ πρότερον εἰρηκὼς ὅτι κατ' ‹αὐτὸ τοῦτο› χάριν ἔχει τοῖς Γελῴοις τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι τοὺς λόγους ‹ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀλλ'› ἐν συνεδρίῳ καλῶς γινώ-
8 σκοντι τὰς τοιαύτας περιπετείας. ἐξ ὧν ὁ Τίμαιος οὐ μόνον τῆς πραγματικῆς ἂν δόξειεν ἀπολείπεσθαι δυνάμεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς ἐπι-
9 ‹χειρήσεων οὐκ ὀλίγον› ἐλαττοῦσθαι. πάντες γὰρ δήπουθεν οἴονται δεῖν τὰς ἀποδείξεις φέρειν τῶν ἀγνοουμένων καὶ τῶν ἀπιστουμένων παρὰ τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἤδη γινωσκομένων ματαιότατον εἶναι πάντων καὶ παιδαριωδέστατον τὸ καθευρεσιλογεῖν . . . . . μενον ἢ τὸ
10 γινωσκόμενον. ὁ δὲ χωρὶς τῆς ὅλης παραπτώσεως τοῦ ‹διατε›θεῖσθαι τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὰ καθάπαξ μὴ προσδεόμενα λόγου καὶ
11 λήμμασι κέχρηται τοιούτοις, οἷς τὸν μὲν Ἑρμοκράτην τίς ἂν κεχρῆσθαι πιστεύσειε, τὸν συναγωνισάμενον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν, αὐτανδρὶ δὲ χειρωσάμενον τὰς Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεις καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς κατὰ Σικελίαν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μειράκιον τὸ τυχόν;
26 ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν οἴεται δεῖν ἀναμνησθῆναι τοὺς συνέδρους διότι τοὺς κοιμωμένους τὸν ὄρθρον ἐν μὲν τῷ πολέμῳ διεγείρουσιν αἱ σάλπιγγες,

being the originators of the negotiations, and thirdly for seeing to it that the terms of peace were not discussed by the multitude but by the leading citizens who knew well the difference between war and peace, after this introduces one or two practical reflexions and then says that they themselves must now give ear to him and learn how much war differs from peace, and this after having just said that he was thankful to the Geleans for this very thing that the discussion was not held by the multitude but in a council well acquainted with such changes. From this it appears that Timaeus was not only deficient in practical sense, but does not even attain the level of the themes we hear in schools of rhetoric. For there all, I suppose, think they ought to give their hearers proofs of things of which they are ignorant or which they disbelieve, but that to exercise our wits in speaking of what our hearers already know is most foolish and childish. . . . Apart from his general mistake in devoting the greater part of the speech to a matter that does not require a single word, he employs such arguments as none could believe to have been used by, I will not say that Hermocrates who took part with the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Aegospotami and captured the whole Athenian army with its generals in Sicily but, by any ordinary schoolboy. 26. In the first place he thinks it proper to remind the council that men are aroused in the morning in war time by the trumpet

2 κατὰ δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην οἱ ὄρνιθες. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Ἡρακλέα φησὶ τὸν μὲν Ὀλυμπίων ἀγῶνα θεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν δεῖγμα ποιούμενον τῆς αὐτοῦ προαιρέσεως, ὅσοις δ' ἐπολέμησε, τούτους πάντας βεβλαφέναι κατὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ κατ' ἐπιταγήν, ἑκουσίως δὲ παραίτιον οὐδενὶ
3 γεγονέναι κακοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔξῆς δὲ τούτοις παρὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητῇ τὸν Δία παρεισάγεσθαι δυσαρεστούμενον τῷ Ἄρει καὶ λέγοντα

ἔχθιστος δέ μοί ἐσσι θεῶν, οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν·
αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε.

4 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον τῶν ἡρώων λέγειν

ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος
ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος.

5 ὁμογνωμονεῖν δὲ τῷ ποιητῇ καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδην, ἐν οἷς φησιν,

εἰρήνα βαθύπλουτε,
καλλίστα μακάρων θεῶν,
ζῆλός μοι σέθεν, ὡς χρονίζεις.
δέδοικα δὲ μὴ πρὶν ὑπερβάλῃ με γῆρας,
πρὶν σὰν χαρίεσσαν προσιδεῖν ὥραν
καὶ καλλιχόρους ἀοιδὰς
φιλοστεφάνους τε κώμους.

6 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὁμοιότατον εἶναί φησι τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τῇ νόσῳ, τὴν δ' εἰρήνην τῇ ὑγιείᾳ· τὴν μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἀναλαμβάνειν, ἐν ᾧ

[a] Homer, *Iliad*, v. 890. The translations are Pope's.
[b] Homer, *Iliad*, ix. 63.
[c] Eurip. frag. 453.

and in peace by the crowing of cocks. After this he tells them that Heracles founded the Olympian games and truce as a proof of his real preference, and that he had injured all those he fought with under compulsion and by order, but that he had done no evil to any man of his own free will. Next he says that Homer represents Zeus as displeased with Ares and saying

> Of all the gods who tread the spangled skies,
> Thou most unjust, most odious in our eyes!
> Inhuman discord is thy dire delight,
> The waste of slaughter, and the rage of fight;[a]

that similarly the wisest of his heroes says

> Cursed is the man, and void of law and right,
> Unworthy property, unworthy light,
> Unfit for public rule, or private care,
> That wretch, that monster, who delights in war;[b]

and that Euripides expresses the same opinion as Homer in these verses:

> O Peace, loaded with riches, of the blest
> Gods thou art far the loveliest.
> So long thou tarriest, I am fain,
> And fear lest age o'ertake me ere
> I look upon thy features fair
> Once again,
> See them dancing in a ring,
> As they sing,
> See the wreaths upon their brows,
> As they troop from the carouse.[c]

In addition to this Hermocrates is made to say that war very much resembles sickness and peace is very like health, for peace restores even the sick

7 δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας ἀπόλλυσθαι. καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὴν εἰρήνην τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν νέων θάπτεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ τἀναντία,
8 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἐν μὲν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδ' ἄχρι τῶν τειχῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην μέχρι τῶν τῆς χώρας ὅρων, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα
9 παραπλήσια. θαυμάζω δὴ τίσι ποτ' ἂν ἄλλοις ἐχρήσατο λόγοις ἢ προφοραῖς μειράκιον ἄρτι γενόμενον περὶ διατριβὰς καὶ ‹τὰς› ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων πολυπραγμοσύνας καὶ βουλόμενον παραγγελματικῶς ἐκ τῶν παρεπομένων τοῖς προσώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ‹οὐχ ἑτ›έροις, ἀλλὰ τούτοις οἷς Τίμαιος Ἑρμοκράτην κεχρῆσθαί φησι.

26[a] Τί δὲ πάλιν ὅταν ὁ Τιμολέων ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ βύβλῳ παρακαλῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους κίνδυνον, καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἤδη μελλόντων συνάγειν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς πολλαπλασίοις οὖσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἀξιοῖ μὴ βλέπειν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀλλὰ
2 πρὸς τὴν ἀνανδρίαν; καὶ γὰρ τῆς Λιβύης ἁπάσης συνεχῶς οἰκουμένης καὶ πληθυούσης ἀνθρώπων, ὅμως ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις, ὅταν περὶ ἐρημίας ἔμφασιν βουλώμεθα ποιῆσαι, λέγειν ἡμᾶς "ἐρημότερα τῆς Λιβύης," οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν φέροντας τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνανδριαν τῶν κατοικούντων.
3 καθόλου δέ, φησί, τίς ἂν φοβηθείη τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες τῆς φύσεως τοῦτο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δεδωκυίας ἴδιον παρὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ζώων, λέγω δὲ τὰς χεῖρας, ταύτας παρ' ὅλον τὸν βίον ἐντὸς τῶν
4 χιτώνων ἔχοντες ἀπράκτους περιφέρουσι; τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ὅτι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς χιτωνίσκοις, φησί,

and in war even the healthy perish. In peace again we are told that the old are buried by the young as is natural, while in war it is the reverse, and that above all in war there is no safety even up to the walls, but in peace there is safety as far as the boundaries of the land, and a number of similar things. I wonder what other words or expressions would be used by a boy fresh from the schools and the curious study of memoirs who wished to compose a declamatory essay made up of all that was consonant with the character of certain historical personages. The style of it would probably be no other than that of the speech Timaeus puts into the mouth of Hermocrates.

26ª. And what shall we say again when Timoleon in the same book exhorting the Greeks to do battle with the Carthaginians, almost at the moment that they are about to encounter an enemy largely outnumbering them, first bids them not to consider the numbers of their foes but their cowardice. For, he says, although the whole of Libya is thickly populated and full of men, yet when we wish to convey an impression of solitude we use the proverbial phrase "more desert than Libya," not referring to its solitude but to the cowardice of the inhabitants. "In general," he says, "how can we be afraid of men who having received from nature in distinction from other animals the gift of hands, hold them for the whole of their life idle inside their tunics, and above all wear drawers under their

περιζώματα φοροῦσιν, ἵνα μηδ' ὅταν ἀποθάνωσιν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις φανεροὶ γένωνται τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. . . .

26[b] Ὅτι Γέλωνος ἐπαγγελλομένου τοῖς Ἕλλησι δισμυρίοις πεζοῖς, διακοσίαις δὲ ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις βοηθήσειν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἢ τῆς κατὰ γῆν ἢ τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν παραχωρήσωσι, φασὶ τοὺς προκαθημένους ἐν Κορίνθῳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πραγματικώτατον ἀπόκριμα δοῦναι τοῖς
2 παρὰ τοῦ Γέλωνος πρεσβευταῖς· ἐκέλευον γὰρ ὡς ἐπίκουρον ἔρχεσθαι τὸν Γέλωνα μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, τὴν δ' ἡγεμονίαν ἀνάγκη τὰ πράγματα
3 περιθήσειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἀνδρῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οὐ καταφευγόντων ἐπὶ τὰς Συρακοσίων ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πιστευόντων αὑτοῖς καὶ προκαλουμένων τὸν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἀνδρείας ἀγῶνα
4 καὶ τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς στέφανον. ἀλλ' ὅμως Τίμαιος εἰς ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων τοσούτους ἐκτείνει λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην ποιεῖται σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ τὴν μὲν Σικελίαν μεγαλομερεστέραν ποιῆσαι τῆς συμπάσης Ἑλλάδος, τὰς δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πράξεις ἐπιφανεστέρας καὶ καλλίους τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην οἰκουμένην, τῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν τῶν μὲν σοφίᾳ διενηνοχότων σοφωτάτους τοὺς ἐν Σικελίᾳ, τῶν δὲ πραγματικῶν ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ θειο-
5 τάτους τοὺς ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολὴν τοῖς μειρακίοις τοῖς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς καὶ τοῖς <περι>πάτοις πρὸς τὰς παραδόξους ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὅταν ἢ Θερσίτου λέγειν ἐγκώμιον ἢ Πηνελόπης πρόθωνται ψόγον ἤ τινος ἑτέρου τῶν τοιούτων.

26[c] Λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτων διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας οὐκ εἰς σύγκρισιν, ἀλλ' εἰς κατα-

tunics that they may not even when killed in battle be exposed to the view of their enemies?[a] . . .

26ᵇ. When Gelo promised to send to the assistance of the Greeks twenty thousand infantry and two hundred warships, if they would grant him the command either on land or at sea, they say that the representatives of Greece sitting in council at Corinth gave a reply to Gelo's envoys which was much to the point. They bade Gelo with his forces come as an auxiliary, but as for the command actual circumstances would of necessity invest the most capable men with it. These are by no means the words of men resting their sole hope on Syracuse, but of men relying on themselves and inviting anyone who wished to do so to join in the contest and win the prize of valour. But Timaeus, in commenting on all this, is so long-winded and so obviously anxious to manifest that Sicily was more important than all the rest of Greece—the events occurring in Sicily being so much more magnificent and more noble than those anywhere else in the world, the sagest of men distinguished for wisdom coming from Sicily and the most capable and wonderful leaders being those from Syracuse—that no boy in a school of rhetoric who is set to write a eulogy of Thersites or a censure of Penelope or anything else of the sort could surpass him in the paradoxes he ventures on.

26ᶜ. The consequence of this is that, owing to this excessive addiction to paradox, he does not induce

[a] Campe proposes to add *ἄνδρες ὄντες* which gives a better sense: "that it may not be evident to their enemies that they are men."

μώκησιν ἄγει καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰς πράξεις
ὧν βούλεται προϊστασθαι, καὶ σχεδὸν εἰς τὸ
παραπλήσιον ἐμπίπτει τοῖς περὶ τοὺς ἐν Ἀκαδη-
μείᾳ λόγους ⟨πρὸς⟩ τὸν προχειρότατον λόγον
2 ἠσκηκόσι. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τινὲς βουλόμενοι περί
τε τῶν προφανῶς καταληπτῶν εἶναι δοκούντων
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγειν
τοὺς προσδιαλεγομένους τοιαύταις χρῶνται παρα-
δοξολογίαις καὶ τοιαύτας εὐποροῦσι πιθανότητας
ὥστε διαπορεῖν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοὺς ἐν Ἀθήναις
ὄντας ὀσφραίνεσθαι τῶν ἐψομένων ὠῶν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ
καὶ διστάζειν μή πως, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ
διαλέγονται περὶ τούτων, οὐχ ὕπαρ, ἀλλ' ὄναρ ἐν
οἴκῳ κατακείμενοι τούτους διατίθενται τοὺς λόγους.
3 ἐξ ὧν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας
εἰς διαβολὴν ἦχασι τὴν ὅλην αἵρεσιν, ὥστε καὶ
4 τὰ καλῶς ἀπορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς
ἀπιστίαν ἦχθαι. καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἰδίας ἀστοχίας
καὶ τοῖς νέοις τοιοῦτον ἐντετόκασι ζῆλον, ὥστε
τῶν μὲν ἠθικῶν καὶ πραγματικῶν λόγων μηδὲ
τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἐπίνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι ⟨συμβαίνει⟩, δι'
ὧν ὄνησις τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀνωφελεῖς
καὶ παραδόξους εὑρεσιλογίας κενοδοξοῦντες κατα-
τρίβουσι τοὺς βίους.

26[d] Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ Τιμαίῳ συμβέβηκε περὶ τὴν
ἱστορίαν καὶ τοῖς τούτου ζηλωταῖς· παραδοξολόγος
γὰρ ὢν καὶ φιλόνεικος περὶ τὸ προτεθὲν τοὺς μὲν
πολλοὺς καταπέπληκται τοῖς λόγοις, ἠνάγκακε δ'
αὐτῷ ⟨προσέχειν⟩ διὰ τὴν ἐπίφασιν τῆς ἀληθινο-
λογίας, τινὰς δὲ καὶ προσκέκληται καὶ μετ' ἀπο-
2 δείξεως δοκεῖ πείσειν. καὶ μάλιστα ταύτην γ'
ἐνείργασται τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀποικίας

us to consider and compare, but exposes to ridicule the men and the actions he is championing, and comes very near falling into the same vicious habit as those who in the discussions of the Academy have trained themselves in extreme readiness of speech. For some of these philosophers, too, in their effort to puzzle the minds of those with whom they are arguing about the comprehensible and incomprehensible, resort to such paradoxes and are so fertile in inventing plausibilities that they wonder whether or not it is possible for those in Athens to smell eggs being roasted in Ephesus, and are in doubt as to whether all the time they are discussing the matter in the Academy they are not lying in their beds at home and composing this discourse in a dream and not in reality. Consequently from this excessive love of paradox they have brought the whole sect into disrepute, so that people have come to disbelieve in the existence of legitimate subjects of doubt. And apart from their own purposelessness they have implanted such a passion in the minds of our young men, that they never give even a thought to ethical and political questions which really benefit students of philosophy, but spend their lives in the vain effort to invent useless paradoxes.

25d. Timaeus and his admirers are in the same case as regards history. For being given to paradox and contentiously defending every statement, he overawes most people by his language, compelling them to belief by the superficial appearance of veracity, while in other cases he invites discussion and seems likely to carry conviction by the proofs he produces. He is most successful in creating this impression when he makes statements about

καὶ κτίσεις καὶ συγγενείας ἀποφάσεων· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τηλικαύτην ἐπίφασιν ποιεῖ διὰ τῆς ἀκριβολογίας καὶ τῆς πικρίας τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλέγχων, οἷς χρῆται κατὰ τῶν πέλας, ὥστε δοκεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους συγγραφέας ἅπαντας συγκεκοιμῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ κατεσχεδιακέναι τῆς οἰκουμένης, αὐτὸν δὲ μόνον ἐξητακέναι τὴν ἀκρίβειαν καὶ διευκρινηκέναι τὰς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἱστορίας, ἐν οἷς πολλὰ μὲν ὑγιῶς λέγεται, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἱ πλείω χρόνον συντραφέντες αὐτοῦ τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν οἷς αἱ περὶ τῶν προειρημένων εἰσὶ συντάξεις, ὅταν ἅπασαν συνταξαμένῳ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἀποπιστεύσωσι, κἄπειτά τις αὐτοῖς ἀποδεικνύῃ τὸν Τίμαιον, ἐν οἷς πικρότατός ἐστι κατὰ τῶν πέλας, αὐτὸν ἔνοχον ὄντα, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἀρτίως ἐπὶ τῶν Λοκρῶν καὶ τῶν ἑξῆς παραπαίοντα συνεστήσαμεν, δυσέριδες γίνονται καὶ φιλόνεικοι καὶ δυσμετάθετοι, καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οἱ φιλοπονώτατα προσεδρεύσαντες τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦτ' ἀποφέρονται τὸ λυσιτελὲς ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως. οἵ γε μὴν ταῖς δημηγορίαις προσσχόντες αὐτοῦ καὶ καθόλου τοῖς διεξοδικοῖς λόγοις μειρακιώδεις καὶ διατριβικοὶ καὶ τελέως ἀναλήθεις γίνονται διὰ τὰς ἄρτι ῥηθείσας αἰτίας.

26[e] Λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ πραγματικὸν αὐτῷ μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας ἐκ πάντων σύγκειται τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ὧν τὰ πλεῖστα διεληλύθαμεν· τὴν δ' αἰτίαν τῆς ἁμαρτίας νῦν ἐροῦμεν, ἥτις οὐκ ἔνδοξος μὲν φανεῖται τοῖς πλείστοις, ἀληθινωτάτη δ' εὑρεθήσεται τῶν Τιμαίου κατηγορημάτων. δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρικὴν περὶ ἕκαστα δύναμιν καὶ

colonies, the foundation of towns and family history. For here he makes such a fine show owing to his accuracy of statement and the bitter tone in which he confutes others that one would think all writers except himself had dozed over events and made mere random shots at what was befalling the world, while he alone had tested the accuracy of everything and submitted to careful scrutiny the various stories in which there is much that is genuine and much that is false. But, as a fact, when those who have made themselves by long study familiar with the earlier part of his work, in which he treats of the subjects I mentioned, have come to rely fully on his excessive professions of accuracy, and when after this someone proves to them that Timaeus is himself guilty of the very faults he bitterly reproaches in others, committing errors such as I have just above exhibited in the cases of the Locrians and others ; then, I say, they become the most captious of critics, disposed to contest every statement, difficult to shake ; and it is chiefly those who have devoted most labour to the study of his works who profit thus by their reading. Those on the other hand who model themselves on his speeches and in general on his more verbose passages become for the reasons I give above childish, scholastic, and quite unveracious.

26e. The systematic part of his history, then, is a tissue of all the faults, most of which I have described. I will now deal with the prime cause of his errors, a cause which most people will not be inclined to admit, but it will be found to be the truest accusation to be brought against him. He seems to me to have acquired both practical experi-

τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης ἕξιν παρεσκευάσθαι
καὶ συλλήβδην φιλοπόνως προσεληλυθέναι πρὸς
4 τὸ γράφειν τὴν ἱστορίαν, ἐν ἐνίοις δ' οὐδεὶς οὔτ'
ἀπειρότερος οὔτ' ἀφιλοπονώτερος φαίνεται γεγο-
νέναι τῶν ἐπ' ὀνόματος συγγραφέων. δῆλον δ'
27 ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τούτων. δυεῖν γὰρ ὄντων
κατὰ φύσιν ὡς ἂν εἴ τινων ὀργάνων ἡμῖν, οἷς
πάντα πυνθανόμεθα καὶ πολυπραγμονοῦμεν, ἀκοῆς
καὶ ὁράσεως, ἀληθινωτέρας δ' οὔσης οὐ μικρῷ
τῆς ὁράσεως κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον—ὀφθαλμοὶ
2 γὰρ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες—τούτων
Τίμαιος τὴν ἡδίω μέν, ἧττω δὲ τῶν ὁδῶν ὥρμησε
3 πρὸς τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς
ὁράσεως εἰς τέλος ἀπέστη, τῶν δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς
ἀντεποιήσατο. καὶ ταύτης ‹δι›μερ‹οῦς› οὔσης
τινός, τοῦ μὲν διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων . . . τὸ δὲ
περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις ῥᾳθύμως ἀνεστράφη, καθάπερ
4 ἐν τοῖς ἀνώτερον ἡμῖν δεδήλωται. δι' ἣν δ'
αἰτίαν ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν αἵρεσιν εὐχερὲς κατα-
μαθεῖν· ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν βυβλίων δύναται
πολυπραγμονεῖσθαι χωρὶς κινδύνου καὶ κακο-
παθείας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο προνοηθῇ μόνον ὥστε
λαβεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἔχουσαν ὑπομνημάτων πλῆθος ἢ
5 βυβλιοθήκην που γειτνιῶσαν. λοιπὸν κατακεί-
μενον ἐρευνᾶν δεῖ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ συγκρίνειν
τὰς τῶν προγεγονότων συγγραφέων ἀγνοίας ἄνευ
6 πάσης κακοπαθείας. ἡ δὲ πολυπραγμοσύνη πολλῆς
μὲν προσδεῖται ταλαιπωρίας καὶ δαπάνης, μέγα
δέ τι συμβάλλεται καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι μέρος τῆς
7 ἱστορίας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν

ence and the habit of industrious study of documents, and in fact generally speaking to have approached the task of writing history in a painstaking spirit, but in some matters we know of no author of repute who seems to have been less experienced and less painstaking. What I am saying will be clearer from the following considerations. 27. Nature has given us two instruments, as it were,[a] by the aid of which we inform ourselves and inquire about everything. These are hearing and sight, and of the two sight is much more veracious according to Heracleitus. "The eyes are more accurate witnesses than the ears," he says. Now, Timaeus enters on his inquiries by the pleasanter of the two roads, but the inferior one. For he entirely avoids employing his eyes and prefers to employ his ears. Now the knowledge derived from hearing being of two sorts, Timaeus diligently pursued the one, the reading of books, as I have above pointed out, but was very remiss in his use of the other, the interrogation of living witnesses. It is easy enough to perceive what caused him to make this choice. Inquiries from books may be made without any danger or hardship, provided only that one takes care to have access to a town rich in documents or to have a library near at hand. After that one has only to pursue one's researches in perfect repose and compare the accounts of different writers without exposing oneself to any hardship. Personal inquiry, on the contrary, requires severe labour and great expense, but is exceedingly valuable and is the most important part of history. This is

[a] I render *ὄργανα* "instruments" not "organs" as Polybius justifies his use of the word, which is, however, quite commonly used of the bodily organs by Aristotle.

τὰς συντάξεις πραγματευομένων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
Ἔφορός φησιν, εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι
πᾶσι τοῖς πράγμασι, ταύτην ἂν διαφέρειν πολὺ τῶν
8 ἐμπειριῶν· ὁ δὲ Θεόπομπος τοῦτον μὲν ἄριστον
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τὸν πλείστοις κινδύνοις παρα-
τετευχότα, τοῦτον δὲ δυνατώτατον ἐν λόγῳ τὸν
9 πλείστων μετεσχηκότα πολιτικῶν ἀγώνων. τὸν
αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον συμβαίνειν ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ
10 κυβερνητικῆς. ἔτι δὲ τούτων ἐμφαντικώτερον ὁ
ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους. ἐκεῖνος
γὰρ βουλόμενος ὑποδεικνύειν ἡμῖν οἷον δεῖ τὸν
ἄνδρα τὸν πραγματικὸν εἶναι, προθέμενος τὸ τοῦ
Ὀδυσσέως πρόσωπον λέγει πως οὕτως·

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα
πολλὰ πλάγχθη,

11 καὶ προβάς,

πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,
πολλὰ δ' ὅγ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ
θυμόν,

καὶ ἔτι

ἀνδρῶν τε πτολέμους ἀλεγεινά τε κύματα
πείρων.

28 Δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας πρόσχημα τοι-
2 οῦτον ἄνδρα ζητεῖν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων φησὶ τότε
τἀνθρώπεια καλῶς ἕξειν, ὅταν ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι
3 βασιλεύσωσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλεῖς φιλοσοφήσωσι· κἀγὼ
δ' ἂν εἴποιμι διότι τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ἕξει τότε
καλῶς, ὅταν ἢ οἱ πραγματικοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γράφειν

evident from expressions used by historians themselves. Ephorus, for example, says that if we could be personally present at all transactions such knowledge would be far superior to any other. Theopompus says that the man who has the best knowledge of war is he who has been present at the most battles, that the most capable speaker is he who has taken part in the greatest number of debates, and that the same holds good about medicine and navigation. Homer has been still more emphatic on this subject than these writers. Wishing to show us what qualities one should possess in order to be a man of action he says :

> The man for wisdom's various arts renowned,
> Long exercised in woes, O muse, resound,
> Wandering from clime to clime ;[a]

and further on

> Observant strayed,
> Their manners noted, and their states surveyed :
> On stormy seas unnumbered toils he bore ;[a]

and again—

> In scenes of death by tempest and by war.[b]

28. It appears to me that the dignity of history also demands such a man. Plato,[c] as we know, tells us that human affairs will then go well when either philosophers become kings or kings study philosophy, and I would say that it will be well with history either when men of action undertake to write history,

[a] Homer, *Od.* i. 1-3. The translations are Pope's.
[b] Homer, *Od.* viii. 183.
[c] Plato, *Rep.* v. 473 c.

4 ἐπιχειρήσωσι τὰς ἱστορίας, μὴ καθάπερ νῦν παρέργως, νομίσαντες δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων καὶ καλλίστων, ἀπερίσπαστοι . . . παράσχωνται πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος κατὰ τὸν 5 βίον, ἢ οἱ γράφειν ἐπιβαλλόμενοι τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἕξιν ἀναγκαίαν ἡγήσωνται πρὸς τὴν ἱστορίαν. πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἔσται παῦλα τῆς 6 τῶν ἱστοριογράφων ἀγνοίας. ὧν Τίμαιος οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην πρόνοιαν θέμενος, ἀλλὰ καταβιώσας ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ ξενιτεύων, καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰ κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἀπειπάμενος καὶ τὴν ἐνεργητικὴν τὴν περὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς πλάνης καὶ θέας αὐτοπάθειαν, οὐκ 7 οἶδ' ὅπως ἐκφέρεται δόξαν ὡς ἔλκων τὴν τοῦ συγγραφέως προστασίαν. καὶ διότι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀνθομολογούμενον εὐχερὲς παραστῆσαι τὸν 8 Τίμαιον. κατὰ γὰρ τὸ προοίμιον τῆς ἕκτης βύβλου φησί τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν διότι τινὸς μείζονος δεῖται φύσεως καὶ φιλοπονίας καὶ παρασκευῆς τὸ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων γένος ἢ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας· ταύτας δὲ τὰς δόξας πρότερον μὲν 9 Ἐφόρῳ φησὶ προσπεσεῖν, οὐ δυνηθέντος δ' ἱκανῶς ἐκείνου πρὸς τοὺς ταὐτα λέγοντας ἀπαντῆσαι, πειρᾶται συγκρίνειν αὐτὸς ἐκ παραβολῆς τὴν 10 ἱστορίαν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις, πρᾶγμα ποιῶν πάντων ἀτοπώτατον, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ συγγραφέως. ὁ γὰρ Ἔφορος παρ' ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν θαυμάσιος ὢν καὶ κατὰ τὴν φράσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χειρισμὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν λημμάτων, δεινότατός ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς παρεκβάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀφ' αὑτοῦ γνωμολογίαις, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅταν που τὸν ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον

not as now happens in a perfunctory manner, but when in the belief that this is a most necessary and most noble thing they apply themselves all through their life to it with undivided attention, or again when would-be authors regard a training in actual affairs as necessary for writing history. Before this be so the errors of historians will never cease. Timaeus never gave a moment's thought to this, but though he spent all his life in exile in one single place, though he almost seems to have deliberately denied himself any active part in war or politics or any personal experience gained by travel and observation, yet, for some unknown reason, he has acquired the reputation of being a leading author. That such is the character of Timaeus can easily be shown from his own avowal. For in the preface to his sixth book he says that some suppose that greater talent, more industry, and more previous training are required for declamatory than for historical writing. Such opinions, he says, formerly incurred Ephorus's disapproval, but as that writer could give no satisfactory answer to those who held them, he himself attempts to institute a comparison between history and declamatory writing, a most surprising thing to do, firstly in that his statement about Ephorus is false. For Ephorus, while throughout his whole work he is admirable in his phraseology, method, and the originality of his thought, is most eloquent in his digressions and in the expression of his personal judgement, whenever, in fact, he allows himself to enlarge on any subject,

11 διατίθηται· κατὰ δέ τινα συντυχίαν εὐχαριστό-
τατα καὶ πιθανώτατα περὶ τῆς συγκρίσεως εἴρηκε
12 τῆς τῶν ἱστοριογράφων καὶ λογογράφων. ὁ δ'
ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ κατακολουθεῖν Ἐφόρῳ, πρὸς τῷ
κατεψεῦσθαι 'κείνου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν <ἅμα> κατ-
έγν<ωκε· τὰ γὰρ παρ'> ἄλλων δεόντως κεχειρισμένα
μακρῶς καὶ ἀσαφῶς καὶ τρόπῳ παντὶ χεῖρον
ἐξηγούμενος οὐδένα τῶν ζώντων ὑπέλαβε τοῦτο
28ᵃ παρατηρήσειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος αὔξειν
τὴν ἱστορίαν πρῶτον μὲν τηλικαύτην εἶναί φησι
διαφορὰν τῆς ἱστορίας πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιδεικτικοὺς
λόγους, ἡλίκην ἔχει τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ᾠκοδομη-
μένα καὶ κατεσκευασμένα τῶν ἐν ταῖς σκηνο-
2 γραφίαις φαινομένων τόπων καὶ διαθέσεων· δεύ-
τερον αὐτὸ τὸ συναθροῖσαί φησι τὴν παρασκευὴν
τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἱστορίαν μεῖζον ἔργον εἶναι τῆς
ὅλης πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐπιδεικτικοὺς
3 λόγους· αὐτὸς γοῦν τηλικαύτην ὑπομεμενηκέ<ναι>
δαπάνην καὶ κακοπάθειαν τοῦ συναγαγεῖν τὰ
παρὰ Κυρνίων ὑπομνήματα καὶ πολυπραγμονῆσαι
τὰ Λιγύων ἔθη καὶ Κελτῶν, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις
Ἰβήρων, ὥστε μήτ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἐλπίσαι μήτ' ἂν
ἑτέρους ἐξηγουμένους πιστευθῆναι περὶ τούτων.
4 ἡδέως δέ τις ἂν ἔροιτο τὸν συγγραφέα πότερον
ὑπολαμβάνει μείζονος δεῖσθαι δαπάνης καὶ κακο-
παθείας τὸ καθήμενον ἐν ἄστει συνάγειν ὑπο-
μνήματα καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰ Λιγύων ἔθη καὶ
Κελτῶν ἢ τὸ πειραθῆναι τῶν πλείστων ἐθνῶν
5 καὶ τόπων αὐτόπτην γενέσθαι. τί δ' αὖ τὸ πυν-
θάνεσθαι τὰς παρατάξεις καὶ πολιορκίας, ἔτι δὲ
ναυμαχίας, τῶν παρατετυχηκότων τοῖς κινδύνοις,
ἢ τὸ πεῖραν λαβεῖν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἅμα τούτοις

and it so happens that his remarks on the difference between historians and speech-writers are peculiarly charming and convincing. But Timaeus, in order not to seem to be copying Ephorus, besides making a false statement about him has at the same time condemned all other historians. For dealing with matters, treated by others correctly, at inordinate length, in a confused manner, and in every respect worse, he thinks that not a living soul will notice this. 28ª. Actually in order to glorify history he says that the difference between it and declamatory writing is as great as that between real buildings or furniture and the views and compositions we see in scene-paintings. In the second place he says that the mere collection of the material required for a history is a more serious task than the complete course of study of the art of declamatory speaking. He himself, he tells us, had incurred such expense and been put to so much trouble in collecting his notes from Assyria [?] and inquiring into the manners and customs of the Ligurians, Celts, and Iberians that he could not hope that either his own testimony or that of others to this would be believed. One would like to ask this writer whether he thinks that to sit in town collecting notes and inquiring into the manners and customs of the Ligurians and Celts involves more trouble and expense than an attempt to see the majority of places and peoples with one's own eyes. Which again is most troublesome, to inquire from those present at the engagements the details of battles by land and sea and of sieges, or to be present at the actual scene and experience

6 συμβαινόντων ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; ἐγὼ μὲν
γὰρ οὐκ οἴομαι τηλικαύτην διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὰ
κατ' ἀλήθειαν οἰκοδομήματα τῶν ἐν ταῖς σκηνο-
γραφίαις τόπων, οὐδὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν τῶν ἐπιδεικτι-
κῶν λόγων, ἡλίκην ἐπὶ πασῶν τῶν συντάξεων τὴν
ἐξ αὐτουργίας καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοπαθείας ἀπόφασιν
7 τῶν ἐξ ἀκοῆς καὶ διηγήματος γραφομένων· ἧς
εἰς τέλος ἄπειρος ὢν εἰκότως ὑπέλαβε τὸ πάντων
ἐλάχιστον καὶ ῥᾷστον εἶναι ‹μέγιστον καὶ χαλε-
πώτατον› τοῖς πραγματευομένοις ‹τὴν› ἱστορίαν,
λέγω δὲ τὸ συνάγειν ὑπομνήματα καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι
8 παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων. καίτοι
γε περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἀνάγκη μεγάλα διαψεύ-
δεσθαι τοὺς ἀπείρους· πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε καλῶς
ἀνακρῖναι περὶ παρατάξεως ἢ πολιορκίας ἢ ναυ-
μαχίας; πῶς δὲ συνεῖναι τῶν ἐξηγουμένων τὰ
κατὰ μέρος ἀνεννόητον ὄντα τῶν προειρημένων;
9 οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον ὁ πυνθανόμενος τῶν ἀπαγγελ-
λόντων συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ἐξήγησιν· ἡ γὰρ
τῶν παρεπομένων τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑπόμνησις αὐτὴ
χειραγωγεῖ τὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἐφ' ἕκαστα τῶν
10 συμβεβηκότων· ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ μὲν ἄπειρος οὔτ'
ἀνακρῖναι τοὺς παραγεγονότας ἱκανός ἐστιν οὔτε
συμπαρὼν γνῶναι τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλὰ κἂν παρῇ
τρόπον τινὰ παρὼν ‹οὐ πάρεστιν›.

oneself the dangers and vicissitudes of battle? In my opinion the difference between real buildings and scene-paintings or between history and declamatory speech-making is not so great as is, in the case of all works, the difference between an account founded on participation, active or passive, in the occurrences and one composed from report and the narratives of others. But Timaeus, having no experience of the former proceeding, naturally thinks that what is really of smallest importance and easiest is most important and difficult, I mean the collection of documents and inquiry from those personally acquainted with the facts. And even in this task men of no experience are sure to be frequently deceived. For how is it possible to examine a person properly about a battle, a siege, or a sea-fight, or to understand the details of his narrative, if one has no clear ideas about these matters? For the inquirer contributes to the narrative as much as his informant, since the suggestions of the person who follows the narrative guide the memory of the narrator to each incident, and these are matters in which a man of no experience is neither competent to question those who were present at an action, nor when present himself to understand what is going on, but even if present he is in a sense not present.

FRAGMENTA LIBRI XIII

I. Res Graeciae

1 Ὅτι Αἰτωλοὶ διά τε τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν πολέμων καὶ διὰ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῶν βίων ἔλαθον οὐ μόνον ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κατάχρεοι γενηθέν-
2 τες. διόπερ οἰκείως διακείμενοι πρὸς καινοτομίαν τῆς οἰκείας πολιτείας εἵλοντο νομογράφους Δωρί-
3 μαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, θεωροῦντες τούτους κατά τε τὰς προαιρέσεις κινητικοὺς ὑπάρχοντας καὶ κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας ἐνδεδεμένους εἰς πολλὰ τῶν βιωτικῶν συναλλαγμάτων. οἳ καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἔγραψαν νόμους. . . .

1[a] Ὅτι Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Αἰτωλὸς νομοθετοῦντος Δωριμάχου καὶ Σκόπα ἀντέλεγε τοῖς γραφομένοις, ἐκ πολλῶν ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὅτι παρ' οἷς ἔφυ τοῦτο τὸ φυτόν, οὐδέποτε κατέληξε πρότερον ἢ μεγάλοις κακοῖς περιβαλεῖν τοὺς ἅπαξ αὐτῷ χρησαμένους·
2 διόπερ ἠξίου μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέπειν, εἰ κουφισθήσονται τῶν ἐνεστώτων συναλλαγ-
3 μάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἶναι πολεμοῦντας μὲν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα προΐεσθαι χάριν τῆς τῶν τέκνων ἀσφαλείας, βουλευομένους

[a] We must understand χρεῶν ἀποκοπαί, the cancelling of debts.

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XIII

I. Affairs of Greece

The Aetolians

1. The Aetolians, owing to the long continuance of hostilities and owing to their extravagant way of living, became deeply in debt before anyone else or even they themselves were aware of it. Being therefore naturally fond of making innovations in their own constitution they chose Dorimachus and Scopas to draw up laws, as they saw that both of these men had revolutionary tendencies and that their fortunes were compromised in many private financial transactions. Having been invested with this authority they drafted laws. . . . 205 B.C.

1[a]. Alexander of Aetolia, during the legislation of Dorimachus and Scopas, opposed their proposal, showing from many instances that where this weed [a] once took root it never stopped its growth until it had inflicted the greatest disaster on those who had once introduced it. He begged them therefore not to keep their eyes only on their present relief from the obligations they had incurred but to look to the future too. For it was, he said, strange indeed that on the battle-field they should give even their lives for the sake of their children's safety, but in the

δὲ μηδένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνου. . . .

2 Ὅτι Σκόπας Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγὸς ἀποτυχὼν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἧς χάριν ἐτόλμα γράφειν τοὺς νόμους, μετέωρος ἦν εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν, ταῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐλπίσι πεπεισμένος ἀναπληρώσειν τὰ λείποντα τοῦ βίου καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ πλεῖον ἐπι-
2 θυμίαν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑδρωπικῶν οὐδέποτε ποιεῖ παῦλαν οὐδὲ κόρον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἡ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑγρῶν παράθεσις, ἐὰν μὴ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι διάθεσιν ὑγιάσῃ τις, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸ πλεῖον ἐπιθυμίαν οἷόν τε κορέσαι μὴ οὐ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κακίαν λόγῳ τινὶ διορθωσάμενον. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτο συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον,
3 ὑπὲρ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος. τούτῳ γὰρ εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἀφικομένῳ πρὸς ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαίθρων ὠφελείαις, ὧν ἦν αὐτὸς κύριος διὰ τὸ πιστεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων, καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης ὀψώνιον ἐξέθηκεν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῷ μὲν δεκαμναιαῖον, τοῖς δ' ἐπί τινος ἡγεμονίας μετ' αὐτὸν τεταγ-
4 μένοις μναιαῖον. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἠρκεῖτο τούτοις,
5 ὃς τὸ πρότερον προσκαρτερῶν τῷ πλείονι διετέλεσε, μέχρι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς διδοῦσι φθονηθεὶς τὸ πνεῦμα προσέθηκε τῷ χρυσίῳ. . . .

3 Ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κακοπραγμοσύνην, ἣν δὴ βασιλικὴν μὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδεὶς ἂν εἶναι φήσειεν, ἀναγκαίαν δὲ βούλονται λέγειν ἔνιοι πρὸς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐπι-

council chamber should take no thought for future times. . . .

2. Scopas, the strategus of the Aetolians, when he fell from the office by power of which he ventured to draft these laws, turned eagerly towards Alexandria for help, convinced that if his expectations in that quarter were realized he would repair his damaged fortunes and satisfy his soul's longing for gain. He was unaware that as in the case of a dropsy the thirst of the sufferer never ceases and is never allayed by the administration of liquids from without, unless we cure the morbid condition of the body itself, so it is impossible to satiate the greed for gain, unless we correct by reasoning the vice inherent in the soul. The most conspicuous case of this was that of the very man of whom we are now speaking. For when he reached Alexandria, in addition to the profit he drew from the force in the field which had been placed absolutely at his disposal, the king assigned him personally a daily pay of ten minae, while those serving under him in any command received one mina each. Still he was not satisfied with this, but from the very first was so devoted to gain that at the end, arousing by his insatiate greed the aversion of those even who ministered to it, he delivered his soul over to money.

Philip's treacherous Policy

3. Philip became addicted to that kind of treacherous dealings which no one indeed would say in any way became a king but which some maintain to be necessary in practical politics, owing to the

2 πολάζουσαν κακοπραγμοσύνην. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολύ τι τοῦ τοιούτου μέρους ἐκτὸς ἦσαν· τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀπηλλοτρίωντο τοῦ κακομηχανεῖν περὶ τοὺς φίλους χάριν τοῦ τῷ τοιούτῳ συναύξειν τὰς σφετέρας δυναστείας, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τοὺς πολεμίους
3 ᾑροῦντο δι' ἀπάτης νικᾶν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ‹οὐδὲν› οὔτε λαμπρὸν οὐδὲ μὴν βέβαιον εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ἐὰν μή τις ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μαχόμενος
4 ἡττήσῃ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους. διὸ καὶ συνετίθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς μήτ' ἀδήλοις βέλεσι μήθ' ἑκηβόλοις χρήσασθαι κατ' ἀλλήλων, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ συστάδην γινομένην μάχην
5 ἀληθινὴν ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι κρίσιν πραγμάτων. ἦ καὶ τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλήλοις προύλεγον καὶ τὰς μάχας, ὅτε πρόθοιντο διακινδυνεύειν, καὶ τοὺς τόπους, ‹εἰς› οὓς μέλλοιεν ἐξιέναι παραταξόμενοι.
6 νῦν δὲ καὶ φαύλου φασὶν εἶναι στρατηγοῦ τὸ
7 προφανῶς τι πράττειν τῶν πολεμικῶν. βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἴχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαίας αἱρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά· καὶ γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται
8 καὶ ‹συ›στάδην. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τὸν ἐπιπολάζοντα νῦν ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον ἐν τῇ κακοπραγμοσύνῃ ζῆλον περὶ τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἔν τε ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ πολεμικαῖς οἰκονομίαις.

4 Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος Ἡρακλείδῃ μέν, καθάπερ ὑπόθεσιν δούς, ἐπέταξε φροντίζειν πῶς ἂν κακοποιήσαι καὶ διαφθείραι τὰς τῶς Ῥοδίων νῆας,
2 εἰς δὲ τὴν Κρήτην πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ἐρεθιοῦντας καὶ παρορμήσοντας ἐπὶ τὸν κατὰ
3 τῶν Ῥοδίων πόλεμον. ὁ δ' Ἡρακλείδης, ἄν-

present prevalence of treachery. The ancients, as we know, were far removed from such malpractices. For so far were they from plotting mischief against their friends with the purpose of aggrandizing their own power, that they would not even consent to get the better of their enemies by fraud, regarding no success as brilliant or secure unless they crushed the spirit of their adversaries in open battle. For this reason they entered into a convention among themselves to use against each other neither secret missiles nor those discharged from a distance, and considered that it was only a hand-to-hand battle at close quarters which was truly decisive. Hence they preceded war by a declaration, and when they intended to do battle gave notice of the fact and of the spot to which they would proceed and array their army. But at the present they say it is a sign of poor generalship to do anything openly in war. Some slight traces, however, of the ancient principles of warfare survive among the Romans. For they make declaration of war, they very seldom use ambuscades, and they fight hand-to-hand at close quarters. These reflections are occasioned by the excessive prevalence among our present leaders both in the conduct of public affairs and in that of war of a keenness for double dealing.

4. Philip, as if giving Heracleides a proper subject for the exercise of his talents, ordered him to think of the best means of damaging and destroying the navy of Rhodes, and at the same time sent envoys to Crete to provoke the Cretans and incite them to make war on Rhodes. Heracleides, a born mischief-

θρωπος εὖ πεφυκὼς πρὸς τὸ κακόν, ἑρμαῖον ἡγησάμενος τὴν ἐπιταγήν, καὶ διανοηθεὶς ἅττα δήποτ' οὖν παρ' αὑτῷ, μετά τινα χρόνον ὥρμησε καὶ
4 παρῆν καταπλέων εἰς τὴν Ῥόδον. συνέβαινε δὲ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην τοῦτον τὸ μὲν γένος ἀνέκαθεν εἶναι Ταραντῖνον, πεφυκέναι δ' ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ χειροτεχνῶν ἀνθρώπων, μεγάλα δ' ἐσχηκέναι προ-
5 τερήματα πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν καὶ ῥᾳδιουργίαν· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἀναφανδὸν τῷ σώματι παρεκέχρητο κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν, εἶτ' ἀγχίνους ὑπῆρχε καὶ μνήμων, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ταπεινοτέρους καταπληκτικώτατος καὶ τολμηρότατος, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς
6 ὑπερέχοντας κολακικώτατος. οὗτος ἀρχῆθεν μὲν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐξέπεσε δόξας τὸν Τάραντα πράττειν Ῥωμαίοις, οὐ πολιτικὴν ἔχων δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἀρχιτέκτων ὑπάρχων καὶ διά τινας ἐπισκευὰς τῶν τειχῶν κύριος γενόμενος τῶν κλειδῶν
7 τῆς πύλης τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ μεσόγαιον φερούσης· καταφυγὼν δὲ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν γράφων καὶ διαπεμπόμενος εἰς τὸν Τάραντα καὶ πρὸς Ἀννίβαν, ἐπεὶ καταφανὴς ἐγένετο, προαισθόμενος τὸ μέλλον αὖθις ἔφυγε πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον.
8 παρ' ᾧ τοιαύτην περιεποιήσατο πίστιν καὶ δύναμιν ὥστε τοῦ καταστραφῆναι τὴν τηλικαύτην βασιλείαν σχεδὸν αἰτιώτατος γεγονέναι. . . .

5 Διαπιστοῦντες δ' οἱ πρυτάνεις ἤδη τῷ Φιλίππῳ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ Κρητικὰ κακοπραγμοσύνην, καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ὑπώπτευον ἐγκάθετον εἶναι.

2 Ὁ δ' εἰσελθὼν ἀπελογίζετο τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς πεφευγὼς εἴη τὸν Φίλιππον

3 Πᾶν γὰρ βουληθῆναι τὸν Φίλιππον ἀναδέξασθαι ἢ καταφανῆ γενέσθαι Ῥοδίοις τὴν ἐν τούτοις

maker, thinking this commission a godsend and forming some kind of scheme in his mind, waited a little and then set out on his voyage and appeared at Rhodes. This Heracleides was of Tarentine origin, his parents were vulgar mechanics and he possessed advantages admirably qualifying him to be a dare-devil and arrant knave. For, to begin with, in his early years he had openly prostituted his person, but later he showed great sharpness and an excellent memory, and while he was a terrible bully and most bold-faced in dealing with his inferiors he was most obsequious to his superiors. He was originally expelled from his native town as he was suspected of a design of betraying Tarentum to the Romans, not that he had any political power, but because he was an architect and owing to some repairs they were making in the wall had been entrusted with the keys of the gate leading to the interior. He then took refuge with the Romans, but later when he was detected in sending letters and messages from the Roman camp to Tarentum and to Hannibal, he foresaw what would be the result and this time sought safety with Philip, at whose court he acquired such credit and power that he was almost the chief instrument of the ruin of that mighty kingdom. . . .

5. The prytaneis of Rhodes, who already distrusted Philip owing to his treacherous conduct in the Cretan question, suspected that Heracleides also was involved. . . .

He appeared before them and offered an explanation of the reasons why he had deserted Philip.

" Philip," he said, " would put up with anything rather than that his design in this matter should be

αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν. ἥ καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἀπέλυσε τῆς ὑποψίας. . . .

4 Καί μοι δοκεῖ μεγίστην θεὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ φύσις ἀποδεῖξαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ μεγίστην αὐτῇ
5 προσθεῖναι δύναμιν. πάντων γοῦν αὐτὴν καταγωνιζομένων, ἐνίοτε καὶ πασῶν τῶν πιθανοτήτων μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους ταττομένων, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς εἰσδύεται τῶν
6 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν παραχρῆμα δείκνυσι τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐπισκοτισθεῖσα, τέλος αὐτὴ δι' ἑαυτῆς ἐπικρατεῖ καὶ καταγωνίζεται τὸ ψεῦδος, ὡς συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην τὸν παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς Ῥόδον ἀφικόμενον. . . .

7 Ὅτι Δαμοκλῆς ὁ μετὰ Πυθίωνος πεμφθεὶς κατάσκοπος πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὑπηρετικὸν ἦν σκεῦος εὐφυὲς καὶ πολλὰς ἔχον ἀφορμὰς εἰς πραγμάτων οἰκονομίαν. . . .

6 Ὁ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τύραννος Νάβις, ἔτος ἤδη τρίτον ἔχων τὴν ἀρχήν, ὁλοσχερὲς μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπεβάλλετο πράττειν οὐδὲ τολμᾶν διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἧτταν τοῦ
2 Μαχανίδου, καταβολὴν δ' ἐποιεῖτο καὶ θεμέλιον ὑπεβάλλετο πολυχρονίου καὶ βαρείας τυραννίδος.
3 διέφθειρε γὰρ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἄρδην ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης, ἐφυγάδευσε δὲ τοὺς κατὰ πλέον πλούτῳ διαφέροντας ἢ δόξῃ προγονικῇ, τὰς δὲ τούτων οὐσίας καὶ γυναῖκας διεδίδου τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς ἐπιφανε-
4 στάτοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις. οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν ἀνδροφόνοι καὶ παρασχίσται, λωποδύται, τοιχωρύχοι. καθόλου γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἠθροίζετο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπιμελῶς ἐκ τῆς οἰκουμένης, οἷς

revealed to the Rhodians." By this means he also freed Heracleides from suspicion. . . .

In my opinion Nature has proclaimed to men that Truth is the greatest of gods and has invested her with the greatest power. At least when all are trying to suppress her and all probabilities are on the side of falsehood, she somehow finds her own means of penetrating into the hearts of men and sometimes shows her power at once, sometimes after being darkened for years at last by her own force prevails and crushes falsehood, as happened in the case of Heracleides, King Philip's messenger to Rhodes. . . .

Damocles, who was sent with Pythion as a spy to Rome, was a handy tool, full of resources in the management of affairs.

Nabis, Tyrant of Sparta

6. Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians, who had now been in power for over two years, had not yet ventured to attempt any important enterprise, the defeat of Machanidas by the Aetolians being so recent, but was occupied in laying the foundations of a lasting and oppressive tyranny. For he utterly exterminated those of the royal houses [a] who survived in Sparta, and banishing those citizens who were distinguished for their wealth and illustrious ancestry, gave their property and wives to the chief of his own supporters and to his mercenaries, who were for the most part murderers, rippers, highwaymen, and burglars. For such kind of people flocked sedulously to his court from all over the world, people who

[a] Some definition of λοιπούς has obviously dropped out.

ἄβατος ἦν ἡ θρέψασα δι ἀσέβειαν καὶ παρανομίαν.
5 ὧν προστάτην [καὶ βασιλέα] αὑτὸν ἀναδείξας,
καὶ χρώμενος δορυφόροις καὶ σωματοφύλαξι τού-
τοις, δῆλον ἔμελλε πολυχρόνιον ἔχειν τὴν ἐπ'
6 ἀσεβείᾳ φήμην καὶ δυναστείαν. ὅς γε χωρὶς
τῶν προειρημένων οὐκ ἐξηρκεῖτο φυγαδεύειν τοὺς
πολίτας, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς φεύγουσιν οὐδεὶς τόπος
7 ἦν ἀσφαλὴς οὐδὲ καταφυγὴ βέβαιος. τοὺς μὲν
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐπαποστέλλων ἀνῄρει, τοὺς δ'
8 ἐκ τῶν τόπων ἐπανάγοντας ἐφόνευε. τὸ δὲ τελευ-
ταῖον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὰς σύνεγγυς οἰκίας, ὅπου
τις τυγχάνοι κατοικῶν τῶν φυγάδων, μισθούμενος
δι' ἀνυπονοήτων ἀνθρώπων, εἰς ταύτας εἰσέπεμπε
Κρῆτας, οἵτινες ῥήγματα ποιοῦντες ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις
καὶ διὰ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν θυρίδων τοξεύοντες τοὺς
μὲν ἑστῶτας τῶν φυγάδων, τοὺς δ' ἀνακειμένους
9 ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκίαις διέφθειρον, ὥστε μήτε τόπον
εἶναι μηδένα φύξιμον μήτε καιρὸν ἀσφαλῆ τοῖς
10 ταλαιπώροις Λακεδαιμονίοις. καὶ δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ
7 τρόπῳ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους αὐτῶν ἠφάνισε. κατ-
εσκευάσατο δὲ καί τινα μηχανήν, εἰ μηχανὴν
2 ταύτην χρὴ λέγειν. ἦν γὰρ εἴδωλον γυναικεῖον,
πολυτελέσιν ἱματίοις ἠμφιεσμένον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν
μορφὴν εἰς ὁμοιότητα τῇ τοῦ Νάβιδος γυναικὶ
3 διαφόρως ἀπειργασμένον. ὁπότε δέ τινας τῶν
πολιτικῶν ἀνακαλέσαιτο, βουλόμενος εἰσπρᾶξαι
χρήματα, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς διετίθετο λόγους πλείονας
4 καὶ φιλανθρώπους, ὑποδεικνύων μὲν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν
Ἀχαιῶν ἐπικρεμάμενον τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ τῇ πόλει
φόβον, διασαφῶν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν μισθοφόρων
τὸ τρεφόμενον τῆς ἐκείνων ἀσφαλείας χάριν, ἔτι
5 δὲ τὰς εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοινὰς τῆς πόλεως

dared not set foot in their own countries owing to their crimes against God and man. As he constituted himself their protector and employed these men as satellites and members of his bodyguard, it was evident that his rule would long be memorable for its wickedness. Besides the abuses I have mentioned, not content with banishing the citizens, he left no place safe for them in their exile and no refuge secure. For he sent men after some to slay them on their journey and killed others as they were returning from their country seats. Finally, in the towns, renting through unsuspected agents the houses next door to those in which the exiles resided, he introduced Cretans into them, who breaking down the walls and shooting through the existing windows slew the exiles in their own houses either when standing or reposing, so that for the unhappy Spartans there was no place to fly to and no moment at which their lives were safe. It was by these means that he destroyed the greater number of them. 7. He had also constructed a machine, if one can call such a thing a machine. It was in fact an image of a woman richly dressed and was a very good likeness of the wife of Nabis. Whenever he summoned any of the citizens before him with the design of extracting money from him he would begin by addressing him in kind terms, pointing out the danger to which the city and country were exposed from the Achaeans and calling attention to the number of the mercenaries he was obliged to maintain to ensure the safety of his subjects, as well as to the amount spent on religious ceremonies and

δαπάνας. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐντρέποιντο διὰ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, εἶχεν ἀποχρώντως αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ προ-
6 κείμενον· εἰ δέ τινες ἐξαρνούμενοι διωθοῖντο τὴν ἐπιταγήν, ἐπεφθέγγετο λόγον τοιοῦτον "ἴσως ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ δύναμαί σε πείθειν, Ἀπῆγαν μέντοι ταύτην δοκῶ σε πείσειν"· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὄνομα τῇ γυναικὶ
7 τοῦ Νάβιδος. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔλεγε, καὶ παρῆν ὁ μικρῷ
8 πρότερον ἔλεγον εἴδωλον. καὶ δεξιωσάμενος, ἐπειδὰν ἐκ τῆς καθέδρας ἀνέστησε τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ περιέπτυξε ταῖς χερσί, προσήγετο κατὰ
9 βραχὺ πρὸς τὰ στέρνα. τοὺς δὲ πήχεις εἶχε καὶ τὰς χεῖρας πλήρεις σιδηρῶν γόμφων ὑπὸ τοῖς
10 ἱματίοις, ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ τοὺς μαστούς. ὅταν προσήρεισε ταῖς χερσὶ πρὸς τὰ νῶτα τῆς γυναικός, κἄπειτα διὰ τῶν ὀργάνων ἑλκόμενον ἐπέτεινε καὶ προσῆγε πρὸς τοὺς μαστοὺς κατ' ἐλάχιστον, πᾶσαν ἠνάγκαζε φωνὴν προΐεσθαι τὸν πιεζόμενον.
11 καὶ πολλοὺς δή τινας τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ διέφθειρε τῶν ἐξαρνουμένων.

8 Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δ' ἦν τούτοις ὅμοια καὶ σύστοιχα
2 κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐκοινώνει μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Κρησὶ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν λῃστειῶν· εἶχε δὲ καθ' ὅλην τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἱεροσύλους, ὁδοιδόκους, φονέας, οἷς μερίτης γινόμενος τῶν ἐκ τῆς ῥᾳδιουργίας λυσιτελῶν ὁρμητήριον καὶ καταφυγὴν παρείχετο
3 τούτοις τὴν Σπάρτην. πλὴν κατά γε τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους ξένοι τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Βοιωτίας εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα παρεπιδημήσαντες ἐψυχαγώγησάν τινα τῶν τοῦ Νάβιδος ἱπποκόμων ὥστε συναποχωρῆσαι μεθ' ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντα λευκὸν ἵππον, ὃς ἐδόκει γενναιότατος εἶναι τῶν ἐκ τῆς τυραν-
4 νικῆς ἱπποστάσεως. τοῦτο δὲ πεισθέντος καὶ

the public outlay of the city. If they yielded to these arguments it was sufficient for his purpose. But if anyone refused and objected to pay the sum imposed, he would continue somewhat as follows: "Very possibly I shall not be able to persuade you, but I think this Apega of mine may do so"—this being his wife's name—and even as he spoke in came the image I have described. When the man offered her his hand he made the woman rise from her chair and taking her in his arms drew her gradually to his bosom.[a] Both her arms and hands as well as her breasts were covered with iron nails concealed under her dress. So that when Nabis rested his hands on her back and then by means of certain springs drew his victim towards her and increasing the pressure brought him at all in contact with her breasts he made the man thus embraced say anything and everything. Indeed by this means he killed a considerable number of those who denied him money.

8. The rest of his conduct during his rule was similar and on a level with this. For he participated in the acts of piracy of the Cretans, and through the whole of the Peloponnese he had plunderers of temples, highwaymen, and assassins, the profits of whose misdeeds he shared and allowed them to make Sparta their base of operations and their refuge. But in one case some foreign soldiers from Boeotia who were paying a visit to Sparta tried to induce one of Nabis's grooms to leave with them, bringing away a white horse supposed to be the best bred animal in the tyrant's stables. Upon the

[a] The description of this "Maiden" has evidently been shortened by the epitomator, thus confusing the persons.

πράξαντος τοῦ προειρημένου, καταδιώξαντες οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Νάβιδος εἰς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν καὶ καταλαβόντες τὸν μὲν ἵππον εὐθὺς ἀπῆγον καὶ τὸν ἱπποκόμον, οὐδενὸς ἀντιποιουμένου, μετὰ δὲ
5 ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς ξένοις ἐπέβαλον τὰς χεῖρας. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠξίουν ἄγειν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν· οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος ἀνεβόα
6 τις τῶν ξένων "βοήθεια." συνδραμόντων δὲ τῶν ἐγχωρίων καὶ μαρτυρομένων τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπανάγειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἠναγκάσθησαν προιέμενοι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Νάβιδος
7 ἀπελθεῖν. ὁ δὲ πάλαι ζητῶν ἀφορμὰς ἐγκλημάτων καὶ πρόφασιν εὔλογον διαφορᾶς, τότε λαβόμενος ταύτης εὐθέως ἤλαυνε τὰ Προαγόρου θρέμματα καί τινων ἑτέρων. ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο ‹κατ›αρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου.

II. Res Asiae

9 2 Χαττηνία, χώρα τρίτη Γερραίων. Πολύβιος ιγ΄. "ἔστι δ' ἡ Χαττηνία τἄλλα μὲν λυπρά, κώμαις δὲ καὶ πύργοις διεσκεύασται διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν
3 τῶν Γερραίων· οὗτοι γὰρ αὐτὴν νέμονται." ἔστι δὲ τῆς Ἐρυθρᾶς θαλάσσης. . . .

4 Οἱ δὲ Γερραῖοι ἀξιοῦσι τὸν βασιλέα μὴ καταλῦσαι τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτοῖς δεδομένα, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀΐδιον εἰρήνην καὶ ἐλευθερίαν. ὁ δὲ ἑρμηνευθείσης οἱ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἔφη συγχωρεῖν τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις. . . .

5 Κυρωθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῖς Γερραίοις ἐστεφάνωσαν παραχρῆμα τὸν Ἀντίοχον τὸν βασιλέα

groom consenting and doing as they wished, Nabis's men pursued them as far as Megalopolis and catching them there at once took away the horse and the groom, no one offering any objection. When, in the next place, they tried to lay hands on the foreigners, the Boeotians at first demanded to be brought before the magistrates, and when no one paid any attention to their request, one of them called out "Help." Upon this the populace collected and protested that the men should be brought before the magistrates, and now Nabis's men were compelled to release their prisoners and take their departure. Nabis had been long on the look-out for some pretended grievance and a specious pretext for a rupture, and taking hold of this at once raided the cattle of Proagoras and some others. This was the origin of the war.

II. Affairs of Asia

Chattenia and the Gerraeans

9. Chattenia in the Persian Gulf is the third district belonging to the Gerraeans. It is a poor district in other respects, but villages and towers have been established in it for the convenience of the Gerraeans who cultivate it. . . .

The Gerraeans begged the king not to abolish the gifts the gods had bestowed on them, perpetual peace and freedom. The king, when the letter had been interpreted to him, said that he granted their request. . . .

When their freedom had been established, the Gerraeans passed a decree honouring Antiochus with

πεντακοσίοις ἀργυρίου ταλάντοις, χιλίοις δὲ λιβανωτοῦ καὶ διακοσίοις τῆς λεγομένης στακτῆς. καὶ ἐποίει τὸν πλοῦν ἐπὶ Τύλον τὴν νῆσον καὶ ἐποίει τὸν ἀπόπλουν ἐπὶ Σελευκείας. ἦσαν δὲ τὰ ἀρώματα ἐν τῇ Ἐρυθρᾷ θαλάττῃ.

the gift of five hundred talents of silver, a thousand talents of frankincense, and two hundred talents of the so-called "stacte."[a] He then sailed to the island of Tylus and left for Seleucia. The spices were from the Persian Gulf.

[From the place-names quoted from this book it seems that it dealt chiefly with the war in Bruttium against Hannibal just before he left Italy with Cretan affairs and with a war waged by Philip in Thrace.]

[a] Oil of myrrh or cinnamon.

FRAGMENTA LIBRI XIV

I. Ex prooemio

1[a] Ὅτι φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος περὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν βίβλων ὑποθετικῆς ἐξηγήσεως· Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πάσαις ταῖς ὀλυμπιάσιν αἱ προεκθέσεις τῶν πράξεων εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἄγουσι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν γεγονότων, ὡς ἂν ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγομένων
2 τῶν ἐξ ὅλης τῆς οἰκουμένης ἔργων· οὐ μὴν ⟨ἀλλὰ⟩ τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὀλυμπιάδα μάλιστα νομίζω συνεπιστήσειν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας διὰ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Λιβύην πολέμους ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις εἰληφέναι τὴν συντέλειαν· ὑπὲρ ὧν τίς οὐκ ἂν ἱστορῆσαι βουληθείη ποία τις
3 ἡ καταστροφὴ καὶ τί τὸ τέλος αὐτῶν ἐγένετο; φύσει γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, κἂν ὁλοσχερῶς ⟨παρα⟩δέχωνται τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἔργα καὶ λόγους,
4 ὅμως ἑκάστων τὸ τέλος ἱμείρουσι μαθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις συμβαίνει καὶ τὰς προαιρέσεις τῶν βασιλέων ἐκφανεστάτας γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους· ἃ γὰρ πρότερον ἐλέγετο περὶ αὐτῶν, τότε σαφῶς ἐπεγνώσθη πάντα παρὰ πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς μηδ' ὅλως ἐθέλουσι πολυπραγμονεῖν.
5 διὸ καὶ βουλόμενοι κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ποιή-

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XIV

I. From the Preface

1[a]. Perhaps it is true that in all Olympiads the syllabus of events arrests the attention of the reader, owing to their number and importance, the actions of the whole world being brought under one point of view. But I think the events of this Olympiad (CXLIV) will have a peculiar power of doing this. For in the first place it was during this Olympiad that the wars in Italy and Africa were brought to an end, wars the final outcome of which who will not be curious to learn? For everyone naturally, although he may completely accept our account of particular actions and speeches, still always longs to know the end. Besides this, the political tendencies of the kings were clearly revealed during these years. For all that had been hitherto a matter of gossip about them now became clearly known to everyone, even to those who were not at all disposed to be curious. For this reason, as I wish to give such an account of the facts as their

204–201 B.C.

σασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, οὐ τὰς ἐκ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν πράξεις κατατετάχαμεν εἰς μίαν βύβλον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἀποδεδώκαμεν.

II. Res a Scipione in Africa gestae

1 Οἱ μὲν οὖν ὕπατοι περὶ ταύτας ἐγίνοντο τὰς
2 πράξεις, ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν πυνθανόμενος ἐξαρτύειν στόλον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ἐγίνετο μὲν καὶ περὶ ταύτην τὴν παρασκευήν, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς Ἰτύκης
3 πολιορκίαν. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸν Σόφακα τελέως ἐλπίδος ἀφίστατο, διεπέμπετο δὲ συνεχῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ πολὺ ἀφεστάναι τὰς δυνάμεις ἀλλήλων, πεπεισμένος μετακαλέσειν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν
4 Καρχηδονίων συμμαχίας. οὐ γὰρ ἀπεγίνωσκε καὶ τῆς παιδίσκης αὐτὸν ἤδη κόρον ἔχειν, δι' ἣν εἵλετο τὰ Καρχηδονίων, καὶ καθόλου τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Φοίνικας φιλίας διά τε τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν Νομάδων ἀψικορίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρός τε τοὺς
5 θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀθεσίαν. ὢν δὲ περὶ πολλὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ποικίλας ἔχων ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τὸ κατορρωδεῖν τὸν ἔξω κίνδυνον τῷ πολλαπλασίους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους,
6 ἐπελάβετό τινος ἀφορμῆς τοιαύτης. τῶν γὰρ διαπεμπομένων πρὸς τὸν Σόφακά τινες ἀνήγγειλαν αὐτῷ διότι συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους ἐκ παντοδαπῶν ξύλων καὶ φυλλάδος ἄνευ γῆς ἐν τῇ
7 παραχειμασίᾳ κατεσκευακέναι τὰς σκηνάς, τῶν δὲ Νομάδων τοὺς μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ καλάμων, τοὺς

importance deserves, I have not comprised the events of two years in one Book as was my practice in previous cases.

II. Scipio in Africa

1. The consuls, then, were engaged in these matters, but Publius Scipio, who was in winter quarters in Africa, hearing that the Carthaginians were getting a fleet ready, occupied himself in making his own naval preparations, but continued to prosecute none the less the siege of Utica. Nor did he entirely abandon his hope of winning over Syphax, but sent frequent messages to him, their armies being at no great distance from each other, feeling sure of inducing him to abandon the Carthaginian alliance. He thought it indeed not at all unlikely that he had already grown tired of the girl[a] for whose sake he had chosen the cause of the Carthaginians, and tired generally of his friendship for Phoenicians, as Scipio well knew the natural tendency of the Numidians to grow disgusted with what pleased them and how lightly they always break their faith to gods and men alike. At present his mind was much distracted and agitated by various apprehensions, as he feared an attack owing to the enemy's superiority in numbers, and he gladly availed himself of the following occasion when it offered itself. Some of his messengers to Syphax reported that the Carthaginians in their winter camp had made their huts from all kinds of wood and branches without any mixture of earth, that the first Numidians to arrive had constructed theirs with 204–243 B.C.

[a] Sophonisba, daughter of Hasdrubal and granddaughter of Gesco.

δ' ἐ<πι>συναγομένους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φυλλάδος σκηνοποιεῖσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ἐντός, τοὺς δὲ πλείους αὐτῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς
8 τάφρου καὶ τοῦ χάρακος. νομίσας οὖν ὁ Πόπλιος παραδοξοτάτην μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις, πραγματικωτάτην δὲ σφίσιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπιβολήν,
9 ἐγένετο περὶ ταύτην τὴν κατασκευήν. ὁ δὲ Σόφαξ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸν Πόπλιον διαποστολαῖς ἀεί πως ἐπὶ ταύτην κατήντα τὴν γνώμην ὅτι δέοι Καρχηδονίους μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, Ῥωμαίους δὲ παραπλησίως ἐκ τῆς Λιβύης, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων ἔχειν ἀμφοτέρους ὡς τότε κατεῖχον.
10 ὧν ὁ Πόπλιος ἀκούων ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ χρόνοις οὐδαμῶς ἀνείχετο· τότε δὲ τῷ Νομάδι βραχεῖαν ἔμφασιν ἐποιήσατο διὰ τῶν ἀποστελλομένων ὡς οὐκ ἀδυνάτου τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὔσης, ἧς ἐπιβάλλεται.
11 δι' οὗ συνέβη τὸν Σόφακα κουφισθέντα πολλα-
12 πλασίως ἐπιρρωσθῆναι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιπλοκήν. οὗ γινομένου πλείους ἦσαν οἱ διαπεμπόμενοι καὶ πλεονάκις· ἔστι δ' ὅτε καί τινας ἡμέρας ἔμενον
13 παρ' ἀλλήλοις ἀπαρατηρήτως. ἐν αἷς ὁ Πόπλιος ἀεί τινας μὲν τῶν πραγματικῶν, οὓς δὲ καὶ στρατιωτικῶν, ῥυπῶντας καὶ ταπεινούς, εἰς δουλικὰς ἐσθῆτας διασκευάζων, μετὰ τῶν ἀποστελλομένων ἐξέπεμπε χάριν τοῦ τὰς προσόδους καὶ τὰς εἰσόδους τὰς εἰς ἑκατέραν τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀσφαλῶς ἐξερευ-
14 νῆσαι καὶ κατοπτεῦσαι. δύο γὰρ ἦσαν στρατοπεδεῖαι, μία μὲν ἣν Ἀσδρούβας εἶχε μετὰ πεζῶν τρισμυρίων καὶ τρισχιλίων ἱππέων, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ δέκα σταδίους ἀφεστῶσα ταύτης, ἣ τῶν Νομάδων, ἱππεῖς μὲν εἰς μυρίους ἔχουσα, πεζοὺς δὲ περὶ

reeds, while the others who kept joining the army from the cities had used nothing but branches for the present, some of them being encamped inside but most outside the trench and palisade. Scipio, therefore, thinking that an attempt to fire the camp would be a complete surprise for the enemy and very serviceable to himself, began to take the necessary measures. Syphax in his communications with Scipio always kept harking back to the opinion that the Carthaginians ought to evacuate Italy and the Romans do the same as regards Africa, each nation continuing to occupy the points they held between these two countries. Scipio had previously refused entirely to listen to this proposal, but he now ordered his messengers to throw out slight hints to the Numidian prince that the attainment of this end was not beyond the bounds of possibility. Syphax was very much relieved in consequence and became much more disposed than he had been to engage in parleys, the consequence being that the messengers became more numerous and their visits more frequent, some of them at times spending several days in the hostile camp without any objection being made. Scipio on such occasions used to send in the company of his envoys certain expert observers and certain of his officers, looking mean and dirty fellows, disguised as they were in the habit of slaves, with the object of exploring and inspecting undisturbed the approaches and the entrances of both camps. For there were two of them, one occupied by Hasdrubal with thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, and another at a distance of ten stades belonging to the Numidians and containing about ten thousand horse and fifty thousand foot.

15 πεντακισμυρίους. ἦ δὴ καὶ μᾶλλον εὐέφοδος ἦν καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς εἶχε τελέως εὐφυεῖς πρὸς ἐμπυρισμὸν διὰ ‹τὸ› τοὺς Νομάδας, ὡς ἀρτίως εἶπον, μὴ διὰ ξύλων μηδὲ διὰ γῆς, ἁπλῶς δὲ κάνναις καὶ καλάμοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς σκηνοποιίας.

2 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ μὲν τῆς ἐαρινῆς ὥρας ὑπέφαινεν ἤδη, τῷ δὲ Σκιπίωνι πάντα διηρεύνητο πρὸς τὴν προειρημένην ἐπιβολὴν τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους,
2 τὰς μὲν νῆας καθεῖλκε καὶ μηχανὰς κατεσκεύαζε ταύταις ὡς πολιορκήσων ἐκ θαλάττης τὴν Ἰτύκην,
3 τοῖς δὲ πεζοῖς, οὖσιν ὡς δισχιλίοις, κατελάβετο πάλιν τὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν πόλιν κείμενον λόφον, καὶ
4 τοῦτον ὠχυροῦτο καὶ διετάφρευε πολυτελῶς, τοῖς μὲν ὑπεναντίοις ποιῶν φαντασίαν ὡς τοῦτο πράττων τῆς πολιορκίας ἕνεκα, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ βουλόμενος ἐφεδρεύειν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν τῆς πράξεως καιρόν, ἵνα μὴ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς χωρισθέντων οἱ τὴν Ἰτύκην παραφυλάττοντες στρατιῶται τολμήσαιεν ἐξελθόντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐγχειρεῖν τῷ χάρακι διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς
5 εἶναι, καὶ πολιορκεῖν τοὺς φυλάττοντας. ταῦτα δὲ παρασκευαζόμενος ἅμα διεπέμπετο πρὸς τὸν Σόφακα, πυνθανόμενος, ἐὰν συγχωρῇ τοῖς παρακαλουμένοις, εἰ καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἔσται ταῦτα κατὰ νοῦν καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἐκεῖνοι φήσουσι
6 βουλεύσεσθαι περὶ τῶν συγχωρουμένων. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις προσενετείλατο τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς μὴ πρότερον ὡς αὐτὸν ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἢ λαβεῖν ἀπόκρισιν
7 ὑπὲρ τούτων. ὧν ἀφικομένων διακούσας ὁ Νομὰς ἐπείσθη διότι πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν ἐστι τὰς διαλύσεις ὁ Σκιπίων, ἔκ τε τοῦ φάναι τοὺς πρέσβεις μὴ πρότερον ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι πρὶν ἢ λαβεῖν παρ'

The latter was the easiest to attack and the huts very suitable for setting on fire, since the Numidians, as I just said, used neither wood nor earth for their huts, but only reeds and matting.

2. As soon as there were signs of the approach of spring, Scipio having now completed all the inquiries necessary for the above design against the enemy, launched his ships and constructed siege-machines to place on them as if he were about to blockade Utica from the sea. With his infantry, who numbered about two thousand, he again occupied the hill situated above the town and spared no expense in fortifying this hill and digging a moat round it, giving the enemy the idea that he did so for the purpose of the siege, but in reality desiring to secure himself from possible danger on the day of his enterprise ; for he feared lest when his legions had left their camp the garrison of Utica might venture on a sortie, and falling on the camp, which was close by, besiege the force left to defend it. While making these preparations he sent a message to Syphax to inquire, on the supposition that the proposed terms met with his own approval, if they would also be agreeable to the Carthaginians and if they could be trusted not to say again that they would further consider before accepting what he was ready to concede. He also instructed his envoys not to return to him before receiving an answer to this question. When they arrived and Syphax had received the message, he felt convinced that Scipio was determined to conclude the treaty, both because the envoys had told him they would not return without

αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ἔκ τε τοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι
8 τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων συγκατάθεσιν. διὸ καὶ
πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔπεμπε, δια-
σαφῶν τὰ γινόμενα καὶ παρακαλῶν δέχεσθαι τὴν
εἰρήνην, αὐτὸς δὲ ῥᾳθύμως διῆγε, καὶ τοὺς ἐπι-
συναγομένους Νομάδας ἐκτὸς εἶα τῆς παρεμβολῆς
9 αὐτοῦ κατασκηνοῦν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος κατὰ μὲν
τὴν ἐπίφασιν ἐποίει τὸ παραπλήσιον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν
ἀλήθειαν ‹ἐν› τοῖς μάλιστα περὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς
10 ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τῷ
Σόφακι διεσαφήθη συντελεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας,
ὁ δὲ Νομὰς περιχαρὴς ὢν εἶπε τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς
ὑπὲρ τούτων, εὐθέως οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπῆεσαν εἰς τὴν
ἰδίαν παρεμβολήν, μηνύσοντες τῷ Ποπλίῳ τὰ
11 πραχθέντα παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. ὧν ἀκούσας ὁ
τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς αὖθις ἐκ ποδὸς ἔπεμπε
πρέσβεις, δηλώσοντας τῷ Σόφακι διότι συμβαίνει
τὸν μὲν Πόπλιον εὐδοκεῖν καὶ σπουδάζειν ὑπὲρ
τῆς εἰρήνης, τοὺς δ' ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ διαφέρεσθαι
12 καὶ φάναι διαμένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· οἳ καὶ
παραγενόμενοι διεσάφησαν ταῦτα τῷ Νομάδι.
13 τὴν δ' ἀποστολὴν ταύτην ὁ Σκιπίων ἐποιήσατο
χάριν τοῦ μὴ δόξαι παρασπονδεῖν, ἐὰν ἔτι μενούσης
τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν διαλύσεων ἐπικηρυκείας πρὸς ἀλλή-
14 λους πράξῃ τι τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔργων. γενομένης
δὲ τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ταύτης ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον
ἀνεπίληπτον ἔξειν ὑπέλαβε τὴν προαίρεσιν.

3 Ὁ δὲ Σόφαξ ταῦτα διακούσας ἔφερε μὲν δυσ-
χερῶς διὰ τὸ προκατηλπικέναι περὶ τῶν διαλύσεων,
συνῄει δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν εἰς λόγους, καὶ
διεσάφει τὰ παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων αὐτῷ προσαγ-
2 γελλόμενα. περὶ ὧν πολλὰ διαπορήσαντες ἐβου-

an answer and because of the anxiety shown to make sure of the consent of the Carthaginians. So he sent off at once to Hasdrubal informing him of what had occurred and begging him to accept peace, while he himself passed his time at his ease and allowed the Numidians who kept on joining him to encamp outside his fortified camp. Scipio pretended to do the same, but as a fact was making every possible preparation for his attack. When Syphax had once been instructed by the Carthaginians to conclude the peace, and overjoyed at this, spoke to the envoys on the matter, they at once left for their own camp to tell Scipio the result of the king's action. The Roman commander, on hearing of it, lost no time in sending other envoys to announce to Syphax that Scipio approved of peace and was earnestly working for it, but that members of the council were of a different opinion, maintaining that matters should rest as they were. The envoys went to Syphax and informed him to this effect. Scipio dispatched this embassy in order not to appear to have broken the truce if, while formal negotiations for peace were still in progress, he committed any hostile act. But after having made this declaration he considered that whatever happened no one could find fault with his conduct.

3. Syphax, on hearing this, was no little vexed as he had made up his mind that peace was assured, but he now met Hasdrubal and communicated to him the message he had received from the Romans. After much discussion of it they fell to considering

λεύοντο πῶς σφίσι καθήκει χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐξῆς πράγμασι, πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντες ταῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ
3 ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τοῦ μέλλοντος· περὶ φυλακῆς μὲν γὰρ ἢ τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι δεινὸν οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν εἶχον πρόληψιν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δρᾶσαί τι καὶ προκαλέσασθαι τοὺς πολεμίους εἰς ὁμαλὸν τόπον
4 πολλή τις ἦν αὐτῶν ὁρμὴ καὶ προθυμία. Πόπλιος δὲ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ὑπεδείκνυε διά τε τῆς παρασκευῆς καὶ τῶν παραγγελμάτων ὡς κατὰ τῆς Ἰτύκης ἔχων πρᾶξιν,
5 τῶν δὲ χιλιάρχων τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους καὶ πιστοτάτους καλέσας περὶ μέσον ἡμέρας ἐξέθηκε τὴν ἐπιβολήν, καὶ παρήγγειλε δειπνοποιησαμένους καθ' ὥραν ἐξάγειν τὰ στρατόπεδα πρὸ τοῦ χάρακος, ἐπειδὰν κατὰ τὸν ἐθισμὸν οἱ σαλπιγκταὶ σημαίνωσιν
6 ἅμα πάντες· ἔστι γὰρ ἔθος Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὸν τοῦ δείπνου καιρὸν τοὺς βυκανητὰς καὶ σαλπιγκτὰς πάντας σημαίνειν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ σκηνήν, χάριν τοῦ τὰς νυκτερινὰς φυλακὰς κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν
7 τοῦτον ἵστασθαι κατὰ τοὺς ἰδίους τόπους. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς κατασκόπους ἀνακαλεσάμενος, οὓς ἐτύγχανε διαπεμπόμενος εἰς τὰ τῶν πολεμίων στρατόπεδα, συνέκρινε καὶ διηρεύνα τὰ λεγόμενα περί τε τῶν προσβάσεων καὶ τῶν εἰσόδων τῶν εἰς τὰς παρεμβολάς, χρώμενος ἐπικριτῇ τῶν λεγομένων καὶ συμβούλῳ Μασαννάσᾳ διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων ἐμπειρίαν.

4 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πάντ' ἦν εὐτρεπῆ τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν, ἀπολιπὼν τοὺς ἱκανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἐπὶ τῆς παρεμβολῆς, ἀναλαβὼν τὰς δυνάμεις προῆγεν ἄρτι ληγούσης τῆς πρώτης φυλακῆς· περὶ γὰρ ἑξήκοντα σταδίους ἀπεῖχον οἱ

how they should now deal with the situation, being very far both in their apprehensions and designs from any suspicion of what was actually about to happen. For they never had the least thought of taking any precaution for their security or of the likelihood of any disaster, but they were very eager and anxious to take some active steps and to challenge the enemy to battle on level ground. Scipio, in the meanwhile, by his preparations and the orders he issued gave his soldiery to understand that he was about to make an attempt to seize Utica by surprise, but summoning the ablest and most trusty of his tribunes about midday, and disclosing his plan ordered them to get their supper early and then lead the legions out of the camp, after the trumpeters had all sounded the retreat as usual. For it is the custom among the Romans at supper-time for the trumpeters and buglers to sound their instruments outside the general's tent as a signal that it is time to set the night-watches at their several stations. After this, calling the spies whom he used to send to the enemy's camps, he questioned them closely and compared the accounts they gave of the approaches and entrances of the camps, letting Massanissa decide, and following his advice owing to his personal knowledge of the ground.

4. When all was in readiness for his present enterprise, he left a sufficient body of troops suitable for the purpose to guard the camp and advanced with the rest of his army just at the end of the first watch, the enemy being at a distance of sixty stades.

πολέμιοι. συνεγγίσας δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις περὶ
2 τρίτην φυλακὴν λήγουσαν, Γαίῳ μὲν Λαιλίῳ καὶ
Μασαννάσῃ τοὺς ἡμίσεις ἀπονείμας τῶν στρα-
τιωτῶν καὶ πάντας τοὺς Νομάδας ἐπέταξε
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν προσβολὴν πρὸς τὸν τοῦ Σόφακος
3 χάρακα, παρακαλέσας ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι
καὶ μηδὲν εἰκῇ πράττειν, σαφῶς εἰδότας ὅτι,
καθ' ὅσον ἐμποδίζει καὶ κωλύει τὰ τῆς ὁράσεως
τὸ σκότος, κατὰ τοσοῦτον δεῖ συνεκπληροῦν τῇ
διανοίᾳ καὶ τῇ τόλμῃ τὰς νυκτερινὰς ἐπιβολάς·
4 αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν λοιπὴν στρατιὰν ἀναλαβὼν ἐποιεῖτο
τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν. ἦν δ' αὐτῷ
συλλελογισμένον μὴ πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν, ἕως ἂν
οἱ περὶ τὸν Λαίλιον πρῶτοι τὸ πῦρ ἐμβάλωσι τοῖς
5 πολεμίοις. οὗτος μὲν τοιαύτας ἔχων ἐπινοίας
βάδην ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Λαίλιον
εἰς δύο μέρη σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διελόντες ἅμα προσ-
6 έβαλλον τοῖς πολεμίοις. τῆς δὲ τῶν σκηνῶν
διαθέσεως οἷον ἐπίτηδες πρὸς ἐμπυρισμὸν κατ-
εσκευασμένης, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον εἶπον, ὡς οἱ
προηγούμενοι τὸ πῦρ ἐνέβαλλον, κατανεμηθὲν εἰς
τὰς πρώτας σκηνὰς εὐθέως ἀβοήθητον ἐποίει τὸ
κακὸν διά τε τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ διὰ
7 τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὕλης. ὁ μὲν οὖν
Λαίλιος ἔχων ἐφεδρείας τάξιν ἔμενεν· ὁ δὲ Μασαν-
νάσας εἰδὼς τοὺς τόπους, καθ' οὓς ἔμελλον οἱ
φεύγοντες τὸ πῦρ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν,
ἐν τούτοις ἐπέστησε τοὺς αὐτοῦ στρατιώτας.
8 τῶν δὲ Νομάδων οὐδεὶς ἁπλῶς συνυπώπτευσε τὸ
γινόμενον, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ Σόφαξ, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτο-
μάτως ἐμπεπρησμένου τοῦ χάρακος, ταύτην ἔσχον
9 τὴν διάληψιν. ὅθεν ἀνυπονοήτως οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν

When towards the end of the third watch he approached them he placed half of his legionaries and all the Numidians under the command of Gaius Laelius and Massanissa with orders to attack the camp of Syphax, exhorting them to behave like brave men and to do nothing rashly, as they well knew that the more the darkness in night attacks hinders and impedes the sight, the more must one supply the place of actual vision by skill and daring. He himself, with the rest of his army, advanced to attack Hasdrubal. He had made up his mind not to deliver his attack before Laelius had set fire to the other hostile camp, and, therefore, this being his purpose, marched at a slow pace. Laelius and Massanissa dividing their forces into two attacked the enemy simultaneously. The huts having been, as I stated above, almost specially constructed for the purpose of catching fire, once the front ranks of the Romans had set the fire alight it spread at once over the first row, and made the evil irremediable owing to the closeness of the huts to each other and the quantity of the fuel it fed on. Laelius remained to cover the operation, and Massanissa, knowing the places by which those who were trying to escape from the flames would have to pass, stationed his own men at those spots. Absolutely none of the Numidians had any suspicion of the actual fact, not even Syphax, but they all supposed that the camp had caught fire by accident. So that suspect-

ὕπνων, οἱ δ' ἀκμὴν ἔτι μεθυσκόμενοι καὶ πίνοντες
10 ἐξεπήδων ἐκ τῶν σκηνῶν. καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν ὑφ' αὑτῶν περὶ τὰς τοῦ χάρακος ἐξόδους συνεπατήθησαν, πολλοὶ δὲ περικαταληφθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς φλογὸς κατεπρήσθησαν· οἱ δὲ καὶ διαφυγόντες τὴν φλόγα, πάντες εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἐμπίπτοντες, οὔθ' ὃ πάσχουσιν οὔθ' ὃ ποιοῦσι γινώσκοντες διεφθείροντο.

5 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἐξαιρομένης φλογός, ὑπολαβόντες αὐτομάτως ἀνῆφθαι τὸν τῶν Νομάδων χάρακα, τινὲς μὲν
2 ἐβοήθουν ἐξ αὐτῆς, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ἐκτρέχοντες ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς ἄνοπλοι συνίσταντο πρὸ τῆς ἰδίας στρατοπεδείας, ἐκπλαγεῖς ὄντες ἐπὶ τοῖς
3 γινομένοις. ὁ δὲ Σκιπίων, τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἂν εἰ κατ' εὐχὴν αὐτῷ προχωρησάντων, ἐπιπεσὼν τοῖς ἐξεληλυθόσιν, οὓς μὲν ἐφόνευεν, οὓς δὲ καταδιώκων ἅμα τὸ πῦρ ἐνέβαλλε ταῖς σκηναῖς.
4 οὗ γενομένου παραπλήσια συνέβαινε πάσχειν τοὺς Φοίνικας ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῆς ὅλης περιστάσεως
5 τοῖς ἄρτι ῥηθεῖσι περὶ τῶν Νομάδων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν τοῦ μὲν τῷ πυρὶ βοηθεῖν αὐτόθεν εὐθέως ἀπέστησαν, γνόντες ἐκ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοὺς Νομάδας οὐκ αὐτομάτως, καθάπερ ὑπέλαβον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ‹τῶν› πολεμίων
6 ἐπιβολῆς καὶ τόλμης ἐγεγόνει τὸ δεινόν· ἐγίνοντο δὲ περὶ τὸ σώζειν ἑαυτούς, βραχείας σφίσι καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐλπίδος ἔτι καταλειπομένης.
7 τό τε γὰρ πῦρ ταχέως ἐπενέμετο καὶ περιελάμβανε πάντας τοὺς τόπους, αἵ τε δίοδοι πλήρεις ἦσαν ἵππων, ὑποζυγίων, ἀνδρῶν, τῶν μὲν ἡμιθνήτων

ing nothing, some of them aroused from sleep and others surprised while still drinking and carousing, they rushed out of their huts. Many were trampled to death in the passages that led out of the camp, and many others were caught by the flames and consumed, while all those who escaped from the fire fell into the midst of the enemy and perished without knowing what was happening to them or what they were doing.

5. Meanwhile the Carthaginians, when they saw the strength of the fire and the volume of flame that rose to the sky, thinking that the Numidian camp had caught fire by accident, rushed some of them to give assistance, while all the rest, flocking out of their camp unarmed, stood in front of it in a state of terror at what was taking place. Scipio, now that all had gone as well as he could have wished, fell upon those who had come out. Killing some and pursuing others he set their huts also on fire, with the result that the scene of conflagration and general destruction I have just described in the case of the Numidian camp was reproduced in that of the Phoenicians. Hasdrubal at once entirely desisted from any attempt to extinguish the fire, as he knew now from what had befallen him that the calamity that had befallen the Numidians also was not, as they had supposed, the result of chance but was due to the initiative and daring of the enemy. He now thought but of saving himself, and there was very little hope left of even doing this. For the fire spread with great rapidity, and soon covered the whole area of the camp, the passages of which were full of horses, mules, and men, some half-dead

καὶ διεφθαρμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρός, τῶν δ' ἐξεπτοη-
8 μένων καὶ παρεστώτων ταῖς διανοίαις, ὥστε καὶ
τοῖς ἀνδραγαθεῖν προαιρουμένοις ἐμπόδια ταῦτα
γίνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν ταραχὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν
9 ἀνέλπιστον εἶναι τὴν σωτηρίαν. παραπλήσια δὲ
τούτοις ἦν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Σόφακα καὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους ἡγεμόνας. πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν ἀμφότεροι μετ'
10 ὀλίγων ἱππέων ἐξέσωσαν αὑτούς· αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ
μυριάδες ἀνδρῶν, ἵππων, ὑποζυγίων, ἀτυχῶς μὲν
11 καὶ ἐλεεινῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπώλλυντο· αἰσχρῶς
δὲ καὶ ἐπονειδίστως ἔνιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὴν τοῦ
πυρὸς βίαν φεύγοντες, ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων δι-
εφθείροντο, χωρὶς οὐ μόνον τῶν ὅπλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ
12 τῶν ἱματίων, γυμνοὶ φονευόμενοι. καθόλου δὲ
πᾶς ἦν ὁ τόπος οἰμωγῆς, βοῆς ἀτάκτου, φόβου,
ψόφου παρηλλαγμένου, σὺν δὲ τούτοις πυρὸς
13 ἐνεργοῦ καὶ φλογὸς ὑπερβαλλούσης πλήρης· ὧν
ἓν ἱκανὸν [ὂν] ἐκπλῆξαι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν,
μηδ' ὅτι καὶ πάνθ' ὁμοῦ συγκυρήσαντα παραδόξως.
14 διὸ καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς οὐδὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν εἰκάσαι
. δυνατὸν οὐδενὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν· οὕτως ὑπερ-
πεπαίκει τῇ δεινότητι πάσας τὰς προειρημένας
15 πράξεις. ᾗ καὶ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν διειργασμένων
Σκιπίωνι κάλλιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοὔργον
καὶ παραβολώτατον τῶν ἐκείνῳ πεπραγμένων. . . .

6 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης, καὶ τῶν
πολεμίων τῶν μὲν ἀπολωλότων, τῶν δὲ προτροπά-
δην πεφευγότων, παρακαλέσας τοὺς χιλιάρχους ἐκ
2 ποδὸς ἐπηκολούθει. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς ὁ Καρ-
χηδόνιος ὑπέμενε, καίπερ αὐτῷ προσαγγελίας γε-
νομένης· τοῦτο δ' ἐποίει πιστεύων τῇ τῆς πόλεως
3 ὀχυρότητι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνθεωρήσας τοὺς

and consumed by the flames, and some frenzied and beside themselves, so that even those ready to make a bold effort were prevented by these obstacles, and owing to the confusion and disturbance there was no hope of safety. Syphax, too, and the other officers were in the same plight. The two generals, however, managed to escape with a small body of horse, but of the rest those thousands and thousands of men, horses, and mules met with an unhappy and miserable end in the flames, while some of the men trying to escape the fury of the fire died a disgraceful and dishonourable death at the hands of the enemy, cut down as they were naked, not only without their arms but without their clothes. In a word the whole place was filled with wailing and confused cries, panic fear, strange noises, and above all raging fire and flames that overbore all resistance, things any one of which would be sufficient to strike terror into a human heart, and how much more this extraordinary combination of them all. So it is not possible to find any other disaster which even if exaggerated could be compared with this, so much did it exceed in horror all previous events. Therefore of all the brilliant exploits performed by Scipio this seems to me the most splendid and most adventurous. . . .

6. But when day dawned, and the enemy had all either perished or were in headlong flight, Scipio exhorted his officers and at once started in pursuit. The Carthaginian commander at first remained where he was, although he had received notice of the approach of the Romans ; it was his confidence in the strength of the town in which he was that made him act thus. But afterwards, when he saw that

ἐγχωρίους στασιάζοντας, καταπλαγεὶς τὴν ἔφοδον
τοῦ Σκιπίωνος, ἔφευγε μετὰ τῶν διασεσωσμένων·
οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν ἱππεῖς μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους πεντακοσίων,
4 πεζοὶ δὲ περὶ δισχιλίους. οἱ δ' ἐγχώριοι συμ-
φρονήσαντες ἐπέτρεψαν περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς
5 Ῥωμαίοις. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος τούτων μὲν ἐφείσατο,
δύο δὲ τὰς παρακειμένας πόλεις ἐφῆκε τοῖς στρατο-
πέδοις διαρπάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος αὖθις
ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανῆει παρεμβολήν.
6 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παλιντρόπου τῆς ἐλπίδος αὐτοῖς
ἀποβαινούσης πρὸς τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολάς, βαρέως
7 ἔφερον τὸ γεγονός· ἐλπίσαντες γὰρ πολιορκήσειν
τοὺς Ῥωμαίους συγκλείσαντες εἰς τὴν ἄκραν τὴν
προσοῦσαν τῆς Ἰτύκης, ἐν ᾗ τὴν παραχειμασίαν
ἐποιοῦντο, κατὰ γῆν μὲν τοῖς πεζοῖς στρατεύμασι,
κατὰ θάλατταν δὲ ταῖς ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσι, καὶ
πρὸς τοῦτο πάσας ἡτοιμακότες τὰς παρασκευάς,
8 ἅμα τῷ μὴ μόνον τῶν ὑπαίθρων οὕτως ἀλόγως
καὶ παραδόξως ἐκχωρῆσαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τὸν περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ὅσον
οὐκ ἤδη προσδοκᾶν κίνδυνον, τελέως ἐκπλαγεῖς
9 ἦσαν καὶ περίφοβοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόντων ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν
καὶ βουλὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἦν τὸ συνέδριον
ἀπορίας καὶ ποικίλων καὶ τεταραγμένων ἐπινοη-
10 μάτων πλῆρες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφασαν δεῖν πέμπειν
ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν καὶ καλεῖν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὡς
μιᾶς ἔτι καταλειπομένης ἐλπίδος τῆς ἐν ἐκείνῳ
11 τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ ταῖς μετ' ἐκείνου δυνάμεσιν, οἱ
δὲ διαπρεσβεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸν Πόπλιον ὑπὲρ ἀνοχῶν
καὶ λαλεῖν ὑπὲρ διαλύσεων καὶ συνθηκῶν, ἕτεροι
δὲ θαρρεῖν καὶ συνάγειν τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ δια-

the inhabitants of the place were disaffected, the prospect of being attacked by Scipio dismayed him and he continued his flight with all those who had escaped, and who consisted of not less than five hundred horse and about two thousand foot. Upon this the inhabitants with one accord surrendered at discretion to the Romans. Scipio spared them, but gave up two of the neighbouring towns to his soldiers to pillage and after this returned to his original camp.

The Carthaginians, now that the prospect of success in their original design had been reversed, were deeply dejected. For they had hoped to shut in the Romans on the cape adjacent to Utica, which they made their winter quarters, besieging them by land with their armies and by sea with their navy and had made all preparations for this purpose ; so that now when by a strange and unexpected disaster they had not only been obliged to abandon to the enemy the command of the open country but expected that at any moment they themselves and their city would be in imminent peril, they became thoroughly dismayed and faint-hearted. The situation, however, demanded that they should take precautions and deliberate as to the future, and when the senate assembled it was full of perplexity and the most divergent and tumultuary suggestions abounded. Some held that they should send to Hannibal and recall him from Italy, their only remaining hope being in that general and his army, others proposed sending an embassy to Scipio to ask for a truce and speak to him about terms of peace, while others said they should pluck up courage and

12 πέμπεσθαι πρὸς τὸν Σόφακα· καὶ γὰρ πλησίον
αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Ἄββαν ἀποκεχωρηκέναι, συν-
αθροίζειν δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ κινδύνου διαφυγόντας.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τέλος αὕτη τῶν γνωμῶν ἐπεκράτησεν.
13 Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τάς τε δυνάμεις ἤθροιζον, ἐκ-
πέμψαντες τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, καὶ διεπέμψαντο πρὸς
τὸν Σόφακα, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν καὶ μένειν
ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν,
ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μετὰ τῶν δυνά-
7 μεων πρὸς αὐτὸν συνάψοντος· ὁ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων
στρατηγὸς ἐγίνετο μὲν καὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς Ἰτύκης
πολιορκίαν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον, ἀκούων ἐπιμένειν τὸν
Σόφακα καὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους πάλιν ἀθροίζειν
στρατιάν, ἐξῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ παρενέβαλλε
2 πρὸ τῆς Ἰτύκης. ἅμα δὲ καὶ νείμας τῶν λαφύρων
. . . τοὺς μὲν . . . ἐμπόρους ἐξαπέστειλε . . . λυ-
3 σιτελῶς· καλῆς γὰρ τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδος
ὑπογραφομένης ἐκ τοῦ γεγονότος εὐτυχήματος,
ἑτοίμως τὴν παροῦσαν ὠφέλειαν οἱ στρατιῶται παρ'
οὐδὲν ποιούμενοι διετίθεντο τοῖς ἐμπόροις.
4 Τῷ δὲ βασιλεῖ τῶν Νομάδων καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν
5 ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν· τῶν δὲ Κελτιβήρων
αὐτοῖς ἀπαντησάντων περὶ τὴν Ἄββαν, οἵτινες
ἐτύγχανον ὑπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐξενολογημένοι,
πλείους ὄντες τῶν τετρακισχιλίων, πιστεύοντες
ταῖς χερσὶ ταύταις οὕτως ἐπέστησαν καὶ βραχύ τι
6 ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐθάρρησαν. σὺν δὲ τούτοις ἅμα καὶ
τῆς παιδίσκης, ἥτις ἦν θυγάτηρ μὲν Ἀσδρούβου
<τοῦ> στρατηγοῦ, γυνὴ δὲ τοῦ Σόφακος, καθάπερ
ἐπάνω προεῖπον, δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης μεῖναι
καὶ μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς τοὺς

communicate with Syphax, who had retired to Abba quite near by, and collect the troops who had escaped from the disaster. This was the counsel which finally prevailed.

The Carthaginians, then, began to assemble their forces, dispatching Hasdrubal to do so, and at the same time sent to Syphax entreating him to help them and to remain firm to his first engagements, assuring him that Hasdrubal would at once join him with his army. 7. The Roman general both occupied himself with preparations for the siege of Utica and now, on hearing that Syphax remained faithful and that the Carthaginians were again collecting an army, led out his own forces and encamped before that city. He also at the same time distributed the booty, but sent about their business the merchants who were making too good an affair of it; for as their recent success had made them form a rosy picture of the future, the soldiers attached no value to their actual booty and were very ready to dispose of it to the merchants for a song.

The Numidian prince and his friends had at first decided to continue their retreat and seek their homes, but when they were met near Abba by the Celtiberians who had been hired by the Carthaginians and who numbered over four thousand, the reliance they placed on this additional force made them halt and pluck up a little courage. And when at the same time the young girl, who was, as I have said, the daughter of the general, Hasdrubal, and wife of Syphax, begged and entreated him to remain and not desert the Carthaginians at such a critical

Καρχηδονίους, ἐπείσθη καὶ προσέσχε τοῖς παρα-
7 καλουμένοις ὁ Νομάς. οὐ μικρὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς Καρ-
χηδονίους ἐλπίζειν παρεσκεύασαν οἱ Κελτίβηρες·
ἀντὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τετρακισχιλίων μυρίους αὑτοὺς
ἀπήγγελλον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους ἀν-
υποστάτους ὑπάρχειν καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τοῖς
8 καθοπλισμοῖς. ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φήμης καὶ τῆς
χυδαίου καὶ πανδήμου λαλιᾶς μετεωρισθέντες οἱ
Καρχηδόνιοι διπλασίως ἐπερρώσθησαν πρὸς τὸ
9 πάλιν ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων. καὶ τέλος
ἐν ἡμέραις τριάκοντα περὶ τὰ Μεγάλα πεδία
καλούμενα βαλόμενοι χάρακα συνεστρατοπέδευον
ὁμοῦ τοῖς Νομάσι καὶ τοῖς Κελτίβηρσιν, ὄντες
οὐκ ἐλάττους οἱ πάντες τρισμυρίων.

8 Ὧν διασαφηθέντων εἰς τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρα-
τόπεδον εὐθέως ὁ Πόπλιος ἐγίνετο περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον,
καὶ συντάξας τοῖς πολιορκοῦσι τὴν Ἰτύκην ἃ δέον
ἦν πράττειν καὶ τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐξώρμησε, τὸ
2 στράτευμα πᾶν ἔχων εὔζωνον. ἀφικόμενος δὲ
πεμπταῖος ἐπὶ τὰ Μεγάλα πεδία καὶ συνεγγίσας
τοῖς πολεμίοις, τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἡμέραν ἐπί τινος
λόφου κατεστρατοπέδευσε, περὶ τριάκοντα σταδίους
3 ἀποσχὼν τῶν πολεμίων, τῇ δ' ἑξῆς καταβὰς εἰς
τὰ πεδία καὶ προθέμενος τοὺς ἱππέας ⟨ἐν⟩ ἑπτὰ
4 σταδίοις παρενέβαλε. δύο δὲ τὰς κατὰ πόδας
ἡμέρας μείναντες καὶ βραχέα διὰ τῶν ἀκροβολισμῶν
καταπειράσαντες ἀλλήλων, τῇ τετάρτῃ κατὰ πρό-
θεσιν ἐξῆγον ἀμφότεροι καὶ παρενέβαλλον τὰς
5 δυνάμεις. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πόπλιος ἁπλῶς κατὰ τὸ
παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἔθηκε πρῶτον μὲν τὰς τῶν
ἀστάτων σημαίας, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύταις τὰς τῶν πριγ-
κίπων, τελευταίας δ' ἐπέστησε κατόπιν τὰς τῶν

time, the Numidian prince suffered himself to be persuaded and yielded to her prayers. The Celtiberians contributed also not a little to inspire the Carthaginians with hope. For instead of four thousand it was announced that they were ten thousand, and that their personal courage and their armament rendered them invincible in the field. These reports and the vulgar gossip of the rabble raised so much the spirits of the Carthaginians that their confidence in being able to take the field once more against the enemy was redoubled. Finally in thirty days they encamped and entrenched themselves on the so-called Great Plain together with the Numidians and Celtiberians, the whole force numbering not less than thirty thousand.

8. When the news reached the Roman camp, Scipio at once prepared to advance against them, and after giving the necessary orders to the land and sea forces besieging Utica, he set out on his march, his whole force being in light marching order. On the fifth day he reached the Great Plain, and on approaching the enemy encamped for the first day on a hill at a distance of thirty stades from them, but on the next day came down from the hill, and placing his cavalry in front drew up his army at a distance of seven stades from the Carthaginians. After remaining where they were for the two subsequent days and making trial of their strength by some slight skirmishing, on the fourth day both generals deliberately advanced their forces and arrayed them for battle. Scipio simply followed the usual Roman practice of placing the maniples of *hastati* in front, behind them the *principes*, and hindmost of all the

6 τριαρίων· τῶν δ' ἱππέων τοὺς μὲν Ἰταλικοὺς ἐπὶ
τὸ δεξιὸν ἔθηκε, τοὺς δὲ Νομάδας καὶ Μασαν-
7 νάσαν ἐπὶ τὸ λαιόν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σόφακα καὶ
τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν τοὺς μὲν Κελτίβηρας μέσους
ἔταξαν ἀντίους ταῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων σπείραις,
τοὺς δὲ Νομάδας ἐξ εὐωνύμου, τοὺς δὲ Καρχη-
8 δονίους ἐκ τῶν δεξιῶν. ἅμα δὲ τῷ γενέσθαι τὴν
πρώτην ἔφοδον εὐθέως οἱ Νομάδες ἐνέκλιναν τοὺς
Ἰταλικοὺς ἱππεῖς, οἵ τε Καρχηδόνιοι τοὺς περὶ
τὸν Μασαννάσαν, ἅτε πλεονάκις ἤδη προηττη-
9 μένοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς. οἱ δὲ Κελτίβηρες ἐμάχοντο
γενναίως, συστάντες τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. οὔτε γὰρ
φεύγοντες ἐλπίδα σωτηρίας εἶχον διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν
τῶν τόπων οὔτε ζωγρίᾳ κρατηθέντες διὰ τὴν
10 ἀθεσίαν τὴν εἰς τὸν Πόπλιον· οὐδὲν γὰρ πολέμιον
πεποιηθότες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράξεις
ἀδίκως ἐφαίνοντο καὶ παρασπόνδως ἥκειν κατὰ
11 Ῥωμαίων συμμαχήσοντες τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. οὐ
μὴν ἀλλ' ἅμα τῷ κλῖναι τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν κεράτων
ταχέως κυκλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν πριγκίπων καὶ
τριαρίων αὐτοῦ κατεκόπησαν πάντες πλὴν τελέως
12 ὀλίγων. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κελτίβηρες τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
ἀπώλοντο, μεγάλην [παρ' ὅλην] παρασχόμενοι
χρείαν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν
13 μάχην, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φυγήν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ τοῦτ'
ἐμπόδιον ἐγένετο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀλλ' εὐθέως
ἐκ ποδὸς ἠκολούθησαν τοῖς φεύγουσι, παντελῶς ἂν
14 ὀλίγοι ‹δι›έφυγον τῶν ὑπεναντίων. νῦν δὲ περὶ τού-
τους γενομένης ἐπιστάσεως οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Σόφακα
μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων ἀσφαλῶς ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀποχώ-
ρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν
μετὰ τῶν διασῳζομένων εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα.

triarii. He stationed his Italian cavalry on his right and the Numidians with Massanissa on the left. Syphax and Hasdrubal placed the Celtiberians in the centre opposite the Roman maniples, the Numidians on the left, and the Carthaginians on the right. At the first encounter the Numidians gave way before the Italian horse and the Carthaginians before Massanissa, their courage having been broken by previous defeats, but the Celtiberians fought bravely holding out against the Romans. For they neither had any hope of safety in flight owing to their ignorance of the country, nor could they expect to be spared if made prisoners, owing to their treachery to Scipio in thus coming to fight in the service of Carthage against the Romans in spite of his never having been guilty of any acts of hostility to them during his Spanish campaigns. But when the wings gave way they were soon surrounded by the *principes* and *triarii* and cut to pieces where they stood except quite a few. Thus perished the Celtiberians after proving of the greatest service to the Carthaginians not only in the battle but in the flight. For if the Romans had not met with this obstacle, but had directly pursued the fugitives, very few of the enemy would have escaped. But as it was, owing to this stand made by the Celtiberians, Syphax with his cavalry made his way safely back home and Hasdrubal also with the survivors of his force reached Carthage.

9 Ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἐπεὶ τὰ σκῦλα καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους εὐτρεπεῖς ἔθετο, συγκαλέσας τὸ συνέδριον ἐβουλεύετο περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς, τί δέον ἦν 2 ποιεῖν. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν Πόπλιον καὶ μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως μένειν ἐπιπορευόμενον τὰς πόλεις, τὸν δὲ Λαίλιον καὶ τὸν Μασανιάσαν, λαβόντας τούς τε Νομάδας καὶ μέρος τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων, ἔπεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σόφακα καὶ μὴ δοῦναι χρόνον εἰς ἐπί- 3 στασιν καὶ παρασκευήν. οὗτοι μὲν ταῦτα βουλευσάμενοι διεχωρίσθησαν, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Σόφακα μετὰ τῶν προειρημένων στρατιωτῶν, ὁ δὲ στρα- 4 τηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. ὧν αἱ μὲν ἐθελοντὴν προσετίθεντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις διὰ τὸν φόβον, ἃς 5 δὲ πολιορκῶν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κράτος ᾕρει. πάντα δ' ἦν οἰκεῖα μεταβολῆς τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ἅτε συνεχῶς [τε] ἐκκείμενα ταῖς κακοπαθείαις καὶ ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς διὰ τὸ πολυχρονίους γεγονέναι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πολέμους.

6 Ἐν δὲ τῇ Καρχηδόνι μεγάλης καὶ πρότερον ὑπαρχούσης ἀκαταστασίας, ἔτι μείζω τότε συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν ταραχήν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ δευτέρου τηλικαύτῃ πληγῇ <περι>πεπτωκότων ἤδη καὶ 7 ἀπειπόντων τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρωδέστατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν συμβούλων ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶν ἐκέλευον ἤδη πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἰτύκην πολιορκοῦντας, καὶ τήν τε πολιορκίαν πειρᾶσθαι λύειν καὶ ναυμαχεῖν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ἀπαρασκεύοις οὖσι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ 8 μέρος· ἐπί τε τὸν Ἀννίβαν πέμπειν ἠξίουν καὶ μηδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν ποιησαμένους ἐξελέγχειν καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα· μεγάλας γὰρ ἀμφοτέραις

9. The Roman general, as soon as he had arranged about the disposal of the booty and prisoners, summoned the council to deliberate as to what should be done next. It was decided that Scipio with a part of his army should remain and go round to the several cities, while Laelius and Massanissa with the Numidians and a portion of the Roman legions should follow up Syphax and not give him time to stop and prepare for resistance. Having come to this decision they separated, these two going after Syphax with the troops I mentioned and the general visiting the towns, some of which surrendered voluntarily to the Romans out of fear, while he besieged and stormed others. The whole country indeed was inclined for a change, as the people had been constantly exposed to hardship and excessive taxation owing to the long duration of the war in Spain.

In Carthage itself the disorder had been serious enough previously, but now the city was still more deeply disturbed, and it seemed that after this second heavy blow they had lost all confidence in themselves. But nevertheless the advice of those who were thought to be the boldest spirits in the senate was to sail with the fleet against the besiegers of Utica and attempt to raise the siege and engage the enemy's fleet, which was unprepared for an encounter. They also demanded that Hannibal should be summoned to return and that resource put to the test without any delay. Both these

εἶναι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἀφορμὰς
9 πρὸς σωτηρίαν. τινὲς δὲ ταύτας μὲν ἔφασαν
μηκέτι φέρειν τοὺς καιρούς, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὀχυροῦν
καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι πρὸς πολιορκίαν· πολλὰς
γὰρ δώσειν ἀφορμὰς ταὐτόματον, ἂν ὁμονοῶσιν.
10 ἅμα δὲ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ διαλύσεως καὶ συνθηκῶν
παρήνουν, ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἂν λύσιν ποιήσαιντο
11 τῶν ἐνεστώτων κακῶν. γενομένων δὲ καὶ πλειόνων
λόγων περὶ ταῦτα, πάσας ἐκύρωσαν ἅμα τὰς
10 γνώμας. κριθέντων δὲ τούτων οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν
Ἰταλίαν μέλλοντες πλεῖν εὐθέως ἐκ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου
προῆγον ἐπὶ θάλατταν, ὁ δὲ ναύαρχος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς·
οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ περί τε τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἀσφαλείας
προενοοῦντο καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐβουλεύοντο
συνεχῶς.

2 Καὶ [ὁ] Πόπλιος, καταγέμοντος ἤδη τοῦ στρατο-
πέδου τῆς λείας διὰ τὸ μηδέν' ἀντιπράττειν, ἀλλὰ
πάντας εἴκειν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἔκρινε τὸ μὲν τῶν
λαφύρων πλεῖον εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραπέμψαι
3 παρεμβολήν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν στρατείαν ἀναλαβὼν
εὔζωνον καταλαβέσθαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τύνητι χάρακα
καὶ στρατοπεδεῦσαι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἐν συνόψει·
μάλιστα γὰρ οὕτως ἐκφοβήσειν ὑπελάμβανε καὶ
4 καταπλήξειν αὐτούς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Καρχηδόνιοι
μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας τά τε πληρώματα καὶ τὰς
σιταρχίας ἑτοίμας ἔχοντες ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐγίνοντο
πρὸς ἀναγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς προκειμένοις· ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος
ἦκε πρὸς τὸν Τύνητα, καὶ φυγόντων τὴν ἔφοδον
αὐτοῦ τῶν παραφυλαττόντων κατέλαβε τὸν τόπον.
5 ὁ δὲ Τύνης ἀπέχει μὲν τῆς Καρχηδόνος ὡς ἑκατὸν
εἴκοσι σταδίους, ἔστι δὲ σύνοπτος σχεδὸν ἐξ ὅλης
τῆς πόλεως, διαφέρει δ' ὀχυρότητι καὶ φυσικῇ

measures, they said, offered, as far as could be reasonably judged, great chances of saving the country. But others maintained that the time for these steps was past, and that they must now strengthen the city and prepare for a siege. For if they only preserved concord, chance would afford many opportunities. They also advised them to take the question of peace into consideration, and to decide on what terms and by what means they could be delivered from the present evils. There were several debates on these proposals and finally they adopted them all. 10. As soon as the vote had been taken, those senators who were to sail for Italy proceeded directly from the senate-house to sea, and the admiral went straight on board his ship. The remainder made it their business to see to the defences of the city and met frequently to discuss points of detail.

Scipio's camp was now full of booty, as he met with no resistance but all gave way to him no matter what he attempted, and he decided to send off the greater part of the booty to his original camp, and taking with him his army thus lightened to seize on the entrenched position before Tunis and to encamp in full view of Carthage. For this he thought would be the most effective means of striking the Carthaginians with terror and dismay. The Carthaginians had got ready in a few days the crews and stores for their ships and were about to put to sea to execute their purpose, when Scipio arrived at Tunis and upon its garrison taking to flight occupied the place. Tunis is situated at a distance of about 120 stades from Carthage, and is visible from nearly the whole town. As I have

καὶ χειροποιήτῳ, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον ἡμῖν
6 εἴρηται. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἄρτι κατεστρατοπε-
δευκότων ἀνήγοντο ταῖς ναυσὶν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι,
7 ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν εἰς τὴν Ἰτύκην. ὁ δὲ
Πόπλιος ὁρῶν τὸν ἀνάπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, καὶ
δεδιὼς μή τι περὶ ‹τὸ› σφέτερον αὐτῶν ναυτικὸν
συμβῇ, διεταράττετο πάντων ἀνυπονοήτως δια-
κειμένων καὶ ἀπαρασκεύως πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.
8 αὖθις δ' ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἀναστρατοπεδεύσας ἠπείγετο
9 βοηθήσων τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασι. καταλαβὼν δὲ
τὰς καταφράκτους ναῦς πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐξαιρέσεις
καὶ προσαγωγὰς τῶν ὀργάνων καὶ καθόλου πρὸς
πολιορκίαν εὖ καὶ δεόντως ἐξηρτυμένας, πρὸς δὲ
ναυμαχίαν ἥκιστα παρεσκευασμένας, τὸν δὲ τῶν
ὑπεναντίων στόλον ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ χειμῶνος πρὸς αὐτὸ
10 τοῦτο κατηρτισμένον, τὸ μὲν ἀνανάγεσθαι καὶ
ναυμαχεῖν ἀπογνούς, συνορμίσας δὲ τὰς κατα-
φράκτους νῆας περιέστησε ταύταις τὰς φορτηγοὺς
11 ἐπὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέτταρας τὸ βάθος, κἄπειτα καθελό-
μενος τοὺς ἱστοὺς καὶ τὰς κεραίας ἔζευξε τούτοις
12 βιαίως πρὸς ἀλλήλας, βραχὺ διάστημα ποιῶν,
ὥσθ' ὑπηρετικοῖς ἐκπλεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ διαπλεῖν.

III. Res Aegypti

11 ‹Πολύβιος› ἐν τῇ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτῃ ‹φησὶν›
Ἀγαθοκλέους τοῦ Οἰνάνθης υἱοῦ, ἑταίρου δὲ τοῦ
Φιλοπάτορος βασιλέως, ‹κόλακα γενέσθαι›
Φίλωνα. . . .

2 Πολύβιος δὲ ἐν τῇ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτῃ τῶν
ἱστοριῶν Κλεινοῦς φησι τῆς οἰνοχοούσης αὐτῷ
‹Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Φιλαδέλφῳ› εἰκόνας πολλὰς

previously stated, both nature and art have contributed to render it a very strong place. Just as the Romans had encamped there the Carthaginian fleet was putting to sea on its way to Utica. Scipio when he saw the enemy under way was much disturbed, as he feared that something untoward might happen to his own fleet, since no one expected to be attacked or had made any preparations for such a contingency. He, therefore, at once broke up his camp and marched hastily to the help of his own people. Finding that his warships were well provided with facilities for supporting and moving forward siege-machines, and in general for all siege operations, but were quite unprepared for a naval action, while the enemy's fleet had during the whole winter been equipping for this very purpose, he abandoned any idea of advancing and offering battle, but anchoring his warships in a line placed round them the transports three or four deep, and then taking down the masts and yards lashed the transports securely to each other with these, leaving a small interval for dispatch-boats to pass in and out.

III. Affairs of Egypt since B.C. 213 [a]

11. Polybius in his fourteenth book says that Philo was the flatterer of Agathocles, the son of Oenanthe and the companion of Ptolemy Philopator. . . .

[b] Polybius in his fourteenth book tells us that there were many portraits in Alexandrian temples of Cleino, the cupbearer of Ptolemy Philadelphus,

[a] From Athen. vi. 251 c.
[b] From Athen. xiii. 756 c.

ἀνακεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν μονοχίτωνας
3 καὶ ῥυτὸν ἐχούσας ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἱ δὲ κάλλισται
τῶν οἰκιῶν, φησίν, οὐ Μυρτίου καὶ Μνησίδος καὶ
4 Ποθεινῆς προσαγορεύονται; καίτοι Μνησὶς μὲν
ἦν αὐλητρὶς καὶ Ποθεινή. Μύρτιον δὲ μία τῶν
5 ἀποδεδειγμένων καὶ κοινῶν δεικτηριάδων. τοῦ δὲ
Φιλοπάτορος βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου οὐκ Ἀγαθό-
κλεια ἡ ἑταίρα ἐκράτει ἡ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀνατρέψασα τὴν
βασιλείαν; . . .

12 Ἴσως δέ τινες ἐπαπορήσουσι πῶς ἡμεῖς τὰς
ἄλλας πράξεις ἁπάσας κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν γράφοντες
τὰς καταλλήλους περὶ μόνων τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον
ἐν καιρῷ τῷ νῦν ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου πεποιήμεθα
2 τὴν ἐξήγησιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦτο πεποιήκαμεν διά
3 τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. Πτολεμαῖος ὁ βασιλεύς,
περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος, ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ, μετὰ τὸ συν-
τελεσθῆναι τὸν περὶ Κοίλην Συρίαν πόλεμον
ἀποστὰς πάντων τῶν καλῶν ἐτράπη πρὸς βίον
ἄσωτον καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀρτίως διεληλύθαμεν.
4 ὀψὲ δέ ποτε βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνέπεσεν
εἰς τὸν νῦν δεδηλωμένον πόλεμον, ὃς χωρὶς τῆς
εἰς ἀλλήλους ὠμότητος καὶ παρανομίας οὔτε
παράταξιν οὔτε ναυμαχίαν οὔτε πολιορκίαν οὔθ'
6 ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἔσχε μνήμης ἄξιον. διόπερ ὑπ-
έδραμεν οὕτω κἀμοὶ τῷ γράφοντι ῥᾳδίαν ἔσεσθαι
καὶ τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν εὐμαθεστέραν τὴν διήγη-
σιν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπιψαύων μικρῶν [καὶ]
οὐκ ἀξίων ἐπιστάσεως πραγμάτων ἀποδιδοίην τὸν
λόγον, ἀλλ' εἰσάπαξ οἷον εἰ σωματοειδῆ ποιήσας
τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως προαίρεσιν ἀπαγγείλαιμι περὶ
αὐτῆς.

representing her clothed only in a chiton and holding a rhyton. "And are not some of the finest houses," he says, "called Myrtion's, Mnesis's, and Potheine's? But what were Mnesis and Potheine but flute-players and Myrtion one of the professional and vulgar mimae? And was not Ptolemy Philopator the slave of the courtesan Agathocleia, who overturned the whole kingdom?" . . .

12. Perhaps some of my readers will wonder why while elsewhere I dealt with the successive events of each year separately, in the case of Egypt alone I give on the present occasion a narrative of occurrences there extending over a considerable period. The reason of this I may state as follows. Ptolemy Philopator, of whom I am now talking, after the termination of the war for Coele-Syria abandoned entirely the path of virtue and took to a life of dissipation such as I have just described. Late in his reign he was forced by circumstances into the war I have mentioned, a war which, apart from the mutual savagery and lawlessness of the combatants, contained nothing worthy of note, no pitched battle, no sea-fight, no siege. It, therefore, struck me that my narrative would be easier both for me to write and for my readers to follow if I performed this part of my task not by merely alluding every year to small events not worth serious attention, but by giving once for all a life-like picture so to speak of this king's character.

FRAGMENTA LIBRI XV

I. Res Italiae et Africae

1 Ὅτι τῶν Καρχηδονίων λαβόντων αἰχμαλώτους τὰς φορτηγοὺς νῆας τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ χορηγίας πλῆθος ἐξαίσιον ὁ Πόπλιος βαρέως μὲν ἔφερεν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ μόνον σφίσι παρῃρῆσθαι τὴν χορηγίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς παρεσκευάσθαι δαψίλειαν
2 τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἔτι δὲ βαρύτερον ἐπὶ τῷ παραβεβηκέναι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ἐγεί-
3 ρεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον. διὸ καὶ παραυτίκα προχειρισάμενος πρεσβευτὰς Λεύκιον Σέργιον καὶ Λεύκιον Βαίβιον καὶ Λεύκιον Φάβιον ἐξαπέστειλε διαλεξομένους τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ὑπὲρ τῶν γε-
γονότων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δηλώσοντας ὅτι κεκύρωκε
4 τὰς συνθήκας ὁ δῆμος τῶν Ῥωμαίων· ἄρτι γὰρ
5 ἦκε τῷ Ποπλίῳ γράμματα διασαφοῦντα περὶ τῶν προειρημένων. οἱ δὲ παραγενηθέντες εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον,
6 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς παραχθέντες, ἔλεγον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων μετὰ παρρησίας, πρῶτον μὲν ἀναμιμνήσκοντες ὡς οἱ παρ' ἐκείνων πρεσβευταί, παραγενηθέντες εἰς Τύνητα πρὸς σφᾶς καὶ παρελθόντες εἰς τὸ συνέδριον, οὐ μόνον

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK XV

I. Affairs of Italy and Africa

1. The Carthaginians having captured the Roman transports and a vast quantity of supplies, Scipio was much disturbed, as not only had he been deprived of his own supplies, but the enemy had thus procured for themselves abundance of provisions. What aggrieved him still more was that the Carthaginians had violated the late solemn agreement and that the war had been thus rekindled from a fresh source. He, therefore, at once appointed as legates Lucius Sergius, Lucius Baebius, and Lucius Fabius, and dispatched them to confer with the Carthaginians about what had occurred and at the same time to inform them that the Roman people had ratified the treaty: for dispatches had just arrived for Scipio informing him of this fact. On arriving at Carthage they first of all addressed the senate, and afterwards being brought before the popular assembly, spoke with great freedom about the situation. In the first place they reminded the assembly that when the Carthaginian envoys came to Tunis to the Romans and presented themselves before the council, they 203–202 B.C.

τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσπάσαιντο καὶ τὴν γῆν προσκυνήσαιεν,
7 καθάπερ ἔστιν ἔθος τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ
καὶ πεσόντες ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἀγεννῶς τοὺς πόδας
καταφιλοῖεν τῶν ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
πάλιν ἀναστάντες [ὡς] κατηγορήσαιεν σφῶν αὐ-
τῶν, διότι καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένας συνθήκας
Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ἀθετήσαιεν αὐτοί.
8 διόπερ ἔφασαν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πᾶν εἰκότως ἂν
πάθοιεν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τύχης ἕνεκα
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐδέοντο μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον·
ἔσεσθαι γὰρ τὴν σφετέραν ἀβουλίαν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς
9 Ῥωμαίων καλοκἀγαθίας. ὧν μνημονεύοντα τὸν
στρατηγὸν ἔφασαν [τὸν] αὐτὸν οἱ πρέσβεις καὶ
τοὺς ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ τότε γεγονότας ἐκπλήττεσθαι,
τίνι ποτὲ πιστεύοντες ἐπελανθάνοντο μὲν τῶν
τότε ῥηθέντων, ἀθετεῖν δὲ τολμῶσι τοὺς ὅρκους
10 καὶ τὰς συνθήκας. σχεδὸν δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι δῆλον
ὡς Ἀννίβᾳ πεποιθότες καὶ ταῖς μετὰ τούτου
παρούσαις δυνάμεσι ταῦτα τολμῶσι ποιεῖν, κακῶς
11 φρονοῦντες· σαφῶς γὰρ εἰδέναι πάντας ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι
δεύτερον ἔτος ἤδη φεύγοντες ἐκ πάσης Ἰταλίας
εἰς τοὺς περὶ Λακίνιον τόπους, κἀκεῖ συγ-
κεκλεισμένοι καὶ μόνον οὐ πολιορκούμενοι, μόλις
12 ἑαυτοὺς ἐκσεσωκότες ἥκουσι νῦν. "οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
εἰ καὶ νενικηκότες τοὺς ἐκεῖ παρῆσαν, καὶ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς ἔμελλον διακινδυνεύειν τοὺς δυσὶ μάχαις
ἑξῆς ὑμᾶς ἤδη νενικηκότας, ὅμως ἀμφιδόξους
ἔχειν <ἔ>δει τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος, καὶ
μὴ μόνον τοῦ νικᾶν ἔννοιαν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
13 τοῦ σφαλῆναι πάλιν. οὗ συμβάντος ποίους ἐπι-

not only saluted the gods and did obeisance to the Earth, as is the custom with other men, but that they debased themselves by falling prostrate on the ground and kissing the feet of the members of the council ; and that afterwards when they got up again they accused themselves of having been alone guilty of breaking the original treaty between the Romans and the Carthaginians. Therefore, they said, they were well aware that the Romans would be justified in any punishment they inflicted on them, but in the name of the common fortune of mankind they had entreated them not to proceed to extremities, but rather let their folly afford a proof of the generosity of the Romans. The general himself, they said, and those who had been present then at the council, when they called this to mind, were amazed and asked themselves whence the Carthaginians had the assurance now to ignore what they said on that occasion and to venture on breaking this last solemn treaty. It seemed almost evident that they ventured to act thus relying on Hannibal and the forces with him. In this confidence they were most ill-advised ; for everyone knew quite well, that for the last two years Hannibal and his troops, after abandoning every part of Italy, had fled to the Lacinian promontory, and that, shut in there and almost besieged, they only just succeeded in saving themselves and leaving for Africa. " And even," they said, " if they had been coming after a victory in Italy and were about to give battle to us, who have beaten you in two successive battles, your expectation of success should be quite uncertain and you should not only contemplate the prospect of victory but that of a further defeat.

καλέσεσθε" ἔφη "θεούς; ποίοις δὲ χρώμενοι λόγοις τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρατούντων ἔλεον ἐπισπάσεσθε
14 πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν συμφοράς; πάσης εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλπίδος ἀποκλεισθήσεσθαι καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὴν ἀθεσίαν καὶ τὴν ἀβουλίαν."

2 Οἱ μὲν οὖν πρέσβεις τοιαῦτα διαλεχθέντες ἀν-
2 εχώρησαν· τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὀλίγοι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ συναινοῦντες μὴ παραβαίνειν τὰς ὁμολογίας, οἱ δὲ πλείους καὶ τῶν πολιτευομένων καὶ τῶν βουλευομένων βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον τὰς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἐπιταγάς, δυσχερῶς δ' ἀνείχοντο τὴν τῶν πρεσβευτῶν παρρησίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ οἷοί τ' ἦσαν προέσθαι τὰ κατηγμένα πλοῖα
3 καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων χορηγίας. τὸ δὲ συνέχον, οὐ μικρὰς ἀλλὰ μεγάλας εἶχον ἐλπίδας νικήσειν
4 διὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ἔδοξε τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀναποκρίτους ἐξαποστέλλειν· τῶν δὲ πολιτευομένων οἷς ἦν προκείμενον ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συγχέαι πάλιν τὸν πόλεμον, οὗτοι
5 συνεδρεύσαντες μηχανῶνταί τι τοιοῦτον. ἔφασαν δεῖν πρόνοιαν ποιήσασθαι τῶν πρεσβευτῶν, ἵνα μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἀνακομισθῶσιν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν
6 παρεμβολήν. καὶ παραυτίκα τούτοις μὲν ἡτοίμαζον δύο τριήρεις παραπόμπους, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ναύαρχον Ἀσδρούβαν διεπέμψαντο παρακαλοῦντες ἑτοιμάσαι πλοῖα μὴ μακρὰν τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων παρεμβολῆς, ἵν' ἐπειδὰν αἱ παραπέμπουσαι νῆες ἀπολίπωσι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐπαναχθέντα ταῦτα
7 καταποντίσῃ τοὺς πρεσβευτάς. ἐφώρμει γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ ναυτικὸν κατὰ τοὺς πρὸ τῆς Ἰτύκης
8 ἐγκειμένους τόπους. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διαταξάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ἐξέπεμπον τοὺς

And then what gods will you have to invoke, and on what plea will you be able to supplicate the victors to take pity on your calamity? Will not your faithlessness and folly exclude you from almost all hope for the mercy of gods and men?"

2. The ambassadors after making this speech took their departure. There were but few among the Carthaginians who approved of adhering to the treaty. The majority both of their leading politicians and of those who took part in the deliberation objected to its harsh conditions, and with difficulty tolerated the bold language of the ambassadors. Besides this, they were not disposed to give up the ships they had brought into port and the supplies they contained. But above all they had no slight hopes of conquering with the assistance of Hannibal, but were on the contrary most sanguine. The popular assembly decided simply to dismiss the ambassadors without a reply, but those of the politicians who had determined by any and every means to stir up the war again held a meeting and contrived the following plan. They declared that all due care should be taken to ensure the safe arrival of the ambassadors at their own camp and at once prepared two triremes to escort them. Then they sent to the admiral, Hasdrubal, begging him to have some ships ready not far from the Roman camp, so that when the Romans were left by the ships that escorted them they might bear down upon them and sink them. For the Carthaginian fleet was now anchored off the coast close to Utica. Having given these instructions to Hasdrubal they

Ῥωμαίους, ἐντειλάμενοι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν τριήρων, [ὡς] ἐὰν παραλλάξωσι τὸν Μακάραν ποταμόν, αὖθις ἀπολιπόντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐν τῷ πόρῳ τοὺς
9 πρεσβευτάς· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων συνορᾶν ἤδη τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων παρεμβολήν·
10 οἱ δὲ παραπέμποντες, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τὸ συνταχθὲν παρήλλαξαν τὸν ποταμόν, ἀσπασάμενοι τοὺς Ῥω-
11 μαίους αὖθις ἐπανέπλεον. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Λεύκιον ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὑφεωρῶντο δεινόν, νομίσαντες δὲ τοὺς παραπέμποντας δι' ὀλιγωρίαν αὐτοὺς προ-
12 απολιπεῖν ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐδυσχέραινον. ἅμα δὲ τῷ μονωθέντας αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ἐπανάγονται τρισὶ τριήρεσιν ἐξ ὑποβολῆς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ παραβαλόντες τῇ Ῥωμαϊκῇ πεντήρει τρῶσαι μὲν οὐχ οἷοί τ' ἦσαν, ὑποχωρούσης τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ τοῦ καταστρώματος ἐπιβῆναι διὰ τὸ γενναίως ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς
13 ἄνδρας· ἐκ παραβολῆς δὲ καὶ πέριξ προσμαχόμενοι κατετίτρωσκον τοὺς ἐπιβάτας καὶ διέφθειρον
14 πολλοὺς αὐτῶν, ἕως οὗ κατιδόντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς προνομεύοντας τὴν παραλίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας στρατοπεδείας παραβοηθοῦντας ἐπὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν
15 ἐξέβαλον τὴν ναῦν εἰς τὴν γῆν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐπιβατῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δὲ πρεσβευταὶ παραδόξως ἐξεσώθησαν.

3 Γενομένων δὲ τούτων αὖθις ὁ πόλεμος ἄλλην ἀρχὴν εἰλήφει βαρυτέραν τῆς πρόσθεν καὶ δυσμενι-
2 κωτέραν. οἵ τε γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι δοκοῦντες παρεσπονδῆσθαι φιλοτίμως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸ περιγενέσθαι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἵ τε Καρχηδόνιοι συνειδότες σφίσι τὰ πεπραγμένα πρὸς πᾶν ἑτοίμως εἶχον πρὸς τὸ μὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑποχείριοι γενηθῆναι.
3 τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν παραστάσεως ὑπ-

sent off the Romans. They had ordered the commanders of the triremes, as soon as they passed the river Macar, to leave the ambassadors in the strait and return, this being a spot from which the enemy's camp could already be seen. The escort acting on their orders, as soon as they had passed the river-mouth saluted the Romans and sailed back. Lucius and his colleagues were unsuspicious of any danger but were somewhat put out, thinking it was due to negligence that the escort had left them too soon. But as they were continuing their voyage alone three Carthaginian triremes bore down on them as they had been directed to do. When they came up to the Roman quinquereme they could not ram her as she avoided the strokes, nor could they board her as her crew made a gallant resistance. But running alongside of her and circling round her they kept on shooting the men on board and killing a number of them, until the Romans, seeing that the men from their own camp who were foraging on the coast were running down to the beach to assist them, managed to run their ship ashore. Most of the men on board had been killed in the action, but the ambassadors, wonderful to say, escaped.

3. The consequence of this was that the war began afresh, the cause of its renewal being more serious and more productive of bitter feeling than the original one. For the Romans, thinking that they had been treacherously attacked, set their hearts on getting the better of the Carthaginians, and the latter, conscious of their guilt, were ready to suffer anything rather than fall into the power of the Romans. Both sides being animated by such fury,

ἀρχούσης προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι δεήσει μάχῃ κρίνεσθαι
4 περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον
τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Λιβύην πάντας, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν καὶ Σικελίαν καὶ
Σαρδόνα μετεώρους εἶναι καὶ περισπᾶσθαι ταῖς
διανοίαις, καραδοκοῦντας τὸ συμβησόμενον.
5 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἀννίβας, ἐλλείπων
τοῖς ἱππικοῖς, διέπεμπε πρός τινα Νομάδα Τυχαῖον,
ὃς ἦν μὲν οἰκεῖος Σόφακος, ἱππεῖς δὲ μαχιμω-
6 τάτους ἔχειν ἐδόκει τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, παρα-
καλῶν αὐτὸν βοηθεῖν καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ
καιροῦ, σαφῶς γινώσκοντα διότι Καρχηδονίων
κρατησάντων δύναται διαφυλάττειν τὴν ἀρχήν,
Ῥωμαίων δ' ἐκνικησάντων καὶ τῷ βίῳ κινδυ-
7 νεύσει διὰ τὴν Μασαννάσου φιλαρχίαν. οὗτος
οὖν πεισθεὶς τοῖς παρακαλουμένοις ἦκε μετὰ
δισχιλίων ἱππέων πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν.

4 Πόπλιος δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν ἀσφα-
λισάμενος καὶ καταλιπὼν Βαίβιον ἀντιστράτηγον,
2 αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, οὐκέτι παραλαμ-
βάνων εἰς τὴν πίστιν τοὺς ἐθελοντὴν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς
ἐγχειρίζοντας, ἀλλὰ μετὰ βίας ἀνδραποδιζόμενος
καὶ φανερὰν ποιῶν τὴν ὀργήν, ἣν εἶχε πρὸς τοὺς
πολεμίους διὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων παρασπόνδησιν·
3 πρὸς δὲ Μασαννάσαν διεπέμπετο συνεχῶς, ἀπο-
δηλῶν αὐτῷ τίνα τρόπον παραβεβηκότες εἶεν οἱ
Φοίνικες τὰς σπονδάς, καὶ παρακαλῶν ἀθροίζειν
δύναμιν ὡς πλείστην καὶ συνάπτειν αὐτῷ κατὰ
4 σπουδήν. ὁ γὰρ Μασαννάσας ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι
τὰς συνθήκας, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, εὐθέως
ἀφώρμησε μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως, προσλαβὼν
δέκα σημαίας Ῥωμαϊκὰς ἱππέων καὶ πεζῶν καὶ

it was evident that the issue must be decided by a battle. Consequently not only all the inhabitants of Italy and Africa, but those of Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia likewise were held in suspense and distracted, awaiting the result.

Hannibal at this time was very poorly off for cavalry and sent to a certain Numidian called Tychaeus, who was a relative of Syphax, and was thought to have the best cavalry in Africa, begging him to help him and join in saving the situation, as he knew well that, if the Carthaginians won, he could retain his principality, but if the Romans were victors, he would risk losing his life too, owing to Massanissa's greed of power. Accordingly, Tychaeus was prevailed on by this appeal and came to Hannibal with a body of two thousand horse.

4. Scipio, having taken measures for the security of his fleet, deputed the command to Baebius and himself went round the towns, no longer receiving the submission of those which offered to surrender, but taking them all by assault and selling the inhabitants as slaves, to manifest the anger he felt against the enemy owing to the treacherous behaviour of the Carthaginians. He was constantly sending to Massanissa, pointing out to him how the Carthaginians had violated the treaty, and begging him to raise as strong a force as possible and to make haste to join him. For Massanissa, as I above stated, immediately on the conclusion of the treaty left with his own forces, taking with him besides ten cohorts of Roman cavalry and infantry, and

πρεσβευτὰς παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, χάριν τοῦ μὴ μόνον τὴν πατρῴαν ἀρχὴν ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ Σόφακος προσκατακτήσασθαι διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπικουρίας· ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι.

5 Συνέτυχε δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ Ῥώμης πρεσβευτὰς περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς εἰς τὸν ναυτικὸν χάρακα
6 τὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων καταπλεῦσαι. τοὺς μὲν οὖν παρ' αὑτῶν ὁ Βαίβιος παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Πόπλιον ἐξέπεμψε, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων παρακατεῖχε, τά τε λοιπὰ δυσθύμως διακειμένους καὶ νομίζοντας
7 ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις εἶναι κινδύνοις· πυθόμενοι γὰρ τὴν γεγενημένην ἐκ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀσέβειαν πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις, πρόδηλον
8 ἐδόκουν εἶναι σφίσι τὴν ἐκ τούτων τιμωρίαν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος, διακούσας τῶν παραγεγονότων ὅτι προθύμως ἥ τε σύγκλητος ὅ τε δῆμος ἀποδέξαιντο τὰς γενομένας δι' αὑτοῦ συνθήκας πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ διότι πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ἑτοίμως ἔχοιεν, ἐπὶ μὲν τούτοις ἔχαιρε
9 μεγάλως, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων προσέταξε τῷ Βαιβίῳ μετὰ πάσης φιλανθρωπίας ἀποπέμπειν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, πάνυ καλῶς βουλευσάμενος, ὡς
10 γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ φρονίμως. θεωρῶν ‹γὰρ› τὴν σφετέραν πατρίδα περὶ πλείστου ποιουμένην τὴν περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς πίστιν, ἐσκοπεῖτο παρ' αὑτῷ συλλογιζόμενος οὐχ οὕτως τί δέον παθεῖν Καρχηδονίους, ὡς τί δέον ἦν πρᾶξαι Ῥωμαίους.
11 διὸ παρακατασχὼν τὸν ἴδιον θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσι πικρίαν, ἐπειράθη διαφυλάξαι, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, "πατέρων εὖ κείμενα
12 ἔργα." τοιγαροῦν καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι πάντας ἥττησε ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν

legates on the part of Scipio, in order not only to recover his paternal kingdom, but with the assistance of the Romans to add that of Syphax to it, which he ultimately succeeded in doing.

It happened that at about the same time the envoys from Rome reached the Roman naval camp. So Baebius at once dispatched the Roman envoys to Scipio, but detained the Carthaginians, who were generally dispirited and considered themselves in great danger. For when they heard of the flagitious treatment of the Roman envoys by the Carthaginians, they thought that vengeance for it would assuredly be taken on themselves. But Scipio, on hearing from the Roman legates that both the senate and the people had readily accepted the treaty he had made with the Carthaginians and were ready to comply with all his requests, was highly gratified by this, and ordered Baebius to treat the Carthaginian envoys with all courtesy and send them home, acting, as I think, very rightly and wisely. For aware as he was of the high value attached by his own nation to keeping faith to ambassadors, he took into consideration not so much the deserts of the Carthaginians as the duty of the Romans. Therefore restraining his own anger and the bitter resentment he felt owing to the late occurrence, he did his best to preserve "the glorious record of our sires," as the saying is. The consequence was that he humiliated all the people of Carthage and Hannibal himself by thus

αὐτόν, ὑπερθέμενος τῇ καλοκἀγαθίᾳ τὴν ἐκείνων ἄνοιαν.

5 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες τὰς πόλεις ἐκ-
πορθουμένας, ἔπεμπον πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν, δεόμενοι
μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλὰ προσπελάζειν τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ
2 κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα διὰ μάχης. ὁ δὲ διακούσας
τοῖς μὲν παροῦσιν ἀπεκρίθη τἄλλα σκοπεῖν, περὶ
δὲ τούτου ῥᾳθυμεῖν· διαλήψεσθαι ‹γὰρ› τὸν καιρὸν
3 αὐτός. μετὰ δέ τινας ἡμέρας ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῶν
παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρύμητα τόπων προῆλθε καὶ κατεστρα-
τοπέδευσε περὶ Ζάμαν· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ πόλις ἀπέχουσα
Καρχηδόνος ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις ὁδὸν ἡμερῶν
4 πέντε. κἀκεῖθεν ἐξέπεμψε τρεῖς κατασκόπους,
βουλόμενος ἐπιγνῶναι ποῦ στρατοπεδεύουσι καὶ
πῶς χειρίζει τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς ὁ τῶν
5 Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός. Πόπλιος δ', ἐπαναχθέντων
ὡς αὐτὸν τῶν κατασκόπων, τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε
τοῦ κολάζειν τοὺς ἁλωκότας, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς τοὐναντίον συστήσας αὐτοῖς χιλί-
αρχον ἐπέταξε πάντα καθαρίως ὑποδεῖξαι τὰ κατὰ
6 τὴν παρεμβολήν. γενομένου δὲ τούτου προσε-
πύθετο τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ πάντα φιλοτίμως αὐτοῖς
7 ὑποδέδειχεν ὁ συσταθείς· τῶν δὲ φησάντων, δοὺς
ἐφόδια καὶ παραπομπὴν ἐξαπέστειλε προστάξας
ἐπιμελῶς Ἀννίβᾳ διασαφεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀπηντη-
8 μένων αὐτοῖς. ὧν παραγενηθέντων θαυμάσας ὁ
Ἀννίβας τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν τἀνδρὸς
οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἰς ὁρμὴν ἔπεσε τοῦ βούλεσθαι
9 συνελθεῖν εἰς λόγους τῷ Ποπλίῳ. κρίνας δὲ τοῦτο
διεπέμψατο κήρυκα, φάσκων βούλεσθαι κοινο-
10 λογηθῆναι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων. ὁ δὲ
Πόπλιος ἀκούσας ταῦτα τοῦ κήρυκος συγκατετίθετο

requiting in ampler measure their baseness by his generosity.

5. The Carthaginians, when they saw their towns being sacked, sent to Hannibal begging him not to delay, but to approach the enemy and decide matters by a battle. After listening to the messengers he bade them in reply pay attention to other matters and be at their ease about this; for he himself would judge when it was time. After a few days he shifted his camp from the neighbourhood of Adrumetum and advancing encamped near Zama. This is a town lying five days' journey to the west of Carthage. From here he sent out three spies, wishing to find out where the Romans were encamped, and what disposition their general had made in his camp. When these men were caught and brought before him Scipio was so far from punishing them, as is the usual practice, that on the contrary he ordered a tribune to attend them and point out clearly to them the exact arrangement of the camp. After this had been done he asked them if the officer had explained everything to them with proper diligence. When they answered that he had done so, he furnished them with provisions and an escort, and told them to report carefully to Hannibal what had happened to them. On their return Hannibal was so much struck with admiration of Scipio's magnanimity and daring, that he conceived, curiously enough, a strong desire to meet him and converse with him. Having decided on this he sent a herald saying that he desired to discuss the whole situation with him, and Scipio, on receiving the herald's message,

τοῖς παρακαλουμένοις, ἔφη δὲ πέμψειν πρὸς αὐτὸν διασαφῶν, ἐπειδὰν μέλλῃ συμπορεύεσθαι, τὸν
11 τόπον καὶ τὸν καιρόν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀκούσας ὁ κῆρυξ ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν παρεμβολήν·
12 τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἦκε Μασαννάσας, ἔχων πεζοὺς
13 μὲν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ τετρακισχιλίους. ὃν ἀποδεξάμενος ὁ Πόπλιος φιλανθρώπως καὶ συγχαρεὶς ἐπὶ τῷ πάντας ὑπηκόους πεποιῆσθαι
14 τοὺς πρότερον Σόφακι πειθομένους, ἀνέζευξε, καὶ παραγενηθεὶς πρὸς πόλιν Ναράγαρα κατεστρατοπέδευσε, πρός τε τἄλλα τόπον εὐφυῆ καταλαβόμενος καὶ τὴν ὑδρείαν ἐντὸς βέλους ποιησάμενος.
6 κἀντεῦθεν ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, φάσκων ἕτοιμος εἶναι συμπορεύεσθαι
2 πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς λόγους. ὃν ἀκούσας Ἀννίβας ἀνέζευξε, καὶ συνεγγίσας, ὥστε μὴ πλεῖον ἀπέχειν τριάκοντα σταδίων, κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρός τινα λόφον, ὃς τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἐδόκει, τὴν δ' ὑδρείαν ἀπωτέρω μικρὸν εἶχε· καὶ πολλὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ὑπέμενον οἱ στρα-
3 τιῶται περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος. κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἑξῆς ἡμέραν προῆλθον ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς ἀμφότεροι μετ' ὀλίγων ἱππέων, κἄπειτα χωρισθέντες ἀπὸ τούτων αὐτοὶ συνῆλθον εἰς τὸ μέσον
4 ἔχοντες ἑρμηνέα μεθ' αὑτῶν. δεξιωσάμενος δὲ πρῶτος Ἀννίβας ἤρξατο λέγειν ὡς ἐβούλετο μὲν ἂν μήτε Ῥωμαίους ἐπιθυμῆσαι μηδέποτε μηδενὸς τῶν ἐκτὸς Ἰταλίας μήτε Καρχηδονίους τῶν ἐκτὸς
5 Λιβύης· ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ εἶναι ταύτας καὶ καλλίστας δυναστείας καὶ συλλήβδην ὡς ἂν εἰ περιωρισμένας
6 ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως. "ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν ἀμφισβητήσαντες ἐξεπολεμώσαμεν

assented to the request and said he would send to Hannibal fixing a place and hour for the interview. Upon this the herald returned to his own camp. Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand foot and four thousand horse. Scipio received him kindly, congratulating him on having brought under his dominion all the former subjects of Syphax. He then broke up his camp and on reaching a town called Naragara encamped there, selecting a spot which was favourably situated in other respects and had water within the throw of a javelin. 6. From here he sent to the Carthaginian general saying that he was now ready for the meeting. When Hannibal heard this he broke up his camp and on getting within a distance of not more than thirty stades of the Romans encamped on a hill which appeared to be convenient for his present design, but was rather too far away from water, and indeed his men suffered considerable hardship owing to this. On the following day both generals came out of their camps accompanied by a few horsemen, and then, leaving their escorts behind, met each other alone, having an interpreter with them. Hannibal first saluted Scipio and began to speak as follows :

" Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa ; for both these were very fine empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself had fixed their limits. But now that in the first place we went to war with each other for the

ἀλλήλους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ὑπὲρ τῶν κατ' Ἰβηρίαν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης οὔπω νουθετούμενοι μέχρι τούτου προβεβήκαμεν ὥστε καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους οὗς μὲν κεκινδυνευκέναι,
7 τοὺς δ' ἀκμὴν ἔτι καὶ νῦν κινδυνεύειν, λοιπόν ἐστιν, εἴ πως δυνάμεθα δι' αὑτῶν παραιτησάμενοι τοὺς θεοὺς διαλύσασθαι τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν φιλοτιμίαν.
8 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἕτοιμός εἰμι τῷ πεῖραν εἰληφέναι δι' αὑτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ‹εὐ›μετάθετός ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ παρὰ μικρὸν εἰς ἑκάτερα ποιεῖ μεγάλας
7 ῥοπάς, καθάπερ εἰ νηπίοις παισὶ χρωμένη· σὲ δ' ἀγωνιῶ, Πόπλιε, λίαν" ἔφη "καὶ διὰ τὸ νέον εἶναι κομιδῇ καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντα σοι κατὰ λόγον κεχωρηκέναι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην καὶ μηδέπω μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν εἰς τὴν τῆς τύχης ἐμπεπτωκέναι παλιρρύμην, μήποτ' οὐ πεισθῇς διὰ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις,
2 καίπερ οὖσι πιστοῖς. σκόπει δ' ἀφ' ἑνὸς τῶν λόγων τὰ πράγματα, μὴ τὰ τῶν προγεγονότων,
3 ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. εἰμὶ τοιγαροῦν Ἀννίβας ἐκεῖνος, ὃς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κάνναις μάχην σχεδὸν ἁπάσης Ἰταλίας ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος μετά τινα χρόνον ἦκον πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ στρατοπεδεύσας ἐν τετταράκοντα σταδίοις ἐβουλευόμην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ τῆς ὑμετέρας πατρίδος ἐδάφους
4 πῶς ἐστί μοι χρηστέον, ὃς νῦν ἐν Λιβύῃ πάρειμι πρὸς σὲ Ῥωμαῖον ὄντα περὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων σωτηρίας κοινολογησόμενος.
5 εἰς ἃ βλέποντα παρακαλῶ σε μὴ μέγα φρονεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπίνως βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀεὶ τὸ μέγιστον,
6 τῶν κακῶν δὲ τοὐλάχιστον αἱρεῖσθαι. τίς οὖν

possession of Sicily and next for that of Spain, now that, finally refusing to listen to the admonition of Fortune, we have gone so far that your native soil was once in imminent danger and our own still is. what remains but to consider by what means we can avert the anger of the gods and compose our present contention? I myself am ready to do so as I learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest moment, as if she were sporting with little children. 7. But I fear that you, Publius, both because you are very young and because success has constantly attended you both in Spain and in Africa, and you have never up to now at least fallen into the counter-current of Fortune, will not be convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be. Consider things by the light of one example, an example not drawn from remote times, but from our own. I, then, am that Hannibal who after the battle of Cannae became master of almost the whole of Italy, who not long afterwards advanced even up to Rome, and encamping at forty stades from the walls deliberated with myself how I should treat you and your native soil. And now here am I in Africa on the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country. Consider this, I beg you, and be not overproud, but take such counsel at the present juncture as a mere man can take, and that is ever to choose the most good and the least evil. What man of sense, I ask, would rush into

ἂν ἕλοιτο νοῦν ἔχων πρὸς τοιοῦτον ὁρμᾶν κίνδυνον οἷος σοὶ νῦν ἐνέστηκεν; ἐν ᾧ νικήσας μὲν οὔτε τῇ σαυτοῦ δόξῃ μέγα τι προσθήσεις οὔτε τῇ τῆς πατρίδος, ἡττηθεὶς δὲ πάντα τὰ πρὸ τούτου σεμνὰ 7 καὶ καλὰ δι' αὐτὸν ἄρδην ἀναιρήσεις. τί οὖν 8 ἐστιν ὃ προτίθεμαι τέλος τῶν νυνὶ λόγων; πάντα περὶ ὧν πρότερον ἠμφισβητήσαμεν, Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν—ταῦτα δ' ἦν Σικελία, Σαρδώ, τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν—καὶ μηδέποτε Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀντᾶραι πόλεμον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νήσους, ὅσαι μεταξὺ κεῖνται τῆς 9 Ἰταλίας καὶ Λιβύης, Ῥωμαίων ὑπάρχειν. ταύτας γὰρ πέπεισμαι τὰς συνθήκας καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀσφαλεστάτας μὲν εἶναι Καρχηδονίοις, ἐνδοξοτάτας δὲ σοὶ καὶ πᾶσι Ῥωμαίοις."

8 Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν ταῦτ' εἶπεν. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος ὑπολαβὼν οὔτε τοῦ περὶ Σικελίας ἔφη πολέμου Ῥωμαίους οὔτε τοῦ περὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας αἰτίους 2 γεγονέναι, Καρχηδονίους δὲ προφανῶς· ὑπὲρ ὧν κάλλιστα γινώσκειν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν. μάρτυρας δὲ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς γεγονέναι τούτων, περιθέντας τὸ κράτος οὐ τοῖς ἄρχουσι χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ 3 τοῖς ἀμυνομένοις. βλέπειν δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς τύχης οὐδενὸς ἧττον καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων στοχάζεσθαι 4 κατὰ δύναμιν. "ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν εἰς Λιβύην αὐτὸς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἐκχωρήσας προύτεινας τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας, οὐκ 5 ἂν οἶομαί σε διαψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος. ἐπεὶ δὲ σὺ μὲν ἄκων ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀπηλλάγης, ἡμεῖς δὲ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Λιβύην τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἐκρατήσαμεν, δῆλον ὡς μεγάλην εἴληφε τὰ πράγματα 6 παραλλαγήν. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον ἤλθομεν ἐπὶ τί

such danger as that which confronts you now? If you conquer you will add but little to the fame of your country and your own, but if you suffer defeat you will utterly efface the memory of all that was grand and glorious in your past. What then is the end I would gain by this interview? I propose that all the countries that were formerly a subject of dispute between us, that is Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, shall belong to Rome and that Carthage shall never make war upon Rome on account of them. Likewise that the other islands lying between Italy and Africa shall belong to Rome. Such terms of peace would, I am convinced, be most secure for the Carthaginians and most honourable to you and to all the Romans."

8. Hannibal having spoken so, Scipio replied. He said that neither for the war about Sicily, nor for that about Spain, were the Romans responsible, but the Carthaginians were evidently the authors of both, as Hannibal himself was well aware. The gods, too, had testified to this by bestowing victory not on the unjust aggressors but on those who had taken up arms to defend themselves. No one, he said, was more awake than himself to the fickleness of Fortune and as far as it was in his power he took into consideration the uncertainty of human affairs. "But as for the conditions you propose," he continued, "if before the Romans had crossed to Africa you had retired from Italy and then proposed them, I think your expectations would not have been disappointed. But now that you have been forced reluctantly to leave Italy, and that we, having crossed to Africa, are in command of the open country, the situation is manifestly much changed. And—for this is the most important question—what is the

7 πέρας; ἡττηθέντων καὶ δεηθέντων τῶν παρὰ σοῦ πολιτῶν ἐθέμεθα συνθήκας ἐγγράπτους, ἐν αἷς ἦν πρὸς τοῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν προτεινομένοις τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀποδοῦναι χωρὶς λύτρων Καρχηδονίους, τῶν πλοίων παραχωρῆσαι τῶν καταφράκτων, πεντακισχίλια τάλαντα προσενεγκεῖν, ὅμηρα δοῦναι
8 περὶ τούτων. ταῦτ' ἦν ἃ συνεθέμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους· ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν ἀμφότεροι πρός τε τὴν σύγκλητον τὴν ἡμετέραν καὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἡμεῖς μὲν ὁμολογοῦντες εὐδοκεῖν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ δεόμενοι τούτων τυ-
9 χεῖν. ἐπείσθη τὸ συνέδριον τούτοις, ὁ δὲ δῆμος συγκατήνεσε. τυχόντες ὧν ἠξίουν ἠθέτησαν ταῦτα
10 Καρχηδόνιοι, παρασπονδήσαντες ἡμᾶς. τί λείπεται ποιεῖν; σὺ τὴν ἐμὴν χώραν μεταλαβὼν εἶπον.
11 ἀφελεῖν τὰ βαρύτατα τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐπιταγμάτων; ἵνα δὴ λαβόντες ἆθλα τῆς παρανομίας διδαχθῶσι τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν παρα-
12 πονδεῖν· ἀλλ' ἵνα τυχόντες ὧν ἀξιοῦσι χάριν ὀφείλωσιν ἡμῖν; ἀλλὰ νυνὶ μεθ' ἱκετηρίας τυχόντες ὧν παρεκάλουν, ὅτι βραχείας ἐλπίδος ἐπελάβοντο τῆς κατὰ σέ, παρὰ πόδας ὡς ἐχθροῖς ἡμῖν κέχρηνται
13 καὶ πολεμίοις. ἐν οἷς βαρυτέρου μέν τινος προσεπιταχθέντος δυνατὸν ἀνενεγκεῖν τῷ δήμῳ περὶ διαλύσεως, ὑφαίρεσιν δὲ ποιουμένοις τῶν ὑποκει-
14 μένων οὐδ' ἀναφορὰν ἔχει τὸ διαβούλιον. τί πέρας οὖν πάλιν τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων; ἢ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν ὑμᾶς διδόναι περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἢ μαχομένους νικᾶν."

position we have now reached ? When your countrymen were beaten and begged for peace we framed a treaty in writing in which it was stipulated, in addition to your present proposals, that the Carthaginians should give up their prisoners without ransom, that they should surrender their ships of war, and that they should pay us five thousand talents, and finally that they should give hostages for the performance of those conditions. These were the terms we agreed upon. We jointly sent envoys to Rome to submit them to the senate and the people, we Romans stating that we agreed to the terms offered and you Carthaginians entreating that they might be accepted. The senate agreed and the people also gave their consent. The Carthaginians, after their request had been granted, most treacherously violated the peace. What remains to be done ? Put yourself in my place and tell me. Shall we withdraw the most onerous of the conditions imposed ? That would be to reward your countrymen for their treachery and teach them to continue to betray their benefactors. Or shall we grant their present request in the hope of earning their gratitude ? But now after obtaining their request by earnest supplication, the moment they conceived the slightest hope from your return, they at once treated us as enemies and foes. If we added some conditions even more onerous we might in that case refer the treaty to our popular assembly, but if we withdraw some of the conditions it would be useless even to make mention of this conference at Rome. Of what further use then is our interview ? Either put yourselves and your country at our mercy or fight and conquer us."

9 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διαλεχθέντες αὐτοῖς Ἀννίβας
καὶ Πόπλιος ἐχωρίσθησαν, ἀσύμβατον ποιησάμενοι
2 τὴν κοινολογίαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον ἅμα τῷ
φωτὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξῆγον ἀμφότεροι καὶ συνίσταντο
τὸν ἀγῶνα, Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς σφετέρας
σωτηρίας καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πραγμάτων,
Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνα-
3 στείας. ἐφ' ᾧ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπιστήσας συμπαθὴς
4 γένοιτο κατὰ τὴν ἐξήγησιν; οὔτε γὰρ δυνάμεις
πολεμικωτέρας οὔθ' ἡγεμόνας ἐπιτυχεστέρους τού-
των καὶ μᾶλλον ἀθλητὰς γεγονότας τῶν κατὰ
πόλεμον ἔργων εὕροι τις ἂν ἑτέρους, οὐδὲ μὴν
ἆθλα μείζω τὴν τύχην ἐκτεθεικυῖαν τοῖς ἀγωνι-
5 ζομένοις τῶν τότε προκειμένων· οὐ γὰρ τῆς Λιβύης
αὐτῆς οὐδὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἔμελλον κυριεύειν οἱ
τῇ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν
τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὅσα νῦν πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τὴν ἱστορίαν.
6 ὃ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι μετ' ὀλίγον. πλὴν ὁ μὲν
Πόπλιος ἔθηκε τὰς τάξεις τῶν ἰδίων δυνάμεων
7 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἀστάτους
καὶ τὰς τούτων σημαίας ἐν διαστήμασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ
τούτοις τοὺς πρίγκιπας, τιθεὶς τὰς σπείρας οὐ
κατὰ τὸ τῶν πρώτων σημαιῶν διάστημα, καθάπερ
ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀλλὰ καταλλήλους
ἐν ἀποστάσει διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἐναν-
τίοις ἐλεφάντων· τελευταίους δ' ἐπέστησε τοὺς
8 τριαρίους. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κεράτων ἔταξε κατὰ μὲν
τὸ λαιὸν Γάιον Λαίλιον, ἔχοντα τοὺς Ἰταλικοὺς ἱπ-
πέας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος Μασανάσαν μετὰ
πάντων τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ταττομένων Νομάδων.
9 τὰ δὲ διαστήματα τῶν πρώτων σημαιῶν ἀν-
επλήρωσε ταῖς τῶν γροσφομάχων σπείραις, παρ-

9. After this conversation, which held out no hopes of reconciliation, the two generals parted from each other. On the following morning at daybreak they led out their armies and opened the battle, the Carthaginians fighting for their own safety and the dominion of Africa, and the Romans for the empire of the world. Is there anyone who can remain unmoved in reading the narrative of such an encounter? For it would be impossible to find more valiant soldiers, or generals who had been more successful and were more thoroughly exercised in the art of war, nor indeed had Fortune ever offered to contending armies a more splendid prize of victory, since the conquerors would not be masters of Africa and Europe alone, but of all those parts of the world which now hold a place in history; as indeed they very shortly were. Scipio drew up his army in the following fashion. In front he placed the *hastati* with certain intervals between the maniples and behind them the *principes*, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants. Last of all he placed the *triarii*. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and on the right wing Massanissa with the whole of his Numidians. The intervals of the first maniples he filled up with the cohorts of *velites*,

10 ἀγγείλας τούτοις προκινδυνεύειν, ἐὰν δ' ἐκβιάζωνται κατὰ τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἔφοδον, ἀποχωρεῖν, τοὺς μὲν καταταχοῦντας διὰ τῶν ἐπ' εὐθείας διαστημάτων εἰς τοὐπίσω τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, τοὺς δὲ περικαταλαμβανομένους εἰς τὰ πλάγια παρίστασθαι διαστήματα κατὰ τὰς σημαίας.

10 Ταῦτα δ' ἑτοιμασάμενος ⟨ἐπ⟩επορεύετο παρακαλῶν τὰς δυνάμεις βραχέως μέν, οἰκείως δὲ τῆς
2 ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως. ἠξίου γὰρ μνημονεύοντας τῶν προγεγονότων ἀγώνων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι, σφῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίους, καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὅτι κρατήσαντες μὲν τῶν ἐχθρῶν οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ πραγμάτων ἔσονται κύριοι βεβαίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης οἰκουμένης τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον
3 αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι περιποιήσουσιν· ἐὰν δ' ὡς ἄλλως ἐκβῇ τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον, οἱ μὲν ἀποθανόντες εὐγενῶς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ κάλλιστον ἐντάφιον ἕξουσι τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος θάνατον, οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες αἴσχιστον καὶ ἐλεεινότατον τὸν
4 ἐπίλοιπον βίον. ἀσφάλειαν γὰρ τοῖς φυγοῦσιν οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς περιποιῆσαι τόπος τῶν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ· πεσοῦσι δ' ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων χεῖρας οὐκ ἄδηλα [εἶναι] τὰ συμβησόμενα τοῖς ὀρθῶς λο-
5 γιζομένοις· "ὦν" ἔφη "μηδενὶ γένοιτο πεῖραν ὑμῶν λαβεῖν. τῆς δ' οὖν τύχης ἡμῖν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἄθλων εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸ μέρος ἐκτεθεικυίας, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴημεν ἀγεννέστατοι καὶ συλλήβδην ἀφρονέστατοι πάντων, εἰ παρέντες τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑλοίμεθα τὰ μέγιστα τῶν κακῶν διὰ
6 φιλοζωίαν;" διόπερ ἠξίου δύο προθεμένους, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἢ νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν, ὁμόσε χωρεῖν εἰς

ordering them to open the action, and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines.

10. Having made these preparations he rode along the lines and addressed his troops in a few words suitable to the occasion. "Bear in mind," he said, "your past battles and fight like brave men worthy of yourselves and your country. Keep it before your eyes that if you overcome your enemies not only will you be unquestioned masters of Africa, but you will gain for yourselves and your country the undisputed command and sovereignty of the rest of the world. But if the result of the battle be otherwise, those of you who have fallen bravely in the fight will lie for ever shrouded in the glory of dying thus for their country, while those who save themselves by flight will spend the remainder of their lives in misery and disgrace. For no place in Africa will be able to afford you safety, and if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians it is plain enough to anyone who gives due thought to it what fate awaits you. May none of you, I pray, live to experience that fate. Now that Fortune offers us a choice of the most glorious of prizes, how utterly craven, in short how foolish shall we be, if we reject the greatest of goods and choose the greatest of evils from mere love of life. Go, therefore, to meet the foe with two objects before you,

7 τοὺς πολεμίους. τοὺς γὰρ τοιαύτας ἔχοντας διαλήψεις κατ' ἀνάγκην ἀεὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων, ἐπειδὰν ἀπελπίσαντες τοῦ ζῆν ἴωσιν εἰς τὴν μάχην.

11 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πόπλιος τοιαύτην ἐποιήσατο τὴν παραίνεσιν. ὁ δ' Ἀννίβας τὰ μὲν θηρία πρὸ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως, ὄντα πλείω τῶν ὀγδοήκοντα, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐπέστησε, περὶ μυρίους ὄντας καὶ δισχιλίους τὸν ἀριθμόν. οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν
2 Λιγυστῖνοι, Κελτοί, Βαλιαρεῖς, Μαυρούσιοι. τούτων δὲ κατόπιν παρενέβαλε τοὺς ἐγχωρίους Λίβυας καὶ Καρχηδονίους, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοὺς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἥκοντας μεθ' αὑτοῦ, πλεῖον ἢ στάδιον ἀποστήσας
3 τῶν προτεταγμένων. τὰ δὲ κέρατα διὰ τῶν ἱππέων ἠσφαλίσατο, θεὶς ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ λαιὸν τοὺς συμμάχους Νομάδας, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν τοὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων
4 ἱππεῖς. παρήγγειλε δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους στρατιώτας ἕκαστον παρακαλεῖν, ἀναφέροντας τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰς μεθ' αὑτοῦ παρα-
5 γεγενημένας δυνάμεις· τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἡγουμένους τὰ συμβησόμενα περὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι καὶ τιθέναι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἐὰν ἄλλως πως ἐκβῇ τὰ τῆς μάχης. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐποίουν τὸ παραγγελθέν.
6 Ἀννίβας δὲ τοὺς μεθ' αὑτοῦ παραγεγονότας ἐπιπορευόμενος ἠξίου καὶ παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑπτακαιδεκαέτους συνηθείας, μνησθῆναι δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν προ-
7 γεγονότων αὐτοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγώνων· ἐν οἷς ἀηττήτους γεγονότας οὐδ' ἐλπίδα τοῦ νικᾶν οὐδέ-
8 ποτ' ἔφη Ῥωμαίοις αὐτοὺς ἀπολελοιπέναι. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἠξίου λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν χωρὶς

either victory or death. For men animated by such a spirit must always overcome their adversaries, since they go into battle ready to throw their lives away."

11. Such was the substance of Scipio's harangue. Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants, of which he had over eighty, and behind them the mercenaries numbering about twelve thousand. They were composed of Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Behind these he placed the native Libyans and Carthaginians, and last of all the troops he had brought over from Italy at a distance of more than a stade from the front lines. He secured his wings by cavalry, placing the Numidian allies on the left and the Carthaginian horse on the right He ordered each commanding officer of the mercenaries to address his own men, bidding them be sure of victory as they could rely on his own presence and that of the forces that he had brought back with him. As for the Carthaginians, he ordered their commanders to set before their eyes all the sufferings that would befall their wives and children if the result of the battle were adverse. They did as they were ordered, and Hannibal himself went the round of his own troops, begging and imploring them to remember their comradeship of seventeen years and the number of the battles they had previously fought against the Romans. "In all these battles," he said, "you proved so invincible that you have not left the Romans the smallest hope of ever being able to defeat you. Above all the rest, and apart from

τῶν κατὰ μέρος κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἀναριθμήτων προτερημάτων τήν τε περὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν μάχην πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ νῦν ἡγουμένου Ῥωμαίων, ὁμοίως τὴν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ πρὸς Φλαμίνιον μάχην, ἔτι δὲ τὴν περὶ Κάννας γενομένην πρὸς
9 Αἰμίλιον, ἃς οὔτε κατὰ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὔτε κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀξίας εἶναι συγκρίσεως πρὸς
10 τὸν νῦν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον. καὶ ταῦτα λέγων ἀναβλέπειν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευε ‹καὶ› τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων κατοπτεύειν τάξιν· οὐ γὰρ οἷον ἐλάττους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν μέρος εἶναι τῶν τότε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀγωνισαμένων, ταῖς γε μὴν ἀρεταῖς οὐδὲ
11 σύγκρισιν ἔχειν. ἐκείνους μὲν γὰρ ἀηττήτους ὄντας ἐξ ἀκεραίου διηγωνίσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐκγόνους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ λείψανα τῶν ἡττημένων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ πεφευγότων αὐτὸν πλεο-
12 νάκις. διόπερ [ᾤετο] δεῖν μὴ καταλῦσαι μήτε τὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν μήτε τὴν τοῦ προεστῶτος δόξαν καὶ προσηγορίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγωνισαμένους εὐψύχως βεβαιῶσαι τὴν διαδεδομένην περὶ αὐτῶν φήμην, ὡς ὄντων ἀηττήτων.

13 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τοιαῦτα παρεκάλεσαν ἀμφό-
12 τεροι. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἑκατέροις ἦν εὐτρεπῆ τὰ πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, πάλαι τῶν Νομαδικῶν ἱππέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκροβολιζομένων, τότε παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλεφάντων Ἀννίβας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον
2 ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἅμα δὲ τῷ πανταχόθεν τὰς σάλπιγγας καὶ τὰς βυκάνας ἀναβοῆσαι τινὰ μὲν διαταραχθέντα τῶν θηρίων ἐξ αὐτῆς ὥρμησε παλίσσυτα κατὰ τῶν βεβοηθηκότων τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Νομάδων· . . . τῶν περὶ τὸν Μασαννάσαν ταχέως ἐψιλώθη τὸ λαιὸν κέρας τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

your success in innumerable smaller engagements, keep before your eyes the battle of the Trebia fought against the father of the present Roman general, bear in mind the battle of the Trasimene against Flaminius, and that of Cannae against Aemilius, battles with which the action in which we are about to engage is not worthy of comparison either in respect to the numbers of the forces engaged or the courage of the soldiers." He bade them, as he spoke thus, to cast their eyes on the ranks of the enemy. Not only were they fewer, but they were scarcely a small fraction of the forces that had formerly faced them, and for courage they were not to be compared with those. For then their adversaries were men whose strength was unbroken and who had never suffered defeat, but those of to-day were some of them the children of the former and some the wretched remnant of the legions he had so often vanquished and put to flight in Italy. Therefore he urged them not to destroy the glorious record of themselves and their general, but, fighting bravely, to confirm their reputation for invincibility.

12. Such was the substance of the harangues of the two generals. When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed.

3 τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ συμπεσόντα τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων γροσφομάχοις ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χωρίῳ τῶν παρατάξεων πολλὰ μὲν ἔπασχε κακά, πολλὰ δ' ἐποίει
4 τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἕως ὅτου πεφοβημένα τὰ μὲν διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐξέπεσε, δεξαμένων αὐτὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀσφαλῶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πρόνοιαν, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν μέρος παραφυγόντα διὰ τῶν ἱππέων συνακοντιζόμενα τέλος εἰς τὸν
5 ἔξω τόπον τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐξέπεσεν, ὅτε δὴ καὶ Λαίλιος ἅμα τῇ περὶ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ταραχῇ συμβαλὼν ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν τοὺς τῶν Καρχηδο-
6 νίων ἱππεῖς προτροπάδην. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐκθύμως· τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἐποίει καὶ
7 Μασαννάσας. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον αἱ φάλαγγες ἀμφότεραι βάδην ἀλλήλαις καὶ σοβαρῶς ἐπῄεσαν, πλὴν τῶν ‹ἐκ› τῆς Ἰταλίας μετ' Ἀννίβου παραγεγονότων· οὗτοι δ' ἔμενον ἐπέχοντες τὸν ἐξ
8 ἀρχῆς τόπον. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐγγὺς ἦσαν ἀλλήλων, οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια συναλαλάξαντες καὶ συμψοφήσαντες τοῖς ξίφεσι τοὺς θυρεοὺς προσ-
9 έβαλλον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀδιάκριτον ἐποίουν τὴν φωνὴν καὶ παρηλλαγμένην· οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἦν κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ὁ αὐτὸς θροῦς

οὐδ' ἴα γῆρυς,
ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα, πολύκλητοι δ' ἔσαν ἄνδρες,

καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἐξηριθμησάμην.

13 Πάσης δ' οὔσης ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα τῆς μάχης [διὰ τὸ μὴ δόρασι μηδὲ ξίφεσι χρῆσθαι τοὺς

[a] Homer, *Il.* iv. 437, ii. 809.

The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman *velites* in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line which Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa. In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position. When the phalanxes were close to each other, the Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice, while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but

> Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound,
> Their names all various,[a]

as appears from the list of them I gave above.

13. As the whole battle was a hand-to-hand affair [the men using neither spears nor swords],[b] the

[b] I have bracketed this phrase in the English, as in the Greek, with the Teubner edition. I do not like to suppress it.

ἀγωνιζομένους], τῇ μὲν εὐχερείᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ προ-
εἶχον οἱ μισθοφόροι τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ πολλοὺς κατ-
2 ετραυμάτιζον τῶν Ῥωμαίων, τῷ δὲ τῆς συντάξεως
ἀκριβεῖ καὶ τῷ καθοπλισμῷ πιστεύοντες οἱ Ῥω-
3 μαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐπέβαινον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. ἅμα δὲ
τοῖς μὲν Ῥωμαίοις ἑπομένων καὶ παρακαλούντων
τῶν κατόπιν, τοῖς δὲ μισθοφόροις τῶν Καρχηδο-
νίων οὐ συνεγγιζόντων οὐδὲ παραβοηθούντων, ἀλλ'
4 ἀποδειλιώντων ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πέρας ἐνέκλιναν οἱ
βάρβαροι, καὶ δόξαντες ἐγκαταλείπεσθαι προφανῶς
ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, ἐπιπεσόντες κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν
5 εἰς τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας ἔκτεινον τούτους. ὃ καὶ
πολλοὺς ἠνάγκασε τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀνδρωδῶς
ἀποθανεῖν· φονευόμενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων
ἐμάχοντο παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν προαίρεσιν ἅμα πρός
6 τε τοὺς ἰδίους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. ποιού-
μενοι δὲ τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκστατικῶς καὶ παρηλ-
λαγμένως οὐκ ὀλίγους διέφθειραν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων
7 καὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων. καὶ δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ
συνέχεαν ἐπιπεσόντες τὰς τῶν ἀστάτων σημαίας·
οἱ μέντοι τῶν πριγκίπων ἡγεμόνες συνθεασάμενοι
8 τὸ γεγονὸς ἐπέστησαν τὰς αὑτῶν τάξεις. τῶν δὲ
μισθοφόρων καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὸ πλεῖστον
μέρος τὸ μὲν ὑφ' αὑτῶν, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστάτων
9 αὐτοῦ κατεκόπη. τοὺς δὲ διασῳζομένους καὶ
φεύγοντας οὐκ εἴασε καταμιγῆναι ταῖς δυνάμεσιν
Ἀννίβας, ἀλλὰ προβαλέσθαι παραγγείλας τοῖς
ἐπιστάταις ἐκώλυσε μὴ παραδέξασθαι τοὺς ἐγ-
10 γίζοντας. ὅθεν ἠναγκάσθησαν οὗτοι μὲν ποιεῖσθαι
τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐπὶ τὰ κέρατα καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων
14 εὐρυχωρίας, γενομένου δὲ τοῦ μεταξὺ τόπου τῶν
καταλειπομένων στρατοπέδων πλήρους αἵματος,

mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans, but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms. The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up, so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them. This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men ; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans, and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy. In this way they even threw the cohorts of the *hastati* into confusion, but the officers of the *principes*, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist, and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the *hastati*. Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force. They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond. 14. The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter,

φόνου, νεκρῶν, πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε τῷ τῶν
2 Ῥωμαίων στρατηγῷ τὸ τῆς τροπῆς ἐμπόδιον· ὅ
τε γὰρ τῶν νεκρῶν ὅλισθος, ὡς ἂν αἱμοφύρτων
καὶ σωρηδὸν πεπτωκότων, ἥ τε τῶν χύδην ἐρριμ-
μένων ὅπλων ὁμοῦ τοῖς πτώμασιν ἀλογία δυσχερῆ
τὴν δίοδον ἔμελλε ποιήσειν τοῖς ἐν τάξει διαπο-
3 ρευομένοις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν τραυματίας εἰς
τοὐπίσω τῆς παρατάξεως κομισάμενος, τοὺς δ'
ἐπιδιώκοντας τῶν ἀστάτων ἀνακαλεσάμενος διὰ
τῆς σάλπιγγος, τοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ πρὸ τῆς μάχης
4 κατὰ μέσους τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπέστησε, τοὺς δὲ
πρίγκιπας καὶ τριαρίους πυκνώσας ἐφ' ἑκάτερον
τὸ κέρας προάγειν παρήγγειλε διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν.
5 ἐπειδὴ δ' ὑπερβάντες ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἀστάτοις
ἐγένοντο, συνέβαλον αἱ φάλαγγες ἀλλήλαις μετὰ
6 τῆς μεγίστης ὁρμῆς καὶ προθυμίας. ὄντων δὲ
καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοῖς φρονήμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς
καὶ τοῖς καθοπλισμοῖς παραπλησίων ἀμφοτέρων,
ἄκριτον ἐπὶ πολὺ συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν μάχην,
ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς χώραις ἐναποθνησκόντων τῶν ἀν-
7 δρῶν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν, ἕως οἱ περὶ τὸν Μασαννάσαν
καὶ Λαίλιον ἀπὸ τοῦ διώγματος τῶν ἱππέων
ἀνακάμπτοντες [καὶ] δαιμονίως εἰς δέοντα καιρὸν
8 συνῆψαν. ὧν προσπεσόντων τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν
κατόπιν οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι κατεκόπησαν ἐν τῇ τάξει,
τῶν δὲ πρὸς φυγὴν ὁρμησάντων ὀλίγοι μὲν τελέως
διέφυγον, ἅτε τῶν ἱππέων ἐν χερσὶν ὄντων καὶ
9 τῶν τόπων ἐπιπέδων ὑπαρχόντων. ἔπεσον δὲ
τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων ὑπὲρ τοὺς χιλίους πεντακοσίους,
τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὑπὲρ δισμυρίους, αἰχμάλωτοι
δ' ἑάλωσαν οὐ πολὺ τούτων ἐλάττους.

15 Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πᾶσι γενομένη μάχη καὶ τὰ ὅλα

and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard. However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the *hastati* who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the *principes* and *triarii* close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the *hastati* the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, until Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment. When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level. More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners.

15. Such was the result of the final battle between

κρίνασα Ῥωμαίοις διὰ τῶν προειρημένων ἡγεμόνων
2 τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος· μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην Πόπλιος
μὲν ἐπακολουθήσας καὶ διαρπάσας τὸν χάρακα τῶν
Καρχηδονίων αὖτις ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν παρ-
3 εμβολήν. Ἀννίβας δὲ μετ' ὀλίγων ἱππέων κατὰ
τὸ συνεχὲς ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς Ἀδρύ-
μητα διεσώθη, πάντα τὰ δυνατὰ ποιήσας κατὰ τὸν
κίνδυνον, ὅσα τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἔδει στρατηγὸν καὶ πολ-
4 λῶν ἤδη πραγμάτων πεῖραν εἰληφότα. πρῶτον
μὲν γὰρ εἰς λόγους συνελθὼν ἐπειράθη δι' αὐτοῦ
5 λύσιν ποιήσασθαι τῶν ἐνεστώτων· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ
τοῦ προειδότος τὰ κατορθώματα, ἀλλ' ἀπιστοῦντος
τῇ τύχῃ καὶ προορωμένου τὰ περὶ τὰς μάχας
6 ἐκβαίνοντα παράλογα. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συγκαταστὰς
εἰς τὸν κίνδυνον οὕτως ἐχρήσατο τοῖς πράγμασιν
ὥστε μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι βέλτιον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους
ἀγῶνα συστήσασθαι, παραπλησίῳ καθοπλισμῷ
7 χρώμενον, οὗ τότε συνεστήσατ' Ἀννίβας. οὔσης
γὰρ δυσδιασπάστου τῆς Ῥωμαίων τάξεως καὶ
δυνάμεως, τὸν ἄνδρα συνέβη καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ
μέρη μάχεσθαι πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιφανείας διὰ τῆς
μιᾶς ἐκτάξεως, ἀεὶ ‹τῶν› ἔγγιστα τῷ δεινῷ
σημαιῶν συνεπιστρεφουσῶν πρὸς τὸ δεόμενον.
8 ἔτι δὲ τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ σκέπην καὶ θράσος παρα-
σκευάζοντος καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ θυρεοῦ καὶ
τὴν τῆς μαχαίρας ὑπομονὴν τῶν πληγῶν, δύσμαχοι
γίνονται καὶ δυσκαταγώνιστοι διὰ τὰς προ-
16 ειρημένας αἰτίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων
οὕτως ἐνδεχομένως Ἀννίβας ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον
ἡρμόσατο παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ὥσθ' ὑπερβολὴν
2 μὴ καταλιπεῖν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐλεφάντων
πλῆθος ἐξ αὐτῆς παρεσκευάσατο καὶ τότε προ-

Scipio and Hannibal, the battle which decided the war in favour of Rome. The action over, Scipio after following up the enemy and plundering their camp returned to his own. Hannibal accompanied by a few horsemen never stopped until he was in safety in Adrumetum. He had done in the battle and before it all that could be done by a good general of long experience. For, in the first place, he had by his conference with Scipio attempted to terminate the dispute by himself alone ; showing thus that while conscious of his former successes he mistrusted Fortune and was fully aware of the part that the unexpected plays in war. In the next place, when he offered battle he so managed matters that it was impossible for any commander with the same arms at his disposal to make better dispositions for a contest against the Romans than Hannibal did on that occasion. The order of a Roman force in battle makes it very difficult to break through, for without any change it enables every man individually and in common with his fellows to present a front in any direction, the maniples which are nearest to the danger turning themselves by a single movement to face it. Their arms also give the men both protection and confidence owing to the size of the shield and owing to the sword being strong enough to endure repeated blows. So that for these reasons they are formidable antagonists very difficult to overcome. 16. But nevertheless to meet each of these advantages Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed. For he had hastily collected that large number of elephants and had

εβάλετο χάριν τοῦ συνταράξαι καὶ διασπάσαι τὰς
3 τάξεις τῶν ὑπεναντίων· τοὺς δὲ μισθοφόρους προ-
έταξε καὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἔθηκε μετὰ τούτους
ἕνεκα τοῦ προεκλῦσαι μὲν τῷ κόπῳ τὰ σώματα
τῶν πολεμίων, ἀχρειῶσαι δὲ τὰς ἀκμὰς τῶν ὅπλων
διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν φονευομένων, ἀναγκάσαι δὲ
τοὺς Καρχηδονίους μέσους ὄντας μένειν καὶ μά-
χεσθαι κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν

ὄφρα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων τις ἀναγκαίῃ πολεμίζοι.

4 τοὺς δὲ μαχιμωτάτους καὶ στασιμωτάτους τῶν
ἀνδρῶν ἐν ἀποστάσει παρενέβαλε χάριν τοῦ προ-
ορωμένους ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸ συμβαῖνον καὶ διαμένοντας
ἀκεραίους τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς σὺν
5 καιρῷ χρήσασθαι ταῖς σφετέραις ἀρεταῖς. εἰ δὲ
πάντα τὰ δυνατὰ ποιήσας πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν ἐσφάλη
τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον ἀήττητος ὤν, συγγνώμην
6 δοτέον· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὅτε καὶ ταὐτόματον ἀντέπραξε
ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε
πάλιν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν·

ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε γεγονέναι περὶ ἐκεῖνον φήσειεν ἄν
τις.

17 Τὰ γὰρ ὑπεραίροντα τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν τῶν
παρ' ἐνίοις ἐθισμῶν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτοπαθῶς δόξῃ γί-
νεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων, ἔλεον
ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι, καὶ
2 συγκινεῖ πως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ ξενισμός· ἐπὰν δὲ
φαίνηται γοητείας χάριν καὶ καθ' ὑπόκρισιν γί-
νεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔλεον, ἀλλ' ὀργὴν ἐξεργά-

placed them in front on the day of battle in order to throw the enemy into confusion and break his ranks. He had placed the mercenaries in advance with the Carthaginians behind them in order that the Romans before the final engagement might be fatigued by their exertions and that their swords might lose their edge owing to the great slaughter, and also in order to compel the Carthaginians thus hemmed in on both sides to stand fast and fight, in the words of Homer

> That e'en the unwilling might be forced to fight.[a]

The most efficient and steadiest of his troops he had placed behind at a certain distance in order that, anticipating and witnessing from afar what took place, they might with undiminished strength and spirit make use of their qualities at the proper time. If he, who had never as yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible step to insure victory, yet failed to do so, we must pardon him. For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, "A brave man meets another braver yet," as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal.

17. When men give expression to their feelings more violently than is the general custom of their nation, if this excess seems to spring from genuine emotion due to the magnitude of their calamities, it arouses the pity of these who see and hear it, and its very strangeness touches all our hearts; but when such extravagance seems to be a mere piece of charlatanry and acting, it gives rise not to pity but to indigna-

[a] Homer, *Il.* iv. 300.

ζεται καὶ μῖσος. ὃ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

3 Ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος διὰ βραχέων ἤρξατο λέγειν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν χάριν οὐδὲν ὀφείλουσι ποιεῖν φιλάνθρωπον, ὁμολογούντων αὐτῶν διότι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπενέγκαιεν Ῥωμαίοις, παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν, καὶ πρώην παρασπονδήσαιεν, ἀθετήσαντες
4 τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς ἐγγράπτους ὁμολογίας· αὑτῶν δὲ χάριν ἔφησε καὶ τῆς τύχης καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κεκρίσθαι σφίσι πράως χρῆσθαι καὶ μεγαλοψύχως
5 τοῖς πράγμασι. φανήσεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο κἀκείνοις ἔφησεν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς διαλαμβάνωσι περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ διδόναι σφίσιν ἐπιταχθήσεται, τοῦτο δεῖν νομίζειν δεινόν, ἀλλ' εἴ τι συγχωρηθήσεται φιλάνθρωπον, τοῦτο μᾶλλον
6 ἡγεῖσθαι παράδοξον, ἐπείπερ ἡ τύχη παρελομένη τὸν ἔλεον αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν συγγνώμην διὰ τὴν σφετέραν ἀδικίαν ὑποχειρίους πεποίηκε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς.
7 ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ἔλεγε τὰ φιλάνθρωπα τὰ διδόμενα, καὶ πάλιν ἃ δέον ἦν ὑπομένειν αὐτούς.

18 Ἦν δὲ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν προτεινομένων ταῦτα. πόλεις ἔχειν κατὰ Λιβύην ἃς καὶ πρότερον εἶχον ἢ τὸν τελευταῖον πόλεμον ἐξενεγκεῖν Ῥωμαίοις, καὶ χώραν ἣν καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν εἶχον, κτήνη καὶ σώματα
2 καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὕπαρξιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης ἀσινεῖς Καρχηδονίους ὑπάρχειν, ἔθεσι καὶ νόμοις
3 χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις, ἀφρουρήτους ὄντας. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἦν τὰ φιλάνθρωπα, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτοις

tion and disgust. Such was the case on the present occasion with regard to the Carthaginian ambassadors.

Scipio began by stating briefly to them that the Romans were not bound to treat them with leniency for their own sakes, as they confessed that they had begun the war against Rome by taking Saguntum contrary to their treaty and enslaving its inhabitants, and that they had quite recently been guilty of treachery by violating a written agreement they had sworn to observe. "But for our own sake," he said, "and in consideration of the fortune of war and of the common condition of man we have decided to be clement and magnanimous. This will be evident to you also, if you estimate the situation rightly. For you should not regard it as strange if we impose sufferings and obligations on you or if we demand sacrifices from you, but rather it should surprise you if we grant you any favours, since Fortune owing to your own misconduct has deprived you of any right to pity or pardon and placed you at the mercy of your enemies." After speaking in this sense he informed them first of the indulgences granted to them and afterwards of the severe conditions to which they would have to submit.

18. The principal points of the conditions proposed were as follows. Carthage was to retain all the cities she formerly possessed in Africa before entering on the last war with Rome, all her former territory, all flocks, herds, slaves, and other property: from that day onward the Carthaginians were to suffer no injury, they were to be governed by their own laws and customs and to receive no garrison. These were the lenient conditions; the others of a contrary kind were as follows: Repara-

πάλιν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀνοχὰς ἀδικήματα γενόμενα πάντα Καρχηδονίους ἀποκαταστῆσαι Ῥωμαίοις, τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους καὶ δραπέτας ἐκ παντὸς ἀποδοῦναι τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ μακρὰ πλοῖα παραδοῦναι 4 πάντα πλὴν δέκα τριήρων, ὁμοίως καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐλέφαντας. πόλεμον μηδενὶ τῶν ἔξω τῆς Λιβύης ἐπιφέρειν καθόλου μηδὲ τῶν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ 5 χωρὶς τῆς Ῥωμαίων γνώμης· οἰκίας καὶ χώραν καὶ πόλεις, καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερόν ἐστι Μασαννάσου τοῦ βασιλέως ἢ τῶν προγόνων ἐντὸς τῶν ἀποδειχθησομένων ὅρων αὐτοῖς πάντα ἀποδοῦναι Μασαννάσᾳ· 6 σιτομετρῆσαί τε τὴν δύναμιν τριμήνου καὶ μισθοδοτῆσαι μέχρι ἂν ἐκ Ῥώμης ἀντιφωνηθῇ τι κατὰ 7 τὰς συνθήκας· ἐξενεγκεῖν ἀργυρίου τάλαντα μύρια Καρχηδονίους ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα, φέροντας καθ' 8 ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν Εὐβοϊκὰ τάλαντα διακόσια· ὁμήρους δοῦναι πίστεως χάριν ἑκατὸν οὓς ἂν προγράψῃ τῶν νέων ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων, μὴ νεωτέρους τετταρεσκαίδεκα ἐτῶν μηδὲ πρεσβυτέρους τριάκοντα.

19 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ στρατηγὸς εἶπε τῶν Ῥωμαίων τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς· οἱ δ' ἀκούσαντες ἠπείγοντο καὶ 2 διεσάφουν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι. καθ' ὃν δὴ καιρὸν λέγεται, μέλλοντός τινος τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας ἀντιλέγειν τοῖς προτεινομένοις καὶ καταρχομένου, προελθόντα τὸν Ἀννίβαν κατασπάσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον 3 ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἐξοργισθέντων διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρᾶξαι, πάλιν τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀναστάντα φασὶν ἀγνοεῖν ‹μὲν ὁμολογῆσαι, δεῖν δὲ› συγγνώμην ἔχειν, εἴ τι παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς πράττει, γινώσκοντας ὅτι τὴν μὲν

tion was to be made to the Romans for all acts of injustice committed by the Carthaginians during the truce : prisoners of war and deserters who had fallen into their hands at any date were to be delivered up : they were to surrender their ships of war with the exception of ten triremes, and all their elephants : they were not to make war at all on any nation outside Africa and on no nation in Africa without consulting Rome : they were to restore to King Massanissa, within the boundaries that should subsequently be assigned, all houses, lands, and cities, and other property which had belonged to him or to his ancestors : they were to furnish the Roman army with sufficient corn for three months and pay the soldiers until a reply arrived from Rome regarding the treaty : they were to contribute ten thousand talents in fifty years, paying two hundred Euboic talents each year : finally they were to give as surety a hundred hostages chosen by the Roman general from among their young men between the age of fourteen and thirty.

19. This was the communication that Scipio made to the ambassadors, and after listening to him they lost no time in conveying it to their countrymen in Carthage. On this occasion it is said that when one of the senators was about to oppose the acceptance of the terms and was beginning to speak Hannibal came forward and pulled him down from the tribune. The other members were indignant with him for such a violation of the usage of the house, and Hannibal then rose again and said that he confessed he had been in error, but they must pardon him if he acted contrary to their usage,

ἔξοδον ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐνναέτης ὢν ποιήσαιτο, πλείω δὲ τῶν πέντε καὶ τετταράκοντ' ἐτῶν ἔχων
4 εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπανήκει. διόπερ ἠξίου μὴ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι παραπέπαικε τῆς συνηθείας, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον, εἰ τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος πράγμασιν ἀληθινῶς συμπάσχει· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν εἰς τὴν
5 ἀλογίαν ἐμπεπτωκέναι ταύτην. θαυμαστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ φανῆναι καὶ τελέως ἐξηλλαγμένον, εἴ τις ὑπάρχων Καρχηδόνιος καὶ συνειδὼς τὰ βεβουλευμένα καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πατρίδι καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἑκάστοις ἡμῶν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων οὐ προσκυνεῖ τὴν τύχην, εἰ γεγονὼς ὑποχείριος τοιούτων τυγχάνει φιλανθρώ-
6 πων· οὓς εἴ τις ὀλίγαις πρότερον ἡμέραις ἤρετο πόσ' ἐλπίζουσι πείσεσθαι τὴν πατρίδα κρατησάντων Ῥωμαίων, οὐδ' ἂν εἰπεῖν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν προφαινομένων
7 αὐτοῖς κακῶν. διόπερ ἠξίου καὶ νῦν μηδ' ἐπὶ λόγον ἄγειν, ἀλλ' ὁμοθυμαδὸν δεξαμένους τὰ προτεινόμενα θύειν τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ πάντας εὔχεσθαι βεβαιῶσαι
8 ταῦτα τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ῥωμαίων. φανέντος δὲ φρονίμως αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς οἰκείως συμβουλεύειν, ἔδοξε ποιεῖσθαι τὰς συνθήκας ἐπὶ τοῖς
9 προειρημένοις. καὶ τὸ μὲν συνέδριον παραυτίκα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς ἀνθομολογησομένους ὑπὲρ τούτων.

II. Res Macedoniae et Graeciae

20 Τοῦτο δὲ τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειε, πῶς, ὅτε μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ Πτολεμαῖος ζῶν οὐ προσεδεῖτο τῆς τούτων

as they knew that he had left Carthage at the age of nine, and was, now that he had returned, over five and forty. He, therefore, begged them not to consider whether he had transgressed parliamentary custom, but rather to ask themselves whether or not he really felt for his country; for this was the sentiment which had now made him guilty of this offence. "It seems to me," he said, "astounding and quite incomprehensible, that any man who is a citizen of Carthage and is conscious of the designs that we all individually and as a body have entertained against Rome does not bless his stars that now that he is at the mercy of the Romans he has obtained such lenient terms. If you had been asked but a few days ago what you expected your country to suffer in the event of the victory of the Romans, you would not have been able even to give utterance to your fears, so great and excessive were the calamities then in prospect. So now I beg you not even to discuss the matter, but to agree with one accord to the proposals, to sacrifice to the gods, and to pray all of you that the Roman people may ratify the treaty." As it seemed to all that his advice was wise and opportune, they voted to make the treaty on the above conditions, and the senate at once dispatched envoys with orders to agree to it.

II. Affairs of Macedonia and Greece

Conduct of Philip and Antiochus regarding Egypt

20. It is very surprising that as long as Ptolemy in his lifetime could dispense with the help of Philip 203 B.C

2 ἐπικουρίας, ἕτοιμοι βοηθεῖν ἦσαν, ὅτε δ' ἐκεῖνος μετήλλαξε καταλιπὼν παιδίον νήπιον, ᾧ κατὰ φύσιν ἀμφοῖν ἐπέβαλλε συσσῴζειν τὴν βασιλείαν, τότε παρακαλέσαντες ἀλλήλους ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ διελόμενοι τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἀρχὴν ἐπανελέσθαι τὸν
3 ἀπολελειμμένον, οὐδ' οὖν, καθάπερ οἱ τύραννοι, βραχεῖαν δή τινα προβαλλόμενοι τῆς αἰσχύνης πρόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀνέδην καὶ θηριωδῶς οὕτως ὥστε προσοφλεῖν τὸν λεγόμενον τῶν ἰχθύων βίον, ἐν οἷς φασιν ὁμοφύλοις οὖσι τὴν τοῦ μείονος ἀπώλειαν τῷ μείζονι τροφὴν γίνεσθαι καὶ βίον.
4 ἐξ ὧν τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐμβλέψας οἷον εἰς κάτοπτρον εἰς τὴν συνθήκην ταύτην αὐτόπτης δόξειε γίνεσθαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀσεβείας καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὠμότητος, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ὑπερβαλλούσης
5 πλεονεξίας τῶν προειρημένων βασιλέων; οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τίς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως τῇ τύχῃ μεμψάμενος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων ἐν τούτοις ἀντικαταλλαγείη, διότι ἐκείνοις μὲν ἐπέθηκε μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν δίκην, τοῖς δ' ἐπιγενομένοις ἐξέθηκε κάλλιστον ὑπόδειγμα πρὸς ‹ἐπ›ανόρθωσιν τὸν τῶν προειρημένων βασιλέων παραδειγματισμόν;
6 ἔτι γὰρ αὐτῶν παρασπονδούντων μὲν ἀλλήλους, διασπωμένων δὲ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἀρχήν, ἐπιστήσασα Ῥωμαίους, ἀκεῖνοι κατὰ τῶν πέλας ἐβουλεύσαντο παρανόμως, ταῦτα κατ' ἐκείνων δικαίως ἐκύρωσε
7 καὶ καθηκόντως. παραυτίκα γὰρ ἑκάτεροι διὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἡττηθέντες οὐ μόνον ἐκωλύθησαν τῆς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκλεισθέντες εἰς φόρους ὑπέμειναν Ῥωμαίοις τὸ προσταττό-

and Antiochus, they were very ready to assist him, but when he died leaving an infant son whom it was their natural duty to maintain in possession of his realm, then encouraging each other they hastened to divide the child's kingdom between themselves and be the ruin of the unhappy orphan. Nor did they, as tyrants do, take the pains to provide themselves with some paltry pretext for the shameful deed, but at once acted in a fashion so unscrupulous and brutal that they well deserved to have applied to them the saying about the food of fishes, that though they are all of the same tribe the destruction of the smaller ones is food and life to the larger. Who can look into this treaty as into a mirror without fancying that he sees reflected in it the image of all impiety towards God and all savagery towards men, as well as of the unbounded covetousness of these two kings? But at the same time who among those who reasonably find fault with Fortune for her conduct of affairs, will not be reconciled to her when he learns how she afterwards made them pay the due penalty, and how she exhibited to their successors as a warning for their edification the exemplary chastisement she inflicted on these princes? For even while they were still breaking their faith to each other and tearing to shreds the boy's kingdom she raised up against them the Romans, and very justly and properly visited them with the very evils which they had been contrary to all law designing to bring upon others. For both of them were very soon vanquished in battle, and they were not only prevented from lusting after the property of others but were compelled to submit to pay tribute and obey the behests of Rome. And,

8 μενον ‹ποιεῖν›. τὸ τελευταῖον ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τὴν μὲν Πτολεμαίου βασιλείαν ἡ τύχη διώρθωσε, τὰς δὲ τούτων δυναστείας καὶ τοὺς διαδόχους τοὺς μὲν ἄρδην ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε καὶ πανωλέθρους, τοὺς δὲ μικροῦ δεῖν τοῖς αὐτοῖς περιέβαλε συμπτώμασι. . . .

21 Ὅτι Μολπαγόρας τις ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Κι‹αν›οῖς, ἀνὴρ καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ἱκανός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν 2 αἵρεσιν δημαγωγικὸς καὶ πλεονέκτης. ὃς πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλῶν τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοὺς εὐκαιροῦντας τοῖς βίοις ὑποβάλλων τοῖς ὄχλοις, καὶ τινὰς μὲν εἰς τέλος ἀναιρῶν, τινὰς δὲ φυγαδεύων καὶ τὰς οὐσίας τὰς τούτων δημεύων καὶ διαδιδοὺς τοῖς πολλοῖς, ταχέως τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ περιεποιήσατο μοναρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν. . . .

3 Κιανοὶ μὲν οὖν περιέπεσον τηλικαύταις συμφοραῖς οὐχ οὕτως διὰ τὴν τύχην οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν πέλας ἀδικίαν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀβου- 4 λίαν καὶ κακοπολιτείαν, προάγοντες ἀεὶ τοὺς χειρίστους καὶ κολάζοντες τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους τού- 5 τοις, ἵνα διαιρῶνται τὰς ἀλλήλων οὐσίας, εἰς ταύτας οἷον ἐθελοντὴν ἐνέπεσον τὰς ἀτυχίας, εἰς ἃς οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως πάντες ἄνθρωποι προφανῶς ἐμπίπτοντες οὐ δύνανται λῆξαι τῆς ἀνοίας, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βραχὺ διαπιστῆσαι [ῥᾴδιον], καθάπερ ἔνια τῶν ἀλόγων 6 ζῴων. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἐὰν αὐτά που δυσχρηστήσῃ περὶ τὰ δελέατα καὶ τὰς ἄρκυς, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἕτερον ἴδῃ κινδυνεῦον, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως αὐτὰ προσαγάγοις πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὑποπτεύει καὶ παντὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ 7 διαπιστεῖ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι τὰς μὲν ἀκούοντες ἀπολλυμένας πόλεις ἄρδην τῷ προειρημένῳ τρόπῳ,

finally, in a very short time Fortune re-established the kingdom of Ptolemy, while as for their dynasties and successors she in one case brought utter destruction upon them and in the other calamities very nearly as grave.

Philip and the People of Cius

21. There was a certain Molpagoras at Cius, a capable speaker and politician, but in character a demagogue, greedy of power. This man, by flattering the populace, by inciting the rabble against men of means, by finally killing some of the latter and banishing others whose property he confiscated and distributed among the people, soon attained by these means to supreme power. . . .

Now the people of Cius met with such disasters not so much owing to chance or to the injustice of their neighbours, but chiefly owing to their own stupidity and misgovernment. For by advancing ever the worst men to power and punishing those who opposed them in order to plunder the fortunes of their fellow-citizens, they fell as of their own free will into those misfortunes of which we may say that men in general, after being caught in them with their eyes open, not only cannot cure themselves of their folly, but cannot conceive the least suspicion, as even some of the brutes do. For the latter not only when they have got into trouble themselves from snares and nets, but if they see another animal in danger will not readily approach such engines again, but are even suspicious of the place and mistrust everything they see. Men on the other hand, though they have heard that some cities have been utterly destroyed by the means I have described, and

τὰς δ' ἀκμὴν ὁρῶντες, ὅμως, ὅταν τις χρησάμενος
τῷ πρὸς χάριν λόγῳ προτείνῃ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ἐξ
8 ἀλλήλων ἐπανορθώσεως, προσίασι πρὸς τὸ δέλεαρ
ἀνεπιστάτως, σαφῶς εἰδότες ὅτι τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα
δελέατα καταπιόντων οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε σέσωσται,
πᾶσι δ' ὁμολογουμένως ὄλεθρον ἐπήνεγκαν αἱ
τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι. . . .

22 Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος κύριος γενόμενος τῆς πόλεως
περιχαρ�ὴς ἦν, ὡς καλήν τινα καὶ σεμνὴν πρᾶξιν
ἐπιτετελεσμένος καὶ βεβοηθηκὼς μὲν προθύμως τῷ
κηδεστῇ, καταπεπληγμένος δὲ πάντας τοὺς ἀλλο-
τριάζοντας, σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν ἐκ
2 τοῦ δικαίου περιπεποιημένος. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τού-
τοις οὐ καθεώρα, καίπερ ὄντα προφανῆ, πρῶτον
μὲν ‹ὡς› οὐκ ἀδικουμένῳ, παρασπονδοῦντι δὲ
3 τῷ κηδεστῇ τοὺς πέλας ἐβοήθει, δεύτερον ὅτι πόλιν
Ἑλληνίδα περιβαλὼν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀτυχήμασιν
ἀδίκως ἔμελλε κυρώσειν τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαδεδο-
μένην φήμην ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰς τοὺς φίλους ὠμότητος,
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν δὲ δικαίως καὶ κληρονομήσειν παρὰ
4 πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν ἐπ' ἀσεβείᾳ δόξαν, τρίτον
ὡς ἐνυβρίκει τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν προειρημένων πόλεων
πρεσβευταῖς, οἳ παρῆσαν ἐξελούμενοι τοὺς Κιανοὺς
ἐκ τῶν περιεστώτων κακῶν, ὑπὸ δ' ἐκείνου παρα-
καλούμενοι καὶ διαγελώμενοι καθ' ἡμέραν ‹ἠναγκά-
5 σθησαν› αὐτόπται γενέσθαι τούτων, ὧν ἥκιστ' ἂν
ἐβουλήθησαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τοὺς Ῥοδίους
οὕτως ἀπετεθηριώκει τότε πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥστε μηδένα

though they see ruin overtaking others, nevertheless, whenever anyone courts favour with them and holds out to them the hope of repairing their fortunes by laying hands on those of their neighbours, approach the snare without a moment's reflection, though quite aware that of those who have swallowed such baits not a single one has ever been saved, but that measures like the above are well known to have brought destruction on all governments which adopted them. . . .

22. Philip having made himself master of the city was highly elated, just as if he had performed a good and noble action in coming readily to the help of his son-in-law, and overawing the revolutionary party, and then justifiably enriching himself with the prisoners and money he laid hands on. But he did not see the reverse of the medal, however obvious it was. He did not see that in the first place the son-in-law whom he came to help was not wronged, but was wronging others by his treachery, next that by thus without any justification bringing the greatest of calamities on a Hellenic city he would set the seal on the reputation he enjoyed for cruelty to his friends, and that both these crimes would justly leave him a legacy of infamy throughout the whole of Greece as a violator of all that was sacred ; thirdly, that he had treated with contumely the ambassadors who came from the cities I mentioned to deliver the Cianians from the perils that menaced them, but who day after day yielding to his entreaties and deluded by him were compelled to be witnesses of things they were far from wishing to see ; and finally, that in addition to all he had aroused such savage hate in the Rhodians against

23 λόγον ἔτι προσίεσθαι περὶ Φιλίππου. καὶ γὰρ ἡ
τύχη πρός γε τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτῷ συνήργησε
2 προφανῶς. ὅτε γὰρ ὁ πρεσβευτὴς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ
τὸν ἀπολογισμὸν ἐποιεῖτο πρὸς τοὺς Ῥοδίους,
ἐμφανίζων τὴν τοῦ Φιλίππου μεγαλοψυχίαν, καὶ
διότι τρόπον τινὰ κρατῶν ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δίδωσι
τῷ δήμῳ τὴν χάριν ταύτην, ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο βουλό-
μενος ἐλέγξαι μὲν τὰς τῶν ἀντιπραττόντων αὐτῷ
διαβολάς, φανερὰν δὲ τῇ πόλει καταστῆσαι τὴν
3 αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν· καὶ παρῆν τις ἐκ κατάπλου
πρὸς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἀναγγέλλων τὸν ἐξανδραποδι-
σμὸν τῶν Κιανῶν καὶ ‹τὴν› ὠμότητα τοῦ Φιλίππου
4 τὴν ἐν τούτοις γεγενημένην, ὥστε τοὺς Ῥοδίους,
ἔτι μεταξὺ τοῦ πρεσβευτοῦ τὰ προειρημένα λέγοντος,
ἐπεὶ προελθὼν ὁ πρύτανις διεσάφει τὰ προσηγ-
γελμένα, μὴ δύνασθαι πιστεῦσαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
5 τῆς ἀθεσίας. Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν, παρασπονδήσας
οὐχ οὕτως Κιανοὺς ὡς ἑαυτόν, εἰς τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν
ἦ καὶ παράπτωσιν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἦκεν ὥστ' ἐφ'
οἷς ἐχρῆν αἰσχύνεσθαι καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ἐπὶ τούτοις
6 ὡς καλοῖς σεμνύνεσθαι καὶ μεγαλαυχεῖν· ὁ δὲ
τῶν Ῥοδίων δῆμος ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας ὡς
περὶ πολεμίου διελάμβανε τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ πρὸς
τοῦτον τὸν σκοπὸν ἐποιεῖτο τὰς παρασκευάς.
7 παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς μῖσος ἐκ ταύτης
8 τῆς πράξεως ἐνειργάσατο πρὸς αὐτόν· ἄρτι γὰρ
διαλελυμένος καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐκτείνων πρὸς τὸ
ἔθνος, οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως ἐγγινομένης, φίλων
ὑπαρχόντων καὶ συμμάχων Αἰτωλῶν, Λυσιμαχέων,
9 Καλχηδονίων, Κιανῶν, βραχεῖ χρόνῳ πρότερον,
πρῶτον μὲν προσηγάγετο τὴν Λυσιμαχέων πόλιν,
ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συμμαχίας,

him that they would not listen to a word in his favour. 23. Indeed, chance had very conspicuously intervened to help this matter on. For just when his envoy was speaking in defence of Philip in the theatre at Rhodes and laying stress on his magnanimity, asserting that, though the city of Cius was now more or less at his mercy, he granted this favour to its people and acted so with the object of confuting the slander of his adversaries and clearly revealing what his true sentiments were: at this very time, I say, a man who had just landed entered the Prytaneum and announced the enslavement of the people of Cius and all Philip's cruelty on that occasion. When, therefore, while Philip's ambassador was still speaking the *prytanis* came forward and communicated the news, the people could not believe it, so black was the treachery. Philip, therefore, who had rather betrayed himself than the people of Cius, had become so wrong-headed or rather so lost to all sense of decency that he gave himself credit and boasted of conduct of which he should have been most deeply ashamed, as though it were a fine deed. From this day forth the Rhodians considered him to be their enemy and made their preparations accordingly, and by this action he made himself equally hated by the Aetolians. For though he had but recently made his peace with that nation and was extending the hand of fellowship to them, now without the shadow of a pretext, at a time when the Aetolians had at no distant date entered into friendship and alliance with Lysimachia, Chalcedon, and Cius, he first of all forced the two former cities to withdraw from this alliance and submit to

δευτέραν δὲ τὴν Καλχηδονίων, τρίτην δὲ τὴν Κιανῶν ἐξηνδραποδίσατο, στρατηγοῦ παρ' Αἰτωλῶν ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβοντος καὶ προεστῶτος τῶν κοινῶν.
10 Προυσίας δέ, καθὸ μὲν ἡ πρόθεσις αὐτοῦ συντελείας ἔτυχε, περιχαρ�ὴς ἦν, καθὸ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἆθλα τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἕτερος ἀπέφερεν, αὐτὸς δὲ πόλεως οἰκόπεδον ἔρημον ἐκληρονόμει, δυσχερῶς διέκειτο, ποιεῖν δ' οὐδὲν οἷός τ' ἦν. . . .

24 Ὅτι Φίλιππος κατὰ τὸν ἀνάπλουν ἕτερον ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ παρασπόνδημα μεταχειριζόμενος προσέσχε περὶ μέσον ἡμέρας πρὸς τὴν τῶν Θασίων πόλιν, καὶ ταύτην φιλίαν οὖσαν ἐξηνδραποδίσατο. . . .
2 Θάσιοι εἶπον πρὸς Μητρόδωρον τὸν Φιλίππου στρατηγὸν παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν εἰ διατηρήσοι αὐτοὺς ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἀνεπισταθμεύτους, νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις. . . .
3 Συγχωρεῖν τὸν βασιλέα Θασίους ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἀνεπισταθμεύτους, νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις. ἐπισημηναμένων δὲ μετὰ κραυγῆς πάντων τὰ ῥηθέντα παρήγαγον τὸν Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν πόλιν. . . .
4 Ἴσως μὲν γὰρ πάντες οἱ βασιλεῖς κατὰ τὰς πρώ-
(24[1]) τας ἀρχὰς πᾶσι προτείνουσι τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ὄνομα καὶ φίλους προσαγορεύουσι καὶ συμμάχους ‹τοὺς› κοινωνήσαντας σφίσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων, καθικόμενοι δὲ τῶν πράξεων παρὰ πόδας οὐ συμμαχικῶς, ἀλλὰ δεσποτικῶς χρῶνται τοῖς πι-
5(2) στεύσασι· διὸ καὶ τοῦ μὲν καλοῦ διαψεύδονται, τοῦ δὲ παραυτὰ συμφέροντος ὡς ἐπίπαν οὐκ
6 ἀποτυγχάνουσι· τὸ δ' ἐπιβαλλόμενον τοῖς μεγίστοις καὶ περιλαμβάνοντα ταῖς ἐλπίσι τὴν οἰκουμένην καὶ πάσας ἀκμὴν ἀκεραίους ἔχοντα τὰς ἐπιβολὰς

him, and he now took Cius and enslaved its inhabitants, although an Aetolian strategus was present in the place and at the head of affairs. Prusias, in so far as his purpose had been accomplished, was gratified, but inasmuch as the prize of the enterprise was carried off by another and he received as his share nothing but the desert site of a city, was much dissatisfied. He was, however, unable to take any action.

Conduct of Philip

24. Philip on his return voyage, committing one act of treachery after another, put in at about midday to Thasos, and though that city was friendly took it and enslaved the inhabitants. . . .

The Thasians told Metrodorus, Philip's general, that they would surrender the city if he would let them remain without a garrison, exempt from tribute, with no soldiers quartered on them and governed by their own laws. . . .

The reply was that Philip acceded to this request upon which all present applauded and admitted Philip into the city. . . .

Perhaps it may be said of all kings that at the beginnings of their reigns they talk of freedom as of a gift they offer to all and style all those who are thus loyal adherents friends and allies, but as soon as they have established their authority they at once begin to treat those who placed trust in them not as allies but as servants. Therefore they are disappointed of any credit for noble conduct, though as a rule they do not miss their immediate interest. But who would not qualify as perfectly irrational and insane the conduct of a prince, who, engaging

εὐθέως ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις καὶ πρώτοις τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων ἐπικηρύττειν ἅπασι τὴν ἀθεσίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀβεβαιότητα πῶς οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀλόγιστον εἶναι καὶ μανικόν;

III. Res Aegypti

24[a] (24[a] 4) Ὅτι ἐπεὶ πάσας καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος τὰς κατ-
ἀλληλα πράξεις γενομένας κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην
ἐξηγούμεθα, δῆλον ὡς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸ τέλος ἐπ'
ἐνίων πρότερον ἐκφέρειν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐπειδὰν πρό-
τερος ὁ τόπος ὑποπέσῃ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ὅλης ὑποθέ-
σεως μερισμὸν καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διηγήσεως ἔφοδον
ὁ τὴν συντέλειαν τῆς πράξεως ἔχων τοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν
καὶ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν περιέχοντος. . . .

25 Ὅτι Σωσίβιος ὁ ψευδεπίτροπος Πτολεμαίου
ἐδόκει γεγονέναι σκεῦος ἀγχίνουν καὶ πολυχρόνιον,
2 ἔτι δὲ κακοποιὸν ἐν βασιλείᾳ, καὶ πρώτῳ μὲν
ἀρτῦσαι φόνον Λυσιμάχῳ, ὃς ἦν υἱὸς Ἀρσινόης
τῆς Λυσιμάχου καὶ Πτολεμαίου, δευτέρῳ δὲ Μάγᾳ
τῷ Πτολεμαίου καὶ Βερενίκης τῆς Μάγα, τρίτῃ
δὲ Βερενίκῃ τῇ Πτολεμαίου μητρὶ τοῦ Φιλοπάτορος,
τετάρτῳ Κλεομένει τῷ Σπαρτιάτῃ, πέμπτῃ θυγατρὶ
Βερενίκης Ἀρσινόῃ. . . .

(25[a]) 3 Μετὰ δ' ἡμέρας τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ
περιστύλῳ τῆς αὐλῆς οἰκοδομήσαντες βῆμα συνεκά-
λεσαν τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς καὶ τὴν θεραπείαν, ἅμα δὲ
τούτοις τοὺς πεζῶν καὶ τοὺς ἱππέων ἡγεμόνας.

in vast enterprises and aspiring to universal dominion, with his chances of success in all his projects still unimpaired, yet in matters of no moment, in the very first matters he was called upon to deal with, proclaimed to all his fickleness and faithlessness?

III. Affairs of Egypt

24[a]. As I give a narrative of the successive events that happened in each part of the world in each year, it is evident that in some cases the end must be told before the beginning, in those cases I mean where according to the general scheme of my work and the order imposed on my narrative the locality which was the scene of the final catastrophe occupies an earlier place than that which witnessed the initial stages. . . .

25. Sosibius, the pretended guardian of Ptolemy, appears to have been a dexterous instrument of evil who remained long in power and did much mischief in the kingdom. He first of all compassed the death of Lysimachus, who was Ptolemy's son by Arsinoë the daughter of Lysimachus, next that of Magas, son of Ptolemy and Berenice, daughter of Magas, thirdly that of Berenice, mother of Ptolemy Philopator, fourthly that of Cleomenes of Sparta, and fifthly that of Arsinoë, the daughter of Berenice.

Ambition and Fate of Agathocles

After four or five days, erecting a tribune in the largest colonnade of the palace, they summoned a meeting of the bodyguard and household troops as well as of the officers of the infantry and cavalry. 203 B.C.

4 (2) ἀθροισθέντων δὲ τούτων ἀναβὰς Ἀγαθοκλῆς καὶ Σωσίβιος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα πρῶτον μὲν τὸν τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τὸν τῆς βασιλίσσης θάνατον ἀνθωμολογήσαντο καὶ τὸ πένθος ἀνέφηναν τοῖς πολλοῖς κατὰ
5 τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διάδημα τῷ παιδὶ περιθέντες ἀνέδειξαν βασιλέα, καὶ διαθήκην τινὰ παρανέγνωσαν πεπλασμένην, ἐν ᾗ γεγραμμένον ἦν ὅτι καταλείπει τοῦ παιδὸς ἐπιτρόπους ὁ βασιλεὺς
6 (3) Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Σωσίβιον· καὶ παρεκάλουν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας εὐνοεῖν καὶ διαφυλάττειν τῷ παιδὶ τὴν ἀρχήν· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις δύο κάλπιδας ἀργυρᾶς εἰσήνεγκαν, ὡς τῆς μὲν μιᾶς ἐχούσης τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως
7 (4) ὀστᾶ, τῆς δ' ἑτέρας τὰ τῆς Ἀρσινόης· εἶχε δ' ἡ μὲν μία κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα πλήρης ἦν ἀρωμάτων. ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσαντες εὐθέως ἐπετέλουν τὴν ἐκφοράν. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ πᾶσι τὰ κατὰ
8 (5) τὴν Ἀρσινόην συνέβη γενέσθαι δῆλα. τοῦ γὰρ θανάτου φωτισθέντος ὁ τρόπος ἐπεζητεῖτο τῆς ἀπωλείας· οὐκ οὔσης δὲ προφάσεως ἄλλης οὐδεμιᾶς, τῆς ἀληθινῆς φήμης προσπεπτωκυίας, ἀκμὴν δ' ἀμφισβητουμένης, τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν γεγονὸς ἐν ταῖς ἑκάστων γνώμαις ἐπεσφραγίσθη. διὸ καὶ συνέβη μεγάλην γενέσθαι τὴν σύγχυσιν τῶν ὅχλων.
9 (6) τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βασιλέως οὐθεὶς οὐθένα λόγον ἐποιεῖτο, περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀρσινόης, ἀνανεούμενοι τινὲς μὲν τὴν ὀρφανίαν αὐτῆς, ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῷ ζῆν ὕβριν, ἣν ὑπέμεινε, καὶ τὴν αἰκίαν, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τὸ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀτύχημα, εἰς τοσαύτην παράστασιν ἐνέπιπτον καὶ δυσθυμίαν ὥστε πλήρη γενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν στεναγμοῦ, δακρύων, οἰμωγῆς
10 (7) ἀκαταπαύστου. ταῦτα δ' ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις οὐχ οὕτω τῆς πρὸς Ἀρσινόην εὐνοίας

When all these had collected, Agathocles and Sosibius mounted the tribune, and in the first place acknowledged the death of the king and queen and enjoined the populace to go into mourning as was their usual practice. After this they crowned the boy and proclaimed him king,[a] and then read a forged will, in which it was written that the king appointed Agathocles and Sosibius guardians of his son. They begged the officers to remain well disposed and maintain the boy on his throne ; and afterwards brought in two silver urns, the one said to contain the bones of the king and the other those of Arsinoë. As a fact, the one did contain the king's bones, but the other was full of spices. Hereupon they at once celebrated the funeral, and now the real circumstances of Arsinoë's fate became manifest to all. For on her death being made known, everyone began to inquire how she had perished. As there was no other cause assigned when the true report began to reach people's ears, though doubt still subsisted, the truth was impressed on the minds of all, and the people were much stirred in consequence. As for the king, no one cared, but concerning Arsinoë, when some recalled her orphanhood and others the insults and outrages inflicted on her during her whole life, and finally her unhappy death, the people fell into such a state of distraction and affliction that the town was full of groans, tears, and ceaseless lamentation, a testimony, in the opinion of those who judged

[a] It will be seen in the sequel that the solemn festival of his Proclamation (Anacleteria) was only celebrated in 196 B.C.

τεκμήρια, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν
11 (8) Ἀγαθοκλέα μίσους· ὁ δὲ προειρημένος, ἐπειδὴ τὰς
ὑδρίας εἰς τοὺς βασιλικοὺς οἴκους ἔθηκε, παραγγεί-
λας ἀποθέσθαι τὰ φαιά, πρῶτον μὲν διμήνου τὰς
δυνάμεις ὠψωνίασε, πεπεισμένος τὸ παρὰ τοῖς
πολλοῖς μῖσος ἀμβλύνειν διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελὲς
ὁρμῆς αὐτῶν, εἶτ' ἐπεξώρκισε τὸν ὅρκον ὃν ἦσαν
ὀμνύειν εἰθισμένοι κατὰ τὰς ἀναδείξεις τῶν βασι-
12 (9) λέων. ἐξαπέστειλε δὲ καὶ Φιλάμμωνα τὸν ἐπι-
στάντα τῷ τῆς Ἀρσινόης φόνῳ, ποιήσας αὐτὸν Λιβυ-
άρχην τῶν κατὰ Κυρήνην τόπων, τὸ δὲ παιδίον
ἐνεχείρισε ταῖς περὶ τὴν Οἰνάνθην καὶ Ἀγαθόκλειαν.
13 (10) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Πέλοπα μὲν ἐξέπεμψε τὸν Πέλοπος
εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν πρὸς Ἀντίοχον τὸν βασιλέα,
παρακαλέσοντα συντηρεῖν τὴν φιλίαν καὶ μὴ
παραβαίνειν τὰς πρὸς τὸν τοῦ παιδὸς πατέρα
συνθήκας, Πτολεμαῖον δὲ τὸν Σωσιβίου πρὸς
Φίλιππον τά τε περὶ τῆς ἐπιγαμίας συνθησόμενον
καὶ παρακαλέσοντα βοηθεῖν, ἐὰν ὁλοσχερέστερον
14 αὐτοὺς Ἀντίοχος ἐπιβάληται παρασπονδεῖν. προ-
εχειρίσατο δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαῖον τὸν Ἀγησάρχου
πρεσβευτὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, οὐχ ὡς ἐπισπεύσοντα
τὴν πρεσβείαν, ἀλλ' ὡς, ἂν ἅψηται τῆς Ἑλλάδος
καὶ συμμίξῃ τοῖς ἐκεῖ φίλοις καὶ συγγενέσιν,
15 (11) αὐτοῦ καταμενοῦντα. προέκειτο γὰρ αὐτῷ πάντας
16 τοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρας ἐκποδὼν ποιῆσαι. ἐξαπ-
έστειλε δὲ καὶ Σκόπαν τὸν Αἰτωλὸν ἐπὶ ξενολογίαν
εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, πλῆθος χρυσίου συνθεὶς εἰς τὰ
17 προδόματα. δύο γὰρ ἔσχε προθέσεις ὑπὲρ ταύτης
τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, μίαν μὲν ἀποχρῆσθαι τοῖς ξενο-
λογηθεῖσιν εἰς τὸν πρὸς Ἀντίοχον πόλεμον, ἄλλην
δὲ τοὺς ἀρχαίους καὶ προϋπάρχοντας ξένους ἐπὶ

correctly, not so much of affection for Arsinoë as of hatred of Agathocles. The latter, after depositing the urns in the royal vaults, ordered the public mourning to cease, and as a first step granted two months' pay to the troops, feeling sure of taking the edge off their hatred by appealing to the soldiers' spirit of avarice, and in the next place imposed on them the oath they were accustomed to take on the proclamation of a new king. He also sent away Philammon who had carried out the murder of Arsinoë, making him libyarch in the Cyrenaica, and he placed the child in the care of Oenanthe and Agathoclea. After this he dispatched Pelops, son of Pelops, to Asia, to King Antiochus to beg him to remain on friendly terms and not to transgress his treaty with the young king's father, and sent Ptolemy, son of Sosibius, to Philip to arrange for the proposed match and to beg for his help if Antiochus attempted any serious violation of his obligations. He also appointed Ptolemy, the son of Agesarchus, ambassador to Rome, with the idea not of his hurrying to his post, but of his remaining in Greece when he reached that country and met his friends and relatives there, the object of Agathocles being to remove all men of distinction from Egypt. He also sent Scopas, the Aetolian, to Greece to hire mercenaries, providing him with a large sum of money to advance to them. Two reasons underlay this plan ; for in the first place, he wished to use the troops he hired for the war against Antiochus, and next to send away the existing force of mercen-

τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια καὶ τὰς κατοικίας ἀποστεῖλαι, τοῖς δὲ παραγενομένοις ἀναπληρῶσαι καὶ καινοποιῆσαι τὴν θεραπείαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν φυλακεῖα, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν
18 ἄλλην πόλιν, νομίζων τοὺς δι' αὑτοῦ ξενολογηθέντας καὶ μισθοδοτουμένους τῶν μὲν προγεγονότων μηδενὶ συμπαθήσοντας διὰ τὸ μηδὲν γινώσκειν, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχοντας καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας καὶ τῆς ἐπανορθώσεως, ἑτοίμους ἕξειν συναγωνιστὰς
19 (12) καὶ συνεργοὺς πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον. ταῦτα δ' ἐγενήθη πρότερα τοῦ παρὰ Φιλίππῳ διαβουλίου . . ., ὡς ἐδηλώσαμεν· ἀλλ' ἐκείνων κατὰ τὴν τῆς διηγήσεως τάξιν προτέρων λαμβανομένων ἀναγκαῖον ἦν οὕτως ταῦτα χειρίζειν ὥστε πρότερον ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὰς ἐντεύξεις καὶ τοὺς χρηματισμοὺς τῶν πρεσβευτῶν καὶ τῆς καταστάσεως καὶ τῆς ἐξαποστολῆς.
20 (13) Ὁ δ' Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐπεὶ τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκποδὼν ἐποίησε, καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς τοῦ πλήθους ὀργῆς παρακατέσχε τῇ τῶν ὀψωνίων ἀποδόσει, παρὰ πόδας εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνήθειαν ἐπανῆλθε.
21 (14) καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φίλων χώρας ἀνεπλήρωσε, παρεισαγαγὼν ἐκ τῆς διακονίας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὑπηρε-
22 (15) σίας τοὺς εἰκαιοτάτους καὶ θρασυτάτους· αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐν μέθῃ διέτριβε καὶ ταῖς τῇ μέθῃ παρεπομέναις ἀκρασίαις, οὐ φειδόμενος οὔτ' ἀκμαζούσης γυναικὸς οὔτε νύμφης οὔτε παρθένου, καὶ πάντα ταῦτ' ἔπραττε μετὰ τῆς
23 (16) ἐπαχθεστάτης φαντασίας. ὅθεν πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως, οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ θεραπείας οὐδὲ βοηθείας προσαγομένης, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἀεὶ προσεπαγομένης ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας,
24 (17) ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ

aries to the country forts in Egypt and to the foreign settlements, and then with these new arrivals to fill up and remodel the household troops and the guards of the court, and of the rest of the city, thinking that the men he himself had enlisted and whom he paid, as they had no political sympathies regarding past events of which they were ignorant, and as they reposed their hopes of preservation and advancement on himself, would readily support him and join heartily in executing all his behests. All this happened before the negotiations with Philip, as I have stated, but as the negotiations fell to be dealt with first owing to the order of my narrative, it was necessary for me to manage matters so as to give an account of the interviews and speeches of the ambassadors before mentioning their appointment and dispatch.

Agathocles, as soon as he had removed all the most notable men and checked to a great extent by the advance of pay the disaffection among the troops, turned to his old courses. He filled up the vacant places of the royal "friends" by appointing from the body servants and other attendants those most remarkable for their effrontery and recklessness. He himself spent the greater part of the day and night in drinking and the debauchery which commonly accompanies it, sparing neither women in the flower of their age nor brides nor virgins, and all this he did with the most odious ostentation. So that as strong dislike against him was aroused on all sides, as no attempt was made to conciliate or help those aggrieved, but on the contrary there was a constant repetition of outrage, arrogance, and neglect, the

προϋπάρχον μῖσος καὶ πάντες ἀνενεοῦντο τὰ προγεγενημένα περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀτυχήματα
25 (18) διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τούτους. τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἔχειν πρόσωπον ἀξιόχρεων τὸ προστησόμενον, καὶ δι' οὗ τὴν ὀργὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ τὴν Ἀγαθόκλειαν ἀπερείσονται, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἔτι μίαν ἐλπίδα καραδοκοῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸν Τληπόλεμον
26 (19) καὶ ταύτῃ προσανέχοντες. ὁ δὲ Τληπόλεμος, ἕως μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔζη, τὰ καθ' αὑτὸν ἔπραττεν· ἅμα δὲ τῷ μεταλλάξαι κεῖνον ταχέως ἐξομαλίσας τὰ πλήθη στρατηγὸς πάλιν ἐγενήθη τῶν κατὰ
27 Πηλούσιον τόπων. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀναφορὰν τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως συμφέρον, πεπεισμένος ὑπάρξειν τι συνέδριον ὃ τήν τε τοῦ παιδὸς ἐπιτροπείαν ἕξει καὶ τὴν τῶν
28 (20) ὅλων προστασίαν. ὡς δ' ἑώρα τοὺς μὲν ἀξίους ἐπιτροπῆς ἄνδρας ἐκποδὼν γεγονότας, τῆς δὲ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς κατατολμῶντα τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα, ταχέως ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἐγένετο γνώμης, ὑφορώμενος τὸν προεστῶτα κίνδυνον διὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην αὐτοῖς ἔχθραν, καὶ τάς τε δυνάμεις περὶ αὑτὸν ἤθροιζε καὶ περὶ πόρον ἐγίνετο χρημάτων, ἵνα μηδενὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
29 (21) εὐχείρωτος ᾖ. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ἐπιτροπείαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων προστασίαν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἥξειν οὐκ ἀπήλπιζε, νομίζων καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν μὲν κρίσιν αὐτὸς ἀξιοχρεώτερος ὑπάρχειν Ἀγαθοκλέους πρὸς πᾶν, ἔτι μᾶλλον δὲ πυνθανόμενος καὶ τὰς ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ταττομένας δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν τοῦ καταλύειν τὴν Ἀγαθοκλέους ὕβριν.
30 (22) οὔσης δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν οἵας εἴρηκα διαλήψεως, ταχέως τὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς αὔξησιν ἔλαβε συνεργούν-

former hatred of the populace for him began to fume again, and all recalled the calamities that these men had brought on the kingdom. But since they had no leader of any weight, through whom to vent their anger on Agathocles and Agathoclea, they kept quiet, their only remaining hope, to which they eagerly clung, being in Tlepolemus. While the king still lived, Tlepolemus attended to his own affairs, but on the death of Ptolemy, after quieting the populace, he became again military governor of the district round Pelusium; and at first he consulted the king's interest in all he did, believing that there would be some council charged with the guardianship of the child and the general control of affairs. But when he saw that all the men worthy of this office had been got rid of, and that Agathocles ventured to assume the reins of government, he very soon changed his attitude, as he was conscious of the danger that menaced him owing to their long-standing enmity, and collecting his forces around him took measures for providing himself with money in order that he might not fall an easy prey to any of his foes. At the same time he did not despair of himself obtaining the guardianship of the child and the direction of affairs, thinking that he was, if his own judgement did not deceive him, more capable in every respect than Agathocles and more especially because he heard that both the troops under his own command and those in Alexandria placed in him their hopes of overthrowing the insolent domination of Agathocles. Such being his opinion of himself, the difference between them became

31 (23) *των ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόθεσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Τληπόλεμος, ἐξιδιάζεσθαι σπεύδων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ ταξιάρχους καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτων ταττομένους, συνῆγε πότους ἐπιμελῶς, καὶ παρὰ τὰς συνουσίας τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πρὸς χάριν λεγόντων αἰκαλλόμενος, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ὁρμῆς, ἅτε*
νέος ὢν καὶ παρὰ τὸν οἶνον γινομένης τῆς ὁμιλίας, ἐρρίπτει λόγους κατὰ τῆς συγγενείας τῆς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς αἰνιγματώδεις, εἶτ' ἀμφιβόλους, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐκφανεῖς καὶ
32 (24) *τὴν πικροτάτην ἔχοντας λοιδορίαν. ἐπεχεῖτο γὰρ τοῦ θρανογράφου καὶ τῆς σαμβυκιστρίας καὶ τῆς κουρίδος, ἔτι δὲ τοῦ παιδαρίου τοῦ πάντα πεποιηκότος καὶ πεπονθότος παρὰ τοὺς πότους, ὅτ'*
33 (25) *ἐῳνοχόει τῷ βασιλεῖ παῖς ὤν. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἀεὶ τῶν συμπαρόντων γελώντων καὶ συμβαλλομένων τι πρὸς τὸν χλευασμόν, ταχέως εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα τὸ πρᾶγμα παρεγενήθη.*
34 (26) *γενομένης δ' ἔχθρας ὁμολογουμένης εὐθέως ὁ Ἀγαθοκλῆς διαβολὴν εἰσῆγε κατὰ τοῦ Τληπολέμου, φάσκων αὐτὸν ἀλλοτριάζειν τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ*
35 *καλεῖν Ἀντίοχον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα. καὶ πολλὰς εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐπόρει πιθανότητας, τὰς μὲν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων παρεκδεχόμενος καὶ διαστρέφων, τὰς δ' ἐκ καταβολῆς πλάττων καὶ*
36 (27) *διασκευάζων. ταῦτα δ' ἐποίει βουλόμενος τὰ πλήθη παροξύνειν κατὰ τοῦ Τληπολέμου· συνέβαινε δὲ τοὐναντίον. πάλαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ προειρημένῳ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχοντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ λίαν*
37 (28) *ἤδέως ἑώρων ἐκκαιομένην τὴν διαφοράν. ἐγένετο δ' ἡ καταρχὴ τοῦ περὶ τὰ πλήθη κινήματος διά τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. Νίκων ὁ συγγενὴς τῶν*

speedily more acute, since both of them contributed to this end. For Tlepolemus, as he was desirous of attaching to himself the commanders, taxiarchs, and inferior officers, entertained them sedulously at banquets; and on these occasions, either flattered by those who wished to make themselves agreeable to him or on his own impulse, since he was young and they were talking over their wine, he would make remarks about the family of Agathocles, at first enigmatical, then of doubtful import, but finally quite outspoken and conveying the most venomous insults. For he used to toast the wall-dauber and the sackbut-girl and the lady-barber, and the young boy who was so complaisant at the drinking-bouts when he was cupbearer to the king in his childhood's days. As his guests always laughed with him and contributed something of their own to his jests, the matter soon reached the ears of Agathocles. Their enmity was now avowed, and Agathocles lost no time in bringing an accusation against Tlepolemus, charging him with disaffection to the king and stating that he was inviting Antiochus to assume the government. He was in no lack of specious grounds for this accusation, some resting on reports of actual facts which he distorted and some being pure inventions of his own. All this he did with the object of working up the populace against Tlepolemus, but it had the contrary result. For as they had for long rested their hopes on Tlepolemus, they were exceedingly glad to see the quarrel becoming more inflamed. The popular movement originated in the following manner. Nicon,

περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα ζῶντος ἔτι τοῦ βασιλέως καθεσταμένος ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ· τότε δὲ τῶν. . .

26[a] (25[b]) Ὅτι Δείνωνα τὸν Δείνωνος ἐπανείλετο Ἀγαθοκλῆς, καὶ τοῦτο ἔπραξε τῶν ἀδίκων ἔργων, ὡς ἡ παροιμία φησί, δικαιότατον· καθ' ὃν μὲν γὰρ καιρόν, τῶν γραμμάτων αὐτῷ προσπεσόντων ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως τῆς Ἀρσινόης, ἐξουσίαν ἔσχε μηνῦσαι τὴν πρᾶξιν καὶ σῶσαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν, τότε δὴ συνεργήσας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Φιλάμμωνα, πάντων ἐγένετο τῶν ἐπιγενομένων κακῶν
2 αἴτιος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ συντελεσθῆναι τὸν φόνον ἀνανεούμενος καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς οἰκτιζόμενος καὶ μεταμελόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ τοιοῦτον καιρὸν παραλιπεῖν δῆλος ἐγένετο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα· διὸ καὶ παραυτίκα τυχὼν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τιμωρίας μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον. . . .

26 Πρώτους δὲ συναθροίσας τοὺς Μακεδόνας, εἰς τούτους εἰσῆλθε μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς
2 Ἀγαθοκλείας. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ὑπεκρίνετο τὸν οὐ δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν ἃ βούλεται διὰ τὸ πλῆθος
3 τῶν ἐπιφερομένων δακρύων· ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονάκις ἀπομάττων τῇ χλαμύδι κατεκράτησε τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς, βαστάσας τὸ παιδίον "Λάβετε" ἔφη "τοῦτον, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἀποθνήσκων εἰς μὲν τὰς ἀγκάλας ἔδωκε ταύτῃ" δείξας τὴν ἀδελφὴν "παρακατέθετο δ' εἰς τὴν ὑμετέραν, ὦ ἄνδρες Μακεδόνες, πίστιν.
4 ἡ μὲν οὖν [καὶ] ταύτης εὔνοια βραχεῖάν τινα ῥοπὴν ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τούτου σωτηρίαν, ἐν ὑμῖν δὲ κεῖται καὶ ταῖς ὑμετέραις χερσὶ τὰ τούτου νυνὶ
5 πράγματα. Τληπόλεμος γὰρ πάλαι μὲν ἦν δῆλος τοῖς ὀρθῶς σκοπουμένοις μειζόνων ἐφιέμενος ἢ καθ' ἑαυτὸν πραγμάτων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν

who was a relative of Agathocles, had been appointed director of naval affairs during the lifetime of Ptolemy, and he now . . .

26[a]. Agathocles also killed Deinon, son of Deinon, and this was, as the saying is, "the justest of his many iniquities." For at the time when dispatches reached Deinon proposing the murder of Arsinoë, it was perfectly in his power to report the criminal project and save the kingdom, but he chose to take the part of Philammon and became thus the cause of all the evils which followed. However, after the murder had been committed, Agathocles found out that he was always recalling his conduct, lamenting it to many people and expressing regret for the chance he had let slip. Therefore he at once met with the punishment he merited and lost his life. . . .

26. Agathocles in the first place summoned a meeting of the Macedonians and appeared together with Agathoclea and the young king. At first he pretended that he could not say what he wished owing to the abundance of the tears that choked him, but after wiping his eyes many times with his chlamys and subduing the outburst, he took the child in his arms and exclaimed, "Take the child whom his father on his death-bed placed in the arms of this woman," pointing to his sister, "and confided to your faith, you soldiers of Macedon. Her affection indeed is of but little moment to ensure his safety, but his fate depends on you and your valour. For it has long been evident to those who judge correctly that Tlepolemus aspires to a position higher than it behoves him to covet, and now he has actually

καὶ τὸν καιρὸν ὥρικεν, ἐν ᾗ μέλλει τὸ διάδημ'
6 ἀναλαμβάνειν." καὶ περὶ τούτων οὐχ αὑτῷ πι-
στεύειν ἐκέλευεν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν
7 καὶ παροῦσι νῦν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. καὶ
τοῦτ' εἰπὼν εἰσῆγε τὸν Κριτόλαον, ὃς ἔφη καὶ τοὺς
βωμοὺς αὐτὸς ἑωρακέναι κατασκευαζομένους καὶ
τὰ θύματα παρὰ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἑτοιμαζόμενα
8 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ διαδήματος ἀνάδειξιν. ὧν οἱ Μακε-
δόνες ἀκούοντες οὐχ οἷον ἠλέουν αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς
οὐδὲν προσεῖχον τῶν λεγομένων, μυχθίζοντες ‹δὲ
καὶ› διαψιθυρίζοντες ἐξελήρησαν οὕτως ὥστε μηδ'
αὐτὸν εἰδέναι [μήτε] πῶς τὸ παράπαν ἐκ τῆς
9 ἐκκλησίας ἀπελύθη. παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἐγί-
νετο καὶ περὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συστήματα κατὰ τοὺς
10 ἐκκλησιασμούς. ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ πολὺς ἦν ὁ
καταπλέων ἐκ τῶν ἄνω στρατοπέδων, καὶ παρ-
εκάλουν οἱ μὲν συγγενεῖς, οἱ δὲ φίλους, βοηθεῖν
τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, καὶ μὴ περιδεῖν σφᾶς ἀνέδην
11 ὑφ' οὕτως ἀναξίων ὑβριζομένους. μάλιστα δὲ παρ-
ώξυνε τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν προεστώτων
τιμωρίαν τὸ γινώσκειν ὅτι τὸ μέλλειν καθ' αὑτῶν
ἐστι διὰ τὸ πάντων τῶν παρακομιζομένων ἐπιτη-
δείων εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν κρατεῖν τοὺς περὶ
27 τὸν Τληπόλεμον. ἐγένετο δέ τι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν
‹τῶν› περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα συνέργημα πρὸς τὸ
τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπιτεῖναι τήν τε τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὴν
2 τοῦ Τληπολέμου· τὴν γὰρ Δανάην, ἥτις ἦν πενθερὰ
τοῦ προειρημένου, λαβόντες ἐκ τοῦ τῆς Δήμητρος
ἱεροῦ καὶ διὰ μέσου τῆς πόλεως ἑλκύσαντες ἀκατα-
κάλυπτον εἰς φυλακὴν ἀπέθεντο, βουλόμενοι φανε-
ρὰν ποιεῖν τὴν πρὸς τὸν Τληπόλεμον διαφοράν.
3 ἐφ' οἷς τὸ πλῆθος ἀγανακτοῦν οὐκέτι κατ' ἰδίαν

fixed the day and hour at which he will assume the diadem." And as to this he told them not to rely on his own word but on that of those who knew the truth and had just come from the very scene of action. After speaking thus he brought forward Critolaus, who told them that he had himself seen the altars being erected and the victims being prepared in presence of the populace for the ceremony of proclaiming the coronation. When the Macedonians heard this, not only did they feel no pity for Agathocles but paid absolutely no attention to his words, and showed such levity by hooting and murmuring to each other that he did not know himself how he got away from the meeting. The same kind of thing took place at the meetings of the other regiments. Meanwhile numbers of men kept on arriving by boat from the garrisons in upper Egypt, and all begged their relatives or friends to help them at the present crisis and not allow them to be thus outrageously tyrannized over by such unworthy persons. The chief incentive to the soldiery to wreak their vengeance on those in power was their knowledge that any delay was prejudicial to themselves, as Tlepolemus controlled the entire supply of provisions reaching Alexandria. 27. There was also one thing done by Agathocles and his party which contributed to exasperate the populace and Tlepolemus. For they took Danaë, who was the latter's mother-in-law, from the temple of Demeter, and dragged her unveiled through the middle of the town and committed her to prison, with the express object of exhibiting their hostility to him. This so irritated the people that they no longer spoke of the matter

οὐδὲ δι' ἀπορρήτων ἐποιεῖτο τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τὰς νύκτας εἰς πάντα τόπον ἐπέγραφον, οἱ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας συστρεφόμενοι κατὰ μέρη φανερῶς ἐξέφερον ἤδη τὸ μῖσος εἰς τοὺς προεστῶτας.

4 Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα βλέποντες τὰ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ μοχθηρὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχοντες περὶ αὑτῶν, τοτὲ μὲν ἐγίνοντο περὶ δρασμόν, οὐδενὸς δ' αὐτοῖς ἡτοιμασμένου πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διὰ τὴν σφετέραν ἀβουλίαν ἀφίσταντο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς·

5 τοτὲ δὲ συνωμότας κατέγραφον καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς τόλμης, ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοὺς μὲν κατασφάξοντες, τοὺς δὲ συλληψόμενοι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τυραννικὴν ἐξουσίαν περιποιησόμενοι.

6 ταῦτα δ' αὐτῶν διανοουμένων προσέπεσε διαβολὴ κατά τινος Μοιραγένους, ἑνὸς τῶν σωματοφυλάκων, διότι μηνύοι πάντα τῷ Τληπολέμῳ καὶ συνεργοίη διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ἀδαῖον οἰκειότητα

7 τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Βουβαστοῦ τότε καθεσταμένον. ὁ δ' Ἀγαθοκλῆς εὐθέως συνέταξε Νικοστράτῳ τῷ πρὸς τοῖς γράμμασι τεταγμένῳ συλλαβόντι τὸν Μοιραγένη φιλοτίμως ἐξετάσαι, πᾶσαν προ-

8 τιθέντα βάσανον. οὗτος μὲν οὖν παραχρῆμα συλληφθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Νικοστράτου καὶ παραχθεὶς εἴς τινα μέρη τῆς αὐλῆς ἀποκεχωρηκότα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξ ὀρθῆς ἀνεκρίνετο περὶ τῶν προσ-

9 πεπτωκότων, πρὸς οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἀνθομολογούμενος ἐξεδύθη· καὶ τινὲς μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὰς βασάνους ὄργανα διεσκεύαζον, οἱ δὲ τὰς μάστιγας ἔχοντες μετὰ χεῖρας . ἀπεδύοντο τὰς

10 χλαμύδας. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον προστρέχει τις τῶν ὑπηρετῶν πρὸς τὸν Νικόστρατον, καὶ ψιθυρίσας πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἅττα δήποτ' οὖν ἀπ-

in private and secretly, but while some expressed their detestation of those in power by scribbling it all over the town at night, others even began to meet openly in groups in the day-time for this purpose.

Agathocles, seeing what was happening and entertaining poor hopes of his own security, began to contemplate flight; but as owing to his own imprudence he had made no preparations for this purpose he desisted from the project, and his next step was to enrol conspirators ready to join in the venture, with a view to putting to death some of his enemies at once and arresting others, after which he could possess himself of tyrannical power. While he was engaged in this project an accusation was brought against a certain Moeragenes, one of the bodyguards, to the effect that he informed Tlepolemus of everything and worked for his cause owing to his relationship with Adaeus, then governor of Bubastus. Agathocles at once gave orders to Nicostratus, his secretary of state, to arrest Moeragenes and examine him diligently, menacing him with every kind of torture. Moeragenes was instantly arrested and conducted to a remote part of the palace, where he was at first questioned directly concerning these rumours, and on his denying every one of the charges was stripped. Some began to get the instruments of torture ready and others with the scourges in their hands were taking off their cloaks, when one of the servants ran up to Nicostratus and after whispering something into his

11 ηλλάττετο μετὰ σπουδῆς. ὁ δὲ Νικόστρατος ἐκ
ποδὸς ἐπηκολούθει τούτῳ, λέγων μὲν οὐδέν,
28 τύπτων δὲ συνεχῶς τὸν μηρόν. περὶ δὲ τὸν
Μοιραγένην ἄφατον ἦν καὶ παράλογον τὸ συμβαῖνον.
2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ μόνον οὐ διατεταμένοι τὰς μάστιγας
παρέστασαν, οἱ δὲ πρὸ ποδῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ πρὸς
3 ἀνάγκας ὄργανα διεσκεύαζον· τοῦ δὲ Νικοστρά-
του παραχωρήσαντος ἔστασαν ἀχανεῖς πάντες,
ἐμβλέποντες ἀλλήλοις, προσδοκῶντες ἀεί ποτε
4 τὸν προειρημένον ἀνακάμψειν. χρόνου δὲ γινο-
μένου κατὰ βραχὺ διέρρεον οἱ παρεστῶτες, τέλος
δ' ὁ Μοιραγένης ἀπελείφθη. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα
διελθὼν τὴν αὐλὴν ἀνελπίστως παρέπεσε γυμνὸς
εἴς τινα σκηνὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων, σύνεγγυς κειμένην
5 τῆς αὐλῆς. καταλαβὼν δὲ κατὰ τύχην ἀριστῶντας
καὶ συνηθροισμένους, ἔλεγε τὰ περὶ αὑτὸν συμ-
6 βεβηκότα καὶ τὸ παράλογον τῆς σωτηρίας. οἱ
δὲ τὰ μὲν ἠπίστουν, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁρῶντες αὐτὸν
7 γυμνὸν ἠναγκάζοντο πιστεύειν. ἐκ δὲ ταύτης
τῆς περιπετείας ὅ τε Μοιραγένης μετὰ δακρύων
ἐδεῖτο τῶν Μακεδόνων μὴ μόνον τῆς αὑτοῦ
συνεπιλαβέσθαι σωτηρίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τοῦ
8 βασιλέως, καὶ μάλιστα τῆς σφῶν αὐτῶν· πρόδηλον
γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τὸν ὄλεθρον, ἐὰν μὴ συνάψωνται
τοῦ καιροῦ, καθ' ὃν ἀκμάζει τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μῖσος
καὶ πᾶς ἕτοιμός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κατ' Ἀγαθοκλέους
9 τιμωρίαν. ἀκμάζειν δὲ νῦν μάλιστ' ἔφη καὶ
29 προσδεῖσθαι τῶν καταρξομένων. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες
ἀκούσαντες τούτων παροξύνονται, καὶ πέρας ἐπεί-
σθησαν τῷ Μοιραγένει, καὶ πρώτας μὲν εὐθέως
ἐπῆσαν τὰς τῶν Μακεδόνων σκηνάς, μετὰ δὲ

ear made off in haste. Nicostratus immediately followed him without saying a word, but striking his thigh with his hand repeatedly. 28. It is difficult to describe the strange situation in which Moeragenes found himself. For some of the executioners stood there with their scourges almost raised to strike him and others were getting the instruments of torture ready before his eyes; but when Nicostratus departed all remained in mute astonishment, looking at each other, and each moment expecting Nicostratus to return; but after a little time had elapsed they gradually dispersed, and Moeragenes was left by himself. After that he was able, much to his surprise, to traverse the palace, and naked as he was rushed into a tent belonging to the Macedonian troops not far from the palace. Finding them by chance assembled there at breakfast he told his story and the extraordinary manner in which he had been delivered. They were disposed to discredit it, but afterwards seeing him naked they were compelled to believe him. Availing himself of this complete change of circumstances, Moeragenes begged the Macedonians with tears not only to help him to save himself, but to save the king also and chiefly themselves. He urged upon them that their destruction was inevitable if they did not avail themselves of the present opportunity, when the hatred of the populace was at its height and everyone was ready to take vengeance on Agathocles. This was just the time, he said, when the feeling was most thoroughly aroused and it only wanted someone to begin. 29. The Macedonians on hearing this were stimulated to action and finally took the advice of Moeragenes, first without delay visiting the Macedonian tents

2 ταῦτα τὰς τῶν ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν· εἰσὶ δ' αὗται
συνεχεῖς, πρὸς ἓν μέρος ἀπονενευκυῖαι τῆς πόλεως.
3 οὔσης δὲ τῆς μὲν ὁρμῆς πάλαι προχείρου τῆς τῶν
πολλῶν, προσδεομένης δὲ τοῦ προκαλεσομένου
μόνον καὶ τολμήσοντος, ἅμα τῷ λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν τὸ
4 πρᾶγμα ταχέως οἷον εἰ πῦρ ἐξέλαμψεν. οὐ γὰρ
ἐγενήθησαν ὧραι τέτταρες καὶ πάντα τὰ γένη
συμπεφωνήκει καὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ καὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ
5 πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν. συνήργησε γὰρ μεγάλα καὶ
ταὐτόματον ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ πρὸς τὴν συν-
6 τέλειαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλῆς, ἀνενεχθείσης πρὸς
αὐτὸν ἐπιστολῆς καὶ κατασκόπων ἐπαναχθέντων,
καὶ τῆς μὲν ἐπιστολῆς γεγραμμένης πρὸς τὰς
δυνάμεις παρὰ τοῦ Πτολεμέου καὶ δηλούσης
ὅτι παρέσται ταχέως, τῶν δὲ κατασκόπων δια-
7 σαφούντων ὅτι πάρεστιν, οὕτως ἐξέστη τῶν φρενῶν
ὥστ' ἀφέμενος τοῦ πράττειν τι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι
περὶ τῶν προσπεπτωκότων ἀπῆλθε κατὰ τὸν
εἰθισμένον καιρὸν εἰς τὸν πότον, κἀκεῖ κατὰ τὴν
8 εἰθισμένην ἀγωγὴν ἐπετέλει τὴν συνουσίαν. ἡ δ'
Οἰνάνθη περικακοῦσα παρῆν εἰς τὸ Θεσμοφορεῖον,
ἀνεῳγμένου τοῦ νεὼ διά τινα θυσίαν ἐπέτειον.
9 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐλιπάρει γονυπετοῦσα καὶ
μαγγανεύουσα πρὸς τὰς θεάς, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
καθίσασα πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν εἶχε τὴν ἡσυχίαν.
10 αἱ μὲν οὖν πολλαὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἡδέως ὁρῶσαι
τὴν δυσθυμίαν καὶ περικάκησιν αὐτῆς, ἀπεσιώπων·
αἱ δὲ τοῦ Πολυκράτους συγγενεῖς καί τινες ἕτεραι
τῶν ἐνδόξων, ἀδήλου τῆς περιστάσεως αὐταῖς
ἀκμὴν ὑπαρχούσης, προσελθοῦσαι παρεμυθοῦντο
11 τὴν Οἰνάνθην. ἡ δ' ἀναβοήσασα μεγάλῃ τῇ
φωνῇ "μή μοι πρόσιτέ" φησι "θηρία· καλῶς

and then those of the other soldiers, which are all close together, and turned towards a single part of the city. As the people had long been disposed to revolt and required only some man of courage to appeal to them, once the movement began it spread like wildfire. Four hours had scarcely elapsed when men of all nationalities, both soldiers and civilians, had agreed to attack the government. Chance too co-operated much at this time to the accomplishment of their aim. For Agathocles, when a letter reached his hands, and some spies were brought before him, and when the letter proved to be one addressed by Tlepolemus to the troops announcing that he was on the point of coming, and the spies reported that he had actually arrived, so entirely lost his head that, neglecting to take any action or to consider the news he had received, he went to carouse at his usual hour and conducted himself at the banquet in his usual manner. Oenanthe, who was in great distress, betook herself to the Thesmophoreum, that temple being open for an annual sacrifice. She first of all fell on her knees and with many gestures prayed fervently to the goddesses, and afterwards seated herself by the altar and held her peace. Most of the women, pleased to see her so dejected and distressed, remained silent, but the relatives of Polycrates and some other noble ladies, who were not yet aware of the danger, came up to her to console her. "Come not near me, you beasts," she cried aloud to them,

γὰρ ὑμᾶς γινώσκω, διότι καὶ φρονεῖθ' ἡμῖν ἐναντία καὶ ταῖς θεαῖς εὔχεσθε τὰ δυσχερέστατα καθ'
12 ἡμῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔτι πέποιθα τῶν θεῶν βουλο-
13 μένων γεύσειν ὑμᾶς τῶν ἰδίων τέκνων." καὶ ταῦτ' εἰποῦσα ταῖς ῥαβδούχοις ἀνείργειν προσ-
14 έταξε καὶ παίειν τὰς μὴ πειθαρχούσας. αἱ δ' ἐπιλαβόμεναι τῆς προφάσεως ταύτης ἀπηλλάττοντο πᾶσαι, τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνίσχουσαι τὰς χεῖρας καὶ καταρώμεναι λαβεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκείνην πεῖραν τούτων, ἃ κατὰ τῶν πέλας ἐπανετείνετο πράξειν.

30 Ἤδη δὲ κεκριμένου τοῦ καινοτομεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐπιγενομένης καθ' ἑκάστην οἰκίαν καὶ τῆς ἐκ
2 τῶν γυναικῶν ὀργῆς διπλάσιον ἐξεκαύθη τὸ μῖσος. ἅμα δὲ τῷ μεταλαβεῖν τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς πᾶσα πλήρης
3 ἦν ἡ πόλις θορύβου καὶ φώτων καὶ διαδρομῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἠθροίζοντο μετὰ κραυγῆς, οἱ δὲ παρεκάλουν ἀλλήλους, οἱ δὲ κατεδύοντο διαδιδράσκοντες εἰς ἀνυπονοήτους οἰκίας καὶ τόπους·
4 ἤδη δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν εὐρυχωριῶν καὶ τοῦ σταδίου καὶ τῆς πλατείας πλήρους ὑπαρχούσης ὄχλου παντοδαποῦ καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ Διονυσιακὸν
5 θέατρον προστασίας, πυθόμενος τὸ συμβαῖνον Ἀγαθοκλῆς ἐξηγέρθη μεθύων, ἄρτι καταλελυκὼς τὸν πότον, καὶ παραλαβὼν τοὺς συγγενεῖς πάντας
6 πλὴν Φίλωνος ἦκε πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. καὶ βραχέα πρὸς τοῦτον οἰκτισάμενος καὶ λαβόμενος αὐτοῦ τῆς χειρός, ἀνέβαινεν εἰς τὴν σύριγγα τὴν μεταξὺ τοῦ Μαιάνδρου καὶ τῆς παλαίστρας κειμένην καὶ
7 φέρουσαν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου πάροδον. μετὰ

" I know well that you bear us ill-will and that you pray to the goddesses that the worst may befall us, but yet I trust that, if it be the will of heaven, I shall yet make you taste the flesh of your own children." After saying this she bade her lictors drive them away from her and strike those who refused to leave. Availing themselves of this pretext all the ladies withdrew, holding up their hands to the goddesses and praying that she might be cursed with the fate that she threatened to bring on others.

30. The men had already decided on a revolution, but now that in each house the rage of the women was added to their own, the hatred of the usurper blazed up twice as violent. When day again gave place to night, the whole town was full of disturbance and torches and movement. For some collected in the stadium shouting, some were encouraging each other, others running in different directions took refuge in houses and places not likely to be suspected. The open spaces round the palace, the stadium, and the great square were now filled by a mixed multitude, including all the crowd of supernumerary performers in the theatre of Dionysius,[a] and Agathocles, when he heard what was occurring, aroused himself from his drunken slumber, having broken up the banquet a short time previously, and taking all his relatives except Philo went to the king. After lamenting his ill-fortune to the boy in a few words he took him by the hand and went up to the gallery between the Maeander and the palaestra leading to the entrance to the theatre.

[a] This I believe to be the meaning of *προστασία*. It has been rendered "precincts," but owing to the position of the clause it cannot be local.

δὲ ταῦτα, δύο θύρας ἀσφαλισάμενος τὰς πρώτας, εἰς τὴν τρίτην ἀνεχώρησε μετὰ δυεῖν ἢ τριῶν σωματοφυλάκων καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ
8 συγγενείας. συνέβαινε δὲ τὰς θύρας εἶναι δικτυωτὰς διαφανεῖς, ἀποκλειομένας δὲ διττοῖς μοχλοῖς, κατὰ
9 δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἠθροισμένου τοῦ πλήθους ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐπιπέδους τόπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ βάθρα καὶ τὰ τέγη καταγέμειν ἀνθρώπων, ἐγίνετο βοὴ καὶ κραυγὴ σύμμικτος, ὡς ἂν γυναικῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ παίδων ἀνδράσιν �ανα-
10 μεμιγμένων· οὐ γὰρ ἐλάττω ποιεῖ τὰ παιδάρια τῶν ἀνδρῶν περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ταραχὰς ἔν τε τῇ Καρχηδονίων πόλει καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν.

31 Ἤδη δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ὑποφαινούσης ἦν μὲν ἄκριτος ἡ κραυγή, μάλιστα δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐξέλαμψε τὸ
2 καλεῖν τὸν βασιλέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐξαναστάντες κατελάβοντο τὸν χρηματι-
3 στικὸν πυλῶνα τῶν βασιλείων· μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον ἐπιγνόντες ποῦ τῆς αὐλῆς ‹ἦν› ὁ βασιλεύς, περιελθόντες τὰς μὲν πρώτας τῆς [πρώτης] σύριγγος ἐξέβαλον θύρας, ἐγγίσαντες δὲ τῆς
4 δευτέρας ἠτοῦντο τὸν παῖδα μετὰ κραυγῆς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα, βλέποντες ἤδη τὰ καθ' αὑτούς, ἐδέοντο τῶν σωματοφυλάκων πρεσβεῦσαι περὶ αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνας, δηλοῦντας ὅτι τῆς ἐπιτροπείας ἐκχωροῦσι καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἐξ-
ουσίας καὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν χορηγίων ὧν
5 ἔχουσι πάντων, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ πνευμάτιον δέονται συγχωρηθῆναι σφίσι μετὰ τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς, ἵνα χωρήσαντες εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διάθεσιν μηδὲ
6 βουληθέντες ἔτι δύνωνται λυπεῖν μηδένα. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων σωματοφυλάκων οὐδεὶς ὑπήκουσεν,

After this, having made fast the first two doors, he retired to the third with a few of the bodyguard, the king, and his own relatives. The doors were of open lattice-work and one could see through them, and they were each secured by two bolts. Meanwhile the populace were assembling from every part of the city, so that not only level spaces but the roofs and steps were full of people, and there was a confused hubbub and clamour, women and children being mixed with the men. For in Carthage and also in Alexandria the children play no less a part in such tumults than the men.

31. When the day began to break it was difficult to distinguish the various cries, but that of "Bring the king" predominated. At first the Macedonians got up and seized the gate of audience of the palace, but shortly after, when they discovered in what part of the building the king was, they went round and after taking the first door of the gallery off its hinges approached the second and clamoured loudly for the king. Agathocles was looking now to his own safety and begged the bodyguards to convey a message on his behalf to the Macedonians, stating that he abandoned the office of regent and all his powers and dignities as well as all his revenue, and begged simply for his poor life and a sufficient supply of food, so that retiring into his original obscurity he could not in future, even if he wished it, hurt anyone. None of the other bodyguards consented,

Ἀριστομένης δὲ μόνος ὑπέστη τὴν χρείαν ταύτην ὁ
μετά τινα χρόνον ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων γενόμενος.
7 ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ οὗτος τὸ μὲν γένος ἦν Ἀκαρνάν, καθ'
ὅσον δὲ προβαίνων κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, γενόμενος
κύριος τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων, κάλλιστα καὶ σεμνό-
τατα δοκεῖ προστῆναι τοῦ τε βασιλέως καὶ τῆς βα-
σιλείας, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κεκολακευκέναι τὴν Ἀγαθο-
8 κλέους εὐκαιρίαν. πρῶτος μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ
δεῖπνον καλέσας τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα χρυσοῦν στέφανον
ἀνέδωκε μόνῳ τῶν παρόντων, ὃ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν
9 αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐστὶ μόνοις συγχωρεῖσθαι, πρῶτος δὲ
τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ προειρημένου φέρειν ἐτόλμησεν ἐν
τῷ δακτυλίῳ· γενομένης δὲ θυγατρὸς αὐτῷ ταύτην
10 Ἀγαθόκλειαν προσηγόρευσεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ὑπὲρ μὲν
τούτων ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα· λαβὼν δὲ τὰς
προειρημένας ἐντολὰς καὶ διά τινος ῥινοπύλης ἐξ-
11 ελθών, ἦκε πρὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνας. βραχέα δ' αὐτοῦ
διαλεχθέντος καὶ δηλώσαντος τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἐπ-
εβάλοντο μὲν οἱ Μακεδόνες παραχρῆμα συγκεντῆσαι,
ταχὺ δέ τινων ὑπερεχόντων αὐτοῦ τὰς χεῖρας καὶ
παραιτησαμένων τοὺς πολλούς, ἐπανῆλθε λαβὼν ἐν-
τολὴν ἢ τὸν βασιλέα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἄγονθ' ἥκειν ἢ
12 μηδ' αὐτὸν ἐξιέναι. τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀριστομένην ταῦτ'
εἰπόντες οἱ Μακεδόνες ἀπέπεμψαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ταῖς
δευτέραις θύραις ἐγγίσαντες ἐξέωσαν καὶ ταύτας.
13 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν
Μακεδόνων βίαν διά τε τῶν ἐνεργουμένων καὶ διὰ
τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο διὰ τῆς
θύρας προτείναντες τὰς χεῖρας, ἡ δ' Ἀγαθόκλεια
καὶ τοὺς μασθούς, οἷς ἔφη θρέψαι τὸν βασιλέα,
δεῖσθαι τῶν Μακεδόνων, πᾶσαν προϊέμενοι φωνὴν
32 πρὸς τὸ περιποιήσασθαι τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον· ἐπεὶ

but Aristomenes alone, who afterwards became minister, undertook this service. He was by birth an Acarnanian, and the adulation he had paid to Agathocles in the season of his prosperity was no less conspicuous than his admirable and scrupulous fidelity to the interests of the king and his kingdom when later in life he was at the head of affairs. For he was the first who having invited Agathocles to dinner presented to him alone among the guests a crown of gold, an honour which is customarily paid only to the king, and he was the first who ventured to wear a ring with Agathocles' portrait engraved on it, and when a daughter was born to him he actually called her Agathoclea. Perhaps regarding his character I have said enough ; but now when he had received Agathocles' commission he went out by a wicket-gate to the Macedonians. After he had said a few words to them and explained the proposal, the Macedonians at once attempted to run him through, but when some few persons held their hands over him and begged them to spare him, he went back with orders either to return to them bringing the king or not to come out at all. Aristomenes, then, was sent back by the Macedonians with this message, and they themselves came up to the second door and broke it in also. Agathocles and his people, seeing the violence of the Macedonians both by their actions and their determined demand, at first attempted to entreat the soldiers, leaving no word unspoken that might move them to spare their lives at least, Agathocles putting out his hands through the door and Agathoclea her breasts with which she said she had suckled the king. 32. When bitterly

δὲ πολλὰ κατολοφυρόμενοι τὴν αὑτῶν τύχην οὐδὲν
ἧττον, τέλος ἐξέπεμψαν τὸν παῖδα μετὰ τῶν σωμα-
2 τοφυλάκων. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες, παραλαβόντες τὸν
βασιλέα καὶ ταχέως ἐφ' ἵππον ἀναβιβάσαντες, ἦγον
3 εἰς τὸ στάδιον. ἅμα δὲ τῷ φανῆναι μεγάλης κραυγῆς
καὶ κρότου γενηθέντος, ἐπιστήσαντες τὸν ἵππον
καθεῖλον τὸν παῖδα καὶ προαγαγόντες ἐκάθισαν
4 εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν θέαν. περὶ δὲ τοὺς ὄχλους ἐγέ-
νετό τις ἅμα χαρὰ καὶ λύπη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν περι-
χαρεῖς ἐπὶ τῷ κεκομίσθαι τὸν παῖδα, τὰ δὲ πάλιν
δυσηρέστουν τῷ μὴ συνειλῆφθαι τοὺς αἰτίους μηδὲ
5 τυγχάνειν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τιμωρίας. διὸ καὶ συν-
εχῶς ἐβόων, ἄγειν κελεύοντες καὶ παραδειγματίζειν
6 τοὺς πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίους. ἤδη δὲ τῆς ἡμέ-
ρας προβαινούσης, καὶ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπ' οὐδένα
δυναμένου πέρας ἀπερείσασθαι τὴν ὁρμήν, Σωσί-
βιος, ὃς ἦν μὲν υἱὸς Σωσιβίου, τότε δὲ σωματο-
φύλαξ ὑπάρχων μάλιστα τὸν νοῦν προσεῖχε τῷ τε
7 βασιλεῖ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι, θεωρῶν τήν τε τοῦ
πλήθους ὁρμὴν ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν καὶ τὸ παιδίον
δυσχρηστούμενον διά τε τὴν τῶν παρεστώτων ἀσυνή-
θειαν καὶ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὄχλον ταραχήν, ἐπύθετο
τοῦ βασιλέως εἰ παραδώσει τοῖς πολλοῖς τοὺς εἰς
8 αὐτὸν ἢ τὴν μητέρα τι πεπλημμεληκότας. τοῦ δὲ
κατανεύσαντος, τῶν μὲν σωματοφυλάκων τισὶν εἶπε
δηλῶσαι τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως γνώμην, τὸ δὲ παιδίον
ἀναστήσας ἀπῆγε πρὸς τὴν θεραπείαν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν
9 οἰκίαν, σύνεγγυς οὖσαν. τῶν δὲ διασαφούντων τὰ
παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως, κατερρήγνυτο πᾶς ὁ τόπος ὑπὸ
10 τοῦ κρότου καὶ τῆς κραυγῆς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀγα-
θοκλέα καὶ τὴν Ἀγαθόκλειαν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ
διεχωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων εἰς τὰς ἰδίας καταλύσεις.

bewailing their evil fate they found all was useless, they sent out the boy with the bodyguard. The Macedonians then took the king and at once setting him on a horse conducted him to the stadium. His appearance was greeted with loud cheers and clapping of hands, and they now stopped the horse, took him off, and leading him forward placed him in the royal seat. The joy of the crowd was mingled with regret, for on the one hand they were delighted at having the boy in their hands, but on the other they were displeased that the guilty persons had not been arrested and punished as they deserved. So that they continued to shout, demanding that those who had caused all the evil should be taken into custody and made an example. The day had now advanced, and as the people after all could find no one on whom to vent their resentment, Sosibius, who was the son of Sosibius and at the present time, being a member of the bodyguard, particularly devoted his attention to the king and to affairs of state, seeing that there was no hope of appeasing the fury of the populace and that the boy was ill at ease, finding himself among strangers and amidst all the commotion of the mob, asked the king if he would give up to the people those who were in any way guilty of offences to himself or his mother. When the boy nodded his head in assent Sosibius bade some of the bodyguard communicate the royal decision, and making the boy get up led him away to join his household at his own house which was quite near. When the king's consent was announced, there was a deafening outburst of cheering and applause all through the stadium. Meanwhile Agathocles and Agathoclea had separated and each

11 ταχὺ δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τινες, οἱ μὲν ἐθελοντήν, οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐξωθούμενοι, <παρ>ώρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητεῖν τοὺς προειρημένους.

33 Τοῦ δὲ ποιεῖν αἷμα καὶ φόνους ἐγένετό τις ἐκ
2 ταὐτομάτου καταρχὴ τοιαύτη. τῶν γὰρ Ἀγαθοκλέους ὑπηρετῶν καὶ κολάκων τις ὄνομα Φίλων ἐξῆλθε
3 κραιπαλῶν εἰς τὸ στάδιον. οὗτος θεωρῶν τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν ὄχλων εἶπε πρὸς τοὺς παρεστῶτας ὅτι πάλιν αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ πρώην, ἐὰν Ἀγαθοκλῆς
4 ἐξέλθῃ, μεταμελήσει. τῶν δ' ἀκουσάντων οἱ μὲν ἀπελοιδόρουν αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ προύθουν. ἐπιβαλομένου δ' ἀμύνεσθαι ταχέως οἱ μὲν τὴν χλαμύδα περιέρρηξαν, οἱ δὲ τὰς λόγχας προσερείσαντες ἐξεκέντησαν.
5 ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοῦτον εἰς τὸ μέσον ἑλκυσθῆναι μεθ' ὕβρεως ἔτι σπαίροντα, καὶ γεύσασθαι τὰ πλήθη φόνου, πάντες ἐκαραδόκουν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων παρ-
6 ουσίαν. μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ παρῆν ἀγόμενος πρῶτος Ἀγαθοκλῆς δέσμιος· ὃν εὐθέως εἰσιόντα προσδραμόντες τινὲς ἄφνω συνεκέντησαν, ἔργον ποιοῦντες οὐκ ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλ' εὐνοούντων· αἴτιοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς·
7 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον ἤχθη Νίκων, εἶτ' Ἀγαθόκλεια γυμνὴ σὺν ταῖς ἀδελφαῖς, ἑξῆς δὲ τούτοις πάντες οἱ συγ-
8 γενεῖς. ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεσμοφορείου τὴν Οἰνάνθην ἀποσπάσαντες ἦκον εἰς τὸ στάδιον, ἄγοντες
9 γυμνὴν ἐφ' ἵππου. παραδοθέντων δὲ πάντων ὁμοῦ τοῖς ὄχλοις, οἱ μὲν ἔδακνον, οἱ δ' ἐκέντουν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐξέκοπτον· ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ πεσόντος τὰ μέλη διέσπων, ἕως ὅτου κατελώβησαν πάντας αὐ-
10 τούς· δεινὴ γάρ τις ἡ περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ὠμότης

retired to their own residence, and very soon a certain number of soldiers, some on their own initiative and others forced to go by the crowd, set off in search of both.

33. The bloodshed and murders which followed were due to the following incident. Philo, one of Agathocles' attendants and parasites, came out into the stadium suffering from the effects of drink. When he observed the popular excitement, he said to those next him, that if Agathocles came out they would have cause to repent again as they had done some days before. Upon hearing this they began some of them to revile and others to hustle him, and when he attempted to defend himself some very soon tore off his cloak and others levelling their spears at him transpierced him. Then as soon as he was ignominiously dragged still breathing into the middle of the stadium and the people had tasted blood, they all eagerly awaited the arrival of the others. It was not long before Agathocles was led in in fetters, and as soon as he entered some people ran up and at once stabbed him, an act of benevolence rather than of enmity, for they thus saved him from suffering the fate he deserved. Next Nico was brought there and after him Agathoclea stripped naked with her sisters and then all her relatives. Last of all they dragged Oenanthe from the Thesmophorium and led her to the stadium naked on horseback. All of them were delivered into the hands of the mob, and now some began to bite them with their teeth, some to stab them and others to dig out their eyes. Whenever one of them fell they tore the body limb from limb until they had thus mutilated them all. For terrible is the cruelty of the

11 γίνεται τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον σύντροφοι τῆς Ἀρσινόης γεγεννημέναι τινὲς παιδίσκαι, πυθόμεναι παραγεγονέναι τὸν Φιλάμμωνα τριταῖον ἀπὸ Κυρήνης τὸν ἐπιστάντα τῷ φόνῳ τῆς βασιλίσσης, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὴν
12 οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ βιασάμεναι τὸν μὲν Φιλάμμωνα τύπτουσαι τοῖς λίθοις καὶ τοῖς ξύλοις ἀπέκτειναν, τὸν δ' υἱὸν ἀπέπνιξαν, ἀντίπαιδα τὴν ἡλικίαν ὄντα, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ Φιλάμμωνος γυμνὴν εἰς τὴν πλατεῖαν ἐξέλκουσαι διέφθειραν.

13 Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ τὴν Ἀγαθόκλειαν καὶ τοὺς τούτων συγγενεῖς τοιοῦτον ἔσχε
34 τὸ τέλος. ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μὲν τὰς τερατείας καὶ διασκευάς, αἷς κέχρηνται πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τῶν ἀκουόντων ἔνιοι τῶν γεγραφότων τὰς πράξεις ταύτας, πλείω τὸν ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον διατιθέμενοι τοῦ
2 συνέχοντος τὰ πράγματα καὶ κυρίου, τινὲς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τύχην ἀναφέροντες τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τιθέντες ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν τὸ ταύτης ἀβέβαιον καὶ δυσφύλακτον, οἱ δὲ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν συμβεβηκότων ὑπὸ λόγον ἄγοντες, πειρώμενοι τοῖς γεγονόσιν αἰτίας καὶ πι-
3 θανότητας ὑποτάττειν. οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε προεθέμην τούτῳ χρήσασθαι τῷ χειρισμῷ περὶ τῶν προειρημένων διὰ τὸ μήτε πολεμικὴν τόλμαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐπίσημον γεγονέναι περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα μήτε χει-
4 ρισμὸν πραγμάτων ἐπιτυχῆ καὶ ζηλωτὸν μήτε τὸ τελευταῖον τὴν αὐλικὴν ἀγχίνοιαν καὶ κακοπραγμοσύνην διαφέρουσαν, ἐν ᾗ Σωσίβιος καὶ πλείους ἕτεροι κατεβίωσαν, βασιλεῖς ἐκ βασιλέων μεταχειριζόμενοι, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτοις συμβεβηκέναι περὶ
5 τὸν προειρημένον ἄνδρα. προαγωγῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔτυχε παραδόξου διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φιλοπάτορος ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ

Egyptians when their anger is aroused. At the same time some young girls who had been Arsinoë's close companions, hearing that Philammon, who had directed the queen's murder, had arrived from Cyrene three days before, rushed to his house and forcing an entrance killed Philammon with clubs and stones ; strangled his son who was no longer a child, and dragging out his wife naked into the square slew her.

Such was the end of Agathocles, Agathoclea, and their kindred. 34. I am not unaware that some authors in describing these events have introduced the sensational element and worked up their material with the object of making the whole more striking to their readers, largely transgressing the bounds of what is essential to give coherence to their narrative. Some of them attribute all to Fortune, and lay stress on her instability and on men's incapacity of evading her, while others take count of the strangeness of all that happened, attempting to assign reasons or probable causes to everything. It was, however not my own object to treat these matters in that manner, inasmuch as Agathocles displayed neither courage in war nor conspicuous ability, nor was he fortunate and exemplary in his management of affairs, nor, finally, had he that acuteness and mischievous address which serve a courtier's ends and which made Sosibius and several others so successful until the end of their lives in their management of king after king. On the contrary it was quite different with Agathocles. Owing to Philopator's incapacity as a ruler he attained an

6 βασιλεύειν· τυχὼν δὲ ταύτης καὶ παραλαβὼν εὐ-
φυέστατον καιρὸν μετὰ τὸν ἐκείνου θάνατον πρὸς
τὸ συντηρῆσαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ἅμα τὰ πράγματα καὶ
τὸ ζῆν ἀπέβαλε διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀνανδρίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυ-
μίαν, ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ καταγνωσθείς.

35 Διόπερ οὐ χρὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις προσάπτειν τὸν
ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον, καθάπερ εἶπα, τῷ δ' Ἀγαθο-
κλεῖ καὶ Διονυσίῳ τοῖς Σικελιώταις καί τισιν ἑτέ-
ροις τῶν ἐν πράγμασιν ἐπ' ὀνόματος γεγονότων.
2 ἐκείνων γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἕτερος ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς
ὑποθέσεως ὁρμηθείς, ὁ δ' Ἀγαθοκλῆς, ὡς ὁ Τίμαιος
ἐπισκώπτων φησί, κεραμεὺς ὑπάρχων καὶ κατα-
λιπὼν τὸν τροχὸν ‹καὶ τὸν› πηλὸν καὶ τὸν καπνόν,
3 ἦκε νέος ὢν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶ-
τον ἐγενήθησαν ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τοὺς ἰδίους καιροὺς
τύραννοι Συρακουσῶν, πόλεως τῆς μέγιστον ἀξίωμα
4 τότε καὶ μέγιστον πλοῦτον περιποιησαμένης, μετὰ
δὲ ταῦτα βασιλεῖς ἁπάσης Σικελίας νομισθέντες καί
5 τινων καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας μερῶν κυριεύσαντες. Ἀγα-
θοκλῆς δ' οὐ μόνον καὶ τῶν τῆς Λιβύης ἀπεπείρα-
σεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τέλος ἐναπέθανε ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ταύ-
6 ταις. διὸ καὶ Πόπλιον Σκιπίωνά φασι τὸν πρῶτον
καταπολεμήσαντα Καρχηδονίους ἐρωτηθέντα τίνας
ὑπολαμβάνει πραγματικωτάτους ἄνδρας γεγονέναι
καὶ σὺν νῷ τολμηροτάτους, εἰπεῖν τοὺς περὶ Ἀγα-
7 θοκλέα καὶ Διονύσιον τοὺς Σικελιώτας. καὶ περὶ
μὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν εἰς ἐπίστασιν ἄγειν τοὺς
ἀναγινώσκοντας, καί που καὶ τῆς τύχης ποιήσασθαι
μνήμην, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, καὶ
καθόλου προστιθέναι τὸν ἐπεκδιδάσκοντα λόγον, ἐπὶ
δὲ τῶν προειρημένων ἀνδρῶν οὐδαμῶς ἁρμόζει.

exceptionally high position; and in this position finding himself after that king's death most favourably circumstanced to maintain his power, he lost both his control and his life through his own cowardice and indolence, becoming an object of universal reprobation in quite a short time.

35. It is not therefore advisable, as I said, to deal at excessive length with the fate of such a man, but it is otherwise with the Sicilian Agathocles and Dionysius and certain other rulers of renown. Of these two, the latter started from an obscure and humble position, and Agathocles, as Timaeus ridiculing him tells us, was a potter and leaving his wheel and the clay and the smoke came to Syracuse as a young man. In the first place they both of them became in their time tyrants of Syracuse, a city which then ranked highest in opulence and dignity, and they were afterwards recognized as kings of the whole of Sicily and had made themselves masters even of some parts of Italy. And Agathocles not only made an attempt to conquer Africa but retained his exalted position until his death. So that they say that Publius Scipio, who was the first to bring Carthage to her knees, when some one asked him whom he thought the greatest statesmen combining courage and wisdom, replied "Agathocles and Dionysius the Sicilians." To the careers of such men indeed it is proper for us to direct the attention of our readers, touching a little on the vicissitudes of fortune and the uncertainty of human affairs, and in general adding to our bare narrative some instructive reflections, but we are by no means called on to do so in the case of the Egyptian Agathocles.

36 Διὰ δὴ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας τὸν μετ' αὐξήσεως
2 λόγον ἀπεδοκιμάσαμεν ὑπὲρ Ἀγαθοκλέους, οὐχ ἥκι-
στα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἐκπληκτικὰς περιπε-
τείας μίαν ἔχειν φαντασίαν τὴν πρώτην ἀξίαν ἐπι-
στάσεως, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν οὐ μόνον ἀνωφελῆ γίνεσθαι
τὴν ἀκρόασιν καὶ θέαν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετά τινος
ὀχλήσεως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῶν τοιούτων.
3 δυεῖν ⟨γὰρ⟩ ὑπαρχόντων τελῶν, ὠφελείας καὶ τέρ-
ψεως, πρὸς ἃ δεῖ τὴν ἀναφορὰν ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς διὰ
τῆς ἀκοῆς ἢ διὰ τῆς ὁράσεως βουλομένους τι πολυ-
πραγμονεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας γένει
τούτου καθήκοντος, ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ὁ πλεονασμὸς
ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκπληκτικῶν συμπτωμάτων ἐκτὸς πίπτει.
4 ζηλοῦν μὲν γὰρ τίς ἂν βουληθείη τὰς παραλόγους
περιπετείας; οὐδὲ μὴν θεώμενος οὐδ' ἀκούων ἥδεται
συνεχῶς οὐδεὶς τῶν παρὰ φύσιν γενομένων πραγ-
μάτων καὶ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν ἔννοιαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
5 ἀλλ' εἰσάπαξ μὲν καὶ πρῶτον σπουδάζομεν ἃ μὲν
ἰδεῖν, ἃ δ' ἀκοῦσαι, χάριν τοῦ γνῶναι τὸ μὴ δοκοῦν
6 δυνατὸν εἶναι διότι δυνατόν ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ πιστεύ-
ωμεν, οὐδεὶς τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἐγχρονίζων εὐδοκεῖ·
τῷ δ' αὐτῷ πλεονάκις ἐγκυρεῖν οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν βου-
7 ληθείη. διόπερ ἢ ζηλωτὸν εἶναι δεῖ τὸ λεγόμενον
ἢ τερπνόν· ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐκτὸς τούτων συμφορᾶς πλεο-
νασμὸς οἰκειότερόν ἐστι τραγῳδίας ἥπερ ἱστορίας.
8 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι συγγνώμην ἔχειν τοῖς μὴ
συνεφιστάνουσι μήτ' ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μήτ' ἐπὶ
9 τὰ καθόλου κατὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα· δοκεῖ
γὰρ αὐτοῖς ταῦτ' εἶναι μέγιστα καὶ θαυμαστότατα
τῶν προγεγονότων οἷς ἂν αὐτοὶ παρατυχόντες ἐγ-
κυρήσωσιν ἢ πυθόμενοι παρά τινων πρὸς αὐτὰ

36. For these reasons I refrained from enlarging on the story of this man, and no less because all sensational occurrences are worthy of attention only when first presented to our view, but afterwards it is not only unprofitable to read about them and keep our eyes on them but such an exercise of our faculties produces a certain disgust. For since there are two objects, improvement and pleasure, which those who wish to study any subject either by the use of their ears or of their eyes, should keep before them, and since this is especially true of the study of history, a too generous treatment of sensational events contributes to neither. For not only do abnormal reversals of fortune arouse no emulation, but no one has any permanent pleasure in seeing or reading of things which are contrary to nature and contrary to the general sentiment of mankind. It is true we are interested in seeing or hearing of them once for all and at first, just for the sake of observing that what seemed to be impossible is possible, but once we are convinced of this no one takes any pleasure in dwelling on the unnatural, and there is none who would have the least wish to meet with frequent references to the same event of this class. Therefore what is told us should either excite admiration or cause pleasure, and the elaborate treatment of an event which does neither is suitable rather to tragedy than to history. Possibly we must excuse writers who do not draw their readers' attention to such matters as are natural or generally happen in the world. For they think that among past events the greatest and most wonderful are those which they have met in their personal experience or which particularly arrested their attention when they heard of them

10 ταῦτα προσέχωσι τὸν νοῦν. διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσι πλείω τοῦ καθήκοντος διατιθέμενοι λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν μήτε καινῶν ὄντων διὰ τὸ καὶ ἑτέροις πρότερον εἰρῆσθαι μήτ' ὠφελεῖν μήτε τέρπειν δυναμένων.
11 περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω.

IV. Res Asiae

37 Ὅτι Ἀντίοχος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐδόκει κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς γεγονέναι μεγαλεπίβολος καὶ τολμηρὸς καὶ
2 τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐξεργαστικός, προβαίνων δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐφάνη πολὺ καταδεέστερος αὑτοῦ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς προσδοκίας.

from witnesses. So that unconsciously they devote too much space to matters which neither are novel, others having spoken of them before, nor are able to benefit or to please us. I have now said enough on this subject.

IV. Affairs of Asia

Character of Antiochus

37. King Antiochus seems to have been at first a man who both conceived great projects and possessed courage and the capability of executing his designs, but as he advanced in life he showed himself much inferior to his former self and disappointed general expectation.

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